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Abstract
The thesis charts the development of vegetation science from its
beginnings. In the first chapter, particular attention is given to
the work of Alexander von Humboldt and to the genesis of the idea
that vegetation exists in natural units. A tradition of Humboldtian
plant geography is traced to the end of the nineteenth century and
the birth of self-conscious plant ecology. The second chapter
follows the development of different notions of the plant association,
and different forms of scientific practice,by F.E. Clements in
Nebraska and J. Braun-Blanquet in Montpelier. Chapter Three describes
the career of Henry Allan Gleason and follows the development of
his individualistic concept of the plant association. Chapter Four
examines the work of J.T. Curtis and R.H. Whittaker which revived
the individualistic hypothesis and established it as dominant in
the English-speaking world. The changing character of the
scientific practice of plant ecology is correlated with interests,
both internal and external to the discipline. A short coda indicates
that debate over the nature of vegetation continues.
The thesis is narrative history, written throughout from a
social and relativistic perspective.
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In recent years the science of ecology has gained a fresh
prominence. The knowledge of the natural world which ecology
generates has become newly conspicuous in a wide cultural context,
playing a prominent role in current debates as to the character of
the natural world. Ecological knowledge is brought to bear on such
problematic matters as the limits Nature sets upon Man's actions
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and the appropriate models for human behaviour. Ecology today, one
might maintain, has as central a role in the controversy over how
Nature is best thought of as Darwinism had in the latter half of
the nineteenth century. Yet the history of ecology, the development
of its present character, has so far received little attention from
historians and sociologists of science. No adequate histories of
the discipline exist. In Donald Worster's vivid and suitably
Western simile, ecology "is like a stranger who has just blown into
2
town, a presence without a past."
This scholarly neglect is to be deprecated. Even setting aside
the cultural importance of ecology as a source of environmental
imagery and rhetoric, ecology has become a large and important
component of current scientific activity. The history and sociology
of science is clearly incomplete without the history and sociology
of ecology. However, there have been encouraging signs recently
that scholars are beginning to rectify this unsatisfactory situation.
The present thesis is intended to aid that process.
I did not set out to provide a complete history of ecology.
Ecology is a massive and multi-faceted subject and such a task
would be beyond a single author, or at least beyond a single
graduate student. My thesis is confined to the history of plant
ecology and, even there, I have been very selective in order to
bring the subject-matter into something like manageable proportions.
I hope, however, that the thesis will be a worthwhile contribution
to the history of ecology as a whole, since plant ecology is
probably the oldest of the discipline's specialties, and is
certainly one of the largest. While it is unwise to extrapolate
from one branch to another of such a diverse subject, there is no
doubt that the history of plant ecology exemplifies many of the
problems, preoccupations and formative influences experienced by
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other ecological specialties.
Scope of the historiography of ecology
The term 'ecology' is nowadays notoriously protean and multi-
vocal. So I ought to make it clear at the outset that this thesis
does not set out to provide a history of environmental thought or
environmentalist political action. Rather it is primarily the
history of a scientific specialty - or, more accurately, the history
of a form of scientific practice. This is ecology as done by
professional botanists, employed in universities or research
institutions, who publish accounts of their work in scientific
5
journals. These people may or may not have any sympathy or
connection with the concerns of Henry Thoreau or the activities of
the Sierra Club. They are employed to generate knowledge about
vegetation, either as an activity of pure academic research or to
help supply society's material wants. If ecologists do these
activities well, they may achieve the conventional rewards of a
successful scientific career.
Academic ecology must be considered as, to some extent, an
autonomous activity in the way that many of the disciplines of
modern science are. It has its own subculture or subcultures, its
own vested interests, its own prizes and professional rewards for
its members to gain. It produces a distinctive form of scientific
knowledge. Thus any adequate history of ecology must be 'internal'
history in that it must contain a convincing account of the
discipline's investigatory practice, its technical and cognitive
developments, and its professional structure.^ Any history of
ecology which failed to take these elements seriously would miss
the raison d'ecre of ecology as a scientific discipline.
However ecology, as well as having in some respects the
character of an autonomous discipline, is also a dependent part of
a much larger institution. It is a component of the scientific
enterprise as a whole. The rewards which ecologists seek are often
not entirely the property of ecology per se, but are offered within
the larger professional frameworks of botany, zoology, or biology.
For instance, there are still relatively f.ew professorial chairs in
ecology. Most plant ecologists, if they are to be professors, must
occupy chairs of botany or, at least, chairs within botany
departments. The research funds available to ecologists would,
generally speaking, be spent elsewhere in biological science, if
they were not directed toward ecology. Research funding is usually
awarded on a competitive basis. Similar competition surrounds the
allocation of staff appointments between the various biological
specialties. Thus the external relations of the specialty of
ecology are often with other parts of the scientific community
rather than with the wider society outside science. It is one of
the principal themes of my thesis that the nature of the interface
between ecology and the rest of science is of crucial historical
importance.
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Science is an exclusive and hierarchical institution. Status
and authority are not distributed equally throughout all its
branches. It maintains its boundaries by employing criteria as to
what is good and what is bad knowledge. Ecology has always been a
discipline of comparatively low status. The welfare of scientific
ecology has therefore been dependent upon the institutionalised
judgements of ecologists' colleagues in other fields. This has led
g
to problems for ecology. Ecologists have frequently been faced
with convincing other scientists of their discipline's scientific
respectability for fear of being denied the full benefits that
accrue to accredited members of the scientific community. The
problematic nature of their status has been a formative influence
on the behaviour of ecologists and the character of the discipline.
Many of the attempts that have been made to reform the discipline's
practice can only be understood as attempts to remove this
difficulty. Thus the disciplinary history of ecology must take into
account its position within the larger institution of science.
But I have also tried to show in the following chapters that
the history of ecology, if it is to be true to its subject, can
never be entirely self-contained disciplinary history, even in the
extended sense of 'disciplinary' employed above. It must also
connect with wider social, political and intellectual issues. It
must be external history every bit as strongly as it is internal
history. Indeed the history of ecology may be regarded as of great
interest as a source of case-studies of the interaction between
internal and external factors in the history of twentieth-century
science. Or, perhaps more cogently, it might be regarded as
providing excellent evidence of the artificiality of the internalist/
g
externalist dichotomy. Every scientist does his work situated
within a constellation of social interests, ranging from those of
his sub-group of the profession, to those of the institution in
which he is employed, those of scientists as a whole, those of his
family, his local or regional community, and those of wider social
or political groupings.
All these different sorts of social interests have equivalent
1 0
status as bases for the explanation of actors' behaviour. I
have felt free to invoke one or another without restraint - using
whichever appeared to me to have explanatory force in the given
circumstances. On certain occasions, for example in my treatment
of Henry Allan Gleason, my interpretations are based chiefly on the
consideration of 'internalist' social factors. On other occasions,
in particular in my treatment of F.E. Clements, I employ external
social interests as the most important explanatory device. On still
other occasions, for example in discussing Herbert Mason and Stanley
Cain in Chapter Four, I point to the importance of the position of
ecology within the larger institution of science. I believe no
11
inconsistency is thereby created. Such eclectism is required if
the full complexity of the forces that shaped ecology is to be
revealed.
That the history of scientific ecology is interwoven with social
interests and intellectual trends of the most multifarious provenance
ought not to surprise us. Ecologists study what one might call the
face of Nature - the immediate and attractive features of the natural,
as opposed to the man-made, world. They are thus occupied with a
subject-matter which is the closest of all the scientific disciplines
to what is referred to as 'Nature' in every-day usage and in the
usage of the humanistic disciplines - 'Nature' as in Nature Study,
the nature of woods, trees, flowers, streams, soil and rocks. One
might say that ecologists study everything that interested Wordsworth
save milkmaids and the shadows of clouds on the land. In the public
imagination ecologists are Nature-Scientists in the way Wordsworth
1 2
was a Nature-Poet. But Man's relationship to Nature is not simply
an aesthetic one. One needs only a little acquaintance with
Wordsworthian moralising to understand this. Nor is it entirely a
technical exercise in prediction and control, designed to supply
mankind's material requirements, or construct a coherent conception
of the world, although ecological inquiry clearly aids these enter-
13
prises. The idea of Nature is a powerful one in other spheres.
As Mary Douglas has pointed out, to argue that some action is
1 A
"against Nature" is a powerful act of disapprobation. Natural
knowledge has an active role in society - or, rather, men and women
actively use conceptions of the natural order to argue for particular
15
social, moral and political ends.
The view of Nature inherent in twentieth-century science may
be secular in comparison with that of previous centuries, but the
potential of the natural order as a moral resource is far from
having been eliminated. Recent debates on the 'environmental crisis'
or over the claims of sociobiology, show that the drawing of social
and moral implications from what are regarded as the facts of nature
is still a tenable polemic strategy. The subject-matter of ecology
is such that the knowledge it creates is particularly amenable to
use in this way. We may no longer be willing to see sermons or
images of society in the physics of fluids, as seventeenth- or
even nineteenth-century commentators were, nor in the subject-
matters of geology or quantum physics, but we still see them in the
1 6
'Wordsworthian' natural world of ecological science. I will
argue that some of the most 'internal' technical features of
scientific ecology bear witness to a willingness to argue from
Nature as to what men ought to do, or what society ought to be.
Themes and structure
As mentioned above, this thesis is not meant to be a complete
history, even of plant ecology. It has a much narrower compass.
But its topic, although specific, is one that has been selected for
the light its investigation sheds upon the historical character of
the discipline as a whole. I intend in the following chapters, to
elucidate the discipline's development by examining one of its most
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enduring preoccupations - a preoccupation that has often been the
focus of controversy - the nature of the plant community. These
controversies and the changing nature of this preoccupation embody
and exemplify many of the cognitive and social interests which have
existed within the discipline, and illustrate the effect of the
1 7
external pressures exerted upon it.
Even within this narrow compass, my treatment is not comprehensive
or universal. The thesis is built around four selected case-studies.
The first chapter investigates the origins of the scientific study
of vegetation, paying particular attention to the work of Alexander
von Humboldt. I draw upon the work of Michel Foucault to argue
that the appearance of an interest in the phenomena of vegetation
was a product of the emergence of a new cognitive order, in
18
Foucault's terms a new episteme, in the later eighteenth century.
Furthermore, I propose an explanation as to why vegetation, when it
first became an object of scientific study in its own right, was
conceived of as existing in natural units - in definite plant
communities. The belief that vegetation could be classified into
natural units was to be a major tenet of ecological theory
many years. Its origins have, however, never previously been
elucidated. Next, I describe the adoption of Humboldt's work on
vegetation, firstly by botanists directly associated with him, and
then more widely and by successive generations of workers. I will
argue that the development of the Humboldtian legacy by these
botanists founded a distinctive research tradition centered upon
the study of the collective phenomena of plants. I believe that my
first case-study sheds fresh light on the origins and early
development of ecology and identifies important and hitherto
unrecognised features of nineteenth-century biological science.
The second case-study takes as its subject the further
development of the study of vegetation in two countries, the United
States of America and France, in the early part of the twentieth
century. A comparison is made between the ecological theory and
practice of F.E. Clements and his associates and that of J. Braun-
Blanquet and the Sigma school. I examine how differences in the
social and institutional settings of plant science in each country
led to divergent conceptions of the plant community and divergent
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classifications of vegetation. The comparative method was adopted .
in this chapter because the cultural and social nature of the
activity of vegetational classification is thereby more clearly
displayed - as is the contingent flexibility of the research
tradition which was inherited from the Humboldtians.
The subject of the third case-study is the ecological career of
Henry Allan Gleason - an American ecologist who was the originator
of what became known as the individualistic hypothesis. This was
a theory that vegetation did not occur in natural units and that the
only real phenomena of vegetation were those of the individual
plants. I construct the first full account of Gleason's career,
interpreting Gleason's advocacy of an individualistic viewpoint in
the light of his possessing professional commitments outside the
mainstream of American ecology. Despite these outside commitments,
and despite his individualistic conception of the plant community,
Gleason's ecological work was still within the tradition of studying
the collective phenomena of plants, the origin of which we see in
the first case-study. His activity, like that of Clements and
Braun-Blanquet, was genetically related to Humboldtian plant
geography. Thus in the work of Gleason we see further exemplification
of the potential for change and alteration, in response to new
circumstances, possessed by a continuous tradition of research.
Gleason's theories survived intense early unpopularity and
were eventually victorious, at least as far as ecology in America
is concerned. The individualistic hypothesis, or something very
like it, was re-assessed and revived in the nineteen-forties and
-fifties. It came to dominate thinking on plant communities. The
fourth case-study investigates this transformation of American
plant ecology. The stresses which the discipline experienced in the
nineteen-forties are examined as the background to the many calls
for reform. The character of the complaints made against the
status quo and the character of the innovative research initiated,
are both considered in the light of pervasive and powerful
culturally-given criteria as to what was good scientific knowledge.
I examine the work of R.H. Whittaker in Tennessee and of J.T. Curtis
and his associates in the University of Wisconsin. Both these
workers offered fresh empirical and theoretical support for the
individualistic hypothesis. The greater persuasive effectiveness
of the Wisconsin work is interpreted in the light of J.T. Curtis's
authority, experience and status within the scientific community.
With this fourth case-study, the thesis comes, in a sense, full
circle. It has looked at the origin of research into natural units
of vegetation; it has examined two of the twentieth-century schools
which employed the idea of natural units in their practices; it
has examined the genesis of an alternative conception of vegetation;
and finally it examines what might be called the beginnings of the
end of the idea that plants occur in natural groups. The four case-
studies thus form a pattern which encapsulates much of the history
of the discipline of plant ecology as a whole. They were chosen
for this reason. The thesis ends with concluding remarks and a
short coda indicating that any resolution of the debate over the
nature of vegetation is more apparent than real. The controversy
has flowed, unabated, into other areas of ecological discourse.
Narrative history - sociologically enlightened
My selection of subject-matter for the thesis may seem
arbitrary and incomplete. Much important work bearing on the nature
of the plant community, done in Europe, Britain, Australia, the
Soviet Union, and the Tropics, is omitted or referred to only in
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passing. But the structure of the thesis has one virtue. The
mode by which the account moves from Europe to America, from the
nineteenth to the twentieth century, exemplifies what sort of
scholarly enterprise I have attempted. The following chapters,
although they may appear to contain the history of an idea - the
concept of the plant community - are not meant to be History of
Ideas as that historical genre is generally understood. Ideas are
20
not in themselves the subject-matter of this thesis. Ecological
knowledge is treated as being essentially social - as actively
developed and modified by groups of people in response to practical
21
contingencies. I concentrate upon how both the cognitive and
the practical aspects of a form of culture (using 'culture' in the
anthropological sense) change as the practitioners find themselves
in different circumstances or as cultural transfers are made from
one country to another, and from one generation to the next.
It should be noted also that the phrase 'history of plant ecology'
as used above to describe the subject-matter of the thesis, is also
somewhat misleading. Continuity and identity can be no more safely
22
assumed for disciplines than it can be for ideas. I do not claim,
for example, that those nineteenth-century European botanists who
first studied the plant community were really doing 'ecology',
before the word was coined. All that is claimed is that they, like
the American ecologists of the twentieth century, looked at the
collective phenomena of plants, and that their practices and
achievements are, in some way, connected genetically with the
practice of the later workers. Indeed the thesis is perhaps more
a story of change and adaptation within scientific culture than it
is an elucidation of the roots of ecology or its disciplinary history.
It will be obvious to some readers of the following chapters
that my historiography is enlightened, if that is the right word,
by my connection with and adherence to a particular school within
the sociology of scientific knowledge - namely the practitioners
of the 'strong programme' as set out in the work of Barry Barnes
23
and David Bloor. My approach is relativist. I have endeavoured
not to be evaluative as to the truth-content of actors' beliefs.
Belief is referred not solely to input from the natural world but
primarily to the social circumstances which sustain it. Knowledge
is regarded as the product of social construction and invention.
The process of social construction of knowledge is held to be
structured around the social and cognitive interests of the
participants.
However, my principal intention in the writing of this thesis
has not been to aid the study of the sociology of knowledge. I
have felt myself to be writing not sociology, but history. Since
history is a narrative form, my intention has been to present a
narrative history of ecology - a tale of the doings of men and
social groups in various places and times, and of the events and
social interests with which they were confronted and in the light
of which they framed their actions. If the narrative, as narrative,
fails to suspend the reader's disbelief, nothing, certainly not
24
sociological theory, can redeem it.
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This is not to say that reference will not be made in the
following to the literature of the sociology of science. In our
culture, at least, the plausibility of historical narrative is
buttressed in different ways from that of, say, works of fiction or
fairy stories. Historical narrative is routinely supported by
explicit reference to evidence derived from sources, principally
textual sources, which are independent of the narrative text itself.
The plausibility of historical narrative is held to depend on such
support. A historian must, however, work not only with textual
evidence but with a view of man and of society. This, of necessity,
underpins his explanations but is, unlike the evidential relation,
more often than not implicit. The reader of a historical account
must identify these underlying assumptions as best he can, often
accepting or rejecting the history as he agrees or disagrees with
*
the conception of human nature each particular author employs. In
this thesis I have attempted on occasion to use the literature of
the sociology of science to make explicit the conception of the
nature of human activity which underlies the historiography. I hope
the overall plausibility of my narrative is thereby increased.
I have also used the sociological literature in an illustrative
manner. For instance, towards the end of Chapter One, I refer to
the work of T.S. Kuhn and Barry Barnes on the nature of scientific
discovery, and in particular to T.S. Kuhn's account of the discovery
of oxygen. My purpose there is simply to help the reader to under¬
stand the genesis of the category 'plant association' by pointing
out that the process underlying the recognition of this category
was similar to that described by T.S. Kuhn for the origins of the
category 'oxygen'. By referring to this literature, I am not making
any statement about what the nature of the process of scientific
discovery in general may be. My intention is simply to clarify for
the reader, by illustrative examples, a particular discovery process.
It is in these instrumental modes that I use the sociological
literature in the following narrative. Sociology of science has
been unreservedly forced into service for the history. This usage
is unashamedly eclectic, opportunistic and may be somewhat uneven.
I have taken the liberty of making my constructions with whatever
materials were available and seemed appropriate at the time.
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Sociological generalisations have for the most part been eschewed.
I hope, however, that sociologists of science will find my narrative
interesting, and that they will find it useful for their own
purposes. But, as mooted above, the final product must stand or
25
fall as narrative - as an imaginative reconstruction of the past.
A Motto for the thesis
The sophisticated and insightful papers of the late Robert H.
Whittaker have been an indispensable aid to my understanding of
ecological classification and the history of vegetation science
more generally. My many specific debts to his work are acknowledged
in the following pages, but my general indebtedness deserves special
mention here. Because of his writings, my relativistic and
culturally-orientated approach to the activity of ecological
classification is not entirely novel. One of his many perceptive
remarks on this subject might stand as the motto of my thesis
"The basis of understanding and judging classifications
cannot be one of literal verisimilitude or fidelity to
nature. Rather than this, one finds that classifications
develop in accordance with whole systems of interbalanced
... judgements ... A classification must be viewed as a
cultural product, understood in a context which includes
both cultural values and ecological conditions, and
judged in its functional relation to present understanding
and practice. Emphasis in this account of certain
things - personal choice and judgement, intuition and
subjectivity, cultural influence and precedent ... runs
counter to what is usually sought in an account of
scientific method ... The question here, however, is
less one of ultimate objectives of science in general




ALEXANDER VON HUMBOLDT, HUMBOLDTIAN SCIENCE,
AND THE ORIGINS OF THE STUDY OF THE PLANT COMMUNITY
Introduction
Vegetation has always provided an important part of Man's
experience of the world. We may assume that, from the earliest times,
a coherent and communicable classification of plant cover was an
essential aid to successful hunting, food-gathering and the choosing
of sites for agriculture and settlement. All the modern languages
retain words which refer to features of the Earth's plant cover,
words which label and identify aspects of the immensely complex
and diverse living landscape of plants. It is instructive to note
how much of our everyday terminology for landscape refers to
vegetation rather than to underlying land-form. Such terms as
moor, heath, meadow, forest, tiaga, steppe, maquis, chapparral and
many more refer to familiar and apparently distinctive groups of
1
plants, to types of vegetation.
In modern times, the practical importance of vegetation is not
diminished and the study of the earth's plant cover has become a
scientific business. Disciplines such as plant ecology have
generated an esoteric and technical body of knowledge about vegetation.
In the present chapter I examine the beginning of this activity -
the earliest academic investigations of vegetation. I examine the
cultural background from which the scientific study of vegetation
sprang. I will also seek to use the insights thus gained to answer
two questions - why did the study of vegetation arise when it did;
and "what gave the study of vegetation the character it then had?
In other words, the present chapter investigates why and how the
regional types of vegetation first became an object of scientific
interest.
It is remarkable that these questions have not been posed by
any previous scholar for, as we shall see, it is by no means self-
evident that vegetation ought to be an object of scientific study,
nor that it exists in natural units.
This chapter consists of two parts. The first examines the
work and cultural background of Alexander von Humboldt for an
explanation of the genesis of the study of vegetation. The section
sub-headed "Why a science of vegetation?" sums up and concludes
this first part. The remainder of the chapter examines how
Humboldt's exemplar was taken up by other workers, leading to a
distinctive tradition of Humboldtian plant geography characterised
by the study of vegetation units.
Vegetation or Flora
Within botany, the study of vegetation is distinguished from
the study of floristics. The study of plant-cover is different
from the study of the species of plants. The flora of a given
region simply consists of all the different plant species which
grow there. The student of floristics, therefore, is interested
in identifying the kinds of plants which grow in his study area.
He may map their respective distributions; he may make generalisa¬
tions about the character of a region's flora as a whole; but the
level of analysis on which his scientific practice is based is
essentially the individual species. The student of vegetation, on
the other hand, studies a collective phenomenon, produced by many
species together. [The apparently distinctive types of vegetation
listed in the first paragraph above correspond, somewhat loosely,
to what ecologists call 'plant communities']. Grass may be a
distinctive feature of prairies and a forest may be mostly oak-
trees. But the occurrence of species of grass within any given area
does not evidence the existence of a prairie, nor the presence of
species of oak a deciduous forest. Such, in principle, is the
difference between the subject-matter of floristics and vegetation
science - for the ecological character of vegetation, not to mention
its visual or aesthetic impression, is the product, not simply of
the presence or absence of particular species, but of the relative
2
abundances and the different growth forms of its constituent plants.
Historically the study of floristics developed before the study
of the collective phenomena of plants. In the middle of the eighteenth
century, botanists concentrated their efforts on finding plants and
classifying the specimens into species and the species into higher
3
taxa. The results of field collecting were summed up in species
lists or catalogues of all the plants present in a given study area.
It was a novel development when some botanists began to write of
vegetation as being an object worthy of scientific investigation in
its own right, and began to describe plant communities, their gross
appearances and their species compositions. This new concern
became an important part of botanical practice in the early decades
of the nineteenth century. Alexander von Humboldt was probably the
first explicitly to recommend to botanists the study of "gruppen
geselliger pflanzen" and to suggest relationships between types of
vegetation and environmental conditions.
Of course this is not to say that the botanists who worked
before Humboldt were unaware of vegetation. They frequently found
it convenient to refer to vegetatiorial features, employing laymen's
terminology for this purpose. Such references were often quite
specific. Linnaeus, for example, in his Philosophia Botanica (1751)
distinguished twenty-five different plant habitats and gave the
5
genera characteristic of each one. He was often very perceptive
in his remarks on the distribution of vegetation.^ But all his
observations on vegetation in this context were made as an adjunct
to his concerns in plant collecting and systematics - that is to say
they were secondary to his floristic activities. Reference to
vegetational features allowed him to specify more accurately the
7
species he was describing and where it was to be found.
Eighteenth-century natural historians might also hypothesize
O
about the role of plants and animals in the "Economy of Nature".
This teleological line of thought might lead to observations upon
the inter-relations between individual species, or between popula¬
tions of plants or animals such as Linnaeus's famous arguments that
the growth of each species of plant was controlled by a specific
herbivorous insect, the numbers of which were likewise controlled by
9
the insectivorous birds, and so on. Certain historians have argued
that this form of reasoning carries within it an assumption as to
the existence of a supra-individual natural category, analogous to
1 0
our present-day concept of the ecosystem. But these supra-
individual categories, however they were conceived, were not themselves
explicitly made the objects of scientific inquiry nor do they
11
resemble the study objects of nineteenth-century vegetation science.
In contrast, the plant geography of Humboldt and those botanists
he inspired and influenced, was centrally concerned with vegetation,
its character, distribution, relation to environmental parameters
and such like, and not solely or primarily with the individual
plants or species. As Humboldt wrote in his "Personal Narrative of
Travels":-
"I was passionately devoted to botany ... and I
flattered myself that our investigations might add some
new species to those which have been already described;
but preferring the connection of facts which have been
long observed, to the knowledge of insulated facts,
although they were new, the discovery of an unknown
genus seemed to me far less interesting than an
observation on the geographical relations of the
vegetable world, or the migration of the social plants,
and the limit of the height which their different
tribes attain on the flanks of the Cordilleras.1,1 ^
While a strong taxonomic component was necessarily retained, it was
with the elucidation of supra-specific matters of this nature that
Humboldtian botany was primarily concerned. There was thus a striking
difference between Humboldt's principal objectives and the principal
objectives of the Linneans. Humboldtian plant geography was to be
vegetational geography. Floristic plant geography, centered on the
elucidation of the distribution of plant species, was to have a
1 3
somewhat separate development throughout the nineteenth century.
While this distinction can readily be over-stated - many, perhaps
most, Humboldtian botanists (Grisebach and Schouw for instance)
undertook both forms of research and the difference between a unit of
flora and a unit of vegetation was sometimes blurred or unimportant
1 A
in practice - it is clear that, in the early nineteenth century,
1 5
vegetation presented a novel object for scientific inquiry. Around
the study of this newly-distinguished object, a new botanical
specialism was to grow.
One of the most interesting aspects of this cognitive re-organisa¬
tion is that not only did vegetation become an object of inquiry per
se, but it also came to be conceived of as existing in regional
types or units. The assumption that there are natural kinds of
vegetation was one of the key elements in the rationale of the new
practice. It is here, therefore, that our search for the origins of
the study of the plant community must begin.
Not putting the phenomena first
How did these shifts of interest come about? What made possible
a new form of scientific practice based upon a new object for
scientific inquiry? The remainder of this chapter will be devoted
to seeking answers to these questions.
I should make it clear at the outset that my account of the
early recognition of vegetation and vegetation units as objects
for study is not meant to be the account of a discovery or discoveries.
I believe it is not helpful to regard the history of the origin of
vegetation units as an event or series of events in which investigators
stumbled upon or somehow otherwise came newly to discern a class of
natural objects which had existed in the real world all along and had
previously been mysteriously neglected or inadvertently misunderstood.
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In this context the classic language of discovery is inappropriate.
To employ it would be to commit the form of historiographical error
which Andrew Pickering has recently termed 'putting the phenomena
first' - that is the assumption that phenomena have an existence
17
independent of the process by which they are observed. Furthermore,
conventional discovery accounts too often depend on an unwarranted
separation between theory and observation - the assumption that
observational data are by themselves sufficient to force theoretical
18
change.
I will argue that the new objects of vegetation were called into
being as the result of a change in scientific practice. Behind the
recognition of vegetation units lay an altered set of intellectual
concerns and an altered set of scientific practices. As we have seen,
eighteenth-century natural historians were well aware of vegetation.
But the problems they concerned themselves with did not require that
1 9
vegetation itself be a level of inquiry. Likewise they made no
great effort to identify unitary entities within it. But new
cognitive interests led to information from the natural world being
re-organised and re-grouped - re-processed one might say. It was not
that a previously unperceived object was realised to exist among
and in some relation to the objects already long recognised. It
was rather that new cognitive concerns produced a new world in
20
which novel objects were discerned.
As we shall see, ever more strongly exemplified as the chapters
of this thesis progress, vegetation is such a thing that it can be
conceived of in a multitude of ways - each empirically satisfactory
21
and consensually agreeable. In this respect at least, the jungle
is neutral. The key to understanding the ways in which vegetation
has been conceived lies, for the historian, not in the vegetation
itself but in the way in which the vegetation has been investigated -
and in the cognitive frameworks which have sustained the various
investigatory practices.
It follows from the above that when I make- statements to the
effect that Linnaeus had no unit of vegetation, no tacit criticism
of Linnaeus should be read. Likewise I do not mean to imply that
Humboldt and his followers possessed extra-ordinary powers of insight
when I state that they recognised such units. Such statements are
entirely descriptive. I am not arguing that Humboldt succeeded
where Linnaeus and the Linneans failed. Rather this chapter is an
attempt to understand why Humboldt and the Humboldtians ordered the
world in a different way from their predecessors. I shall trace
the intellectual concerns which led to natural phenomena and natural
inquiry both being re-organised in a novel manner. But in respect
of the validity of belief, I shall try to be as neutral as the
22
vegetation.
A new regionality and a new episteme
One of the most interesting aspects of the developing study of
vegetation is that the differences between Humboldt and Linnaeus
mirror and exemplify more general changes in the character of
Natural History, indeed in the whole of natural inquiry, as the
23
eighteenth century passes into the nineteenth. Eighteenth-century
natural history was, as Foucault puts it, "the nomination of the
visible" - and not just seeing and naming, but seeing and naming
24
systematically. To Linnaeus, successful naming entailed the fitting
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of all nature into a grand taxonomy. The classification of phenomena
was the end of natural history:-
"The first step in wisdom is to know the things
themselves; this notion consists in having a true
idea of the object; objects are distinguished and
known by classifying them methodically and giving
them appropriate names. Therefore, classification ^
and name-giving will be the foundation of our science."
Thus only those aspects of nature that were clearly describable, and
describable in visual terms, were legitimate objects of inquiry:-
"He may call himself a naturalist (natural historian)
who well distinguishes the parts of natural bodies by
sight and describes and names all these rightly ... "
The paradigm example of an investigable object was, of course, the
plant species as characterised in terms of certain obvious features
of type specimens.
But nominating the visible was not to retain its dominant
influence over the activity of natural historians throughout the
entire century. Foucault has argued that the nineteenth century is
separated from the eighteenth by a most fundamental transformation
of culture and discourse. Beginning in the late half of the eighteenth
century, a profound change took place in the totality of assumptions
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upon which knowledge of the actual world was based. One aspect of
this change was that scholarly emphases moved from the external
features of objects to features and processes, integral but internal
and unseen. We can see a shift from these preoccupations in, for
instance, the work of Immanuel Kant, who has been identified by
29Foucault as a crucial harbinger of the new episteme.
Of particular interest to our present discussion are Kant's
30
lectures on "Phvsische Geographie". To Kant, the systematic
arrangement of things into taxonomies, according to selected visible
features, as done by Linnaeus, was merely the aggregation of arbitrary
31
and artificial divisions of nature. Such an activity lacked
"
... the idea of a whole out of which the manifold
character of things is being derived ... In the existing
so-called system of this type, the objects are merely
put beside each other and ordered in sequence one after
the other."32
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For Kant, the essential prerequisite to a knowledge of the world was
not an apparatus of logical classification working with isolated
and recombined phenomena, but description of phenomena as they
33
actually occur and co-exist in the world. Physical geography
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could give "an idea of the whole in terms of area". It was only
after the preliminary task of geographical description had been
undertaken that a proper "system of nature", based on real phenomena
rather than arbitrary divisions and aggregations, would be possible.
German geographers, following Kant, assumed the existence of
a functional interrelation between all of the individual features
of the Earth's surface. In other words, they assumed an under¬
lying causal unity of Nature, of which the visible forms of things
were only one aspect. This unity of nature was, of course, quite
universal. The earth was one whole. In 1811, the geographer Butte
35
wrote "no scientist doubts the reality of an earth organism".
But the Earth was also regionalised in two important ways. One
form of regionality was what Hartshorne has termed 'vertical unity' ,
the interrelation between all the phenomena of any particular place
36
or area. Phenomena peculiar to a particular region were the cause
of other equally regional phenomena - for example, climatic and
environmental conditions affected the moral properties of men so that,
as Kant wrote, "in the mountains, men are actively and continuously
37
bold lovers of freedom and their homeland". Another form of
regionality was what Hartshorne has termed 'horizontal unity' -
the unity of a region as an entity distinct from other neighbouring
33
units. Thus, although nature was conceived of as being a single
holistic interrelated organism, there existed, within that large
whole, other holistic structures which by reason of their internal
interrelatedness had distinctive characters, and were distinguishable
39
one from another. Nature was made up of distinct natural units.
As Macpherson puts it:-
"Regional emphasis, the study of earth spaces, ...
was one of the traditions in the organisation of German
geography.
Nor were such ideas confined to geographers. As Janet Browne
has recently shown, use of the notion of regionality had also, by
this time, appeared in the work of the late eighteenth-century
20
practitioners of Linnean botany. Prior to 1760 or so, to write a
Flora was simply to produce a list of plants, collected from an
area arbitrarily or haphazardly delimited. But from that date
onward, the concept was gradually formulated that flora and fauna
41
were regionally differentiated. The surface of the globe was
held to be divided into natural regions and each region possessed
a grouping of plants and animals with general characteristics
peculiar to itself. The plants of Sweden, for instance, possessed
the characteristics of a northern European botanical region, a
42
Northern European 'nation of plants'. And these characteristics
were different from those possessed by the plants of Italy or
Australia. The writing of Floras came thus to incorporate a
chorological component. As Browne puts it, "the idea of biological
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provinces had begun to capture the imagination". Floristic
botany paralleled developments in geography; botany became itself
geographical.
One of the earliest writers in whom botanical description has
a strong geographical and regional structure was Johann Reinhold
Forster. As the official naturalist, Forster sailed around the
44
world with Captain Cook on Cook's second voyage (1772-1775).
Forster's account of his trip Observations made on a Voyage around
the World, published in 1778, contains much geographical and botanical
description. This was structured around a strong conception of
regionality. Forster's regionality, like Kant's, was supported
by a theory of environmental influence. Different skies, different
climates, different prevailing winds were held to produce diverse
sorts of vegetation and diverse forms of human society. He wrote
of the Society Islands:-
"The mild and temperate climate, under the powerful,
benevolent and congenial influence of the sun,
mitigated by alternate sea and land-breezes quickens
the growth of vegetation; and therefore in some
measure also, benefits and improves the human frame,
by this happy combustion,"45
and, more generally, of the tropical islands:-
"
... the climate softens what is savage in human
nature, and I may say naturally leads to the civilisa¬
tion of Mankind, the people are fond of variety of
food, of conveniences at home and of neatness and
ornament in dress."^6
Forster's regions were not precisely delimited - they were
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held to grade into one another over broad areas of transition.
But the fact that the globe did not have a uniform climate necessarily
entailed, for Forster, spatial differentiation of the natural
phenomena of the Earth's surface. His principal explanation for
such differentiation was the unequal application of the heat of the
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sun over the globe. But it is important to note that the patterns
of plant distribution he described were not solely latitudinal
zonations as such an explanatory device might be held to entail.
Forster observed that the flora of America was different, in
important respects, from that of Asia even along the same band of
49
latitude. He held environmental factors such as heat or indeed
overall climate to be of great importance
"
... a similarity of situation and climate sometimes
produces a similarity of vegetation, and this is the
reason why the cold mountains of Tierra del Fuego
produce several plants, which in Europe are the
inhabitants of Lapland, the Pyrenees and the Alps".
But similar environments did not produce wholly identical natural
productions. The individuality and integrity of the 'nations of
plants', like those of the nations of men, were explicable only
if matters of origin and historical development were taken into
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account. Like much contemporary German scholarship, botany
became historical as well as geographical.
Forster's Observations contain much pleasant description of
vegetation. The varieties of plants and of vegetation afforded
an invaluable key to the understanding of the effects of the
environment, and therefore to the general character of nature in
any given region. Also the vegetation was one of the aspects of
the environment which impinged most directly upon humanity. As
Janet Browne points out, by insisting that plants mediated between
the physical and the human sphere, Forster claimed botanical
geography to be a subject of crucial and hitherto unrecognised
importance.
The importance Forster granted vegetation and the new significance
of botanical geography are both evidence of how far cognitive
concerns had altered since Linnaeus's time. Forster, while to a
certain extent involved in taxonomy, was far from being primarily
a nominator of the visible. But although his work exhibited a
new awareness of vegetation as an interesting object in its own
right and had a clear concept of regionality, his regions were at
least primarily floristic units and not vegetational ones. Floristic
analysis was how they were in practice recognised and differentiated:
"As the South-Sea is bounded on one side by America
and on the other by Asia, the plants which grow in its
isles, partly resemble those of the two continents;
and the nearer they are either to the one or the other
the more the vegetation partakes of it. Thus the
easternmost isles contain a greater number of American
than of Indian plants, and again as we advance farther
on to West, the resemblance with India becomes more
strongly discernible.
Forster shows the new concern for vegetation and for regionality
His 'biological provinces' are indeed novel objects for scientific
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inquiry. But they are not yet that novel object whose origins we
are at present seeking. They are not vegetation units per se. The
same can also be said of the concept of biological regionality to
be found in the writings of Karl Ludwig Willdenow.
Karl Ludwig Willdenow: floristic plant geographer
Professor of Natural History and Botany at the University of
Berlin from 1801 until his early death in 1817, Willdenow was
indisputably one of the leading German botanists of the early years
55
of the nineteenth century. His major textbook Grundriss der
Krauterkunde sold widely and influenced much later botanical work
56
in Germany and beyond. The Grundriss was first and foremost a
textbook of taxonomic botany - it was intended to replace Linnaeus's
57
Philosophia Botanica.
Stress on nomination of the visible was still very prominent.
A long section on terminology - one hundred and thirty seven pages
in the second (1811) English edition, approximately one third of
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the book - provided a detailed vocabulary for describing the
external features of plants
"The true knowledge of plants consists in the art of
arranging, distinguishing and naming them ... "^9
The visible structure of plants was proposed to be the principal
object of botanical study
"The first object of a student of Botany, after
becoming acquainted with the terminology is to gain an
accurate knowledge of every plant as it comes his
way. He must acquire what may be called a botanical
glance; that is he must accustom his eye to run over
the stem, the leaves in all their structure, the mode
of inflorescence, and all the other conspicuous parts
of a plant, so as to discover by mere inspection,
determinate characters distinguishing it from similar
plants. In this way he becomes enabled to know plants
by their external appearance ... With this knowledge,
however, he must not be contented, but must examine
more accurately the parts of the flower and fruit
and be able to find in them certain and fixed characters
"60
The study of the external features of plants was not abandoned
in the context of the new episteme. It provided the basis for the
development of taxonomic botany throughout the nineteenth and into
the twentieth century. But nineteenth-century study of visible
structure was by no means identical to that practised by the
Linneans. Willdenow was, for example, concerned much more than
Linnaeus ever had been with developing a natural system of
classification - which would reflect the underlying similarities
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between species - to replace the artificial sexual system.
The study of the visible structure was continued within a new
cognitive framework, within which other phenomena were also important
objects of study. Taxonomy was no longer the whole of botany.
Willdenow's work expressed these new concerns - he was interested
in the historical development of flora and of vegetation, and, like
Forster, he conceived of the world's plant cover in terms of natural
organic regions. [Willdenow had studied natural history under
Johann Forster while a student at Halle in the late 1780s. He
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later acknowledged the large intellectual debt he owed Forster].
The Grundriss contains a long section setting out what Willdenow
termed the 'History of Plants' [Geschichte der Pflanzen] which he
defined as:-
"
... a comprehensive view of the influence of
climate upon vegetation, of the changes which plants
most probably have suffered during the various
revolutions this earth has undergone, of their
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dissemination over the globe, of their migrations, and
lastly of the manner in which nature has provided for
their preservation."63
The characteristics of the world's plant cover were presented
as interpretable in terms of historical processes - as being part of
the history of the earth itself
"When in this way, perhaps after a long succession
of years ... the land was gradually formed, hurricanes,
earthquakes and volcanoes might again destroy large
tracts, and change the form of the land, by which means
a number of plants might be destroyed that afterwards
might never appear again ... Countries that are now
separated by the ocean might formerly have been joined,
at least the plants they have in common authorise the
supposition. In this way might the most northern part
of America have been connected with Europe and New
Holland and the Cape of Good Hope."6^
As we shall see in more detail shortly, the historical investigation
of the earth as a whole was itself a novel element of the new episteme.
Willdenow's "History of Plants" contained much fine observation
of vegetation. There was, for instance, a long and excellent account
of the form of vegetational change which was later to be termed
'plant succession' - the process whereby the activities of the first
species to colonise a particular site lead, by the accumulation of
organic matter and the breaking down of the underlying rock, to
the site becoming suitable for colonisation by other species
"The decay of these mosses and smaller plants
produces, by degrees, a thin stratum of earth, which
increases with years, and now even allows some shrubs
and trees to grow in it, till finally, after a long
series of years, where once barren rocks stood, large
forests with their magnificent branches delight the
wanderers' eye. Thus nature proceeds, acting by degrees,
always great, constant and intent on the good of the
whole."05
He also described the corresponding process of succession which begins
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not with bare rock but with open water.
But Willdenow did not investigate vegetation for its own sake.
His remarks on vegetational development and other vegetational
matters, while certainly those of a shrewd observer and a knowledge¬
able botanist, were incidental to his floristic concerns. His
observations on vegetation were not central to his investigative
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enterprise. Willdenow's "History of Plants" was essentially a
floristic form of inquiry - albeit different in many fundamentals
from that of Linnaeus. It represents one of the first programmes
for a separate botanical specialism to deal with plant distribution
in relation to climatic, geographical, geological, migrational and
other factors - what we might call self-consciously distinct plant
£<7
geography. But it was a floristic, not vegetational plant
geography. It was based on the study of the distribution of the
species of plants:-
"Hence Canada produces different plants from Penn¬
sylvania, this again from Virginia, this again different
plants from Carolina and Carolina from Florida etc. Hence
the northwest coast of North America produces plants
which totally differ from those of the northeast
coast, the southwest coast different plants from
those of the southeast." ^8
Willdenow was here referring to the species of plants, not their
forms of growth nor the general aspect of the vegetation.
Willdenow's plant geography had, like Forster's, and most
contemporary German forms of geographical inquiry, a strong interest
in regional divisions. But, again like Forster's, it did not contain
the vegetational units the conceptual origins of which this essay
seeks - for Willdenow's regions were floristic ones. He distinguished
"five principal floras in Europe, to wit, the Northern Flora, the
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Helvetic, the Austrian, the Pyrenean, and the Appenninian Flora".
The distinctive character of each regional flora was to be
established by the listing of the plant species present within it.
This was Willdenow's principal geographical research project.
Willdenow's work is interestingly different from that of his
predecessors. With its emphases on regionality and historical
development, it displays the transformation which had overtaken
botanical inquiry. It was of great importance in the development
of floristic plant geography - it represents floristic botany
becoming geographical. It shows, too, the beginnings of an interest
in vegetation. But Willdenow's work, like Forster's, does not yet
contain the approach to vegetation whose origins we are at present
seeking.
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Alexander von Humboldt and the new episteme
Alexander von Humboldt, however, never listed plants in the
manner advocated by Willdenow. He and Willdenow, who was only five
years his senior, shared a long and co-operative friendship, dating
70
from 1788. They had many scientific interests in common.
Willdenow had done much to stimulate Humboldt's early interest in
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botany - particularly in the problems of plant distribution.
Willdenow owed something of his grasp of the floristic diversity of
Europe to having examined specimens collected by Humboldt in his
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travels, in particular to the Iberian peninsula. But Humboldt's
botanical geography is, in some respects, as distinctively different
in emphasis from Willdenow's floristics as Willdenow's was from
Linnaeus's.
Alexander von Humboldt was a remarkable man of polymathic
73
learning and a synthetic habit of thought. He sought always to
write what he termed 'physique generale' - the universal science
which would speak of the unity of nature and which ought to be the
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chief end of all natural inquiry. There was no one better
qualified to take up that eclectic and harmonising task. But
cosmological and holistic though his concerns always were, the
geography of plants had an extremely important place within his
grand scheme. It was one of the major routes toward the 'physique
generale'
Humboldt formulated the outline of his programme for the study
of the geography of plants as early as 1790, in which year he
received important criticism and encouragement from George Forster,
1 f)
Johann Reinhold's son. His ideas for the new science were first
publicly set out in the Flora Fribergensis Specimen, published in
1793, when he was twenty-six:-
"Observation of individual parts of trees or grass
is by no means to be considered plant geography;
rather plant geography traces the connections and
relations by which all plants are bound together among
themselves, designates in what lands they are found,
in what atmospheric conditions they live, and tells
of the destruction of rocks and stones by what primitive
forms of the most powerful algae by what roots of
trees, and describes the surface of the earth in which
humus is prepared."77
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Plant geography was thus, for Humboldt, the study of the
collective phenomena of plants and the empirical investigation of
why particular groups of plants flourish where they do. Unlike
the old natural history, unlike Willdenow's floristic plant
geography, it was not primarily the study of individual plants or
species. Interested in taxonomic botany as he was, Humboldt had
moved firmly away from the herbarium. He claimed to focus not upon
arbitrary divisions of nature but upon real phenomena - and to be
concerned not only with visible features but also with the investiga-
7Q
.tion of underlying "connections and relations".
Humboldt's emphases for his plant geography may thus be seen
as congruent in character with changes taking place in many fields
of natural inquiry - not only in geography and, not only in Germany
- as the eighteenth century faded. The older overweening pre¬
occupation with the visible was generally being abandoned as
irrelevant in the face of a new desire to study the underlying
organic cohesiveness of nature and the hidden, but nevertheless
investigable, relationships between phenomena within it. The
natural system of Antoine-Laurent de Jussieu superseded the Linnean
sexual system; Lamarck succeeded Buffon; Treviranus coined a new
name for a new scientific practice. L'Histoire Naturelle became
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la biologie.
It is interesting that Abraham Gottlob Werner, under whom
Humboldt studied at the Freiberg School of Mines, has recently been
identified as a figure of major importance in the genesis of the new
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episteme. Werner was the first to conceive of the possibility
of a historical geology (geognosy). His new science transformed
classical mineralogy - the study of individual mineral forms - and
made possible the historical investigation of the earth as a whole.
Werner's geognosy, like the new studies in comparative anatomy,
involved:-
"
... assembling, analyzing, relating and comparing
a large number of distant facts which do not have the
slightest apparent relation to one another."®1
Albury and Oldroyd identify Humboldt as one of the first to adopt
"Wernerian geognosy as a basis for world-wide research into the
Op
earth's history".
I will attempt to show that as well as extending the Wernerian
programme in geological science, Humboldt exmployed the framework
of the new episteme to create a new science of vegetation. Humboldt
made explicit the link between his attitude to vegetation and the
new historical study of the earth:-
"Geognosy (Erdkunde) studies animate and inanimate
nature ... both organic and inorganic bodies. It is
divided into three parts: solid rock geography, which
Werner had industriously studied; zoological geography,
whose foundations have been laid by Zimmerman; and
the geography of plants, which our colleagues have
left untouched ... This is what distinguishes geography
from nature study, falsely called nature history;
zoology (zoognosia), botany (phytognosia) and geology
(oryctognosia) all form part of the study of nature,
but they study only the forms, anatomy, processes,
etc., of individual animals, plants, metallic things
or fossils. Earth history, more closely affiliated
with geography than with nature study, but as yet not
attempted by any, studies the kinds of plants and
animals that inhabited the primeval earth, their
migrations and disappearance of most of them, the
genesis of mountains, valleys, rock formations and
ore veins ... the earth surface gradually covered
with humus and plants ...
Thus Foucault's analysis, originally applied only to comparative
anatomy and physiology as far as biological science was concerned,
also offers important fresh insights into the history of Man's
attitudes towards his natural environment. The emphasis of
natural discourse changed. The new concerns with integrative
processes, with invisible connections, with natural wholes, ushered
in the study of new objects. Vegetation was one of these new
objects. What had previously been simply the natural setting for
the objects of taxonomic inquiry became a locus of study in its
own right. Furthermore, vegetation and Man's relation to it came
to be conceived of in holistic integrative modes.
The cognitive concerns of the new episteme were distributed
quite generally throughout European natural science. We have seen
some of them also in the writings of Johann Reinhold Forster and
Karl Willdenow. But one might say that they were particularly
strongly institutionalised in the University of GOttingen, where
Blumenbach, Zimmerman and Treviranus taught and where Humboldt had
been a student, and in various French institutions such as the
Museum d'Histoire Naturelle in Paris, with whose faculty Humboldt
developed strong links during his long residence in Paris after
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1804. When, in 1807, Humboldt further articulated his idea of a
plant geography in his Essai sur la Geographie des Plantes, the
French edition was dedicated to Antoine-Laurent de Jussieu and Rene
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Desfontaine, both professors at the Museum d'Histoire Naturelle.
The Essai clearly bore the marks of the new episteme.
Contributions to the literature of scientific travelling
The first draft of the Essai had been composed on the lower
slopes of Chimborazo in 1802, during Humboldt's travels in South
America. This provides another important clue as to the cultural
background from which the Essai sprang. Humboldt saw the making
of scientific journeys as an essential part of the method of natural
inquiry. Travel was obligatory for any scholar who sought to
grasp both the diversity of phenomena and the essential unity of
nature. Humboldt had been introduced to the art of scientific
travelling by an experienced practitioner, the younger Forster,
with whom he travelled in Germany, Flanders, Holland, France and
36
England in 1790. George Forster had been round the world with
his father, Johann Reinhold, on Captain Cook's second voyage, and
87
had very successfully published an account of their travels.
After his journey with Forster, Humboldt was continually making
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plans to undertake an important scientific expedition of his own.
The journey to the Americas was the culmination of a long
programme of preparation and training. There is no doubt that it
was also a turning point in his life. It has a crucial place within
any account of his intellectual concerns and interests.
The expedition to the Americas - with Aime Bonpland as companion
- lasted five years but Humboldt spent many more years collating
and publishing its results. Although he also made a long journey
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to northern and central Asia, the fact that in the New World he
had visited the tropical zone, where plant and animal life were
developed to their greatest richness and the natural productions
were exotically different from those of Europe, meant that the
journey to the Western Hemisphere was always the more important of
90his two major scientific expeditions. The expense of the American
journey and its aftermath - compiling and publishing its results -
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swallowed up most of his private fortune. It was a project to
which he was deeply committed, and more than merely intellectually.
Writing about one's travels was already a well-accepted form
of scholarly activity before Humboldt. Here too Humboldt learned
from George Forster. Shortly after their return to Germany in
1790, Forster published a description of the journey he and Humboldt
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had made. Ansichten vom Niederrhein was acclaimed in literary
circles, particularly by Goethe, Schiller and Alexander's brother,
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Wilhelm von Humboldt. From a comparison of Forster's and
Humboldt's travel writing,we can see that they were both active
within the same genre. There is much of Forster's model in
9A
Humboldt's several accounts of his own travels in South America.
Both men paid particular attention to the morphology of landscape.
Both favoured panoramic description. Both sought scientific
accuracy and collected all manner of detail and data. Both
combined these scientific concerns with avid recording of subjective
impression. Such harmonisation of science and subjectivism was
seen, by the literary men contemporary with Forster and Humboldt,
as new, exciting and a sign of a fresh maturation of natural
inquiry.
It is, thus, a measure of the importance of plant geography in
Humboldt's eyes that the Essai was planned as the introductory
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volume to the full scientific account of his expedition. It
was, to Humboldt, the piece of work which encapsulated, scientific¬
ally and aesthetically, the totality of the impression made upon
him by the tropics of South America:-
"Mais j'ai pens! qu'avant de parler de moi-meme et
des obstacles que j'ai eu a vaincre dans le cours de mes
operations, il vaudroit mieux fixer les regards des
physiciens sur les grands phenomenes que la nature
presente dans les regions qui j'ai parcourues. C'est
leur ensemble que j'ai consider! dans cet essai. II
offre le resultat des observations qui se trouvent
developpees en detail en d'autres ouvrages que je
prepare pour le public.
J'y embrasse tous les phenomenes de physique que




The holistic unity of landscape
The patterns of plant distribution were a key to underlying
regularities within the natural world:-
"
... as the human race in its development must pass
through certain stages of civilisation, so also is the
gradual distribution of plants dependent on definite
physical laws."97
But these regularities in nature could only be understood
holistically and not reductively, for nature was one holistic unity
"Cette science, qui constitue sans doute une. des
parties le plus belles des connaissances humaines, ne
peut faire de progres que par l'etude individuelle, et
la reunion de tout les phenomenes et de toutes les
productions que presente la surface du globe. Oans
ce grand enchainement de causes et d'effets, aucun
fait ne peut etre consider! isolement. L'equilibre
general qui regne au milieu de ces perturbations et
de ce trouble apparent, est le resultant d'une infinite
de forces mecaniques et d'attractions chimiques qui
se balancent les une par les autres; et si chaque
serie de faits doit etre envisagees separement pour y
reconnoitre une loi particuliere, l'etude de la
nature, qui est le grande problem de la physique
generate exige la reunion de touts les connaissances
Q Q
qui traitent des modifications de la matiere."
Furthermore, and it was a topic possibly more important even
than the above, Humboldt argued that vegetation mediated between the
natural world and human society. Thus botanical geography had the
same central importance to Humboldt that it had to Johann Forster.
With a form of argument similar to contemporary Neo-classical theories
of painting, Forster had stressed the unities within landscape,
unities in which Man participates, partly due to the moral influence
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of vegetation. Humboldt developed further, within his own plant
geography, Forster's view of the effect of the natural environment
on Man. To Humboldt, the vegetation was both an expression of
the physical environment and an important part of the environment
as it affected the races of Man, materially and spiritually, the
passage with which Humboldt introduced this subject is important
enough to quote at length:-
"
... mais l'homme sensible aux beautes de la nature
y trouve encore 1 ' explication de 1 ' influence qu'exerce
l'aspect de la vegetation sur le gout et 1' imagination
des peuples. II se plaira a examiner en quoi consiste
ce que l'on nomme le caractere de la vegetation, et la
variete de sensations qu'elle produit dans 1'ame de
celui qui la contemple. Ces considerations sont
d'autant plus importantes qu'elles touchent de pres
aux moyen par lesquels les arts d'imitation et la
poesie descriptive parviennent a agir sur nous. Le
simple aspect de la nature, la vue des champs et des
bois, causent une jouissance qui differe essentielle-
ment de l'impression que fait l'etude particuliere
de la structure d'un etre organise. Ici, c'est le
detail qui nous interesse et qui excite notre curiosite;
la, c'est l'ensemble, ce sont des masses, qui agitent
notre imagination. Quelle impression differente cause
l'aspect d'une vaste prairie bordee de quelques groups
d'arbres, et l'aspect d'un bois touffu et sombre mele
de chenes et de sapins? Quel contraste frappant entre
les forets des zones temperees, et celles de l'equateur,
ou les troncs nus et elances des palmiers s'elevent
au-dessus des acajous fleuris, et presentent dans
l'air de majesteux portiques? Quelle est la cause
morale de ces sensations? sont-elles produites par
la nature, par la grandeur des masses, le contour des
formes, ou le port des vegetaux. Comment ce port,
cette vue d'une nature plus ou moins riche, plus ou
moins riante, influent-ils sur les moeurs et surtout
sur la sensibilite des peuples?"100
Thus,, the regional distribution of kinds of vegetation correlates
with and is, to some extent, a cause of, differences in aesthetic
sensibility and moral development between races and cultures.
Note here that it is the vegetation en masse that is active in this
respect. It is the complete impression presented by the vegetation
as a whole which leaves the vital imprint on the mind of "l'homme
sensible":-
"The poetical works of the Greeks and the ruder songs
of the primitive northern races owe much of their
peculiar character to the forms of plants and animals,
to the mountain-valleys in which their poets dwell,
and to the air which surrounded them ... However much
the character of different regions of the earth may
depend upon a combination of all these external
phenomena, and however much the total impression may
be influenced by the outline of mountains and hills,
the physiognomy of plants and animals, the azure of the
sky, the form of the clouds and the transparency of
the atmosphere, still it cannot be denied that it is
the vegetable covering of the earth's surface which
chiefly conduces to the effect."10'1
The individual plants are involved only as they contribute to this
larger whole.
This holistic emphasis on vegetation rather than individual
plants ran throughout Humboldt's treatment of plant geography, not
only in the Essai but also in his later works. It forms, as we have
seen, one of the principal reasons why his work may be distinguished
from that of the Linneans ana even from that of Willdenow. Humboldt
acknowledged the importance of the study of individual plants and
their species. But this was not the principal focus of his interest
"Les recherches des botanistes sont generalement dirigees
vers des objets qui n'embrassent qu'une tres-petite
partie de leur science. lis s'occupent presque exclusive-
ment de la decouverte de nouvelles especes de plantes,
del'etude de leur structure exterieure, des caracteres
qui les distinguent, et des analogies qui les unissent
en classes et en families.
Cette connaissance des formes sans lesquelles se
presentent les etres organises, est sans doute la
base principale de 1'histoire naturelle descriptive
... mais si elle est digne d'occuper exclusivement un
grand nombre de botanistes, si meme elle est susceptible
d'etre envisagee sous des points de vue philosophiques,
il n'est pas moins important de fixer la Geographie
de plantes; science dont il n'existe encore que le
nam, et qui cependant fair une partie essentielle
de la physique generale.
Humboldt's concern with holistic structures and the unity of
landscape is well-exemplified by the "Tableau Physique des Andes et
Pays voisins". This is a large and elaborate engraving of a cross-
sectional profile of the Andes from the Atlantic to the Pacific at
the latitude of Chimborazo. It is folded within the pages of the
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Essai. In the one illustration were mapped or tabulated:- where
plant species grow, where the altitudinal zones of vegetation begin
and end, which animal species live where, the forms of agriculture
pursued, the underlying geological structures, and all manner of
measurable physical parameters. The object was to give, at a single
glance one might say, a complete impression of a natural region -
the "regions equinoctiales" of South America.
Humboldt's Romanticism and Naturphilosophie
The "Tableau", with its holistic vision of a unified landscape,
did not merely represent a conception unique to Humboldt but rather
one which sprang from the wider background of German Romanticism and
Naturphilosophie. Humboldt had a close intellectual association,
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albeit a brief one, with Schiller; he wrote an essay, "The Genius
of Rhodes", which was an allegory upon the principle of life
conceived of as chemical affinity, for Schiller's influential
1 05
periodical Die Horen. Humboldt also had a much more enduringly
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sympathetic association with Goethe. The German edition of the
Essai sur la Geographie des Plantes, entitled Ideen zu eine
107
Geographie der Pflanzen, was dedicated to Goethe. The dedication
page was illustrated with an engraving which represented the genius
of Poetry unveiling Nature. In the foreground lies an open copy of
108
Goethe's great botanical work Die Metamorphose der Pflanzen.
Goethe enthusiastically studied Humboldt's work on plant geography
and drew an illustration for the text, "a conventional picture" of
109
"a symbolic landscape", which he in turn dedicated to Humboldt.
Although Humboldt was later to be vehemently criticised by
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Schiller, and to have serious scientific disagreements with
Goethe, he never repudiated his early connections with the leaders
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of the German Romantic movement. He reprinted his allegorical
essay "The Genius of Rhodes", ten years after its original publica¬
tion, in his "favourite" and most "purely German" work, the
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compilation volume Ansichten der Natur. Humboldt's last and most
ambitious major work, Die Kosmos, written almost forty years later
still, contains many passages which give high praise to the Natur-
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philosophen. Goethe's influence is acknowledged in the book's
introduction and much of the text is redolent of the Romantic
tradition, continuing to evince intellectual concerns seen in
Humboldt's earlier works - in the Essai and, especially in Ansichten
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der Natur.
His contact with Romanticism is perhaps most obvious in the
importance Humboldt attaches to aesthetics within natural inquiry.
In Humboldt's view, an author writing about Nature must self¬
consciously aim at creating a work of art and not merely give an
accurate account of scientific research:-
"With the simplest statements of scientific facts
there must ever mingle a certain eloquence. Nature
herself is sublimely eloquent. The stars as they
sparkle in the firmament fill us with delight and
ecstasy, and yet they all move in orbit marked out
with mathematical precision.
Man's attitude to natural phenomena must thus combine aesthetic
appreciation with rigorous scientific procedure. It was not that
the scientific faculty comprehends while the aesthetic faculty
merely appreciates. The aesthetic component is not passive in the
comprehension of nature. For example, aesthetic reactions to
different sorts of vegetation are evidence as to the nature of the
effects of the natural environment upon Man and upon culture. Our
aesthetic responses to natural phenomena count as data about these
phenomena. They are also guides and sign-posts for our scientific
investigations. And, even more importantly, Science, if it is to
be true to Nature, must ultimately be aesthetically satisfactory.
Important recent studies into German Naturphilosophie have
shown that attitudes as to the role of aesthetics often provide
crucial clues as to important distinctions to be made with Natur-
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philosophie as a whole. A major problem facing the philosophy of
natural inquiry at the end of the eighteenth century was how human
reason, which had only sense data to work with and was thus confined
to the scrutiny of external characteristics, could ever come to
comprehend the inner realities of things. The Kantian response was
to argue that reason simply could not have direct access beyond the
phenomena. The best one could hope for was, through establishing
systematic interconnections and law-like relationships, to relate
natural phenomena into a synthetic holistic scheme. But that variety
of Naturphilosophen which von Engelhart has termed 'romantic' or
'speculative' were not prepared to accept a necessary dichotomy
between the understanding of the investigator and the object being
investigated. They proposed an alternative solution by which a
theory of aesthetics came to the aid of the theory of rationality.
Man's aesthetic sensitivities could, if suitably trained and applied,
transcend the limitations of reason, penetrate beyond the surface
phenomena and, sensuously and intuitively, grasp the underlying
unities of Nature.
Humboldt is clearly, to some extent, sympathetic to this point
of view:-
"[W]ho is there that does not feel himself differently
affected beneath the embowering shade of the beeches
grove, or on hills crowned with a few scattered pines,
or in the flowering meadow where the breeze murmur
through the trembling foliage of the birch? A feeling
of melancholy, or solemnity, or of light buoyant
animation is in turn awakened by the contemplation of
our native trees. This influence of the physical on
the moral world - this mysterious reaction of the
sensuous on the ideal, gives to the study of nature,
when considered from a higher point of view, a
peculiar charm which has not hitherto been sufficiently
recognised.
Such sentiments are to be found throughout Humboldt's entire
corpus. The degree to which plant geography involved aesthetic
judgement and shared its subject-matter with landscape painting
was, for Humboldt, one of its great attractions and sources of
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significance.
Commitment to empirical science
But Humboldt, although always alive to the prerogatives of
aesthetic sensitivity and the appeal of the Sublime, does not
follow Schiller or Schelling in denigrating the fruits of rationality.
He was chastised by Schiller for his "keen cold reason which would
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have all nature shamelessly exposed to scrutiny". In other words,
he did not repudiate empirical and experimental natural inquiry.
To Humboldt, aesthetics complemented rationality; it did not make
it redundant. The mathematical precision of the stars' orbits was
just as valid a topic for study as their sparkle and its associated
delights.
The Romantic movement was, as Mannheim has demonstrated,
associated with the reaction to the Enlightenment and the French
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Revolution. Its repudiation of rationality was a response to
the claims for the power of reason made by the radical philosophes t
Goethe, Schiller, Schelling, and Hegel were all in their different
121
ways conservatives. Their attitude to nature and to natural
inquiry was part and parcel of their conservative ideology. But
Humboldt was famous in Paris, and notorious in Prussia, for his
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liberalism. He was liberal in the liberal-conservative tradition
which was prevalent, for instance, at the University of GOttingen.
He favoured progressive reform by enlightened aristocratic govern¬
ment; he campaigned for the abolition of slavery; he supported
moves toward the independence of the Spanish Colonies. But he
opposed democratic institutions. A commitment to natural science
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was part of this liberal-conservative ideology. Liberal elements
in Paris, with which Humboldt identified himself, likewise did not
participate in the repudiation of actively manipulative scientific
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inquiry. Humboldt shared certain interests with Goethe and
Schiller - but his view of society and the structure of the state
was different from theirs. The divergent attitudes to science
reflect this.
It is important here to note that conservative Romanticism,
Mannheim's famous characterisation of its distinctive style of
thought notwithstanding, did not have a monopoly on holism. There
was a wide variety of holistic intellectual strategies available
at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth
century. For instance, Neo-classical theory of Art, Blumenbach's
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Kantianism, and the popular science sponsored by the Jacobins,
to take examples from strikingly different provenances, might all
be said to be equally as holistic as the thought of Goethe or
Hegel, in the sense that they all stressed unities and harmonies
in nature, regarded particulars as meaningful only when they
existed within an established framework, and held the mechanical
system to be insufficient, in one way or another. A holistic
stress on organic cohesiveness in nature and underlying regularities
between phenomena may be taken as structural within the prevailing
episteme.
Thus physico-mathematical empiricism, experiment and quantifi¬
cation could be harnessed to the construction of a universal
holistic natural philosophy just as readily as were the intuitive
and speculative efforts of Schiller and Schelling. The work of
Blumenbach, Treviranus and Keilmayer, at the University of Gbttingen,
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provides good examples of this being done in practice. Likewise
Humboldt effortlessly combined a commitment to empiricism and the
experimental elucidation of the laws of nature with an equally
strong commitment to holism and to a view of nature which was
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intended to be aesthetically and spiritually satisfactory.
At several points in this chapter mention has been made of
similarities between Humboldt and scholars associated with the
University of GSttingen. It seems appropriate at this stage to look
more deeply into this connection. Fortunately we are greatly aided
in this task by the detailed study of the University of GOttingen
and its 'transcendental' style of Naturphilosophie which has
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recently been produced by Timothy Lenoir.
GOttingen was the premier centre of scientific scholarship in
Germany throughout the eighteenth century. In the 1780s and 1790s,
scientific practice at GOttingen supported Kant's philosophical
prescriptions in several ways. GOttingen scholars enthusiastically
agreed with Kant's critique of teleological judgement and sought,
like Kant, to harmonise the teleological with the mechanical
viewpoint in the conceptualisation of organic entities. Biological
organisms were conceived of as being objects within which the parts
were bound together in such a way that cause and effect were mutually
and reciprocally related - that is to say, effects participated in
their own causation. This is virtually Kant's definition of holistic
organisation. The GOttingen scholars also shared Kant's concern
with the effect of the total environment upon the organism.
As he was a young man interested in natural science, it is
understandable that Humboldt, at the age of nineteen, came to study
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at GOttingen. If he and not his mother had been in charge of
directing the early stages of his education, he might have got
there sooner. As it was, although he remained there for only a
year, in latter life he referred to the University of GOttingen as
where he received the most valuable part of his scientific
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education. He was a student of Blumenbach. It is not surprising
therefore that Lenoir has identified Humboldt as a major practitioner
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of the GOttingen style.
Certainly there were many points of similarity between Humboldt's
practice and that institutionalised at GOttingen. In his early
experimental work on animal magnetism, Humboldt employed a conception
of vital principle congruent with Blumenbach's Bildungstrieb - that
is a vital teleological agency emergent from the organism's
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material substance. Overall, Humboldt's view of the organism was
very similar to that outlined above as being typical of the GOttingen
school. It was likewise reminiscent of Kant's Critique of Teleological
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Judgement. And, as we have seen, Humboldt applied the holistic
teleological interpretation not only to individual organisms but to
the supra-individual phenomenon of vegetation. Here we can also
recognise elements shared with Blumenbach. Blumenbach had long
been concerned with the effect on the organism of its total
environment (what he called its habitus) and with the geographical
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distribution of natural phenomena. His interest likewise ranged
from the distribution of plants and animals to that of the moral
characteristics of the races and peoples of mankind.
However it is likely that Lenoir both identifies Humboldt too
strongly with GOttingen and over-emphasises the uniqueness and
importance of the GOttingen programme and its achievements.
Humboldt was, as we have seen from his connections with Goethe and
Forster, a most eclectic thinker. And much of what Lenoir identifies
as distinctively a product of Gttttingen was present elsewhere -
137
even in France. The important point is, however, that much of
Humboldt's cognitive concerns, particularly his holistic approach
to the organism, to landscape and to Nature, were not unique to him.
They were part of a much larger, institutionalised and socially
sustained pattern of intellectual activity. It was not only Humboldt
who effortlessly combined a commitment to empiricism, quantification
and experimentation within a holistic framework.
Empirical investigation of the environment of plants
It must be emphasised that Humboldt's plant geography was a
thorough empirical investigation of the environment of plants. As
Humboldt wrote:-
"
... it would be injurious to the advancement of
science to attempt rising to general ideas, in neglecting
the knowledge of particular facts.
In his gathering of facts Humboldt made intensive use of instruments
to measure physical parameters. One of the purposes of his scientific
travelling was to measure accurately, with instruments, where
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previous explorers had merely described. Subjective impressions
were not themselves sufficient as "pointers to the Incommensurable"
and isolated facts, however objective, were liable to mislead by
. . 140
giving only a partial impression of nature. The intensity of
the azure of the sky was not only to be appreciated aesthetically:
it was measured and the measurements were tabulated and compared
of different places. Likewise with the chemical composition of
the air, its temperature, its humidity, its electrical conductivity,
the barometric pressure, the boiling point of water, the dip of
the magnetic needle, and much more beside. Virtually anything
measurable was measured.
This enthusiasm for instrumentation and environmental measure¬
ment, although developed by Humboldt to an unprecedented extent (so
much so that Cannon identified it as the distinguishing feature of
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Humboldtian science), did not arise de novo with Humboldt. Nor
was he the first to employ it as part of the practice of scientific
travelling. The elder Forster measured the temperature of hot
springs in Tahiti, the salinity of sea-water in various parts of
142
the Pacific, and much else besides. Of course, in those days,
astronomy and navigation were the joint epitome of accurate
measuring. It is, thus, no coincidence that many of the instruments
taken by Humboldt to South America were navigational instruments -
sextants from London, dipping needles from the French Board of
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Longitude. He was adopting and adapting the tools and skills of
the navigator and the surveyor. And British navigation, in its turn,
owed much to the methods of terrestrial and celestial measurement
developed by the German astronomer and geographer Tobias Mayer (also
a professor at GOttingen and also interested in the regional
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differentiation of the earth's surface). Quantitative studies
of the physical environment were also part of the practice of
science in Humboldt's adopted country, France. In his essay on
the "Distribution of heat over the globe", Humboldt referred to
observations made by Arago at the French National Observatory, and
145
by Gay-Lussac during his famous ascent in a balloon. Immediately
on his return to Paris from the Americas, Humboldt collaborated
with Biot on a study of geographical variation in magnetic intensity
in which observations he made in South America were combined with
others made by Biot in southern France, Switzerland and northern
1
Italy. Thus Humboldt's interest in environmental quantification
again exemplifies his taking up pre-existing elements from his
cultural and intellectual milieu, and his pressing them into service
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for his own ends.
In Humboldt's plan for plant geography, all the different sorts
of data from many different observation sites were to be tabulated
and then correlated with the distribution of types of vegetation.
Such correlations would aid the discerning of the laws which governed
the distribution of vegetation. To facilitate these correlations,
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Humboldt developed the isoline technique of cartography.
The vegetational regions of the globe
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Humboldt's "magnificent lines" enclosed not only areas of
equal mean temperature and pressure but, in principle at least,
defined areas of uniform vegetation - natural vegetational regions,
characterised by distinctive plants. These regions possessed not
just horizontal unity - they were not simply distinguishable one
from another. They also possessed vertical unity. Indeed the
reason they were horizontally distinguishable was because of the
different integrative processes going on within each one. The
vegetational regions are thus real natural wholes in contrast to
the isolation of herbarium practice, the dried specimens upon
which floristic taxonomy was based. They are identifiable by
physiognomy. They were "non dans les serres et dans les livres de
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botanique, mais dans la nature meme". And the real wholeness
of these regions was expressed at levels other than that of the
vegetation. The regions were not simply vegetational units, but
natural divisions of the earth's surface. They were, for example,
also units of climate and of human activity. The "Tableau Physique
des Regions Equinoctiales" represents in pictorial form one of these
divisions - in this case the equatorial region of South America -
in its unified interrelatedness and complexity
"La meme tableau indique: La vegetation; Les animaux;
Les rapports geologiques; La culture; La temperature
de l'air; Les limites des neiges perpetuelles; La
constitution chimique de 1 1 atmosphere ; Sa tension
electrique; Sa pression barometrique; La decroissement
de la gravitation; L'intensite de la couleur azuree
du ciel; L'affoiblissement de la lumiere pendant son
passage par les couches de l'air; Les refractions
horizontales, et le degre de l'eau bouilante a
differentes hauteurs.
Natural regions of this sort were not, however, imagined to be
topographically or vegetationally homogeneous. The "Tableau" also
pictorially represents spatial differentiation within a single region.
This last point must be grasped if -we are to understand the topo¬
graphical extent of the vegetational entities with which Humboldt
dealt. A region might be defined by, say, the limits of natural
occurrence of the palm tree. But within the region so distinguished,
palm trees would not be distributed uniformly. On the tops of the
mountains one would find a "region des lichens" or, lower down, a
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"region des Cinchona". So within the natural region identified
by the extent of the palm tree, other vegetational regions would
have to be recognised. And vegetational features similar in
character to these regions could be found elsewhere, even outwith the
limit of the palm. Sweden, for example, was known to have regions
of lichens, not quite so high on its mountains and thousands of
miles from the nearest palm tree. Both these sorts of units, the
ones which were of a single place and the ones which recurred within
different geographical regions, were the expressions of environmental
influence:-
"
... and in the same manner as the perpetual snows
are found in every climate at a determinate height,
the febrifuge species of the quinquina (cinchona) have
also their fixed limits."1^
Both revealed patterns in nature. Both units were part of the
subject-matter of Humboldtian plant geography.
The larger units might be regarded as coinciding, broadly
speaking, with the biological provinces of the floristic botanist.
Humboldt's technique of 'Botanical Arithmetic' was used to quantify
154floristic differences between the provinces. There were other
ways in which Humboldt's concerns coincided with those of the
floristic phytogeographers at this level. However the study of the
smaller, recurring unit was truly novel and unique to Humboldtian
science.
The smaller sorts of vegetational region were often distinguishable
by physiognomy - by the gross patterns of vegetational growth. Such
patterns were the product of distinctive life-forms of plants:-
"Darts la variete des vegetaux qui couvrent
la charpente de notre planete, on distingue sans
peine quelque formes generale auxquelles se reduisent
la plupart des autres, et qui presentent autant de
families ou groups plus ou moins analogues entre eux.
II me borne a nommer quinze de ces groupes dont la
physionomie .. .
Examples of the classification of life-form used by Humboldt are:-
the grasses, the palms, the cacti, the conifers, the lianes, the
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horse-tails (Equinetales), the mosses, and the lichens. Thus
the "regions des lichens" were distinguishable by the obvious
profusion of a number of species, all with the same lichenous
life-form:-
"For as in some individual organic being we recognize
a definite physiognomy and as descriptive botany and
zoology are strictly speaking analyses of animal and
vegetable forms, so also there is a certain natural
physiognomy peculiar to every region of the earth."
This aspect of Humboldt's work on vegetation constitutes one of
the most decisive ways in which he departed from floristic taxonomic
methods. Classification by life-form, athough it did in many cases
approximate to more orthodox taxonomies, was proclaimed to be
independent of floristic systems:-
"In determining those forms, on whose individual
beauty, distribution and grouping, the physiognomy of
a country's vegetation depends, we must not ground
our opinion (as from other causes is necessarily the
case in botanical systems) on the smaller organs of
propagation ... but must be guided solely by those
elements of magnitude and mass from which the total
impression of a district receives its character of
individuality. Among the principal forms of vegetation
there are, indeed, some which constitute entire
families, according to the so-called 'natural systems'
of botanists ... The systematising botanist, however,
separates into different groups many plants which the
student of the physiognomy of nature is compelled to
associate together."^58
Likewise, species closely allied for the taxonomist might be put
into different life-form classes by the Humboldtian. For instance,
herbaceous and arborescent members of the same genus would be so
separated. The life-form classification was not proposed as a
rival to the several post-Linnean natural systems. It served a
different purpose, organising and describing natural phenomena from
a different point of view. It did not concern itself with the
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relation of species but with identifying the "regions [which] form
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the natural divisions of the vegetable empire."
Humboldt's concern with physiognomic life-form connects with
the attempt of other German naturalists such as Blumenbach to
construct ideal typologies:-
"The primeval force of organization, notwithstanding
a certain independence in the abnormal development of
individual parts, binds all animal and vegetable
structures to fixed ever-recurring types."
Such a programme was present in both the transcendental and the
speculative/metaphysical traditions of Naturphilosophie. But to
the speculative Naturphilosophen such as Goethe, Oken or Carus, as
Lenoir has observed, the Urtyp was the starting-point of a series
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of transformations producing a set of related forms. To Blumenbach
and Treviranus, the types or Grundformen represented plans of
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functional organisation. This latter sense is the way in which
the idea of physiognomic life-forms was used by Humboldt.
Humboldt's studies of life-form began the development of one
of the major techniques for the classification of vegetation - a
technique which was to form the basis of an enduring tradition of
ecological research, throughout the nineteenth and into the
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twentieth century - classification by physiognomy. The method
was employed and elaborated upon by one of Humboldt's closest
intellectual disciples, August Grisebach, who extended Humboldt's
system to comprise fifty-four classes of physiognomic plant types
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(Vegetationsformen). In 1872, in his Die Vegetation das Erde nach
ihren K-limatischen Anordnung, Grisebach, with this technique,




Closely allied to Humboldt's interest in vegetational features
of the kind represented by the "regions des lichens" and the
"regions des Cinchona" was his interest in what he termed the "social
plants":-
"
... plantes, reunies en societe comme les fourmis
et les abeilles, convient des terraines immense dont
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elles excluent tout espece heterogene."
Examples of vegetational features produced and typified by the
occurrence of social plants were heaths, savannahs and, on a smaller
scale, sphagnum bogs. Such features were identifiable entities
not only because they possessed a unified physiognomy, but also
because the more obvious plants were all of the same species or
genus.
The phenomena of social plants had been discussed by botanists
before Humboldt. Willdenow for example wrote
"In a climate a singular diversity in plants may be
observed, viz. some are sociable, as it were. Others
remain solitary, or some are never found but in great
numbers crowded together ... These gregarious plants
often occupy great tracts of land. Common heath (Erica
vulgaris) is often spread many miles."167
But there is a crucial distinction to be made between Humboldt's
treatment of heath as a vegetational feature and that of Willdenow.
To Willdenow the heath is Erica vulgaris. It is characterised by
the occurrence of one and only one species. Although Humboldt
defines a social plant as one which grows without other species
being present in the same area, in practice his usage is somewhat
different. To him the heathland is not simply where many plants of
Erica vulgaris grow. The heath is rather an 'association' of
several plants of different species, indeed of different physiognomic
types, among which _E. vulgaris is the most obvious, the most
numerous. Thus he writes:-
"Les bruyeres, cette association de 1'erica vulgaris,
de l'erica tetralix, des lichen icmadophile et haematomma
"168
It is not only in considering heaths that Humboldt regards the
phenomena of social plants as being that of groups of different
species occurring together and not simply the profusion of a single
species:-
"Quoique le phenomene des plantes sociales paroisse
appartenir principalement aux zones temperees, les
tropiques en offrent cependent plusieurs exemples.
Sur le dos de la longue chaine des Andes, a trois
milles metres de hauteur, s'etendent le brathis
juniperina, le .jarava (genre de graminees voisin du
papporophorum ) , l'escallonia myrtilloides , plusieurs
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especes de molina et surtaut le tourrettia ... "
Such assemblages are not simply "associations de plantes de la meme
esp&ces"; they are plant communities - types of vegetation.
Humboldt's listing of species occurrence, in the above way, may
be readily distinguished from Willdenow's practice. Humboldt was
characterising units of vegetation; Willdenow, units of flora.
But it should be noted that Humboldt was, by listing constituent
species, characterising vegetational units in floristic, rather than
physiognomic, terms. The development of this technique (which
utilised the traditional skills of taxonomically-trained field
^botanists) has led to another great tradition of vegetational
research and classification - that based on floristic analysis -
which existed (and still exists) side by side with the development
of techniques based upon physiognomy.^
Why a science of vegetation?
We have now seen the broad outlines of the novel complex of
cognitive interests which characterised late eighteenth- and early
nineteenth-century natural history. We have also seen Humboldt's
relation to this new episteme. We can now answer the questions
posed at the beginning of this chapter. What brought into being a
new form of scientific practice based on a new object (vegetation)
- indeed new objects (vegetation units) - for scientific inquiry?
Why, at this particular point in time, did an independent study of
vegetation arise?
A concern with natural regionality was a prominent feature of
the intellectual activity of the age. This was expressed in botany
in the development of both floristic and vegetational plant
geography. The study of plants could readily accommodate a concern
with regionality since the distribution of vegetation was one of
the most striking aspects of the differentiation of the earth's
surface. Also vegetation could itself be subdivided into smaller,
more esoteric, natural units. The late eighteenth-century concern
with regionality produced the ideas of the regional Flora and the
unit of vegetation.
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The new episteme was holistic and presupposed organic cohesive-
ness and regularities underlying visible phenomena. Philosophers
and natural scientists were also concerned with constructing
environmental explanations for the structure of biological organisms
and the character of human societies. Here again the study of
vegetation offered botanists excellent opportunities to conform
with new cognitive trends. The study of vegetation seemed to
transcend the limitations of Linnean botany by addressing itself
not to what were seen as arbitrarily isolated entities, but to
real natural wholes. Vegetation and the relationship between
vegetation and the physical environment were both eminently con¬
ceivable in holistic terms. And vegetation was not only itself an
expression of the total environment, it could be regarded as one
of the aspects of any given environment that most affected Mankind.
For this last reason, the students of vegetation could claim
shared aesthetic concerns with contemporary landscape painters and
nature poets. The study of vegetation had common resonances with
Naturphilosophie. It was not narrowly or coldly scientific but
spiritually rich and fulfilling. Furthermore, accounts of exotic
vegetation were contributions to the literature of travel. The
study of vegetation thus offered a route towards professional
acceptability on a wider cultural stage.
But it did not lack conventional trappings of objective science
- as science was then conceived. It did not lack scientific respectability.
Here the study of vegetation had a tactical advantage over the
study of floristics. Both could readily employ quantification. But
vegetation science with its interest in the physical environment
of plants could more easily make use of measuring instruments. It
could more easily accommodate the compilation of physical data on
a grand scale, the correlation of one physical parameter with
another, the search for universal natural laws. Furthermore the
idea of natural kinds of vegetation identifiable by physiognomic
type was congruent with an emphasis on the construction of ideal
typologies - again an important component of the intellectual activity
of the time.
Thus the changed intellectual climate made the study of vegetation
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feasible, if not quite inevitable or unavoidable. The need for
natural historians to respond to changing scholarly circumstances
made the study of vegetation attractive and convenient. But
congruence with wider cognitive trends was not enough in itself,
to guarantee an enduring place for the study of the novel object of
the plant community within scientific practice. The important point
here is that the recognition of plant communities as entities within
vegetation gave botanists new, interesting and scientifically
respectable things to do. They could go out into the field to
identify, map and classify plant communities. If they were working
on a small scale, in areas in which the flora was already well
investigated, botanists could utilise the taxonomic skills they
already possessed and characterise the units of vegetation by
floristic criteria. If they were working on a large scale, where
floristic analysis would be too cumbersome, or in an area as yet
floristically unexplored, they could classify the vegetation using
non-floristic physiognomic criteria. Furthermore, refining and
elaborating the bases of physiognomic classification was itself a
viable research activity.
The study of the units of vegetation gave botanists useful
things to do when they travelled - as they were supposed to do.
Indeed all Humboldt's expeditionary publications functioned as
exemplifications of how to accomplish the difficult and important
task of making a scientific journey. Humboldt provided exemplars
as to what, how and why the botanical explorer was to observe and
investigate. Of course Humboldt's travel narratives inspired and
influenced many workers perhaps not directly in the Humboldtian
mode such as Darwin, Joseph Hooker and the explorers of the American
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West. But his writings were also, more immediately and directly,
models for a considerable number of botanists (mostly German or
Scandinavian) who went out into the field to identify and study the
types of vegetation. In other words, around the exemplar of
Humboldt's treatment of vegetation, there developed a new research
specialty - Humboldtian plant geography.
The remainder of this chapter is devoted to examining the
emergence of this new form of scientific practice. I have already
described paradigm development. I will now go on to describe
paradigm articulation, mediated by personal communication and
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recruitment.
The Humboldtians - Schouw and Meyen
Humboldt was the first to call communities of plants 'associations'
Humboldt used the term 'association', as we have seen, informally -
"Les bruy&res, cette association de 1'erica vulgaris ... ", or to
take another example, "I have explained the first ideas of the
geography of plants, their natural associations and the history of
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their migrations ... " But the term 'association' soon became
a technical one meaning a definite and distinguishable plant
community. Around the term an extensive technical vocabulary grew -
as a body of practice and practitioners of Humboldtian plant
geography developed.
Humboldt never held an academic position so he had no students
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as such. But as well as the exemplars which his published works
provided, he exercised influence through a vast scholarly acquaintance
175
and considerable academic patronage. He maintained an immense
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scientific correspondence. Joachim F. Schouw, for instance, read
and was inspired by Humboldt's work in the early 1810s, when he
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was abandoning a career in law and training to become a botanist.
He was applying Humboldtian principles to the understanding of the
vegetation of Scandinavia by the end of the decade. This is indicated
by the title of one of his first publications:- "Einige Bemerhungen
uber zwei, die Pflanzengeographie betreffende Werken des Herrn von
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Humboldt". Schouw corresponded with Humboldt and in 1819
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journeyed to Paris to meet his mentor.
Schouw made his visit to Humboldt on the way back from a trip
to Italy. He visited Italy again in 1829. He later published an
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account of these scientific travels. In his introduction to this
work he apologised for his delay in producing an account of his
voyages. This he said was due to his absorption with such Humboldtian
concerns as:-
"
... son traites sur la aeographie universelle des
plantes et son tableau du climat du Danemark.1,181
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Schouw's own descriptions of his work illustrate how similar his
concerns are to Humboldt's. He investigated the physical environment
to correlate it with the distribution of vegetation, to create "la
geographie universelle des plantes":-
"Le volume actuel [the first] contient le tableau
de la temperature et des pluies, et comme la config¬
uration du sol exerce une influence essentielle sur
le climat ... Le second volume contiendra les autres
elemens du climat et une comparaison des annees diverses
relativement au caractere meteorologique, ce qui
conduira aussi a traiter la question interessante des
variations qu'a attribue au climat. Le troisieme volume
, , I QO
sera consacre au tableau phytogeographique . "
The first volume is given over entirely to tables of physical
measurement:-
"Le climat et la vegetation sont influences
puissamment par l'elevation du sol au-dessus de la mer,
le but de mon voyage exigeoit par consequent la
determination de la hauteur d1un grand nombre de
points.1,183
Schouw was also interested in the units of vegetation and, in
1822, he invented a nomenclature for associations which consisted
of adding the suffix '-etum' to the generic name of the plant which
dominated the given association; for example, 'Fagetum' for a
community dominated by a species of Fagus, the beech tree, or
'Quercetum' for an association in which one of the species of the
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oak, Quercus, was the most numerous tree.
Schouw developed both the floristic and the vegetational aspects
185of Humboldt's plant geography. He is probably more famous for
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his work on the floristic side. His approach to plant communities
was, as we can see from his nomenclature, primarily floristic.
However, that was not the whole story of the Humboldtian legacy.
In 1838, August Grisebach re-emphasised the physiognomic aspect
and introduced the new term 'formation'
"I would term a group of plants which bears a
definite physiognomic character, such as meadow, a
forest, etc., a phytogeographic formation. The latter
may be characterized by a single social species, by
a complex of dominant species belonging to one family,
or, finally, it may show an aggregate of species, which,
although of various taxonomic character, have a common
peculiarity; thus the alpine meadow consists almost
exclusively of perennial herbs.
Eventually it became conventional to use the term 'association',
frequently together with the '-etum' nomenclature, to refer to
vegetation types characterised by floristic criteria, and the
term 'formation' to refer to types characterised by physiognomy,
as in Grisebach's examples.1^
Note that it is impossible to say when precisely the idea of
the plant association first arose. To the question "Is the idea of
the association present in Humboldt's writings?" one could give
only an equivocal answer. His use of the term is, as we have seen,
informal. He certainly spoke of natural regions of vegetation,
but are they really associations in the later technical sense of the
word? Only if one interprets Humboldt's text in the light of later
work. On the other hand, to the question "Is the idea of definite
plant communities present in Grisebach's work?" one would have to
give, I think, an affirmative answer (with the proviso, of course,
that usage has changed somewhat in the decades which separate
Grisebach from twentieth-century ecology). When exactly between
Humboldt's Essai and Grisebach's 1848 paper, did the concept of the
association (or the formation) arise? I cannot answer this question.
But this inability is not, I hope, caused by a failure of scholarly
investigation. The situation of the origin of the plant community
is very similar to that described by T.S. Kuhn in his account of
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the discovery of oxygen. The identification of 'oxygen' as an
entity in the real world was not a unit-event. Conceptual categories
changed gradually as new scientific practices developed. Slowly,
the category 'oxygen' emerged. So it was with the idea of the plant
community. In reality, the plausibility of its being part of the
structure of the world, increased as more people investigated it
and found the concept useful in the investigation of other things.
So the reality of plant community, like the reality of oxygen,
gradually emerged from a process of cognitive change. It developed
with the articulation of a new programme of research.
In the work of Meyen, August Grisebach and Kerner von Marilaun,
the Humboldtian programme for a plant geography based on a supra-
individual, supra-specific unit was continued and developed. To
gain the full character of the Humboldtian legacy as it was expressed
in the scientific practice of the next generation, it is worthwhile
looking briefly at these authors.
Franz J.F. Meyen was, until his death in 1840, Professor of
Botany at the University of Berlin. He was one of the most favoured
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of Humboldt's many scientific proteges. Meyen, who had been
working as a physician when Humboldt returned to Berlin in 1826,
owed both his scientific career ana his post at the University to
Humboldt. Humboldt took great trouble to make Meyen's work known
to a wide audience and he personally sponsored Mirbel's French
translation of Meyen's book on plant geography. This book was
later translated into English as Outlines of the Geography of Plants
It is one of the earliest, most successful and most explicit
articulations of the Humboldtian exemplar.
One might almost say that Meyen's career is a replica in
miniature of Humboldt's. Meyen, for example, travelled in the New
World (1830-2) and recorded both scientific and aesthetic observations
made on summits in the Andes
"The sight of a little Gentian, very similar to our
Gentiana uliginosa and G. nivalis at the height of
14,000 or 15,000 feet as in the Cordillera of Southern
Peru, can enchain the botanist for hours; he again
and again gathers this little plant which takes him,
at least in imagination, home."^
Extant correspondence between Humboldt and Meyen indicates that
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Humboldt influenced his protege's travel plans at every stage.
Meyen's botanical geography was explicitly presented as Humboldt's
"new science which answers in a way that had before been impossible,
many of the most interesting questions on the production and
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distribution of organic beings on the surface of the globe".
Humboldt's name was regularly invoked throughout Meyen's book.
Outlines of the Geography of Plants was, among other things, a
sustained and sophisticated attempt to correlate vegetation with
measured physical factors. Meyen employed copious instrumental
records, mostly of his own making, drew up temperature charts and
tables and employed isothermal, isotheral and isocheimenal lines
to apply meteorological data in the study of the distribution of
vegetation:-
"It is very easy to show that the conditions of
climate, particularly heat and moisture, are the chief
causes which determine the station and distribution of
plants and therefore it is of the greatest importance
to know exactly the modes in which the influence of
the often extremely complicated conditions of climate
become apparent. To arrive at this end, we must first
... employ ourselves with the observations which have
been collected on the distribution of the heat and
moisture of the atmosphere over the whole globe and
which are by no means of pure meteorological interest
but constantly point to the influence which individual
meteorological phenomena exercise over vegetation."195
Meyen was interested in floristics and systematics but he had
carefully distinguished floristic plant geography from vegetational
plant geography, which interested him still more. In floristic
plant geography his principal tool was the Botanical Arithmetic
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(or Statistics) of Humboldt, De Candolle and Schouw. In the
study of vegetation, however, he was principally concerned with
classification by physiognomy:-
"The subject of the distribution of plants over the
surface of the globe may be divided into two perfectly
distinct branches, one of which called the Physiognomies
considers vegetation according to the distribution of
forms which point out the groups of plants; it is a
peculiarly natural system in which similarity of form
is the principle of classification ... The other
branch, viz. the Statistics of plants on the contrary
... considers the relative proportions, founded on
real numbers which this or that group by its number of
species bears either to the whole mass of known plants
or to the number of species of other groups."1^
Meyen's plant geography extends Humboldt's Essai in every
direction. He investigated the role of vegetation in Man's aesthetic
appreciation of Nature
"Baron Alexander von Humboldt['s] '... celebrated
work "Considerations on the Physiognomy of Plants"
pointed out this highly interesting side from which
botany may be viewed and how it may improve the taste
of nations by increasing their sensibility to the
beauties of nature and thus have an influence on the
progress of the arts."1
He also considered the effect of vegetation upon human society,
illustrating Humboldt's argument that the regionality of vegetation
was both a reflection and a cause of the natural divisions of
geographical phenomena:-
"It is vegetation which fixes the natural character
of a region and determines the conditions according
to which men gather into various societies, at one
time leading a nomadic life, at another enjoying more
or less the beneficent influence of agriculture. Where
vegetation is scanty, and man is more or less confined
to animal food, as in the case of the Samoyedes and
Esquimaux on the coast of the Northern ocean,
civilisation is impossible. In those regions, man
lives like the beasts and does not even think of
rousing himself above them.1,199
August Grisebach
August Grisebach and Kerner von Marilaun were, like Meyen,
close associates of Humboldt and self-consciously continued
Humboldt's programme for a plant geography. Grisebach was born in
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1814. His early interest in botany was encouraged by his uncle,
the eminent German natural historian Georg F.W. Meyer, who was a
professor at the University of GBttingen. Grisebach was himself a
student at GSttingen from 1832 until 1834 when he moved to the
University of Berlin. In Berlin he was a student of Franz J.F.
Meyen, and he became acquainted with C.S. Kunth, who had been the
botanist principally in charge of the taxonomic work upon the
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specimens collected by Humboldt and Bonpland in South America.
Kunth was, therefore, although principally a taxonomist, one of
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Humboldt's closest scientific collaborators.
In 1833 Grisebach went on a botanising trip to southern France.
He had read Humboldt's accounts of his travels and was already
interested in the types of vegetation characteristic of different
regions and different environments. In 1839 he set out again on
a major expedition into the hitherto botanically-unexplored regions
of Thrace, Macedonia, Albania and Northern Asia Minor. He made a
transect across the Balkan peninsula, reminiscent of the transect
of South America pictorially represented in Humboldt's Essai.
These travels were described in his Reise durch Rumelian und nach
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Brussa im Jahre 1839. This account contains much Humboldtian
observation, particularly of altitudinal zonation of vegetation.
For example, on the slopes of Ulu Dag, he described three main
zones of vegetation:- the region of sweet chestnuts, the region
of conifers, and the alpine region.
On his return to Germany he became privatdozent at the University
of GOttingen, rising to full professor in 1847. Another botanising
and phytogeographical journey was undertaken, to Norway, in 1842.
By this time Grisebach had become a personal friend of Humboldt and
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the two exchanged a copious scientific correspondence. Grisebach
became one of the leading exponents of Humboldtian plant geography
and he wrote the chapter on Humboldt's work in plant geography for
pryr
Bruhn's commemoratory Life of Humboldt. Further displaying the
GOttingen connection, Grisebach also wrote the laudatory account
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of Blumenbach in Gttttinger Professoren.
I have already referred to Grisebach's introduction of the term
'formation' to refer to "a group of plants of definite physiognomy"
- for example an alpine meadow consisting almost entirely of
perennial herbs. In 1838, he indicated the relation between
physiognomic and floristic criteria by pointing out that a physio¬
gnomic formation could be characterised by a single dominant
(social) species or by a number of dominant species of related
Grisebach was an accomplished taxonomist and was interested
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in floristic as well as vegetational plant geography. Indeed
the two activities were held to complement each other:-
"Banbury has made, a report in his botanical travels
in South Africa. His description of the character of
the vegetation in the environs of Cape Town is so
much the more interesting, as being accompanied by
Harvey, who is intimately acquainted with the Cape
Flora, he was enabled to acquire an exact knowledge
of the species."^9
A good example of Grisebach's approach to vegetation is
afforded by his account of Blasius's description of the distribution
of organic nature in European Russia:-
"Northern Russia is chiefly distinguished from the
central province by its dense forests, in which Pinus
sylvestris, L., and _P. abies, L., are the predominant
species, and whose vast extent is only broken by
swamps, or where, in the neighbourhood of the fluvial
valleys, the trees have been thinned and destroyed
by man. Amongst the pines and firs are intermingled
here and there, Alnus incana, L., and Betula pubescens,
Ehrb., which in some parts constitute by themselves
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large forests. The limits between cultivation and the
wilderness are everywhere indicated, especially by
alder bushes. Besides which the only form of leaf-
trees are Populus tremula, L., Sorbus Aucaparia, L.,
and Prunus Padus, L. The pines and firs form two
distinct forest formations, differing in the proportion
of the argillaceous constituent of the soil. The
clayey, often marshy low lands of the old red sand¬
stone are covered with thick fir wood, among which
occur the aspen and the alder; the sandy diluvial
hillocks bear Pinus sylvestris, L., and Betula
pubescens, Ehrb., and represent the forest character
of the North German plain, the soil of which has been
formed at the same time. On this diluvium, where the
soil is deficient in clay, are met with also heaths
of Calluna which do not occur in the Siluria plains
and trap formations. However the diluvium is not
altogether free from bog, where Ledum and Andromeda
calyculata, L. flourish, but even here also, the fir
... does not grow, but only the pine ... which does
not shun the water and requires only a light sandy
soil.'*210
While farther south:-
"The northern marsh willows are replaced by Salix
fusca, L., Cinerea by Caprea L., and Alnus incona,
D.C., is represented by Alnus glutinosa, G. Thus
almost all the plant formations assume another
character, but the physiognomy of the whole country
is much more strikingly altered by the increased
extent of cultivation."2'1''
The last quotation in particular illustrates the relation of
vegetational to floristic phenomena in Grisebach's work. The
formations are phenomena in their own right, distinguishable by
physiognomy, but they are also characterisable by the plant
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species which constitute them.
Kerner von Marilaun
Kerner von Marilaun, Professor of Botany at the University of
Innsbruck, wrote that due to the scientific travels of Humboldt
more was known of the vegetation of South America than of Austria-
Hungary : -
"Attention was called to our native plant formations
only when travelers with genius and good fortune showed
in word and picture the marvelous plant formations
which spread in primeval virginity beneath tropic
suns along the banks of the giant rivers of South
America ...
It is literally true that we have had exact
descriptions and splendidly illustrated portrayals of
the shores of the Pacific Ocean or the tropical zone
of Brazil for a long time before our native plant
formations were given a similar treatment."213
Kerner von Marilaun's task was to redress this imbalance using
Humboldtian methods. He travelled extensively in the previously
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botanically-unexplored regions of eastern Hungary and Transylvania.
In the characterisation of vegetation his methods were physiognomic
ones. He proposed a nomenclature for plant formations, based not
on floristic criteria as Schouw's had been, but on physiognomy.
He was careful to distinguish the study of physiognomy from the
study of floristics:-
"
... almost every systematic group is represented
by various forms which are totally different in
physiognomy ... Plant physiognomy and plant system-
atics go entirely different ways."215
In the work of Grisebach and von Marilaun the opinion was
expressed that the individual plant was fully understandable only
if it was considered as a member of a distinct community. As well
as being a unified response to the climate and other environmental
factors, the plant community had a high degree of internal
integration - which was part of the reason one community was
readily distinguishable from its neighbours. Plants living
together had effects upon one another and the character of
vegetation was partly determined by these effects. The social
groups of plants had a definite social structure.
As Kerner von Marilaun wrote in his classic text Das Pflanzen-
leben der Donauiander, published in 1863:-
"The horizontal and vertical assorting of large
plant communities is by no means accidental in spite
of its apparent lack of order. It follows certain
immutable laws. Every plant has its place, its time,
its function and its meaning ... In every zone the
plants are gathered into definite groups which
appear either as developing or as finished communities,
but never transgress the orderly and correct composition
of their kind. Science has given to such groups the
name Plant Formations. With the comparative study of
landscapes botanists found it necessary to define and
characterize these ever-recurring elements which are
so conspicuous in the physiognomy of landscape.
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Like Humboldt, von Marilaun was also concerned to understand
the vegetation as an expression of the physical environment
"Everywhere plant life is adjusted to the local
climatic conditions. When one opens the great green
Book of Nature, one finds therein the local climatic
conditions generally much more precisely and correctly
registered than on the yellowing pages of thick
meteorological journals and folios. The vegetation
is everywhere the reflection of the local climate.
For that reason no feature of the landscape is so
PI 7
significant and informing as the vegetation."c"
Also, like Humboldt, Kerner von Marilaun regarded the study of
vegetation as bearing upon the entire range of human activities:-
"What a wealth of problems arise in investigating
the relation of these different expressions of
landscape to the spiritual side of Man, to his feeling
toward nature, to his culture and to the products of
his creative art."^1®
It is clear from Das Pflanzenleben der Donauiander that by the
middle of the nineteenth century, much more was known about
vegetation than when Humboldt wrote his essay. Marilaun's descriptions
of the plant formations of Austria-Hungary are very detailed -
his accounts of plant succession, what he termed "the genetical
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relationships of plant formations", are particularly well-observed.
He could confidently point to several instances where the study of
vegetation had proved its practical utility to fields such as
forestry. But the framework of inquiry is recognisably Humboldtian.
Southern Humboldtians - Lecoq and Heer
By the mid-nineteenth century the study of plant communities,
natural kinds of vegetation, was well established in scientific
practice. As well as the workers already mentioned, explicitly
Humboldtian concerns were evident in the work of many other German
and Scandinavian authors. Important examples of texts in this
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tradition are those of Heer, Thurmann, Sendtner, Lorenz and Hult.
These men were, like Grisebach and von Marilaun, the bearers of a
Humboldtian tradition of plant geography and the users of the idea
of the plant community.
A keen interest in the phenomena of vegetation is also displayed
by the advanced and wide-ranging work of the French botanist Henri
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Lecoq, Civic Professor of Natural History at Clermont-Ferrand.
Lecoq's allegiance to Humboldt is clear:-
"Mais alors un livre me tombe sous la main; j'avais
appris, quoique bien jeune encore, a respecter le nom
de son auteur, et ce livre, en me revelant une science
que je soupqonnais sans la connaitre, mit de l'ordre
dans mes idees; et dirigea par la suite une partie
de mes etudes; c'etait L'Essai de Geoqraphie botanique
du celebre Alexandre de Humboldt."z
Lecoq, like Meyen, made a firm distinction between flora and vegetation
"II y a done une tres-grande difference entre La
flore et le tapis vegetal d'une contree. La premiere
fournit les materiaux qui servent a constituer le
second.
Like Humboldt, Lecoq found the geography of plants of more
interest than floristic botany:-
"
... j'ai du autant que possible, conserver les
anciennes especes, en les considerant, au besoin,
comme des groupes. Je n'ai pas l'intention de publier
une flore ni de discuter des characteres, mais
seulement de m'occupe de la geographie etde la
dispersion des especes du plateau central de la
France. Ce n'est done ni par ignorance des Ecrits
publies, ni par negligence ou mauvais vouloir, que
je n'adopte pas la majeure partie des especes
nouvelles; j'apprecie mit le merite des botanistes
qui se livrent a cette etude, mais, pour des travaux
de geographie botanique, je suis force de me
contenter souvent des groupes au lieu d'especes
bien definies .
In his enormous eight-volume treatise on the vegetation of
central and southern France, Lecoq described many different assoc¬
iations. The distribution of the associations was correlated with
climatic and environmental factors such as the intensity of solar
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radiation, temperature, soil water content, and so on. Lecoq
also gave a theoretical discussion of the vegetational phenomena
of 'sociabilite' (many plants of the same species living together)
226
and 'association' (many plants of different species living together).
Of course it must be admitted that not every botanist who
acknowledged the influence of Humboldt was a Humboldtian plant
geographer in the sense I am using that designation. A passage in
praise of Humboldt very similar to that I have quoted from Lecoq
60
occurs in the introduction to Alphonse de Candolle's great book
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Geographie Botanique Raissonnee. What distinguished the
tradition of Humboldtian plant geography from that of floristic
plant geography was the concern for vegetation. De Candolle
correlated plant distribution with climatic, physical and geo¬
graphical factors, but all throughout the book he was concerned
with the distribution of species, genera and families, hardly at
all with vegetation types. It is significant, for instance, that
the illustration folded into the first volume of Geographie Botanique
Raissonnee is not a Humboldtian panorama of natural regions and
vegetation types, but a map of the northerly limit of various
plant species in Europe.
De Candolle recognised the existence of what he called Topographie
botanique, which he defined, partly, as:-
"
... rechercher quels sont les characteres de la
vegetation des marais, des prairies, des forets, etc.,
dans quelles proportions les diverses categories de
plantes s'y trouvent representees, par quels motifs
certaines especes en sont exclues, etc.; ce serait
une Topoqraphie botanique."22S
But he was not very interested in pursuing that study:-
"Cette distribution locale, ou topoqraphie des plantes,
pourrait constituer une branche de la science, moins
importante sans doute que la geographie botanique, mais
offrant des developpements analogues ... Mon intention
n'est pas d'en pariej ci fort en detail, car se serait
sortir de mon sujet."
De Candolle personified the floristic side of the dichotomy
230of emphasis which existed in nineteenth-century plant geography.
The floristic style of botanical geography seems to have been
the most popular in France and Britain. Watson, Hooker, Wallace
and Darwin (as far as his plant geography was concerned) all
practised a form of investigation principally structured around
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the problems of distribution and dispersal of species. There
appear to have been few nineteenth-century British plant geographers
232who placed great emphasis on vegetational phenomena.
However, in the German-speaking countries and Scandinavia, the
Humboldtian example of the study of vegetation seems to have been
widely adopted. [There were, of course, many floristic plant
geographers in Germany and Scandinavia also.] It is instructive,
for example, to compare Richard Hind's account of his botanical
observations during the voyage of H.M.S. Sulphur with the roughly
contemporaneous work of Oswald Heer, Professor of Botany at the
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University of Zurich.
Despite the title of Hind's book - The Regions of Vegetation -
his regions are somewhat arbitrary geographical divisions - the
Japan region, the China region, the Birmah region and so forth. His
description of these regions, apart from brief remarks as to the
general character of the landscape, are entirely floristic. Only
in the description of the "Himma-leh region" does he depart from
this procedure. Here, with a bow, as it were, to Humboldt's
description of the Andes, he recognised the "region of lowland
cultivation", the "region of woods", the "region of shrubs", the
23A
"region of grasses" and the "region of cryptogamic plants".
Heer's emphasis, on the other hand, was almost entirely
vegetational. Folded in at the end of Heer's Beitrage zur Pflanzen-
geographie is an engraving of a mountain panorama, entitled "Gem&lde
der Vegetation des SUdOstlichen Theils des Canton Glarus", which is
strikingly reminiscent in size, style and content, of Humboldt's
"Tableau Physique". Accompanying the engraving is an elaborate
table indicating the physical environment of each region depicted.
Characteristic soil and atmospheric temperatures, for instance, are
given. A key to symbols on the picture gives the most important
species to be found in each region. For instance, the rocks of the
upper zone of the regio nivalis are said to support a vegetation
characterised by saxifrages and Primula.
Heer was careful to distinguish his approach to plant geography
from that of the more floristic Linnean botanist Wahlenberg:-
"Ich suchte auf diesen Reisen mir geuane Verzeich-
nisse von den Pflanzen aller HOhen und Localit&ten
zu verschaffen, wobei ich die Methode von Schouw
befolgte ... Die Methode Wahlenberg fand ich sehr
unzweck m&ssig ... "235
Northern Huraboldtians - Hult
The work of the Swedish botanist, Hampus van Post likewise
exemplifies the distinction between vegetational and floristic
plant geography. He frankly criticised his fellow Scandinavian
botanists for not adopting the physiognomic approach - criticisms
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which earned him some censure from his peers.
Of the later Scandinavian Humboldtians the work of Ragnar Hult
is particularly interesting to look at, since his approach and methods
were further developed by Rutger Sernander under whose leadership
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the Uppsala school of plant sociology was founded. The Uppsala
school was to be one of the two dominant schools of plant ecology
in Western Europe throughout the twentieth century - the other being
the Zurich-Montpelier school founded by Flahault and SchrOter.
Sernander was an assistant of Hult in the early 1880s and Du Rietz,
Osvald, Nordhagen and L. von Post were all students and disciples
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of Sernander. Thus in Hult we see a direct link between the
practice and usage of what I have termed Humboldtian plant geo¬
graphy and the 'self-conscious' ecology and plant sociology of the
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twentieth century.
We can see Hult's debt to Humboldt as far as the style and
content of his work in the introduction to his important article
"Fttrsok till Analytisk Behandling af Vachstformation" (Attempt to
2A0
make an analytical scheme of plant formations). For instance,
Hult shared Humboldt's stress on units above that of the individual
plant species and his concern for an aesthetic as well as a
scientific response to vegetation:-
"When botanical geography first appeared, it was an
appendage and auxiliary to systematic botany. Species,
genus, families and higher taxa were studied from the
point of view of site conditions, distribution and
mode of distribution and from this research conclusions
were drawn regarding each taxon's habitat and so on.
It was ignored or overlooked that there also existed
other individually very obvious groups of plants as
well as the systematic taxa, "one did not see the wood
for the trees".
It needed Humboldt's mighty spirit ... to discover
these groups and to realize their immense significance
in the geography and history of the Earth. In his
travels through tropical America he was struck by the
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definite outlook which certain characteristic and
dominant plants lent the landscape. He saw the shifting
expression of this outlook in the dark of the jungle
and on the monotonous plains of the savannas, on the
palm decked tidal beaches, and in the treeless high
mountains of the Andes; he saw the vegetation of
all the regions together within a limited space, but
organized according to a system of law which he could
not fail to notice ... he emphasised primarily the
physiognomy and the growth forms of plants, the inter¬
dependence of these features from systematic relations,
and their role in the character of the landscape, as
well as these group's mode of growing together, the
monotony of the colonies of the social plants in
contrast to the diversity of forms and variations in
the tropical jungle."^
Hult thus clearly and explicitly identified himself as working
within the Humboldtian tradition. However he adopted only some
aspects of the Humboldtian legacy - its emphasis on physiognomic
forms and the identification of vegetation units, for example -
and discarded others - notably environmetry. By the second half
of the nineteenth century, Humboldtian plant geography had suffered
several internal divergences in the process of its development
as a research tradition. Hult distanced himself from the work of
Schouw for example, whose approach to plant communities he regarded
as deductive - by which he meant principally concerned with the
environment rather than the vegetation itself - and unduly
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floristic. Hult's approach was strictly physiognomic.
Some of the different manifestations of the Humboldtian
tradition had, as in Hult's case, characteristics which their
direct lineal descendants were to continue to display in the era
of self-conscious ecology and plant sociology. For instance, in
Hult's work we see preoccupations that are to become quite
characteristic of the Uppsala school - a concern to study the
vegetation as an end in itself rather than as an expression of
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the habitat, and a concern with very small units of vegetation:-
"Because if one is to go for example to a moor in
the middle of Finland, one can see there in an area
where no differences in the chemical or physical
conditions can be shown at least two sharply divided
plant groupings alternating in patches. One is an
even and dense mass of Cladina silvatica, with other
lichens sprinkled in, as well as Polytricha and low
Empetrum; the other is a similarly thick and even
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mat of Calluna vulgaris, with a sparse undergrowth of
Cladoniaarter, Hylcomia and Polytricha, as well as
sparse and blended clumps mixed in of Hieracium
umbellatum, Solidago, and a few other plants. Here
we can thus see an intimate mixture on the same
location of two plant communities, which are in sharp
contrast to each other. And these have to be united
by the deductive school of thought, which according
to the varying degrees of dampness of the soil,
distinguishes formations with barely distinguishable
vegetation. "2^
The emergence of a 'self-conscious ecology'
The process by which ecology became institutionalised and
recognised as a discipline in its own right, is beyond the scope of
this thesis. However all commentators are agreed that this process
may be said to have been well under way, at least in Europe, by
the time Warming, Drude and Schimper produced their great summary
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volumes in 1895, 1896, and 1898 respectively. Also, by this
time Flahault and SchrOter had laid the foundations of the Southern
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or Zurich-Montpelier school of plant sociology.
The work of all these men bore the mark of the Humboldtian
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tradition. Their investigations possessed much of the character
they did because Humboldt and the Humboldtians lived and worked
before them. SchrOter, for example, was a doctoral student of
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Oswald Heer's at the University of Zurich. He was a sufficiently"
favoured student to inherit Heer's professorship upon Heer's death
in 1883. Schrfiter's biographer and student, Eduard Rubel, has
stressed the influence of Kerner von Marilaun's Pflanzenleben der
249
bonauiander upon SchrOter's early phytogeographical work.
Kerner's Pflanzenleben provided an important model for Schrttter's
own Das Pflanzenleben der Alpe. Thus we see that the Zurich-
Montpelier school, like its northern counterpart the Uppsala school,
had, through its founders, direct student-mentor links to Humboldt
and the early Humboldtians.
Warming's and Schimper's books were of immense influence in
Britain and North America as well as in Germany and Scandinavia.
Two of the principal preoccupations of Schimper's book are already
well known to us - concerns we have identified as clearly belonging
to the Humboldtian tradition. Schimper structured his treatment of
the world's plant cover around a classification of vegetation into
region, formations and smaller units. This classification was, at
least largely, physiognomic:-
"Climatic formations may be traced back to three
chief types - woodland, grassland and desert. Woodland
is constituted essentially of woody plants, and is
termed forest if trees grow in a closed condition;
bushwood when shrubs are so abundant as to keep the
crowns of the trees from touching one another;
shrubwood where shrubs constitute the chief feature."
Secondly Schimper wished to correlate the occurrence of
vegetation types with the physical environment. His book is replete
with tables of mean temperatures in the Brazilian forests, humidity
in the antarctic, the variation of day-length with latitude -
all manner of physical data from all the major vegetational regions
of the world. Schimper was the first to make a distinction between
two forms of environmental control which was to be of lasting
importance in the development of plant ecology:-
"
... two oecological groups of formations should
be distinguished - the climatic or district formations,
the character of whose vegetation is governed by
atmospheric precipitations, and the edapic or local
formations, whose vegetation is chiefly determined
by the nature of the soil."^1
Folded in at the end of the book are a set of maps showing the
distribution of the world's rainfall, correlated with the occurrence
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of the climatic vegetation-types.
There are many novel elements in Schimper's work. The years
since 1850 had seen many changes occur in German botany. Botany
had, with the development of plant physiology, become more
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experimentally orientated and less holistic. The problem of
adaptation, conceived anew in Darwinian terms, altered the
character of studies into the external ana internal structure of
plants. However the new trends in botanical science did not
swamp the older programme of Humboldtian plant geography. Rather
they interacted with it to produce the new style of investigation
that was to be called 'ecology'.
The publication of Grisebach's Die Vegetation der Erde stimulated
many botanists to study the relationship between vegetation and
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environment. For instance, the anatomist Schwendener assigned
to a doctoral student the task of determining whether the vegetation
zones described by Grisebach were reflected in anatomical differences
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between plant species. Grisebach was staunchly anti- Darwinian.
But, generally, those who applied the fruits of the new study of
physiology and morphology to understanding the life of the plant
in the wild were concerned with interpreting structure and formation
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in Darwinian terms. Thus, after Grisebach, vegetational plant
geography incorporated physiology, morphology and Darwinism into
its explanatory structure. Schimper's work well exemplifies
these new developments. Schimper was thoroughly acquainted with
Grisebach's work and made frequent references to Die Vegetation der
Erde;-
"The connexion between the forms of plants and the
external conditions at different points on the earth's
surface forms the subject-matter of oecological
plant-geography, which has only recently become a
prominent subject of interest, although it found a
place in earlier works, especially in Grisebach's
valuable "Vegetation der Erde" ... "^58
Schimper's classification of the world's vegetation was very
similar to Grisebach's. But Schimper, unlike Grisebach, was
strongly Darwinian and interpreted the facts of plant distribution
and morphology accordingly. As Cittadino has recently put it:-
"From the viewpoint of plant geography, Schimper's
work falls within the tradition of Grisebach but ...
Schimper was concerned not only with the nature but
also with the origin of adaptation."^
Likewise it was Schimper's programmatic intention to incorporate
new physiological interpretations into his analysis of the
correlation between vegetation and environment:-
"The oecology of plant-distribution will succeed in
opening out new paths on condition only that it leans
closely on experimental physiology, for it presupposes
an accurate knowledge of the condition of the life of
plants which experiment alone can bestow."^60
It is, thus, impossible to claim that Schimper's "oecological
plant-geography" was simply a direct continuation of Humboldtian
plant geography. But the content of Plant Geography upon a
Physiological Basis was nevertheless, as we have seen, strongly
conditioned by the prior existence of the Humboldtian tradition
of inquiry.
We can see a similar relationship between new and old elements
in the work of Eugen Warming, Professor of Botany at the University
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of Copenhagen. In terms reminiscent of Franz Meyen, Warming
distinguished his activity from floristic plant geography which:-
"
... is concerned with -
1. The compilation of a "Flora", that is, a list of
species growing within a larger or smaller area. Such
lists form the essential basis of the subject.
2. The division of the earth's surface into natural
floristic tracts ... according to their affinities ...
Oecological plant-geography has entirely different
ends in view:-
It teaches us how plants or plant-communities adjust
their forms and modes of behaviour to actually
operating factors ... Oecology seeks -
1. To find out which species are commonly associated
together ...
2. To sketch the physiognomy of the vegetation and
the landscape ...
3. To answer the questions -
Why each species has its own special habit and habitat,
Why the species congregate to form definite communities,
Why these have a characteristic physiognomy.
4. To investigate the problems concerning the economy
of plants ... We thus come to the consideration of
the growth-forms of plants."^2
There is much here we have seen before - the concern with
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physiognomy and "definite communities" for example. Apart from
morphology, the major new element in Warming was the concern with
evolutionary adaptation. But this new preoccupation was to exist
within a familiar framework of vegetational research. Warming
continued to classify vegetation into natural units, according to
physiognomy. He elaborated a new system of classifying the growth-
form - contributing to a research practice he traced from Humboldt
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through Grisebach to his own contemporary Oscar Drude. He
was concerned with relatively smaller, more localised pieces of
vegetation than Schimper's climatic formations. But he was
concerned also to correlate these with the physical environment
and to understand the effect of the environment on the structure
of the plant.
Tobey has recently argued that Warming's 'Darwinian' concept
of a competitive struggle for survival separated him from the
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'idealistic' tradition of Humboldt and Drude. Tobey is wrong
on two counts. Warming was certainly interested in evolution and
the origin of adaptation. But he was not a Darwinian in the sense
that he favoured the mechanism of natural selection. In fact,
like many early ecologists, he was famous for his Neo-Lamarckianism.
Secondly, Warming was, as we have seen, quite unequivocal about
the existence of 'definite' plant communities - one of the features
Tobey identifies as 'idealist' in the Humboldtian tradition. Of
course the Humboldtian research tradition was sufficiently flexible
to allow such communities to be conceived of in a variety of
different ways. But there is no evidence in Warming's work that
he did not allow the existence of, to use Tobey's terminology,
PAT
"functioning communit[ies] of ontological status".
Warming could in fact be said to be nearer to Humboldt's
ideas on physiognomy and the relation between vegetation and
climate than many of his contemporaries. This is because Warming
argued that species and physiognomic growth forms "stand in perfect
harmony (epharmony) with the environment" and that "plants possess
a peculiar inherent ... faculty by the exercise of which they
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directly adapt themselves" to their surroundings. In other
words, vegetation is the creation and the expression of the
environment - a very Humboldtian idea.
The bibliography of Oecology of Plants reads like a roll-call
of Humboldtians - Hult, Schouw, Meyen - back to Humboldt himself.
And, most significantly, Warming, like Schimper, cited no author
who wrote prior to Humboldt. No eighteenth-century botanist, no-one
who worked within the old episteme, is cited. The Essai sur la
Geographie de Plantes was the principal starting point, one might
say the fountainhead, for Warming's and Schimper's research
enterprise - an enterprise which was unequivocally ecology.
The last member of the trio named at the start of this section
- Oscar Drude - is the one with the most direct links to Humboldt.
Drude was, from 1871 to 1873, research assistant to August Grisebach
269
at Gttttingen. Drude regarded himself as continuing Grisebach's
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work in plant geography. He put a strong emphasis on the
unitary integrity of the regional formation - the character of
which was determined by the regional climate. The formations
were, however, internally heterogeneous due to the effect of
topography upon the vegetation. Drude developed further Grisebach's
system of growth-forms but he characterised the formation more
271
floristically than Grisebach had done. Smaller local units,
characterised by dominant species within the large physiognomic
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formations, were termed 'Best&nde'.
Drude's work provides us with another link between Humboldtian
plant geography and twentieth-century ecology because his
Deutschlands Pflanzengeographie was taken up by Pound and Clements
as the model for their early investigations into the phyto-
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geography of Nebraska. This work founded one of the most
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important schools of plant ecology in America.
Conclusions
This chapter began by investigating the reasons why vegetation
first became an object of scientific study. [This part of the
argument has already been summed-up in the section entitled "Why
a science of vegetation"] The latter part of the chapter has gone
on to trace the development of the study of vegetation, as a
distinctive form of botanical inquiry, from Humboldt to the end
of the nineteenth century.
It is clear, however, that we must be on our guard against
the danger of identifying Humboldt too closely with later practice.
As I hope this chapter has made clear, Humboldt's complex of
interests does not fit neatly within twentieth-century disciplinary
boundaries. Humboldtian science corresponds to none of our modern
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scientific subjects or specialties. It would be downright
misleading to refer to Humboldt as an ecologist; one calls him a
plant geographer at some large risk of anachronistic identification.
He was, one might say, primarily a 'Kosmos-ologist'; or to use his
own term, a student of "la physique generale" - a cognitive frame¬
work within which plant geography had a key role. However plant
geography was, to Humboldt, a most important synthetic subject -
a study indeed of Kosmos-ological significance. It was thus quite
different in scope and importance from what we now know as plant
geography or, even, plant ecology.
However I would argue that i't remains legitimate to trace
within Humboldt's work the roots of concepts later employed by
botanists, ecologists and ecological plant geographers within the
cognitive frameworks of these specific disciplines. For not all
the Humboldtians could be as Kosmos-ological or as polymathic as
the great man himself. Other men - Humboldtians in that they were
associated with Humboldt, shared something of his cognitive
framework, followed the exemplar contained in his scientific
writings, used instruments in the manner he recommended, studied
some of the objects he studied, and so forth - were to employ the
resources presented to them by his work in more specialised, more
circumscribed contexts - contexts which more closely resemble our
present disciplinary divisions. Grisebach and Hult, for example,
were primarily botanists - they were not necessarily students of
all the ramifications of "la physique generale". But to show that
scientists after Humboldt were more restricted in their range of
interests than Humboldt was, is not to disprove that they were
practitioners of Humboldtian science as they saw it applicable
within their own subjects.
One must remember that in Humboldt's own lifetime, German
science was in the process of dividing into professional specialties,
and the reformed system of German university education was
producing graduates trained specifically within those specialties.
Thus the Humboldtian tradition necessarily extended into an age
of greater specialisation in natural science - extended indeed to
the birth of ecology as a named and identifiable specialism in
its own right.
Of what use to historiography is this idea of a tradition of
Humboldtian plant geography? Firstly, it illustrates the heuristic
value of the Foucaultian notion of episteme. It extends and
supports his analysis of the difference between the cognitive
frameworks of discourse of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
An understanding of Humboldt's attitude to vegetation clarifies
the character of the new nineteenth-century episteme and helps
us to follow the changing nature of the relationship between Man
and his natural environment.
Secondly, it provides support for Susan Cannon's argument that
the identification of a distinctive Humboldtian form of scientific
inquiry is a powerful historiographical tool and an aid to our
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understanding of the science of the nineteenth century.
Furthermore, my account of Humboldtian plant geography puts flesh
on the bones of Cannon's thesis - by extending the search for
Humboldtian science into areas which she did not investigate.
Cannon, writing Anglo-American history, did not look for Humboldtians
in Humboldt's homeland nor in the country he adopted as his home
in the middle years of his life - France. Cannon's attention was
thus concentrated too narrowly to deal adequately with the
complete phenomenon of Humboldtian science. It has been a serious
flaw in our understanding of Humboldt's legacy that historians
have, in this context, so far largely ignored those scientists who
read Humboldt not in translation, but in the languages in which
his work was originally published, and who talked and corresponded
with Humboldt in those languages.
The search for Humboldtian science has, so far, been peripheral
- and not only geographically. It has also ignored the obvious
in the selection of disciplines within which Humboldt's legacy has
been sought. The major omission here has been botany. Yet the
importance of botany to Humboldt and of Humboldt to botany are
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both well known. Of the thirty volumes of Voyage aux regions
equinoxiales du Nouveau Continent - Humboldt's record of his
scientific exploration in South America - sixteen, that is to say
more than half, were concerned with plants or their geographical
279distribution. Botany is thus the logical starting point for
any study of how the exemplars offered by Humboldt were articulated
in an era when disciplinary boundaries were becoming more defined.
Thirdly, a characterisation of Humboldian plant geography
helps us to understand why vegetation became an object of scientific
study. And it sheds light on why vegetation was held to be divided
into natural units, thus illuminating the origin of one of the
principal study objects of plant ecology - the vegetation type.
Furthermore, it should alert historians of biogeography to the
possibility, so far unexplored, that the distribution of species
was not the only form of biogeographical activity undertaken in
the nineteenth century.
Fourthly, an acceptance of the existence of Humboldtian plant
geography and a recognition of its particular concern with
vegetation would resolve doubts which at present exist as to what
might be called the prehistory of ecology. It has often been said
that plant ecology sprung quite suddenly into existence at the end
of the nineteenth century - fathered by the inspiration of Warming,
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Schimper and Drude's great texts. The story is often found in
the reminiscences of British and American ecologists that one
or other of these books so excited interest that the reader set
out to put the precepts of the continental authors into practice
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in their own countries. No doubt these accounts are true, to
a large extent. Such stories have, however, become received as
part of the official history of ecology - and received as the
explanation of the origin of the subject, not simply its trans¬
mission to Britain or America. As Worster put it:-
"Their [Drude, Schimper, Warming] work during the
1890s transformed Oecologie from just another neologism
to a functioning science with its own peculiar hold
on reality.
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Goodland dubbed Warming "the founder of plant ecology".
However, Godwin has pointed out the obvious over-simplification
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inherent in this account of the origin of ecology. He traced
the influential Zurich-Montpelier school back beyond 1890 and
showed that one of its founders, Carl SchrOter, was well set on
his ecological research independent of the work of Warming and
Schimper. Likewise, Sernanaer had already started applying quanti¬
tative methods to the study of vegetation in the mid-1880s. So
the two great continental schools of vegetation science were
founded before Warming and Schimper published. The existence of
plant ecology, or something like it, must be the explanation for
Warming and Schimper, and not vice-versa. Indeed, it only requires
the briefest look at the Lehrbuch der flkologischen Pflanzen-
geographie or the Pflanzengeographie auf physiologischer Grundlage
- at their size, scope or bibliographic comprehension - to see that
these great texts could not have been produced by men who were
simply the rude forefathers of a nascent scientific specialism. It
is clear that these texts themselves represent the culmination of
many years of inquiry, of a long tradition of research into
vegetation. But what sort of tradition did ecology spring from?
I would contend that I have discerned, extending from Humboldt to
Drude, Schimper and Warming, that tradition of research. As a
research programme it was certainly flexible; it diverged into
several schools; it incorporated new elements - but it is
discernible throughout the nineteenth century neverthless. And
I would contend that it was largely from this pre-existing
tradition that plant ecology developed at the end of the century.
SchrOter, Sernander and Drude were all third generation students
of Humboldtian plant geography.
This novel perspective allows us to see the development of
later views of vegetation and .the plant association not as
isolated or independent events, but as part of a continuing story
of cognitive change and development.
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CHAPTER TWO
DIVERGENT CLASSIFICATIONS - THE CLEMENTSIAN AND
SIGMATIST CONCEPTIONS OF THE PLANT ASSOCIATION
Introduction
The importance of the idea of a supra-individual unit of
1
vegetation of "orderly structure and correct composition" was not
to diminish in the twentieth century. From Schouw until the 1960s,
there was an almost complete consensus among plant ecologists of
all nations that vegetation was made up of natural units, recognisable,
at least in principle, as discrete entities with real boundaries.
These units were generally regarded as part of the structure of
nature - not just the product of particular methods of investigating
vegetation or the product of processes of classification. The
term 'association' expressed this belief that 'essentially' the
same groups of plants were to be found growing together in
2
different locations. The associations were taken to be the proper
basis for ecological study.
The pre-eminent British ecologist Arthur George Tansley put the
matter succinctly:-
"But if we admit, as everyone who has worked at the
subject does admit, that vegetation forms natural units
which have an individuality of their own and that
these units owe their existence to the interaction of
individual plants of different species with their
environment then it becomes clear that a mere study
of the distribution of species as species cannot form
the basis of the science of vegetation. We have instead
to focus our attention on the vegetation units
themselves.
American and European ecologists concurred almost to a man.
The following quotation is taken from a major American ecological
text-book:-
"Vegetation responds [to climatic factors] by its distri¬
bution into groups, each of which is in close equilibrium
with its particular climatic complex ... The plant
formation is the major unit of vegetation. It is a fully
developed or climax community of a natural area in
which the essential climatic relations are similar or
identical. Each formation is a complex and definite
organic entity with a characteristic development and
structure.
H.S. Conard's views were equally representative:-
"The association of individuals and species is much
more than a chance meeting. It is part of the order
of nature ... Associations of plants on land are ^
definable entities, susceptible of naming and classifying.
Carl Schrbter and Charles Flahault "the fathers of the Zurich-
Montpelier school" successfully proposed the following definition
to the nomenclature committee of the International Botanical Congress
of 1910.
"An association is a plant community of definite
floristic composition, presenting a uniform physio¬
gnomy and growing in uniform habitat conditions. „
The association is the fundamental unit of synecology."
So fully accepted was the theory that there were natural kinds
of vegetation that it did not even have a name until 1956 - when
R.H. Whittaker, an American ecologist and one of the first men to
achieve real influence in dissent from this theory, dubbed it the
O
'association-unit' or 'community-unit' theory. Like the cell
theory and the species theory, the community-unit theory was a
conception of the inherent structure and organisation of the
phenomena with which scientists dealt. F.E. Clements expressed
it most succinctly of all:-
"The final task of phytogeography is the division
of the earth's vegetation into natural areas."9
In the twentieth century, the attempt to describe the plant
communities of the world and to understand why each occurred where
it did became a research enterprise of enormous size and scope.
The literature on the study of natural communities runs to uncounted
thousands of papers, in all the languages in which scientific
papers are published.
This scientific enterprise and its sub-divisions have been
given many different names in different countries and contexts -
geobotany, ecological plant geography, plant ecology, phytosociology,
and many more. These names often map out real distinctions of
practice or social divisions between practitioners, but to elucidate
these distinctions fully here would deflect me from the task
presently in hand. With all due apologies to those practitioners
who may feel that such a cavalier procedure masks vital distinctions
between different research programmes, I intend to cut this Gordian
knot of labelling and nomenclature. I shall refer, for the
remainder of this thesis, to the whole of the scientific study of
vegetation, wherever and however done, as either 'vegetation
science' or 'plant ecology'. I shall take these terms to be
virtually synonymous and one will be used rather than the other
simply for reasons of variety. Vegetation science therefore, in
the present usage, encompasses both what the Europeans call
1 0
'phytosociology' and what the Americans call 'plant ecology'.
In all forms of vegetation science, classification has been
centrally important. In describing and explaining the phenomena
of vegetation it is necessary to subdivide one's subject-matter
in some way. This is, of course, a characteristic that ecology
11
shares with other scientific disciplines. But, in ecology,
the importance of classification has been especially emphasised
by the central position accorded to the methodology of classification.
Not only have ecologists been concerned with identifying associations
from within the remarkedly complex and varied mantle of the Earth's
vegetation, they have often attempted to relate the associations
to each other in categories of higher syntaxonomic rank. Many
ecologists have gone so far as to regard the construction of a
comprehensive system of classification as the primary aim of
vegetational research, of great interest in itself and providing
the essential framework without which other ecological research is
12
unlikely to be well-directed or profitable.
Broad agreement over the importance of classification has led
to intense research activity but no universal consensus has
emerged as to which is the best way to classify vegetation. Despite
the fact that a fundamental unit to be used as the basis for a
synthetic classification (as the species is used in the taxonomy
of individual plants) has been generally agreed to exist, and has
been actively sought, for more than a hundred and fifty years, there
has never been agreement about the nature and extent of the
putative unit or the basis on which it should be described.
According to some schools, particularly in Europe, the vegetation
unit (the association) was a small-scale, homogeneous community,
whereas to most Americans, the association was a large-scale unit
including within itself great variation. Thus whereas H.S. Conard,
using methods derived for European phytosociology, described 71
associations in central Long Island, Clements recognised only
13
three in the entire eastern deciduous forest of the United States.
No aspect of ecological science has been the subject of more
discussion and argument nor has had a more central role in the
differentiation of ecology into schools of differing research
practice than this debate over which is the best way to classify
vegetation.1
The last sentence is a paraphrase of the opening lines of
R.H. Whittaker's major review of the methods used to classify
1 5
vegetation, which was published in 1962. It ran to 239 pages
and the bibliography, described by its author as "reasonably
comprehensive", contained more than 1700 titles. It outlined the
standpoints of seven major traditions of classificatory practice,
1 6
each of these internally divided into disputing sub-schools. Since
1962, thousands more articles classifying vegetation have been
published in all the major languages. If some of the issues seem
less controversial now than they did then, it is because the debate
has flowed in new directions. Very little has been resolved to
the satisfaction of even a majority of workers in the field.
Vegetation science is still as divided into schools as it ever was.
These apparently endemic differences between the schools have
created some problems for commentators on classification within the
ecological profession. If, the problem runs, most classifications
are claimed by their perpetuators to be descriptions of the reality
of vegetation, not conventional or instrumental representations,
and ecologists are generally reasonable men (as ecologists must
believe is the case), then why do the different schools classify
in such diverse and different ways? Perhaps a certain amount of
divergence may be ascribed directly to error, or mere factiousness,
or personal idiosyncracy or rampant subjectivity on behalf of the
investigators. But only a certain amount - if ecology itself is
not to be unnecessarily discredited. It is obvious that several
radically different classifications have been sufficiently successful
in describing vegetation to allow these descriptions and the methods
of arriving at them to have been transmitted to generations of
students, to have supported lengthy research programmes, and to
17
have found very fruitful practical applications.
This successful pluralism has lea to the claim that the
explanation for the differences between the schools is to be found
in systematic differences between the characteristics of the
world's vegetational regions. For example, the lower biological
productivity and species-richness of the vegetation of Scandinavia,
when compared with that of Southern Europe, could explain the
difference between the Uppsala and Zurich-Montpelier systems -
each accurately reflecting the vegetational reality of its own area
* ^ 18of study.
This type of explanation, which neatly harmonises the discipline'
commitment to realism with its observed lack of unity in practice,
has been called the 'ecology of ecological traditions', or the
1 9
'ecology of ecologists'. The present chapter will examine this
explanatory thesis critically. It will also consider, as an
alternative explanation, whether the different vegetational
classifications may best be thought of as conventional, and if the
explanation for their divergences is to be found in the differing
20
social contexts of the research groups who employ them.
To this end detailed consideration will be given to two of the
historically most important schools - the one derived from the work
and teaching of J. Braun-Blanquet, which is a variant of the Zurich-
Montpelier or Southern European school, and the system of the
American ecologist, F.E. Clements. For the sake of simplicity,
each school will be treated as being more internally homogeneous
than it actually was - or, in the case of the former example,
actually is, since students of Braun-Blanquet are still active.
This simplification is more of a distortion in the case of the
European example than it is in the case of the American one. Braun-
Blanquet' s approach has undergone considerable modification,
21
especially when employed far from its European homeland. For
the purposes of this chapter, the Braun-Blanquet system will be
described more or less as it was formulated by the man himself,
and by his immediate followers and associates.
The structure of this chapter is complicated and the'reader
must be prepared for quite sudden changes of scene - as aspects of
the American system or its context are compared with their European
equivalents or vice-versa. Such movements may sometimes be
confusing, but I hope the reader will bear with me. The advantage
such interweaving comparisons possesses over a more straightforward
presentation is that the shaping of each school by its contingent
social circumstance may be more readily displayed. I hope that
the divergence between the American and the European systems of
vegetation science illustrates that what we witness in the history
of each school is not the rectilinear march of scientific knowledge
toward greater correspondence with natural reality, but a process
whereby knowledge production is shaped by the particular culture
which sustains it. Comparison enables the individuality of each
set of social circumstances to be more readily apprehended.
The chapter begins with a short account of the development and
differentiation of each school from the tradition of Humboldtian
plant geography. The story is taken up just where the previous
22
chapter left off - at the birth of a 'self-conscious' ecology.
The nature of the vegetation units employed in America and in
Southern Europe will be outlined and contrasted. I will then
consider the 'ecology of ecologists' theory as a possible explanation
for these differences. Having found it wanting, I will examine the
adoption of a taxonomic exemplar by Braun-Blanquet and his colleagues.
This will be interpreted in the light of their involvement in the
professional conflicts and competitions of European botany in the
early twentieth century and in the light of the skills which they
acquired in the course of their botanical training. Clements's
adoption of a different model subject - physiology - will be
interpreted in the context of the different social circumstances
of American botany, particularly in the Western and Mid-Western
States and in the Land-Grant Colleges. I will consider in detail
the effects of a necessary commitment to applicable science upon




Josias Braun was born in Coire, Switzerland in 1884. His
botanical training was under the guidance of two famous botanists,
Carl Schrttter of Zurich and Charles Flahault of Montpelier. It
was under the supervision of Flahault that Braun did his doctoral
thesis in 1915 on the phytogeography of the Southern Cevennes.
Also in 1915, after his marriage, he added his wife's name to his
own and thereafter published as Braun-Blanquet. From 1916, he
was Privatdozent at the Ecole Polytechnique Federale in Zurich,
where he worked under Schrttter and where he collaborated with
another famous student of Schrttter's, Eduard Rttbel.
By the time Braun-Blanquet took up graduate studies, the
vegetation science done at Zurich and Montpelier was already
recognised as the product of a definite school. The early work of
Heer, Lecoq, Christ, Kerner and Bonnier (all botanists in the
Humboldtian tradition) on the rich and varied vegetation of the
Alps and Southern Europe had been further developed in the twentieth
century by Schrttter, a student of Heer, and Flahault, a student
of Bonnier, and by their students in turn, such as Brockmann-Jerosch,
24
RUbel and Pavillard.
These botanists had studied vegetation in relation to the
effect of climate and other environmental factors on its form. They
had used a wide assortment of vegetational features to characterise
the units of vegetation on which their work was based, employing
both physiognomic and floristic criteria in their classificatory
procedures. Units determined by floristic composition were often
regarded as being hierarchically related to larger units determined
by physiognomic structure. For example, several sorts of deciduous
wood each characterised by the presence of different species of
tree or shrub might all be grouped under a larger unit of forest-
25
type characterised by the growth-form of the deciduous tree.
The distinctive difference between Braun-Blanquet's approach
and that of his Southern European predecessors may be seen in the
81
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work he did while a graduate student at Montpelier. His choice of
classificatory criteria was narrower and their use more formalised.
Physiognomy had no part to play in his systematic classification
of vegetation. The basis of classification was to be floristic
composition - and nothing else. Furthermore, floristic criteria
were to be interpreted strictly. Determination of vegetation-types
was to be by 'characteristic' species, revealed by detailed
floristic analysis, rather than simply by dominant species, as
27
had been used by, for example, Flahault.
Braun-Blanquet's work was so influential as to make his name
virtually synonymous with the purely floristic approach to vegetation
28
science. However it is important to note that similarly floristic
methods were advocated by Brockmann-Jerosch in 1907 and by Gradmann
29
in 1909. These works, together with Braun-Blanquet's, collectively
established the distinctive Zurich-Montpelier practices of identifying
'character' species from within floristic associations and of
compiling sample lists for collation into community tables.
Pavillard, a professor at Montpelier, also early adopted a
floristic approach to plant community. In the nineteen-twenties
the floristic programme continued to develop in a series of papers
- 30
by Braun-Blanquet and Pavillard, either singly or together. In
1929, Braun-Blanquet moved to Montpelier. A unified and organised
system of floristic phytosociology was presented to the world with
31
his publication in 1928 of Pflanzensoziologie. Whittaker has
described this text as "one of the two most influential books in
the classification of communities, influencing many phytosociologists
as profoundly as Warming (1909) has influenced English-speaking
32
ecologists."
The independence of Braun-Blanquet's research programme was
institutionalised in 1930 when he was appointed director of the newly-
established Station Internationale de Geobotanique Mediterraneene
33
et Alpine at Montpelier. Sigma, as the station was often called,
has served ever since as the headquarters and training centre for
the school of Braun-Blanquet. Braun-Blanquet's approach is itself
often referred to as Sigmatism. The many younger scientists and
the many hundreds of research publications which Sigma has produced
82
evidence the impact of Braun-Blanquet's system and its sustained
34
development and articulation.
F.E. Clements and the Plant Formation
The school of Braun-Blanquet is still active. There are still
botanists who would describe themselves as Sigmatists. The system
of his American rival, F.E. Clements, is defunct to the extent that
no ecologist (to my knowledge) still refers to himself as a
Clementsian. But F.E. Clements's work was immensely influential on
American and English-speaking ecology for many years, and it has
been claimed that some of his conceptions have survived the unpopularity
of his system by taking on new names in more modern ecological
theory .
36
F.E. Clements was born in Lincoln, Nebraska in 1874. After
graduating from the University of Nebraska in 1894, he became a
member of an industrious and productive group of young botanists
which had gathered around the head of Nebraska's Botany Department,
37
Charles E. Bessey. Bessey was among the foremost of those
botanists who were working toward the introduction of the 'New
38
Botany' into the United States. The New Botany had originated
in Germany. What was new about it was its orientation toward plant
39
physiology and morphology, toward experiment and laboratory methods.
Bessey saw the experimental emphasis and the evident prestige of
the New Botany as capable of improving the status of Botany within
American Science. He was one of the first American botanists to
teach students in the laboratory, and his graduate students organised
themselves into a Botanical Seminar in conscious (if inaccurate)
40
imitation of the forms of German graduate education.
In 1898, Clements, in collaboration with Roscoe Pound (also a
member of the Botanical Seminar and a student of Bessey), produced
41
The Phytogeography of Nebraska. This text was modelled explicitly
upon Oscar Drude's newly published Deutschlands Pflanzengeographie,
__
which both authors greatly admired. This was followed in 1904
by the first presentation of Clements's comprehensive system of
vegetation science "The development and structure of vegetation"
43
and in 1905 by the textbook Research Methods in Ecology. The
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latter dealt with, among other things, the practical analysis of
vegetation by the quadrat and transect techniques, newly devised
by Pound and Clements, and with the use of environmetric recording
44
instruments in the field. The research programme contained in
these two publications was developed in an impressive series of
books and articles culminating in 1916 with the publication of
45
Plant Succession - an analysis of the development of vegetation.
This book has been regarded as the paradigmatic presentation of the
Clementsian system.^
In 1907, Clements became Professor and Head of Department at the
University of Minnesota. He held this position until 1917, when
he joined the Carnegie Institution. He remained with the Ecology
Section of the Carnegie until his retirement in 1941. He died in
1945.
The primary unit of the Clementsian system was termed the
'formation' and was large in area, encompassing great variation, and
including within itself several regional 'associations'. Each
formation was said to be distinguishable by a combination of physio¬
gnomic, floristic and habitat - that is physical - factors. The
formation was defined as the typical or 'climax' community of an
area over which the climate was 'effectively uniform'. Theoretically,
uniformity of habitat had primacy in the determination of the extent
of any vegetation unit but, in fact, 'efficient differences' in
the habitat were recognised only by their producing differences
in the plant cover. Since, by definition, the true dominants of
any one formation had to be all of the same life-form, in order that
the formation present a unified response to the uniform climate,
47
Clements's formations were in effect physiognomic units.
Examples of vegetational areas designated by Clements as
formations were the deciduous forest of the eastern United States,
and the prairie-plains grassland of the Central West. All in all,
only twenty formations were needed to classify the vegetation of
the entire United States in 1916, and further work had reduced this
48
to 14 by 1938. There was, of course, considerable subdivision
within each major formation. The prairie-plains grassland formation
was divided into 8 important associations - examples of which were
true prairie, tall-grass prairie, short-grass prairie, desert
49
plains, and so on.
As is implied by its being said to occupy a definite area,- the
50
Clementsian formation was considered to be a concrete entity.
This was one of the most distinctive features of Clements's system.
To Braun-Blanquet, the association was a real but abstract category
of which the stands of vegetation observed on the ground were the
51
concrete representatives. According to Clements, the stands did
not bear this relation to the formation. They were rather the
52
component parts of a larger structure.
In Braun-Blanquet's work, two basic analogies are made. One
is between the stands of vegetation observed in the field and
individual biological organisms. The other is between the associa¬
tion and the taxonomic species into which both the former are
53
classified. Clements, however, regards the formation as itself
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analogous to the individual organism. The stands are thus
to. be considered as parts of the structure of the formation as
organism - presumably to be thought of as the equivalent of the
tissues or cells of an individual, although Clements never specifies
a precise analogy.
Braun-Blanquet solved the problem posed by there obviously
being more than one kind of vegetation in any given area by
allocating the different types to different associations. To
Clements, however, whatever vegetation fell within an area of
effectively uniform climate was, of necessity, all part of the
55
formation characteristic of, and controlled by, that climate.
Stands of vegetation lying within the area of a formation but
physiognomically distinct from that deemed typical of the formation were
said by Clements to be connected developmentally with the climax
vegetation. They are immature forms of parts of the 'super-
organism'. The processes of vegetation succession, soil maturation
and geomorphological base-levelling would eventually, if the
climate were to remain constant, allow all the vegetation growing
within the geographical limits of the formation to develop into the
highest form of vegetation possible under the given climate. For
example, the highest form of vegetation possible in the Tropics
would be Tropical Rain-forest, in Northern Canada coniferous forest,
further North still, tundra, and so on. This was known as the
'monoclimax' theory - only a single vegetation type was true climax
56
within any given climate.
In the first three decades of the twentieth century, investi¬
gations into the processes of plant succession and vegetational
change were, for reasons I will explain in the next chapter, being
undertaken by virtually every American plant ecologist. In Europe,
investigations of vegetational change were never of such central
importance. The Americans became fond of contrasting their 'dynamic'
approach with the allegedly 'static' conception of vegetation
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employed by the European phytosociologists. The organismic
development theory of the climatic climax was a peculiarly Clementsian
expression of this American interest in vegetational change.
One might characterise the difference between the Clementsian
and Sigmatist viewpoints concisely in the following manner. The
Braun-Blanquet system involved the identification in the field of
small-scale stands of characteristic and actually uniform (that is
to say apparently or virtually uniform) floristic composition.
These stands were then classified into abstract taxons, the
associations, in a manner analogous to that used by taxonomists to
classify individual specimens into species or genera. The
Clementsian system, on the other hand, depended upon the identifica¬
tion in the field of large concrete units of characteristically
uniform (or potentially uniform) physiognomy. By definition all
the dominants of a particular climax formation had to have the same
growth form - since the dominant growth form was a direct expression
CO
of the climate. Areas of vegetation of physiognomy different
from that to be expected within any given climate were regarded
as merely stages toward the climax form. Succession would displace
them and usher in a vegetation with the climatic climax life-form.
Thus, the existence of hemlock, Tsuga canadensis (a coniferous
tree) in the deciduous forest was intepreted by Clements as evidence
of a previous southern extension of the boreal forest. The hemlock




The ecology of ecologists
Overall, the two systems of vegetation science embodied quite
different views as to the nature of vegetation. How can these
differences between two of the most successful schools of plant
ecology be explained? Bearing in mind the 'ecology of ecologists'
explanation referred to above, to what extent were these differences
due to the distinctive characteristics of the vegetation which
each school studied?
It is certainly true that the large expanses of the Prairies
and the Plains confronted turn-of-the-century American ecologists
with a vegetational aspect very different from that to be encountered
in Southern Europe at the same time. Much of the American West
and Mid-West, although already greatly disturbed by Man, had been
pristine within living memory and the original character of the
vegetation was often still quite clearly discernible.^ The great
grasslands were, above all, startlingly homogeneous over huge
tracts of land. This was a feature of the landscape which all
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its early observers commented upon. On the other hand, European
vegetation was, generally speaking, broken up into quite small
patches, due to agriculture and, especially in the Alps, where
Schrdter, Heer and others had done their pioneer studies, to a
rugged and varied topography. Also European vegetation had
obviously been quite radically modified by Man in the course of
hundreds of years of exploitation. The large tracts of virgin
climax vegetation had long since vanished.
But any attempt at building such 'ecological' observations
into a comprehensive explanation of the differences between the
Zurich-Montpelier and the Clementsian schools immediately encounters
serious problems. It is not simply in matters of size that the
differences lie - the respective ecological units are different in
character. The Clementsian unit is a physiognomic one bearing,
in principle, a one-to-one relationship to an area of uniform
climate. The unit of Braun-Blanquet is a floristic one, the
distinctive floristic composition of each unit being a response to
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the totality of environmental influences. It might perhaps be
argued that an observer experienced in the study of large expanses
of relatively homogeneous vegetation - such as occurred over large
parts of the American West - would tend to couch his ecological
explanations in terms of unifying large-scale environmental factors
such as the regional climate. On the other hand, experience of
the relatively small and relatively isolated stands of European
vegetation might lead the observer to think in terms of a smaller
fundamental unit of vegetation. The absence of intermediary types
might render the floristic individuality of individual stands more
apparent. But it is difficult to see how such an argument could
explain why the Clementsian unit was held to be concrete and
organismic and the Sigma unit to be abstract.
Furthermore, to have any explanatory force, such 'ecological'
arguments would have to be of some general application. However,
several damaging counter-instances exist. For example, the
vegetation of the British Isles is every bit as anthropogenic and
broken-up into small patches as that of continental Europe.
Floristically, the British and European vegetations are very
similar. Yet neither the Braun-Blanquet association nor any other
small floristic unit of the Continental type has ever had much
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popularity in Britain. British ecology has always been much closer
in character to its American counterpart than it ever was to
European phytosociology, despite the vegetation of the British
Isles being quite different from that of the Mid-West, the
formative centre of American ecology. Likewise, American ecology
has not often had much in common with Russian ecology, despite the
fact that the scientists of both countries dealt, in some situations
at least, with similarly expansive and comparatively undisturbed
vegetation.^
Therefore we may conclude that the nature of vegetation does
not fully determine the character of the units into which any
given piece of vegetation is classified. This conclusion, however,
does not imply that the nature of vegetation is irrelevant to the
manner in which vegetation is conceptualised by ecologists. Many
of the differences between the Zurich-Montpelier and Uppsala
schools, or between European and American vegetation science,
undoubtedly do express differences in vegetational reality. What
the deficiency of the 'ecology of ecologists' explanation does
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entail, however, is that we must look at factors other than the
input from the natural world, if we are to have a complete explanation
of the differences between the Clementsian and the Sigma schools.
As in the previous case-study, we must look at the cultural
contexts and what one might call the purposes, the relations to
social and cognitive interests, of the respective research
programmes. This was acknowledged by Whittaker:-
"Classifications are affected also by objectives of
research, as these are influenced in part by ecological
conditions, in part by possibilities for practical
applications in relation to these ecological conditions,
and in part by more purely cultural influences on
scientific outlook and objectives ... History and
present problems of classification are to be understood
through the ecological, cultural, and personal
influences affecting them ...Ecological schools too,
have their "ecology" but may also have distinctive ^
characters not clearly determined by their "ecology"."
Braun-Blanquet and the model of taxonomy
Consideration of the different analogies employed by the two
schools is instructive as to where our search for a fuller explanation
ought to begin. Firstly, the analogy of the association to the
species was prominent in all of Braun-Blanquet's writings. Braun-
Blanquet's phytosociological practice was firmly based upon the model
of plant taxonomy. Indeed Braun-Blanquet erected the entire edifice
of his phytosociological classification so as to make it as similar
in structure as possible to that of the floristic study of
individual plants:-
"[Plant sociology's] definite objective, however
remote its accomplishment, is to catalogue and
describe the plant communities of the earth, to
discover their causal explanation, to study their
development and geographic distribution, and to arrange
them according to a natural system of classification."67
Under the Braun-Blanquet system, floristic evidence was the only sort
allowed in the characterisations of associations. The field
practice of the phytosociologist must, therefore, be based upon the
species units as determined by the taxonomist:-
"Species ... are groups of individuals with uniform
inheritance and have been for many years the object of
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careful investigation. In the species are embodied
certain definite adjustments to and demands upon the
environment. Hence the species have come to be
regarded as conspicuous indicators of certain
conditions of life ... Precise recognition of
species is therefore the first and indispensable
requirement for the phytosociologist."68
The flora of a study area must therefore have been worked out by
taxonomists before phytosociological research can begin. Phyto-
sociology, thus, according to Braun-Blanquet, must be both dependent
upon, and consciously imitative of, the science of taxonomy:-
"
... since all phytosociological classification
rests upon a floristic foundation, it is exactly in
this classification that systematic botany is of the
highest service."69
Braun-Blanquet contrasted the well-organised state of the
science of floristics with the comparatively undeveloped condition
of research into physiognomy:-
"The countless individuals may be grouped in two
distinct ways: under the concept of the taxonomic
species or under the concept of growth forms or life
forms. The Brussels Congress (1910) rightly decided
in favour of the species as the fundamental unit for
the plant community. The concept of 'life form'
is indefinite, has not been adequately defined and
cannot be considered as a sufficient basis for a
science of vegetation."'''®
Likewise, Braun-Blanquet summarily dismissed the possibility of a
classification based on the criterion of a uniform habitat as
proposed by various British and American ecologists, including
Clements:-
"A clear and unequivocal delimitation of habitats
according to operative external factors appears quite
unattainable ... On account of this difficulty, it
is more and more necessary, in investigating the
communities, to go directly to the vegetation itself.
We then arrive at the point from which we should
logically have started out: the natural groupings
of plants. The natural unit of vegetation comes thus
into the foreground of our study and, temporarily
ignoring the habitat, we seek to recognize and define
the floristic individuality of the communities."'''1
Phytosociology's utilisation of, and dependence upon, the
species concept of orthodox taxonomy may be clearly seen in
Braun-Blanquet's description of how associations were to be identified
in the field. Braun-Blanquet's procedure for the distinction and
classification of units, as set out in Pflanzensoziologie, was wholly
based on the floristic description of carefully chosen sample
plots. In order fully to convey the role of taxonomic knowledge
and skill in phytosociological practice, it is necessary to describe
in more detail what this procedure entailed. This description will
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also highlight some other noteworthy features of Sigma's methodology.
Firstly, it was considered most important that the vegetation
of the chosen sampling site be uniform. However, the criteria by
which uniformity was to be determined were not specified. Statistical
testing for uniformity was not envisaged. Rather the uniformity
of a prospective sample site was subjectively assessed by the phyto-
sociologist, bearing in mind all the observable properties of the
vegetation. The phytosociologist would seek to place his sample
sites in areas which would provide samples illustrative of the
characteristics of the vegetation of the study area as a whole, as
determined by preliminary reconnaissance. The placing of sample
plots was therefore an exercise of the fine discrimination, the
'Soziologischer Blick' which was held to be in the possession of
the phytosociologist due to his long training and the depth of
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his experience of vegetation.
Having chosen the stands he intended to study, the investigator
would write a short description of their geographical location,
altitude, aspect, major environmental features, and so on. Then all
the species present in the stands were identified and listed. Ideally
this list would be complete, including mosses, liverworts, fungi and
lichens as well as vascular plants. To compile accurately and
expeditiously such a catalogue of the sample area (which might be as
large as four or even, in herbaceous vegetation, eight square metres)
required great skill in the identification of plants. Specific
determination was to be as exact as possible. Any specimens which
could not be identified in the field were labelled and brought back
to the laboratory where, if necessary, expert taxonomic advice would
be sought. Every species in the list was given an index of cover-
abundance (roughly speaking, how much of the surface-area of the
stand it occupied) and sociability (whether it grew singly, in
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small groups, in large groups, in colonies or in pure populations).
In the laboratory, the species lists from all the sample plots
of the study area were grouped in what were called 'association
tables'. The aim was to put together lists which were similar in
order to identify the number of different associations represented
in the field data. According to Braun-Blanquet, decisions as to
how many associations a given tabulation of species lists represented
could only be made by consideration of the 'fidelity' of the various
species. The theory was that certain plant species demonstrated
strong selective preference for definite communities. Their presence
in species lists might be used, diagnostically, in the characterisa¬
tion of associations. Such species were called 'character-species'.
The determination of character-species was, in practice,
extremely difficult. Few species were completely faithful to a
single association. Also, the reasoning involved in identifying
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character-species was apparently circular. Prior knowledge of
the associations was necessary for the recognition of the character-
species, and yet the character-species were to be used diagnostically
to recognise the associations. In fact, no formal rules for the
determination of character-species were given. Rather, the Sigmatists
maintained that the process was something of a craft skill,
developed through long experience, and best learned from an
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accomplished master.
A character-species need not be at all an obviously important
species within the community which it was said to be characteristic
of, and faithful to. It was, for instance, not always a dominant
species. It might be insignificant in terms of size, number of
individuals or area covered within any sampled stand. Only an
expert could discern its importance.
The end-product of the laboratory or 'synthetic' phase was the
compilation of a characteristic species composition for each associa¬
tion. That is, the emphasis eventually shifted from a particular
species with special diagnostic value, the character-species, to
the association's entire species composition. The characteristic
species composition typified the abstract plant association and
might never be found in all its details in the field. Finally the
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units decided upon were checked in the field with new samples being
taken. If the new samples did not correspond readily with the original
tabulations, further associations might be described to accommodate
them.
It can readily be seen that this whole process depended on the
phytosociologist being skilled in the identification of plants and
having the help of taxonomic experts. The phytosociology could
only be sound if the underpinning taxonomy was itself well-founded.
Braun-Blanquet argued that there was a strong symbiotic relationship
between the two sciences. One of the strengths of phytosociology
"dans le domaine des applications pratiques" was the help it could
give to floristics:-
:'Le releve des groupements vegetaux exige une etude
minutieuse de surfaces bien delimitees ou rien ne doit
passer impergu. Cette fagon de proceder amene la
decouverte de nombreuses especes nouvelles pour la
contree etudiee, pour le pays tout entier, ou memes
nouvelles pour la science. C'est en etudiant une
garrique du Brachypodietum ramosi non loin de Montpelier
... qu'on a mis la main sur le fugace Sternberqia
colchiciflora espece nouvelle pour la flore frangaise."
Likewise, floristic study could aid phytosociology:-
"Ponderous manuals and masses of plant lists tell us
with increasing exactness about the occurrence and
distribution of the species of our flora. These sources
can also be made useful synchorologically by means of
the fidelity of species. Oftentime an obscure floristic
paper may enable us to predict the presence of a
certain association. If several characteristic species
occur together in one locality, the presence of the
association in question may be predicted with a high
degree of probability ... "77
The Sigma school's quasi-taxonomic approach was obvious in its
grandest project - the attempt to systematise the plant communities
of the world. The first fascicle of Prodome des Groupements
Vegetaux was published in 1933, and several other volumes have been
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produced since then. In these works, associations were named in
exact analogy to species, with Latin binomials, with rules of
priority and synonomy, and with the author and date of the description
appended to the name of the association. The environmental
relations and distribution of each association were briefly described.
Sub-units were listed, having the same relation to the association
as the variety has to the taxonomic species. The associations
were arranged in a hierarchical system of alliances, orders and
classes, modelled on the hierarchical arrangement of genera, families
and orders in taxonomy. These higher categories were also given
complete with citations and synonomy, and were defined, like the
association, floristically by characteristic species. Physiognomic
criteria were not employed at any level of the classification. As
R.H. Whittaker put it, "In these works [the Prodomes] the ideas of
Braun-Blanquet find their ultimate expression - treatment of natural
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communities in a form exactly paralleling manuals of floras".
It has already been pointed out that the use of floristic data
is not the only way to construct ecological classifications. Why
was it adopted so rigorously by Braun-Blanquet and his followers?
To answer this question we must look at the situation of contention
and competition which obtained within the discipline of botany at
this time.
Phytosociology and the New Botany
In the second half of the nineteenth century, botanists faced
a choice of ways in which to direct their activities. The discipline
had been swept by the New Botany with its novel emphasis upon
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physiology and morphology, upon experiment and laboratory methods.
The New Botanists proselytised for the application within botany
of models of scientific practice ultimately derived from the physical
sciences. This was originally a distinctively Germanic movement
and was a product of the burgeoning of German science from the
eighteen-forties onwards, due to professionalisation and new forms
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of scientific education. However, experimental approaches to
plant physiology also became popular in France and Britain, and,
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by a process of direct transfer from Germany, in the United States.
On the other hand, many botanists were still practising, and
were still training students in, more traditional activities - the
collecting, identifying and classifying of the older natural history
mode of botany, with its orientation toward the herbarium and toward
observation in the field. Many of these traditionalists - for
example, Babington, Professor of Botany at Cambridge - felt
threatened by the aggressive New Botanists who, often quite explicitly,
sought to relegate the expertise of the taxonomist to a subordinate
status:-
"It is rare now to find an Undergraduate or B.A. who
knows, or cares to know, one plant from another ... I
am one of those who consider this to be a sad state
of things. I know much of what is called Botany is
admirably taught among us; but it is not what is known
as Botany outside the Universities, and does not lead
to a practical knowledge of even the most common
plants. It is really Vegetable Physiology, and ought
to be so called. It is a very important subject, but
it does not convey a knowledge of plants."88
Joseph Hooker, the Director of the Kew Herbarium and the doyen
of British systematic botany, was also aware of the changes which
were occurring in the study and teaching of botany
"
... physiology, minute anatomy, and chemico-
physiology, and into physico-physiology ... now form
the staple of botanical teaching ... in this country.
Botany is no longer a knowledge of plants, but how
parts of plants "come about" and what they do! You
begin with yeast, moulds, etc., and the higher you go
the less you know the whole plant and the more of their
"inwards". There is no question of the high scientific
value and interest of all this, but the outcome of
years of it may leave a man in utter ignorance of
any plant bigger than the Torula or Mucor he began
with."84
Hooker came to feel that the pendulum had swung too far towards
the 'New Botany' and that the value of taxonomy and floristics was
being unjustly ignored
"There is a strong feeling apparent, that vegetable
physiology and anatomy alone do not supply the wants
of the public - and that some knowledge of plants in
general, their uses, physiognomies and distribution,
should be taught:- a knowledge of plants, in short
as well as of their "innards" and movement." -5
There was considerable professional conflict between the
traditionalists and the New Botanists. F.O. Bower, one of the
pioneers of the New Botany in Britain, had discontentedly read
botany at Cambridge under Babington before going to Germany to study
under the famous physiologist Julius von Sachs at Wurzburg, and
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the famous morphologist Anton de Bary at Strasbourg. Bower complained
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bitterly about the dominance of the old floristic style of work at
Cambridge
"Thus while official botany at Cambridge has been
splitting analytically the varieties of Rubus [one of
Babington's special interests] the laboratory of
Hofmeister in the Universities of Heidelberg and
TUbingen, was glowing with a new synthetic flame;
and a true comparative morphology had emerged." '
The New Botanists competed with the old guard for the relatively
meagre resources available to the discipline as a whole
"I [Bower] remembered about 1876 how I longed for a
train of wagons to convey the Cambridge herbarium
away to Kew, so as to vacate for the new botany the
rooms that would have served its needs."^8
Despite the conflict there was, as we have seen in the previous
chapter in the work of Schimper, for instance, also scope for
combining these two forms of botanical activity. A place could
be made for the old skills within the context of the New Botany.
From this perspective it is interesting to look at the work of
Gaston Bonnier, who was the teacher of Charles Flahault and
therefore, in terms of pedagogical genealogy, a grandfather of
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Braun-Blanquet.
Nowadays Bonnier is principally remembered for his experimental
and morphological work upon topics such as plant respiration and
the structure and function of the nectaries. He is often commemorated
as a leader of the movement toward an experimental botany. But yet
the major part of his work was in floristics and floristic plant
geography, as is evidenced by such massive volumes as Flore complete
illustr^e en Couleurs de France, Suisse, et Belgique (13 volumes
in quarto), and Nouvelle Flore du Nord de la France et de la
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Belgique. He also undertook important studies in Humboldtian
plant geography, researching into the action of the environment on
vegetation and the distribution of plant associations. For instance,
he greatly refined ideas on the parallelisms between latitudinal
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and altitudinal zonation of vegetation. This had been an important
concern of Humboldt himself.
This sort of combination of interests was quite typical of
botanists doing Humboldtian plant geography - or ecological plant
geography, as it was coming to be known - in the latter decades
of the nineteenth century. Ecological plant geography offered
botanists the opportunity to ally the old skills of description
and classification with the study of process and function. It
was, in principle, quantitative. It could be made to involve advanced
instrumentation and ways could be devised to study vegetation
experimentally - by transplantation techniques, for example, as
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pioneered by Bonnier. Physiology and morphology, the twin emphases
for the New Botany, could both be interpreted ecologically as the
responses or adaptations of the plant to the situation in which it
grew. Yet ecological plant geography was also an observational
science. It also utilised field skills and experience.
Ecologists could thus claim to be fruitfully combining the old
and the new forms of botanical expertise:-
"Thus the ecologist, persuaded of the importance of
the various vital problems ... must have a complicated
equipment for his varied work; he must be as familiar
with the use of the balances, photometric and thermo-
metric instruments, as with the absolute dominion of
lifeless nature. In order not to be betrayed into
forming hasty conclusions, he must work in the
herbarium as a florist, with the microscope as a
physiological anatomist ... "93
Field-orientated botanists, trained in traditional ways but aware of
the decreasing fashionability of traditional botany, found ecological
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plant geography "a natural outlet for their interests and abilities".
However there were dangers inherent in seeking to lie down with
a lion quite as imperialistic as the New Botany. Would its relation¬
ship to traditional skills be indeed symbiotic, with the lamb
being able to ride, as it were, on the back of the lion toward
scientific respectability and status? Or would the lamb find
itself assimilated into the body of the beast? Many traditionalists,
although interested in modernising field studies, feared that their
skills might become entirely subordinate to the new expertise.
Oscar Drude, for example, expressed misgivings about the possibility
of plant geography being too completely dominated by forms of
practice introduced from other sciences:-
"These [MacMillan's and Warming's] works emphasize
the special province of ecology and give preference
to the methods employed in the organic natural sciences
rather than to the methods employed in the geographical.
It soon appeared as if the daughter of biogeography
would destroy the reputation of her mother and usurp
her place, but the opportune appearance of Schimper's
work, based upon the same foundation and fulfilling
Grisebach's unattainable dream, completely restored
the connection between the highly specialized ecological
and the broader geographical points of view."95
There were important matters at stake here. The imperialism
of the New Botany was more than mere rhetoric or the setting out
of an intellectual programme. From the eighteen-fifties, the
intensely competitive German university system was, as ever,
overproducing eager young men, imbued with aggressive professional
pride, and possessing doctorates in physiology or some other aspect
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of the New Botany. The production of New Botanists increased
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even more in the 1880s. The New Botanists coveted the professional
opportunities in general botany. Thus they came directly into
competition with recruits more traditionally trained. This was true
even in Britain where there were many fewer New Botanists. Joseph
Hooker had to advise a friend trained in the 'old school' that he
was unlikely to be successful in an application for a chair in
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botany due to his lack of experience in the new subjects.
It must be remembered that, despite the rise of the New Botany,
the training of botanists in more traditional skills did not cease.
The teaching of taxonomy did not generally become as moribund as it
did in Cambridge under the ageing Babington. The New Botany has
received more attention from historians, but Old Botanists, if one
may so refer to them, continued to be trained - in some numbers by
Engler in Berlin, in lesser numbers in Edinburgh and at various
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centres in Germany, France and Switzerland. As well as the
sheer inertia of a well-established traditional research and
pedagogical activity, floristic botany was sustained by its economic
importance. The Botanical Gardens and Herbaria of Berlin and London
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served Imperial interests. Floristic botany was an essential
tool in the exploitation of the natural resources of the colonial
possessions. The continued existence of taxonomy was assured,
therefore, however unfashionable and unglamorous it might seem
when compared with the New Botany.
Another problem for the floristic botanists was that, given the
intellectual freedom which each professor possessed under the
German system, it was possible to establish a reputation in physio¬
logy, achieve a permanent position on the strength of it, and then
devote one's research efforts to something quite different.'"^
One might, if one enjoyed field work and botanical travelling, extend
one's physiology into ecology and plant geography, interests which
might earlier have been quite secondary. A.r.W. Schimper's career,
for example, follows this pattern quite closely. He was, like
Bower, a student of Anton De Bary at Strasbourg and of Julius von
Sachs at Wttrzburg. Schimper established his reputation by work on
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the origin of starch grains and the morphology of epiphytes. But
after he gained an extraordinary professorship at the University of
Berlin, in 1883 at the age of twenty-seven, he devoted himself more
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and more to the study of vegetation and plant geography. These
studies culminated in the publication of his book Pflanzengeographie
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auf physiologische Grundlage in 1898. Likewise Haberlandt, who
began his research career in physiological anatomy, was able, having
achieved a secure position at the University of Graz, to diversify
his interests and to begin to investigate the adaptations which
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tropical environments produced in plant life. The presence of
such men within the field of ecology, with their new high-prestige
methodology, threatened the respectability of other forms of
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practice. The old botany, even in its ecological guise, might
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seem old hat.
Thus ecological plant geography was an area in which the old
and the new botany were coming into conflict and competition. As
we have seen, representatives of each felt it necessary to defend
the relevance and importance of their own forms of expertise. Here
it is relevant to note that the students of SchrOter and rlahault
received, as undergraduates at Zurich or Montpelier, a traditional,
taxonomy-based training with comparatively little emphasis on
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experimentation. Their professors were not famous physiologists
or prominent New Botanists. Montpelier, in particular, had an
especially strong tradition of floristic research. It had been a
centre for taxonomy, in a characteristically French style, continuously
since the days of Rondelet. Montpelier was the "ancient capital of
French botany" or as Braun-Blanquet expressed it, "ville classique
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des botanistes". Braun-Blanquet and his fellow floristic phyto-
sociologists were practitioners of a traditionally-orientated botany:-
"Braun-Blanquet a pu faire son grand travail sur les
groupements vegetaux parce qu'il etait un excellent
connoisseur des especes. Aussi bien sur les haut
sommets des Alpes que dans les plaines arides de
l'Aragon ou dans les forets humides de l'Irlande ou
du Pays Basque, il se trouvait toujours en terrain
connu du point de vue floristique, ce qui lui permettait
de travailler sans difficultes."1-1-0
One of the achievements of the Sigma programme was to carve
out a position of central importance for their traditional floristic
skills within the framework of twentieth-century vegetation science
- thus defusing the threat from the new methodology of the aggressive
New Botanists. As we shall see, their rejection of the habitat
and physiognomic criteria for determining the association had the
effect of a refusal to yield primacy to physiological methods.
Their stress on the fundamental importance of floristic methods
in ecological investigation was a defence of their own established
practice against the claims of a rival professional group.
Polemical statements directed, explicitly or implicitly,
against the advocates of a different ecological practice are
frequent in the Sigmatist corpus. Such assertions as "Studies of
the structure of vegetation without accurate knowledge of the
species concerned are scientifically worthless"111 were not casual
or diffuse observations. They were criticisms of the work of
other botanists and were responded to as such by the professional
rivals of Sigma and Zurich-Montpelier.
Such a .response may clearly be seen in an article written in
1910 by the British ecologist, C.E. Moss, who in common with most
British ecologists, was unenthusiastic about the central role of an
elaborate classificatory procedure in the Zurich-Montpelier method
and wished to base vegetation science on the study of environmental
factors, either from a physiological or from a geographical point
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of view. Moss was responding not directly to Braun-Blanquet but
to a paper by Gradmann, who had, in 1909, anticipated Braun-Blanquet
and outlined a system of vegetational classification based solely
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on floristic criteria.
Against Gradmann, Moss argued- for the importance of the study
of the habitat. Moss wrote:-
"Whilst the goal reached by the two methods - by the
floristic method advocated by Gradmann and the habitat
method advocated in this paper - must in all cases
be the same, the latter method would appear to be more
appropriate and indeed more fundamental from the point
of view of the study of vegetation as distinct from
the study of Flora. The study of vegetation is not a
department of taxonomy ... The view advocated by
Gradmann should not, in my judgement, supersede the
view that the formation must be determined primarily
by the investigation of the habitat; but Gradmann*s
method furnishes an auxiliary and confirmatory test
of the formation in all cases of doubtful habitat ...
To insist that the floristic composition of the formation
is more important than the habitat is to maintain ^
that the effect is more fundamental that the cause."
Habitat factors, being generally quantifiable physical or
chemical parameters (altitude, temperature, soil composition and
moisture, and so on) were very relevant to the concerns of those
who were trying to apply physiology to the field situation. The
physical habitat was the field equivalent of the experimental
conditions imposed upon the plant in the physiological laboratory.
Thus only by the study of the habitat could the results of laboratory
experiments be related to plant growth in the wild. To the
student of the habitat, every growing plant was an experiment in
physiology. The difficulty was discovering what the relevant
experimental variables were.
Investigation of the physical habitat had, of course, long
been an important concern of Humboldtian plant geography. Moss
wished to emphasise the crucial importance of this form of
investigation. But Gradmann, Braun-Blanquet and the other new
floristic theorists wished to shift the study of habitat factors
from pride of place in the study of vegetation.
The pnytosociologists did not, however, wish altogether to
eliminate the study of the habitat from vegetation science. Such
study was to be a sub-branch of phytosociology entitled 'synecologie'.
Synecology occupied a good portion of Braun-Blanquet's book
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Pflanzensoziologie. He did original research in this area.
But, if Moss's views on habitat delineation are contrasted with
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those of Braun-Blanquet, it will be obvious that what each regards
as the logical and necessary starting point of vegetation science
is directly the opposite of the other's view. To Braun-Blanquet,
the plants themselves were the most reliable indication of the
physical conditions:-
"The most recent grouping of plant communities,
according to similarity of floristic composition,
proceeds from confirmed observation that every species
- indeed every race - has a definite greater or lesser
indicator value."11'''
Thus, the only reliable way to identify habitats was by the study of
the floristic composition of plant communities:-
"When a plant community, an association or a sub¬
division of it, is recognised and floristically
circumscribed, the investigation of the habitat and
habitat factors must be undertaken."1'1®
To Moss, the study of floristic distinctiveness allowed the
investigator "an auxiliary and confirmatory test" that he was on
the right lines in his investigation of habitat. Direct study of
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the habitat came first.
These differences between Moss and the Sigmatists correlate
with the closeness of the relationship between vegetation science
and taxonomy, seen as desirable in each case. Moss, as we have seen,
wished to distinguish taxonomy from the study of vegetation:-
"
... it would be better to refer to the minor
differences in habitat as well as to the differences
in floristic composition in all definitions of the
association. By doing so, the main object of the study
of vegetation would be emphasized; and a tendency -
by no means an imaginary one - to regard plant geography
as a branch of floristic botany would be checked. "120
Clements and the model of physiology
If taxonomy was Braun-Blanquet's model science, F.E. Clements
chose quite a different example to follow. Whereas Braun-Blanquet's
professor had been a traditionalist floristic botanist, Clements's
professor, C.E. Bessey, was in the vanguard of the introduction of
the experimental New Botany to America, and did much to promote the
new experimental disciplines of plant physiology and pathology, as
well as the field discipline of plant ecology, in America. Bessey
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saw the German New Botany as having the resources to transform the
study of botany in America, enhancing its professional status in
the scientific community and its practical value to the larger
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community as a whole. To Bessey's students, in contrast to
Schrdter's, German plant physiology carried not a threat but a
promise. Not surprisingly, Clements chose German models for his
ecology.
Firstly, the work of Oscar Drude was used as the basis for
Clements's and Pound's The Phytogeography of Nebraska:-
"It goes without saying that the writings of the
German phytogeographers which have appeared in recent
years have been a chief source of inspiration. In
particular the admirable Pflanzengeographie von
Deutschland of Dr. Oscar Drude has made light the
darker places in our path by the copious illustrations
and comparisons which it furnishes. It will readily
be perceived that the writings of Dr. Drude ... have
been made use of in the methods employed. We have
departed from his methods only with reluctance, and
only in cases where the peculiar circumstances of
our region appeared to make it imperative."1^
Drude was not as physiologically-orientated as many other German
ecologists. Indeed, as we have seen, Drude had expressed misgivings
as to ecology becoming wholly a province of physiology to the
complete exclusion of geographical studies. But his Deutschlands
Pflanzengeographie was the ideal exemplar for Clements and Pound.
Drude's comparatively simple techniques could be duplicated by the
poorly-equipped young graduate students of Nebraska, and yet such
techniques carried the full prestige of Germanic science.
Secondly, Clements eagerly embraced physiology - the quintessence
of the German New Botany - as the appropriate model science for
ecology. Indeed he went further:-
"There can be little question in regard to the
essential identity of physiology and ecology. This is
evident when it is clearly seen that the present
difference between the two fields is superficial.
Ecology has been largely the descriptive study of
vegetation; physiology has concerned itself with
function; but when carefully analyzed both are seen
to rest on the same foundation ... The growing recog¬
nition of the identity of the two makes it desirable
to anticipate their final merging, and to formulate a
system that will combine the good in each ... In this
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connection it becomes necessary to point out to
ecologist and physiologist alike that, while they have
been working within the confines of the same great
field, each must familiarize himself with the work of
the other ... The ecologist is sadly in need of the
more intimate and exact methods of the physiologist;
the latter must take his experiments into the field,
and must recognize more fully that function is but the
middleman between habitat and plant. It seems
probable that the final name for the whole field will
be physiology ...
In Clements's field techniques, measurement of the physical
parameters of the habitat was of primary importance - for which
purpose he often employed automatic recording devices - mimicking
the 'exact methods' of the physiologist. He continually stressed
the importance of experiment in ecology. Physiology was the study
of adaptation, experimentally and quantitatively, in the laboratory.
Ecology was'to be the study of adaptation, descriptively, experiment¬
ally and quantitatively in the field.
As we have seen, formations, in Clements's opinion, occupied
a definite habitat and exhibited a uniform physiognomy. Clements
argued that this was due to the fact that physiognomic form was a
direct expression of physiological adaptation to the physical
environment. To Clements, the habitat was the cause and the
vegetation the effect, and in describing the relationship between
the two he employed the stimulus-response vocabulary of the
physiologist:-
"The amount of response to a stimulus is proportional
to the intensity of the factor concerned. This does not
mean that the same stimulus produces the same response
in two distinct species or necessarily in two plants
of the one species. In these cases, the rule holds
only when the plants or species are equally plastic.
For each individual however this quantitative
correspondence of stimulus and response is fundamental.
It is uncertain whether an exact or constant ratio
can be established between factor and function; the
answer to this must await the general use of quanti¬
tative methods. There can be no doubt, however, that
within certain limits the adjustment is proportional
to the amount of stimulus ...
Despite all his physiological rhetoric and his stress on
instrumentation, it must be stressed that Clements routinely undertook
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very detailed floristic study in the course of his ecological
investigations. It might be said that his ecological practice was,
in actuality, based on floristic analysis quite as heavily as Braun-
Blanquet's was. Clements devised the metre quadrat and the transect
technique to facilitate objective and quantitative analysis of the
species composition of plant communities. The implications of his
programmatic pronouncements were not necessarily borne out by his
actual practice. But the point I am seeking to make here is that,
in making programmatic pronouncements as to what ecology should be
and what its place among the sciences was, Clements was keen to
associate ecology with the obviously scientific and prestigious
New Botany subject of physiology rather than old-fashioned floristic
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botany.
Although his everyday research practice was firmly based upon
the study of species composition, Clements was scathing as to the
deficiencies of a vegetation science structured primarily upon
floristics and upon the individual species as an ecological entity:-
"The earliest and simplest development of the subject
was concerned with the distribution of plants. This
was at first merely an off-shoot of taxonomy, and, in
spite of the work of Humboldt and Schouw, has persisted
in much of its primitive form to the present time,
where it is represented by innumerable lists and
catalogues. Geographical distribution was grounded
upon the species, a fact that early caused it to
become stereotyped as a statistical study of little
value ... The fixed character of the subject is
conclusively shown by the fact that it still persists
in almost the original form more than a half century
after Grisebach pointed out that the formation was ^
the real unit of vegetation and hence of distribution."
Clements's attitude to taxonomy could not be more different
from that of Braun-Blanquet, to whom taxonomy was a body of
established knowledge on which vegetation science could rely.
In Clements's view, ecological research had shown orthodox taxonomy
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to be to a large extent erroneous and in need of reform. He
prescribed the use of experimental methods in species-making, and
demanded that taxonomic categories coincide with those which are
useful to the ecologist in the field. 'Experiment' was the shibboleth
of the New Botany and the key to its claims for an exalted scientific
status. Clements was constantly at pains to portray ecology as
essentially an experimental subject - in stark contrast to herbarium
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taxonomy with its 'medieval' methods:-
"If taxonomy is to be helpful to anyone but
taxonomists ... it must recognize the field as the
only adequate place for determining new forms,
and must commit itself unreservedly to the methods
of statistical and experimental study.
In other words, taxonomists must virtually become ecologists.
Thus the dependence relation between vegetation science and
taxonomy that we find in Braun-Blanquet is quite reversed. In
Clements's scheme of things, ecology took precedence over taxonomy
in the validation of knowledge. In effect, ecologists (or taxonomists
whose methods were ecological ones) were to do experiments which
would decide what were to count as good species, whereas herbarium
taxonomists were merely to document the results of these experiments:-
"For the preservation of the results obtained by
the ecologic methods ... an evolution harbarium is
proposed. It is felt that the usual taxonomic
herbarium will have its usefulness restricted more
and more to the preservation of types, and to the
purposes of instruction. The evolution herbarium
will be the record of field observations and experi¬
mental results ... the evolution herbarium is still to
be regarded as a record merely. It is not to replace
the taxonomic herbarium as a mass of working material
to be shuffled about and made into species. It is a
repository of species and forms when they have finally
been determined by experiment."1^
One reason why Clements was so anxious to reform taxonomy was
his annoyance at the tendency of the taxonomists of his day to
employ a narrow species concept, encompassing little morphological
variation. Since the demise of Asa Gray, American taxonomy had
131
become notorious for its domination by 'splitters'. The splitting
of established taxonomic categories had led to a multiplication of
the number of species and genera in the regional Floras. The
subtle distinctions between the newly-created taxa frequently
required special expertise to discern:-
"The field worker must deal with units which are
recognizable in the field with a fair exercise of
patience and keenness. He must carry in mind the
names and characteristics of a large number of species,
and he can do this only by relating them to each other.
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There is a very definite limit to the average memory,
and this limit is greatly overstepped by a system which
trebles the total number of species in a region and
substitutes for a clearly marked genus like Astragalus
17 genera recognizable with difficulty bv the systematist
and practically impossible for others."^
Clements's dislike of this practice was shared by Bessey and by his
fellow ecologist, H.C. Cowles, of the University of Chicago. All
three vehemently expressed their disapproval of splitting tendencies
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in American taxonomy at the Botanical Congress of 1908.
Acceptance of a narrow species concept would necessarily have
involved the ecologists in intensive floristic investigations and
would have diverted their attention from the study of the physiological
and habitat correlates of species and vegetation-types. And most
importantly of all, it would render popular communication and practical
application of ecological research more difficult:-
"
... systematic biology [must] aid and not hinder
the development of ecology and the closely related
practical sciences of agriculture, horticulture,
forestry, plant pathology, economic zoology etc.
... It must recognise that a manual which can be
used with success only by the systematist fails
signally in its purpose and be willing to construct
keys and descriptions primarily for foresters,
agronomists, grazing ecologists, and others whose
knowledge of taxonomy is slight."1^
The context of science in the Middle West
To understand why communication with the layman, the forester
and the agriculturalist was important to Clements, one must know
something of the context of academic science in the Middle West.
The University of Nebraska was a Land-Grant college. The
character of the science done in the Land-Grant colleges was
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very closely defined by its social context. In particular, the
colleges were dependent for support upon a lay constituency. To
finance their research and keep their jobs, the faculty members had
to justify their expenditure of public money in cost-effective terms.
The botanists and ecologists had to represent themselves as doing
work which would have direct application to agriculture and land
management. Bessey, for example, was very active and influential
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in redirecting American botanical research so that academic botanists
began to take seriously the study of the cultivated varieties of
136
plants, of plant pathology and other similarly useful topics.
He was also much interested in the study of the vegetation of
Nebraska and in the application of vegetational knowledge to
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practical problems. He investigated, for example, the migration
of introduced weed species such as the Russian thistle within the
state, and the problem of utilising the prairie grasses for forage.
Furthermore, Bessey maintained that finding out how the prairie
'worked' in terms of the composition and dynamics of the plant
communities would lead to more reliable guide-lines as to appropriate
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land use and management.
Clements was likewise throughout his entire career concerned
to present his work as applicable and orientated toward the
problems of farmers, foresters, and grazers. In sharp contrast to
Braun-Blanquet, Clements had direct professional involvements in
applied botany. Between 1893 and 1896, he worked part-time for the
U.S. Department of Agriculture, while still a student or an assistant
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professor. A series of other such appointments occupied him
throughout his life. In Research Methods in Ecology, published in
1905, Clements made explicit the intimate connection he saw
between ecological research and practical concerns:-
"Forestry ... is the ecology of a particular kind
of vegetation, the forest.... whatever contributes to
the ecology of the forest is a contribution to forestry
... A full knowledge of the character and laws of
succession will prove of the greatest value to the
forester in all studies of forestation and reforestation.
Forests which now seem entirely unrelated will be seen
to possess the most intimate developmental connections,
and the fuller insight into the life-history gained
in this way will have a direct bearing upon methods
of conservation, etc."1^
Clements continued to combine interests in pure and applied
research after he went to Minnesota. The University of Minnesota
was also a Land-Grant college and the same social pressures shaped
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the activities of faculty members as at Nebraska. Clements was
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from 1907 to 1910 an adviser with the U.S. Forestry Service. And,
as Minnesota State Botanist, he organized the Botanical Survey of
Minnesota on an ecological and practical basis:-
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"
... a knowledge of soil and climate and of the
plant's relation to them is necessary to determine
what primary crop, grain, forage or forest is best.
For the farms of the State, the best use is a matter
of knowing the soil and climate differences of regions
and fields, and taking advantage of these in crop
production. For the unoccupied lands of Minnesota, we
need a classification survey to determine the best
use of the different areas, to prevent the waste of
human effort and happiness involved in trying to secure
from the land what it cannot give, and yet to insure
that the land will reach as quickly as possible its
maximum permanent return. For occupied lands, the
study and mapping of soil and climatic conditions
would constitute a use survey of the greatest value
in adjusting plant production to the conditions which
control it ... Such a division would be determined
primarily by studies of soil and climate, necessarily
supplemented by the evidence of native vegetation
itself ...
During his period with the Carnegie Institution, Clements's
concern with presenting ecology as an applicable form of pure research
was, if anything, stronger. Unlike some other Land-Grant college or
agricultural experiment station personnel (such as Wisconsin's
E.V. McCollum or Raymond Pearl, also a student of Bessey's),
Clements did not relinquish all interest in his lay constituency
upon leaving the Land-Grant colleges and entering an independent
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institution. Ecology, more than genetics (Pearl's specialty) or
physiological chemistry (McCollum's), had within it an important
role for the popular technocrat which Clements did not renounce.
Plant Indicators, which Clements produced in 1920, was entirely
devoted to the theory and practice of using vegetation as a guide to
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agricultural practice and land management. In it he gave his
opinion on matters such as the value of coyote-proof fences for
lambing-grounds and the relative advantages of various methods of
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sheep herding. Most significantly of all, he set out what he
regarded as the case for. an official use classification of the lands
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of the West. He recommended the essentials of a grazing policy -
going to the extent of quoting, in full, the grazing bill which
William Kent, Congressman for California, presented unsuccessfully
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to the House of Representatives in 1913.
The immense agricultural and social problems of the Great
Drought in the Plains States made Clements even more prominent in
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an applied capacity. In 1933, Clements was requested by the Director
of the Carnegie Institution to place himself at the service of the
Government agencies dealing with erosion problems on the plains, and
he served as a consultant to the Soil Erosion (later the Soil
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Conservation) Service, until his death. He also advised the Great
Plains Drouth Committee as to, as his wife put it, "whether the
farmers of the Dust Bowl should be unsettled, resettled, subsidized,
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taught how to farm, or be painlessly chloroformed". Clements
made detailed recommendations as to how the Plains should be used:-
the Southwest and Great Basin set aside entirely as wilderness,
the Western Ranges to be non-arable, ranching country and only the
more humid east to be farmed. The Great Plains Committee reported
to President Roosevelt in 1936.
In the era of the Dust Bowl and the New Deal, Clements was keen
to make evident the practical utility of his work. This is obvious
from an article he wrote in 1936 entitled "Experimental Ecology in
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the Public Service". His belief in the applicability of technical
ecology to mundane practical matters is well illustrated by the
following quotation:-
"In the three great aspects of the shelter-belt project,
ecological considerations necessarily reign supreme.
The method of indicator communities is indispensable
to the selection of site and species, and it may be
epitomized in the statement that climax areas are
the most difficult of conversion and control, while
serai, subclimax and postclimax sites hold out the
greatest promise. The preparation, development and
maintenance of the wind-break communities are almost
wholly dependent upon the understanding and control
of such processes as reaction and coaction, in which
man may easily become the adverse, element through
omission or commission."1^
There can be no doubt that the applied orientation of the
Land-Grant faculties 'pre-adapted' Clements and his ecology to
play an important role in the national re-orientation of attitudes
towards land use and land management which was occasioned by the
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Great Drought and the Dust Bowl. The era of the New Deal was
the zenith of ecology's involvement 'in the public service', but
the giving of advice to farmers, grazers and management agencies
had been a major concern of Clements throughout his working life.
Such interests were not idiosyncratic to Clements but were
required of any scientist in his institutional position - whether at
Nebraska or Minnesota or indeed, latterly, at the Carnegie's Western
laboratories. Such was the importance of the lay audience upon
1S4
the Land-Grant colleges, and indeed upon American science generally.
Also it might be said that Clements inherited such interests from
Bessey and shared them with other students of Bessey such as H.C.
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Shantz, N.E. Hansen and J.E. Weaver. All these men were subject
to the same contextual pressures and their activities and professional
legitimations were moulded in similar ways.
There was, however, a difficult balance to be found here because
it was also incumbent upon the ecologists of the Mid-West that they
were not seen to be devoting themselves entirely to application and
such matters as keeping the coyotes from the lambing ewes. Otherwise
their status as scientists within the discipline of botany would
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suffer. Clements may be said to look always in two directions;
one was toward the lay constituency in which he sought the status
of a respected technical adviser, and the other was toward the ideal
of disinterested science in the European mode - an ideal sustained
in American plant science by the universities and museums of the
East and sustained for Clements by his professional attachment to
the discipline of botany. Equally as hard as he sought to convince
his lay constituency of the value of ecology in practical application,
Clements sought to establish ecology as an important and respected
branch of botanical science. He wrote to Tansley shortly after the
publication of Research Methods;-
"You will have gathered from the text how deep my
desire is to see ecology fashioned into a real science
... Most of my American colleagues are still very much
at the "descriptive ecology" stage."^57
Accordingly, Clements argued that ecology must become rigorously
experimental and (in the light of Clements's concept of the scientific)
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well-codified and deductive. Hence his concern for strongly
deductive laws of vegetation. Hence the rhetorical importance of
his modelling of ecology upon the indubitably scientific subject
of physiology. Hence the concern for a standardised terminology
for vegetation, strictly and ostentatiously derived from the classical
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languages.
Furthermore, ecologists must reflect upon their methodology:-
"There is no other department of botany in which the
superficial study of more than half a century ago still
prevails to the exclusion of better methods, many of
which have been known for a decade or more."1®)
and gain the objectivity associated with the use of instruments:-
"
... it becomes necessary to appeal to instruments,
in order to determine the exact amount of each factor
that is present in a particular habitat ... The
employment of instruments is clearly indispensable for
the task which we have set for ecology, and every
student that intends to strike at the root of the subject,
and to make lasting contributions to it, must familiarize
himself with instrumental methods. One great benefit
will accrue to ecology as soon as this fact is generally
recognised. The use of instruments and the application
of results from them demand much patience and serious¬
ness of purpose upon the part of the student. As a
consequence there will be a general exodus from ecology
of those that have been attracted to it as the latest
botanical fad, and have done so much to bring it into
disrepute. "1®1
Ecology must be made scientifically respectable.
But, given the necessary context of research in the Land-Grant
colleges, ready communication between scientist and layman, and an
obvious concern with the layman's problems were also demanded. The
difficulties of this balancing act are well illustrated by the
plight of Conway McMillan, Clements's predecessor at Minnesota.
McMillan had been forced by the local reception of his first
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book The Metaspermae of the Minnesota Valley, to modify the
style and content of his writing. He next produced the much more
readily accessible Minnesota Plant Life, which was an applied text
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in the sense that it could be used in the high school classroom.
McMillan confided in Clements that he made this shift because the
administrators at the University of Minnesota were not "terribly
164
fond of erudition".
McMillan's study of the shoreline vegetation of Lake of the
165Woods was a major piece of ecological research. It was the first
American ecological work to receive wide acclaim. Oscar Drude




Pflanzengeographie. But such work gained him little honour in his
own country, and eventually McMillan, frustrated with his conditions
1 ff7
of work at Minnesota, abandoned botany altogether.
It is evident that it was unwise in the context of the Land-Grant
colleges to indulge oneself in unduly esoteric research. Significantly,
the German model of scientific activity was explicitly rejected by
certain figures influential in the direction of science in the West.
E.W. Hilgard, Director of the California Agricultural Experimental
Station, wrote:-
"I do not believe that a station so situated ought
to make it their business to pursue recondite studies
in vegetable physiology or animal chemistry, unless
they have first satisfied this legitimate demand
[applicability]."168
Ready communication with the lay constituency was vitally
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important. As we have seen, such a requirement was partly the
cause of Clements's quarrel with the splitting taxonomists. As
well as complicating ecological field research, a narrow species
concept would, if generally adopted, make communication between
scientist and lay land-users more difficult. However the broader
Grayian species-concept involved the recognition as species (or
at least as genera) of many of the floristic categories of colloquial
speech, such as the flowers and shrubs recognised by farmers and
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forestry workers. It is understandable that it was with this
sort of species-concept that Clements, Bessey and Cowles wished to
, 171work.
It is readily understandable, also, that the Clementsian units
of vegetation were virtually the same in terms of extent and
important identifying characteristics as those of the farmer, the
grazer, and the range manager. Tall-grass prairie, short-grass
prairie, true prairie were categories of prairie easily recognisable
by laymen being, in fact, quite similar to the layman's own
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classification. There must have been little incentive for
Clements to adopt a more esoteric unit of vegetation.
The terminology which Clements employed, and in many cases
invented, to describe these units of vegetation and the relations
between them, was dense with neologisms and complex to the point
173
of obscurity. But the expert must be careful not to speak exactly
the same language as his client; otherwise the client may doubt
the need for the expert., The important point to note here is that
Clements's classification was readily translatable into lay terms
and thus readily communicable to non-experts. Foresters, for example,
continued to speak to their clients in Clementsian terms, if not quite
full Clementsian terminology, for many years. For instance, in
1948 E.I. Roe, silviculturist at the Kawashiwi Experimental Forest
described the natural forest vegetation of the Great Lakes in the
following manner:-
"These types consisted ... of the two climatic climax
associations - the deciduous or maple-bass wood, and
the coniferous or spruce-fir and the various edaphic
climax associations such as elm-ash-soft maple, pine,
oak-hickory, etc. As you know, the latter type of
climax eventually will be succeeded by the climatic
climax types. However this succession requires so
long a period without disturbance that to foresters
the edaphic types are fully as important as the
climatic ones."174
Inherent in these statements was much Clementsian theory such
as the assumption of a climatic monoclimax, long successional
processes displacing edaphic associations and the uniform physiognomy
of the climax - all expressed by the reference to groupings of tree
species, easy for the layman to identify and comprehend.
In contrast, the Sigmatist classification of vegetation
diverged markedly from lay practice. For instance, M. Guinochet's
classificatory map of the vegetation of Pontardies has a large
expanse of Fageturn without a beech tree to be found on the ground,
but dominated by spruce and with beech-association character-species
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in the under-storey. His classification is quite misleading to
the uninitiated, whereas Clements's units are quite plain.
As well as being more esoteric, the European units of vegetation
were much smaller in size that those employed in America. But in
Europe investigation on a small scale was feasible. The Flora was
well worked out; the distances to cover were comparatively short;
the available man-power, in terms of trained botanists, comparatively
large. It was possible for ecologists to sustain intensive research
on small area units - which, of course, the vegetation was generally
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broken up into by topography or human activity. Indeed one might
say that, for ecological inquiry in Europe, especially for inquiry
based on floristics, a small unit was not only possible, it was
professionally convenient. If Europe were to be considered to
contain only, say, twenty or thirty associations, how could the
relatively large number of newly-trained phytosociologists continue
the floristic research programme of their teachers? A small floristic
unit which allowed the younger generation to identify and characterise
new associations obviously had its advantages.
Pure French science
There was much less pressure from a lay constituency on Braun-
Blanquet or on any of the Sigmatists. In Montpelier, they were
freer to present themselves as doing pure science for they worked
within an institutional and cultural ethos which encouraged such a
presentation. H.W. Paul has described how the French, eager to
restore the reputation of French science after Its mid-nineteenth
century comparative decline, developed an ideology of pure, dis-
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interested research in the early years of the twentieth century.
This ideology was produced in the context of a national competition
with the Germans to-be the creative geniuses and scientific pedagogues
of Europe. Whereas Germany's scientific output had been in the
banausic fields of applied research, France, so the argument went,
should cultivate pure research to display French superiority of
culture and intellectuality. In 1918, the President of the Academie
des Sciences, Paul Painleve, spoke of the pursuit of science for
purposes of immediate utilisation or pecuniary gain as degrading
the soul and ending in cultural barbarism:-
"La science n'est moralisatrice qu'a condition de
garder aux yeux de l'elite qui la cultive son caractere
essentiel qui est la recherce desinteressee de la
verite ... de l'autre cote du Rhin, la Science, c'etait
une gigantesque enterprise ou tout un peuple, avec
une patiente servilite, s'achamait a fabriquer la plus
formidable machine a tuer qui ai jamais existe.1,177
Painleve's remarks were directed specifically against the
German industrialisation of laboratory science, but were also of
general import for French science as a whole. Painleve's expression
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may be regarded as rhetorical and hyperbolic but the encouragement
of pure research, to be presented as purer research, was real
enough. The French ideology of pure science meant that the provincial
faculties of science, of which Montpelier was one, were actively
discouraged from increasing the practical orientation of many of
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their courses. Paul aiso points out how these influences extended
into Switzerland where the French were very sensitive of the need
to maintain their position and to prevent the complete absorption
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of the Swiss universities into the German educational system.
However, in the early decades of the twentieth century the
French provincial faculties of science had developed strong links
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with local industry and other commercial enterprises. In
Nancy, for example, there were technical schools in chemistry,
electrochemistry, agriculture and brewing - all training personnel
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for local industry. In Toulouse, courses in agricultural and
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industrial chemistry were inaugurated in 1886 and 1889- A
special part of the curriculum at Lille was devoted to the study
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of the chief industries of Northern France. Similar links
184
between faculty and commerce developed at Montpelier. Often
the financial well-being of the provincial institution was
185
dependent upon these links.
Whatever the official ideology of research might be, the
provincial faculties were not in a position to abandon applied
research altogether. Ideologies of pure and applied research
had to be accommodated together. The result in Montpelier was
that priority was given to pure research with application being
stressed as important but as necessarily consequent upon dis¬
interested research. Thus the Sigmatists did not neglect the
practical applications of phytosociology, but they regarded
application as secondary to the pure study of vegetation for its
186
own sake. Foresters did come to study at Montpelier and a
certain amount of applied research was undertaken under the
187
auspices of Sigma. But generally, students were to come to
Montpelier to learn vegetation science which they were to go away
somewhere else to apply. In 1932, a second station was set up in
Germany under Reinhold Ttixen. TUxen had a special interest in
applied phytosociology. Much of the teaching on applied matters
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was done under his auspices.
Braun-Blanquet, in marked contrast to Clements, was able to
present himself as a scientist doing pure research first and
foremost. The firm distinction made at Sigma between pure and
applied research and the priority given to pure research may be
seen in Braun-Blanquet's text-book:-
"The analysis of plant communities may follow the
purely practical lines of forestry and agriculture
or the more theoretical lines of plant sociology.
For the phytosociologist, the first task is to carve
out and delimit the association, in order to lay the
most indispensable foundation for synecological,
synchronological and syngenetical investigations
... Problems of the structure of communities,
as presented by agriculture and forestry, form in
themselves a very comprehensive complex. These can
be considered here only in so far as they are
related to the structural studies of general plant
sociology.
This is virtually the only mention of applied work in-the entire
text. Such a firm division of pure from applied research is not
present in the Clementsian corpus — indeed is virtually unthinkable
in the context of Clementsian ecology. Braun-Blanquet did not
give his attention to problems of soil erosion, grazing legislation,
sheep pens or any of the other applied matters which occupied
Clements's attention. Indeed he left Zurich partly because he found
the lack of good facilities for pure research at the Ecole Poly-
technique to be uncongenial.1^
Braun-Blanquet did occasionally make programmatic statements
as to the relevance of phytosociology "dans la domaine des
applications pratiques" - the sort of pronouncements that can be
found being made by virtually every scientist who ever tried to
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attract research funding or ever stood on a public platform. His
ideas of practical application for phytosociology include its
usefulness not only to commercial activities directly, but to 'pure'
199
subjects like taxonomy, geology and pedology. "" He was personally
involved in few practical projects. He advised on forestry land-
use in the Languedoc and, in 1939, he directed the camouflaging
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with plants of Swiss gun emplacements. When he returned to
France in 1940, he placed himself at the disposal of the Acacfemie
des Sciences and the Centre de Recherches Appliquees. He was
given the somewhat donnish task of taking pharmacy students on
19+
botanical excursions.
Braun-Blanquet was, thus, not involved in practical advisory
work to anything like the extent Clements was. His career was not
structured around service in forestry and soil erosion service
agencies as Clements *s was. Nor were the French phytosociologists
as a whole as active on the public stage as their American counter¬
parts. There was no French Great Plains Drouth Committee, no
Tennessee Valley Authority, no Conservation Corps. The French
phytosociologists were not routinely at the beck and call of a
lay constituency. The provincial faculties of science had strong
links with local commerce but they were not Land-Grant colleges.
Despite their dependence on direct contributions from local
industry, the French provincial faculties were autonomous to an
extent impossible in America. The Land-Grant colleges were State-
funded institutions and it was a tenet of American democracy that
recipients of public funds were accountable directly to the
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citizenry from which the funds were drawn. No such principle
applied in France. Given Braun-Blanquet's institutional and
disciplinary context, there was clearly no pressing need for him
or his colleagues and students to speak the language of the farmer
and the forester. Hence the feasibility of ecological study based
upon a small, esoteric and intuitively unobvious unit of vegetation.
The organismic analogy
We have not yet looked at one important aspect of Clements's
conceptualisation of vegetation and that is his persistent analogy
between the formation and the individual organism:-
"The developmental study of vegetation necessarily
rests upon the assumption that the unit or climax
formation is an organic entity. As an organism,
the formation arises, grows, matures, and dies.
Its response to the habitat is shown in processes
or functions and in structures which are the
record as well as the result of these functions.
Furthermore, each climax formation is able to
reproduce itself, repeating with essential fidelity
the stages of its development."1*^
It was by employing this organismic conceptualisation of the
plant community, that Clements was able to argue, in contrast to
the Sigmatists, that the formation was a concrete rather than
an abstract or ideal entity. All the vegetation in any given area
was developmentally related to the climax vegetation type.
Therefore it was best considered as part of the same organic entity:-
"All the stages which precede the climax are stages
of growth. They have the same essential relation to the final
stable structure of the organism that seedling and growing
plants have to the adult individual. Moreover, just as
the adult plant repeats its development, i.e. reproduces
itself whenever conditions permit, so also does the
climax formation. The parallel may be extended much
further ... In short, the process of organic development
is essentially alike for the individual and the community."
In his earlier work, Clements defined formations purely in terms
of vegetation but after 1918 or so, he included the associated
animal populations. The principal unit of his ecological system
became the 'biotic formation' which "was regarded as an organic unit
comprising all the species of plants and animals at home in a particul
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habitat". However he continued to write about the plant
formation as an organism. I will generally confine myself to
discussing his plant work. The community organism was sometimes
distinguished from individual organisms by being referred to as the
199
'complex' or 'super-' organism.
There were many holistic schools of thought active in America
in the early decades of the twentieth century. Thus by adopting
this holistic organismic approach Clements was able to present his
views as being in harmony with much of the science and philosophy
of his time. He was, for instance, able to claim that his conception
of the organismic character of the natural community derived support
from the philosophy of Herbert Spencer - which had a huge vogue in
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America at the turn of the century.
We know from the reminiscences of Roscoe Pound that Clements
was reading Spencer with enthusiasm in the 1890s:-
"I remember how he [Clements] and I used to discuss
... Spencer's "Principles of Biology" of which we had
expected great things in the days when Comtian Spencerian
positivism was almost a religion to scientists."2^
In later years Clements was to refer to Spencer's work frequently and
with approval - as embodying an organismic conception of social
order similar to his own:-
"Spencer has discussed the concept of the social
organism with signal clarity and the student of
community development can still turn with great
profit to his treatment of this theme."202
Another important reference to Spencer is to be found in Clements'
essay on the "Social origins and processes among plants" published in
1935 in the Handbook of Social Psychology:-
"The view that the plant community constitutes an
organism of a new order was first advanced in 1901.
With the full recognition of the social bond between
plants and animals the concept was broadened to apply
to the entire biotic grouping which was regarded as
including man, under natural conditions at least ...
It was later recognised that this view had been fore¬
shadowed in part by Comte (T830), by J.S. Mill (1843),
and more particularly by Spencer (1858, 1864), who
emphasized certain striking similarities between
simple organisms and societies. "203
Clements also supported his organismic views with reference
to more contemporary holistic philosophers such as Whitehead and
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Smuts. Smuts was himself interested in ecology and, like
Clements, in Neo-Lamarckianism, so here the reinforcement was
mutual. Smuts wrote:-
"The new Science of Ecology is simply a recognition
of the fact that all organisms feel the force and
moulding effect of their environment as a whole.
There is much more in Ecology than merely the striking
down of the unfit by way of Natural Selection. There
is a much more subtle and far-reaching influence within
the special or local "fields" of Nature than is
commonly recognised or suspected."2®
Clements also claimed affinity with other holist theorists in
the biological and social sciences:-
"The most recent, and in some ways the most significant,
contribution to the concept has been that of emergent
evolution, as embodied in the views of Henderson,
Spaulding, Sellers, Broad, Morgan, Jennings, Summer and
Keller, and Wheeler. While this development has taken
place more or less independently of ecology, it is
in practically complete accord with the earlier
concepts of the complex organism."206
Clements was thus able to give his organismic viewpoint most
impressively respectable intellectual credentials. The common
denominator which Clements pointed to in all these holistic
thinkers was their postulation that highly organised entities were
more than the sum of their constituent parts. He quoted with
approbation the following passage from Summer and Keller's The
Science of Society
"Human society then, by the diversity of its parts,
their specialisation, the distribution of functions,
the mutual service and support of the parts and their
solidarity, is a true system or oganization. It has a
life different from that of the individual. The quality
of a combination is not the sum of the qualities of its
components. There is a body to study as well as a
cell, a society as well as an individual; and the body
and the society are things with lives and laws of their
own. Hence forces arise in the societal organisation
which are characteristically societal forces."^
Thus the plant community might be conceived of as possessing, like
Wheeler's insect societies, 'emergent' properties in this sense.
One might say that it was greater than the sum of its constituent
plants:-
"One of the first consequences of regarding
succession as the key to vegetation was the realisa¬
tion that the community ... is more than the sum
of its individual parts, it is indeed an organism of
a new order. "208
One reason for the organismic analogy being convenient for
Clements to employ was that, as in the above quotation, it enabled
him to speak of 'development' in a sense which mimicked the
discourse of the more prestigious branches of biology. Studies of
the development of the individual organism had lately proved
very fruitful for students of morphology and phylogeny:-
"I hope you will ... feel that my proposals in
regard to the formation offer the opportunity of
putting us on a real and permanent scientific
basis, such as development had made possible or is
making possible in [word indecipherable] other
botanical fields."209
Furthermore, it strengthened the comparison Clements sought to make
between ecology and physiology. Ecology could be represented as
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studying the structures and functions of the complex organisms in
an analogous manner, and with equally exact methods, to the way
physiology studied the structures and functions of the individual
organism.
Organicism and ideology
But to understand fully the useful work that this conceptual¬
isation of the plant community did for Clements, one must understand
something of the social and political background of agriculture and
land-use on the Great Plains, and how Clements sought a particular
role for himself and his science within that context.
The Great Plains, treeless, dry and bare compared to the
Eastern and Western seaboards, and initially unattractive to the
homesteader, were first utilised by the white man as ranching
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country. From the eighteen-forties onwards, the vast area of
what is now Western Texas, Oklahoma, Kansas, Nebraska, North and
South Dakota, Montana, Wyoming, and much else besides, virtually
all the semi-arid grassland, was exploited as grazing for cattle.
The cattle were allowed to range over huge acreages which were
not fenced. The men who owned the cattle often had no property
rights over the land the cattle grazed. Almost all of it was Public
Domain - part of the vast tract of land held purely passively by
the Federal Government. Anyone who could gain access to sufficient
water to supply a herd could set up as a rancher. Inevitably
this system led eventually to overstocking and, frequently,to
lawless rivalry between jostling cattle barons. Overgrazing
became endemic since if any part of the range was not obviously
fully utilised, someone else would put down his own cows there.
The consequent shortage of grass seemed to be serious enough to
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place in doubt the continued viability of beef production.
In 1862, the Federal Homestead Act was passed. This allowed
small farmers to gain possession of land on the Public Domain simply
by the acts of settling on it and cultivating it. The Act was
passed during the Civil War to strengthen the ranks of the yeoman
farmer, a class of citizen invested with special ideological
significance by many American politicians, especially Yankee ones,
122
as the essential bulwark of American individualism and republican
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democracy.
By the eighteen-eighties, just as the overgrazing on the ranges
was becoming acute, the homesteaders were beginning to encroach
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upon the Great Plains. They were brought there by the ever-
increasing population pressure within the United States, the
exhaustion of homesteading opportunities in timbered provinces and
the invention of cheap methods of fencing. Quite large areas of
the grassland, the river-valley bottoms and the tall-grass prairie,
could be homesteaded successfully, but ever-increasing pressure of
numbers forced settlers to occupy land on which arable farming, as
then practised, was problematic due to lack of precipitation, or
underlying light or sandy soils, or both. In these areas the small
farmers failed as often as, indeed more often than, they succeeded.
The homesteading frontier swayed backwards and forwards as a few
dry seasons followed a few wet ones or vice-versa.
Aridity was not, however, the only problem faced by small
farmers in the eighteen-eighties and -nineties. Structural changes
in the American economy were shifting the locus of national economic
21A
power. Agriculture was no longer as predominant as it had been.
The economic importance of the industrial cities was rapidly
increasing. Even relatively successful farmers no longer wielded
purchasing power on a par with their urban equivalents. Agricultural
discontent came to a head with the collapse of farm prices during
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the depression of 1896.
The numbers of impoverished, displaced, or merely discontented
homesteaders created real political and social problems. They
demanded help from State and Federal government - help which the
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governments were often reluctant or unable to give. The very
strength of the farmers was held to be their rugged independence
and self-sufficiency. Nothing, it was said, must be done to
weaken these virtues. Also there were, at the time, formidable
constitutional obstacles in the way of spending public funds to aid
or support any particular group. American government was minimalist
and entrenched in laissez-faire. And the farmers' lobbies, although
they demanded intervention when times were poor, opposed it equally
vehemently when it threatened to circumscribe their right to settle
where they liked and farm how they liked, or when it seemed to
imply a weakening faith in the homesteading ideal.
There were other problems peculiar to the arid lands. Most
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pressing of all was the legal one of water rights. Under the
law which pertained in the East, water belonged to whoever owned
the land upon which the water happened to be. But in a dry country
this principle gave farmers and ranchers the right to fence off water
holes and dam streams, ensuring water for their own crops or herds
but condemning their neighbours to failure. Cattle men fought (often
literally) with farmers as well as each other over access to water,
to droving trails, to feeding areas on the trail and simply for
space on the range. The individualistic location of water and other
land rights meant that the setting-up of collective or public
irrigation schemes, essential if the arid lands were to be developed
to their full arable potential, was greatly hindered.
All this was aggravated by the general lack of legal or political
recognition of the rights and needs of the cattlemen. The Homesteading
Act envisaged small farms of a few hundred acres; the cattlemen
required units of thousands of acres. The cattlemen did not have a
place of honour in the political consciousness of the nation like
that accorded to the yeoman farmer. The large-scale ranchers were
regarded by many merely as obstacles to the establishment of
prosperous farming communities. The ranchers claimed that they were
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misunderstood by the Eastern legislators.
By 1902, with the passing of the Newlands Act, the situation
over water and irrigation was improved with a new legal principle
of collective right to water being established for the Western
States. The range and wire-cutting wars were over. But the problem
of establishing a stable pattern of utilisation for the plains was
not yet solved. The failure rate among the homesteaders on the
dry lands was very high. Between 1890 and 1910, at least one out
of every two new homesteads reverted to the public authorities
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within five years. In Nebraska, the proportion failing was even
higher. The grazing pressure upon the land not yet ploughed was
becoming more intense. These problems were to grumble away until
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the new legislative attitude of the New Deal.
This was the situation within which Land-Grant ecology emerged
in the 1890s and 1900s and within which Clements and Bessey's
other students were called upon to help the individual farmer and
cattle-rancher to maximise their returns. But such a context of
problem and conflict conjured for the ecologists the alluring image
of a grander field of exercise for their skills - the scientific
management of the plains grassland as a whole. Objective expertise
could sit above factional interests and promote scientific efficiency
where previously there had been disorder, strife and wastefulness.
Such a prospect was particularly alluring because the scope of
ecology was thereby enormously widened and the power of its
practitioners correspondingly increased. To achieve the optimal
exploitation of the plains would clearly involve the direction of
human as well as natural resources. The ecologists would be called
upon to advise not just upon the digging of draining ditches and
the uprooting of Russian thistles, but on the very structure of the
agricultural society itself. Clements expressed the ecologist's
new vision of the scope of his subject:-
"Because of the synthesis inherent in it, ecology
is also to be regarded as a point of view and a
method of attack for various great biological problems.
Not only does it concern itself more or less with the
whole of biology, but it also must ... make basic
contributions to the practical sciences of agronomy,
horticulture, forestry, grazing, entomology conservation,
etc., to say nothing of education, economics, sociology,
and politics. "221
Ecology was thus presented as"'a powerful synthetic science, able
to guide all aspects of man's interaction with his natural
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environment.
In many ways the doctrine of the ecologist as expounded by
Clements was no different from that articulated by the advocates
of State forestry, mineral leasing legislation, anti-trust laws, or
any of the other touch-stones of Progressivism. In all these areas,
the problems were seen as the consequence of individualistic and
unrestrained economic behaviour. Collective action guided by
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scientific expertise was the answer.
The imposition of centralised technical planning and direction
when previously the individual or the corporation had cared only for
itself was the common rhetorical demand of reformers in the
generation which sought to heal the social wounds of laissez-faire.
The appeal was routinely made that the larger welfare of society
as a whole should take precedence over that of the individual, and
that individual activity should be so directed that it would serve
rather than harm the common good. The way to maximise social
harmony and economic success was to take the broader view. Hence
the need for a synthetic and socially-aware perspective in the
management of natural resources.
As William Akin has pointed out, within the general context of
Progressivism, this holistic, scientistic and centralising credo
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was first and foremost the ideology of the planner and technocrat.
Scientific expertise, it was claimed, was not tainted by interests
and thus scientists could best perceive where the fairest course
lay. Furthermore, scientists had privileged knowledge of nature
and could thus, as Frederick Winslow Taylor put it, "bring about
the realisation of social harmony through ... the organisation of
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human affairs in harmony with natural law".
Technocracy has been characterised as an ideology of engineers
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- for whom it provided the promise of enhanced status and influence.
I would argue that ecologists should also be regarded as aspiring
technocrats in their own field. The Ecological Society of America
captured the spirit of technocratic rhetoric well when it resolved
that college courses in ecology should seek to:-
"
... inculcate and inspire a broad and synthetic
point of view that will enable students to see the
problems of natural resources, not as separate and
discrete, but as parts of a single master problem of
how best to administer nature as a whole."227
Similar sentiments were expressed by the members of the animal
ecology group, which in the 1930s and -40s gathered around W.C.
Allee at the University of Chicago. These men shared Clements's
belief in the importance of regarding the biotic community as an
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organismic whole. Clements had links with the Chicago group in
that he wrote a textbook jointly with Victor Shelford, Professor of
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Zoology at the University of Illinois. Shelford had been a
student of Cowles at Chicago and had combined the plant ecology of
Cowles with the behavioural studies of C.O. Whitman to produce some
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of the earliest animal ecology done in America. Before moving
to Illinois, Shelford had been on the faculty at Chicago where
W.C. Allee had been his first graduate student. He was pleased to
refer to the "slow but gradual recognition of the importance of the
concept [the community as a unit]" as partly being due, as far as
the animal side of ecology was concerned, to the activities of his
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students. We may assume that the views of Clements, Shelford
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and Allee on the biotic community were broadly similar.
Donald Worster has recently made the following suggestive
remarks on the subject of the Chicago animal ecology group:-
"'The organismic-community concept of modern ecology',
the group suggested at one point ... 'is one of the
fruitful ideas contributed by biological science to
modern civilization' and certainly it was a chief
inspiration in their search for what Emerson [Alfred
E. Emerson, a prominent member of the Chicago
group] called a 'scientific basis for ethics'.
Their earlier, less-known writings stressed this
quest even more strongly. There, they openly,
sometimes dogmatically, strove to extract from
nature a set of holistic values to apply to mankind."
As Cynthia Russett has pointed out, Alfred Emerson'fwas a
"striking ... example of deliberately normative equilibrium theory".'
The Chicago group regularly argued from what nature was to what human
society ought to be. They stressed the great reward that would
accrue from harmony with nature. Emerson's favourite slogan was
'dynamic homeostatis' - a characteristic to be found only in highly
integrated systems, 'organisms' in his terminology:-
"Many terms and phrases carry implications of
homeostatis and indicate that the concept is old.
These include such words and phrases as beneficial,
well-being, adaptation, adjustment, welfare, security,
harmony, equilibrium, balance, the good life, satis¬
faction, prosperity, enrichment, self-fulfillment,
the full life, self-sufficiency, progress ...
contentment and happiness."235
Ecologists thus presented themselves as the experts who could
manage nature along nature's own guidelines and thus make Man's
dealings with nature as harmonious as the image of nature which
their rhetoric conjured. A holistic rhetoric based on the
harmonious qualities of nature served to legitimate the experts'
challenge to the private and sectional expediencies which had led
236
to so much social disruption.
Here it might be objected that the social metaphor used by,
for example, the engineers within the technocratic movement was
not that of the organism but that of the smoothly running intricate
machine. But, despite the endemic disputations in the general
history of biology between organismic and mechanical conceptions,
too much should not be made of this distinction in the present
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context. The important point is that both images were holistic
ones, invoking a harmonious arrangement of human affairs in
accordance with natural laws. An organism, like a machine, could
be described as "a system of interlocking ... processes, inter¬
dependent and delicately balanced, in such a way that the due
working of any part of it is conditional on the due working of
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all the rest". Both models legitimated the role of the expert
in charge since he alone understood the natural laws which governed
the functioning of the complex holistic structure. It was natural,
one might say, for an engineer to pick a mechanical metaphor,
and for a biologist to pick an organismic one, but the rhetorical
function of the two conceptions was identical. And indeed the
two models had common elements. Clements, for example, spoke
about vegetational "dynamic equilibrium" in quite a mechanical
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sense.
This lack of fundamental difference between Clements's
organismic model and a mechanistic one leads us to an important
insight into the nature of Clements's conceptualisation of vegetation.
Clements was at some pains to point out that there was nothing
mysterious, mystical or vitalistic about the properties of the
vegetational superorganism. It was a concrete entity. It obeyed
the laws of physics and chemistry as well as the natural laws of
vegetational development. It had a cause-and-effect relationship
with the physical environment. It was a very mechanistic, natural-
law sort of emergent holistic organism. The social integration
between the plants was not the product of psychic sympathies or
underlying teleological principles, but, as in Spencer's theory
of the social organism, was the product of the intense competition
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between individuals. Mutualism arose as a result of competition.
Clements's formational organism was very far from the vitalistic,
inherently and all-encompassingly mutualistic conceptualisation
which certain authors have detected in other ecologists such as
Robert Smith, a British botanist roughly contemporaneous with
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Clements. Clements identified and opposed such opinions in
certain of his American contemporaries:-
"
... several American botanists ... without a
shred of proof hold firmly the view that there is
"undiscovered vitalistic something" in competition."
It ought also to be noted that although Clements supported the
conception of vegetation by reference to Smuts, Spencer and
Henderson, that does not necessarily imply that his political
opinions or social goals were the same as any of theirs. He may
well have claimed kinship with the many different contemporary forms
of holism simply to enhance the credibility of his own conception
of the natural community. One need not, for instance, regard
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Clements as necessarily sharing Henderson's Harvard conservatism.
Furthermore, although it is clear that he had interests in common
with the Chicago animal ecology group, and agreed with them on the
importance of the organismic analogy, his views were not necessarily
completely identical with theirs. One need not imagine that
Clements shared, for example, Allee's Quaker beliefs in social
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altruism. The concept of society as a social organism may be
applied in many different ways. Indeed it is important to note
that there is a systematic difference in the political moral drawn
from the organismic analogy by Clements as compared to Spencer.
In Spencer's work, the organismic nature of society implied that
efforts by reformers and planners to change the social structure
or control economic competition could only damage the highly
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organised social organism. To Clements, however, the organismic
analogy guaranteed an active role for the expert in social planning.'
Only an expert could comprehend and guide the intricate working
of holistic systems.
Hofstadter has described the vogue for Spencer which gripped
the farming communities of the American Middle West at the turn of
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the century. Spencer was the "shining light of individualism".
A whole generation was brought up on "Republicanism, Presbyterianism
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and Spencerianism". Thus, Clements cleverly adopted an idea in
common currency among his lay constituency and adapted it to serve
his own, somewhat different, purposes.
As well as his explicit references to holist theorists like
Spencer, there were further resonances between Clements's discourse
and the political discourse of his lay constituency - most
importantly with the rhetoric of the Populists. Populism was a
political movement engendered by the agricultural discontent of the
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eighteen eighties and nineties. It was particularly strong m
Nebraska in the 1890s. Hofstadter has identified the idea of a
natural harmony as being a dominant theme in the ideology of the
Populist movement:-
"In assuming a lush natural order whose workings
were being deranged by human laws, Populist writers
were again drawing on the Jacksonian tradition,
whose spokesmen also had pleaded for a proper obedience™
to "natural laws" as a prerequisite of social justice."
Thus a contrast between harmonious nature and disruptive Man
was not an element which Clements introduced into the political
251
discourse of the Middle West. However, in adopting this well-
known argumentative resource, Clements changed its implication
so that the harmony of nature no longer predicated Jacksonian
individualism but rather collectivism and technocracy. It was
the individualistic actions of the homesteaders that were deranging
nature, not Eastern legislators as the rhetoric of Populism had
claimed. A proper obedience to 'natural laws' was indeed a
prerequisite of social justice, but science had demonstrated
that the laws of nature were ultimately those of cooperation and
integration.
Cooperation was a natural characteristic ('function' in
Clementsian terms) of all organised communities. It would grow
spontaneously within the farming community of the Plains as a
reaction to environmental stresses to which the community was being
exposed. The role of the expert was to guide and direct the new
expression of cooperative spirit:-
"Coordination of process and practice on farm or
ranch must be reflected in the organization of the
community. This signifies cooperation, a community
function still almost undeveloped except with respect
to marketing. Though by far the most important of
social processes, it has made such slight progress
against myopic individualism as to confirm the belief
that, like the functions of other and simpler
organisms, it can be evolved only under the stimulus
of outside forces. Fortunately, times of stress
provide the very pressure needed as well as the
agencies to guide the response to it, and it now
seems probable that cooperation will be set forward
more in the present generation than in the full ™
century since the settlement of the West began."
As we have seen, Clements sought to establish a role for central
technical authority in an area previously given over to the free
interplay of individual and interest-group advantage. He advocated
federal intervention in many aspects of land use - in a society
253
where such intervention had previously been anathema. He sought
to limit the freedom of the homesteader to settle on marginal land -
a policy which would entail that the expansion of the agricultural
yeomanry was finally over and would make the High Plains the
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preserve of the ideologically unpopular cattleman. But Clements
sought to direct the rancher too - with a leasing system for the
Public Domain which would entail strict federal controls over
stocking levels, irrigation and all land utilisations, and which
would yield revenue for the federal purse. In all these difficult
tasks the image of a harmonious, organismic natural order was a
powerful tool - functioning to persuade the relevant parties that
there was a welfare to be served greater than that of the individual
or particular interest-group:-
"What has been said of farm and community applies
with like force to every social integration of
higher rank and especially to the nation as a whole
at a time when it has delegated powers to a degree
hitherto unknown. Within such a huge organism,
the whole is much greater than the mere sum of its
parts, and hence the need for coordination and
correlation far transcends all other considerations
whatsoever. It is here that cooperation will meet
its supreme test and it can emerge from this success¬
fully only as the ecological ideal of 'wholeness' or
organs working in unison within a great organism,
prevails over partial and partisan viewpoints."^-®
Another ecologist who drew the same moral as Clements from
characteristics of the biotic community was W.P. Taylor. Taylor was
Senior Biologist with the U.S. Biological Survey, based, in the
early thirties, at Tucson, Arizona. Given his position with a
Government agency, it is not surprising that he expressed a belief
in the potentialities of ecology as an applied science. To Taylor
the applicability of ecology was, in principle, endless. Not only
could ecologists hope to advise on all matters associated with
agriculture, soil erosion control, land use classification, re¬
settlement, fisheries management, water resources management,
reforestation and range rehabilitation, an even more noble enterprise
beckoned them:-
"What, after all, is more reasonable than the ecological
approach to anthropology,economics, sociology and ethics?
Man's evolution, development and behaviour are inevitably
so closely related to his environment that the ecological
viewpoint seems the most natural in the world."256
Taylor was eager to grasp the opportunities for ecology offered
by the New Deal:-
"The program of President Franklin D. Roosevelt
and the Congress of the United States (spring 1933)
to give work to 250,000 of the unemployed in
reforestation affords an opportunity, perhaps of its
kind unparalleled in the world's history, for
application of ecological information."^
His rhetorical repertoire was strikingly similar to Clements:-
"The farm is properly an ecological enterprise.
The ideally diversified farm is one on which there
has been set up an artificial but well-balanced
biotic community ...The less well-balanced the biotic
community on the farm, the more precarious its
economic future ... What is so obviously true of
the farm is equally true of science and administration
of natural resources as a whole, in America and the
world over. Just as the farmer's present and future
prosperity depends on science, intelligence,
cooperation in ever-larger units, and a well-balanced
biological enterprise on his land, so the welfare of
the human race depends on science, intelligence,
breadth of view, cooperation in ever-larger units,
scientifically and administratively, and a well-
balanced maintenance, development and use of world
natural resources."^5°
Cooperation, whether on the farm or on Capitol Hill, was the
best human policy because it was the most natural one:-
"Apparently there is little rugged individualism
in nature ... the biotic community, the interacting,
interrelated, interdependent, loosely or closely
organized cooperative commonwealth of plants and
animals in their environments, is more nearly an
organism than the sum of its parts.
The lack of rugged individualism in nature had direct consequences
for human action
"The stockmen themselves are slowly but surely
coming to realize that unregulated competition for
private profits and proper care of the land and its
resources simply do not go together."260
We see therefore in Taylor, as in Clements, that the image of
a cooperative community of plants and animals functioned as a
legitimation of the role of the ecologist as an expert adviser and
director of human activities. However in Taylor's hands the
organismic analogy displays further subtleties of persuasive
potential. Firstly, as well as legitimating the role of the expert
to the layman, it also may be used to enhance the status of the
ecological expert as against his technocratic peers and rivals.
Other experts, conditioned by their specialist education, may take
only partial viewpoints - only the ecologist has the professional
capability of accurately perceiving the holistic unity of nature
"The man who is sick and in need of medical attention
needs a physician who can see his difficulties as a
whole. It is disturbing to consult two or three
specialists in as many different organs of the body
and to be given a regimen for the improvement of
each which cannot possibly be carried out in view of
what has been prescribed already for others. Some
master practitioner must harmonize the various
proposed cures or the sufferer is heading for
difficulty.
I like to think of ecology as a sort of master
diagnostician who tries not to lose sight of the
fact that Nature, the patient, is not an accidental
collocation of independent and unrelated objects, but
is normally an organized and functioning whole."261
Secondly, the image of an organic natural order could be used to
persuade the layman not to expect too much too quickly from his
scientific adviser. It provided a defence against failure to fulfil
expectation. The scientist too was constrained by nature - healing
the biotic organism could only proceed at nature's own pace:-
"The faith of some of the farmers and business men
in science and scientific men is almost pathetic.
Many seem to believe that various artificial measures,
erosion control, reseeding, replanting, weed control,
rodent control, or other measures will suffice to
repair the obvious damage, even in the absence of
removal of the over-heavy pressure from livestock
which in the case of the grazing range is the funda¬
mental and continuing cause of many of the difficulties
... Formulas for the quickest repair of the damage
done are now being sought by engineers in cooperation
with ecologists. Who better than the ecologist, after
all, can be counted on to see clearly through the
processes which have been going on, to picture
accurately the land as it ought to look and to advise
safely what should be done?"262
The best evidence we have that Clements's organismic metaphor
functioned as a persuasive device is that it was so perceived by
his contemporaries, indeed was so perceived by the people he was
attempting to persuade. James Malin, for example, was a historian
at the University of Kansas who sought to counter the claims of
the technocrats and oppose the collectivist tendencies of the
New Deal. Born and reared on a family farm, he took it upon
himself to champion the culture and defend the individualistic
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prerogatives of the Plains dwellers. Malin identified Clements-
ianism as posing a threat to the Plains community because the
implication of Clements's ecological arguments was that relatively
narrow natural limits were placed upon the activities of the
farmer on the Plains. Furthermore, the threat of Clementsianism
was a serious one because Clements's ideas "became entrenched in
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the United States Department of Agriculture". The U.S.D.A.
provided expert advisers who sought to specify which farming
techniques ought to be applied on the Great Plains.
Malin had a low opinion of most advisory experts, who in their
scientific arrogance "not only disregarded, but ridiculed, folk
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knowledge". Malin questioned the universal utility of applied
science in agriculture:-
"The difference between folk knowledge and scientific¬
ally determined applications of knowledge became more
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sharply drawn, but not always to the credit of science."
Malin regarded the scientists and funding agencies eager to
apply science to the practical problems of the mid-continental
area as carpetbaggers:-
"A large part of American research funds and energy
is expended upon technological research of a short-
term character to achieve functional ends, often
primarily for political advantage ... Government funds,
foundation funds, university funds, poured out to any
Johnny-come-lately for 'quickie research' cannot
meet the challenge."267
Malin categorised Clements as a "closed-space" theorist - one
who regarded the potentialities of man and nature to be finite and
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definable. This was a characteristic Clements was held to share
with another bete noire of Malin - Frederick Jackson Turner.
Turner had argued that the existence of the frontier and free land
had shaped American society - creating a democratic, individualistic
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and egalitarian society. But the Turnerites had further argued
that the disappearance of the frontier had irrevocably changed the
nature of American society. With the frontier gone, democracy
could no longer depend on individualism - it must be collectively
4- • J 270sustained.
Malin, on the other hand, maintained that in fact the relation¬
ship between Man and Nature was an open system. Its potentialities
were infinite:-
"There can be no such thing as the exhaustion of the
natural resources of any area of the earth unless
positive proof can be adduced that no possible tech¬
nological "discovery" can ever bring to the horizon
of utilization any remaining property of area ...
Historical experience points to an indeterminate
release to man of such "new resources" as he becomes
technologically capable of their utilization. At one
stroke, such a concept renders the Turner-Mackinder
doctrine of closed space meaningless and correspondingly
destroys the basis of the argument of the "closed
space corollary to the Turner frontier hypothesis"
which held that a welfare state - a regimental social
order must be instituted to serve as a substitute
for the "closed frontier" in order to preserve American
democracy and opportunity."^1
The frontier was endless.
To Malin, there was no such thing as a natural balance or
harmonious state of nature on the Plain which modern technological
man had disturbed. The stable climax of which Clements spoke was
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a "state of mythic equilibrium":-
"How can the idealized type of theoretical climax,
either of soil or of vegetation, have culminated under
the conditions of continuous disturbance established
by history ... the concept of climax must be redefined,
especially ... its time requirement, both as respects
soil maturity (climax) and vegetational climax.
Furthermore, in that case, the implication that
vegetational succession and climax are dependent
upon progressive soil changes in the direction of
maturity needs restatement or abandonment."273
Malin argued, using historical and archaeological evidence,
that there had been soil loss from the plains grassland, and even
dust storms, before the sod was broken by the steel plough. He
maintained that being overgrazed was likewise the natural condition
of the plains due to the vast herds of bison that had roamed there
before the arrival of the white man. The Indians had also had
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considerable perturbing impact upon the vegetation. Therefore
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"the plow that broke the plains" was not guilty. The homesteader
had not been the unique agent of disturbance the conservationists
claimed. Rather the impact of European man on the plains had been
simply one further chapter in a story of endless indeterminate
change and adjustment.
Malin acknowledged that many of man's activities were in
actuality often circumscribed and controlled by characteristics of
the natural environment. But potentially the relations between
Man and Nature were infinitely flexible. The "contriving brain
2T6
and the skilful hand" were ever exploiting new resources, solving
old problems, overcoming natural barriers. To hold that the
expanding era of the homesteader was over was to impugn the farmers'
native resourcefulness and invention, and to misunderstand the
essential open-endedness of Man's interaction with Nature.
Clements's closed-system organismic conception of nature was
scientifically defunct:-
"In all the discussion by the biologists of organism,
environmentalism, and managed society, there was a
conspicuous absence of historical perspective. Organism
appeared to them to be a discovery arising out of the
ecological approach to the study of plants and animals,
when in fact the concept was already quite fully
developed in Plato's time. The historian of political
theory had given it most careful attention, because
it was a favourite concept used in justification of
absolute monarchy and arbitrary power in early modern
times. The democratic tradition had challenged the
idea that the king was the directing brain of the
political organism. The standard textbook in
principles of political science written during the
progressive era before World War I identified the
concept of organism as the bulwark of the
authoritarian state, and treated both as discredited
and discarded concepts. It seemed scarcely necessary
at that time to devote such space to performing
post-mortems."277
The organismic concept of nature had no validity and served
only the interests of authoritarian 'experts':-
"It is evident that in the twentieth century
several patterns of thought were taking shape,
apparently independently of each other at first,
but after World War I with increasing interaction.
Among them was the myth of the inevitability and
necessity for regimented organisation and manage¬
ment of society. The ideas of organism and
environmentalism in the biological and social
sciences were an integral part of the pseudo-
scientific process of rationalizing the myth. It
was a natural outgrowth of an age that had come to
worship science, the marvels of the laboratory,
and their applications by the engineer, and that,
in consequence, became obsessed with the conviction
that human affairs could be managed similarly."^®
Organicism formed part of a general threat to American
individualism and democracy - a threat exemplified by the 'socialism'
279
of the New Deal. Like all forms of collectivism, organicism
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was totalitarian and "denied the validity of the individual".
It represented an attack on the freedom of the citizen:-
"If the organismic idea was carried out to its
logical conclusion then each human being in the
social organism was comparable to the cell in
the plant or animal body and the capacity of the
common man to manage his own affairs was denied.
Instead of a defense of equalitarianism, the
organismic idea was a repudiation. The assumption
was that the expert, the "brains trust", e.g., the
superior people, were alone entitled to manage the
affairs of society. "281
The dispute between Clements and Maiin mirrors a long¬
standing dichotomy in American political debate. Malin drew upon
the long tradition of American individualistic social thought -
a conception of society which put the individual and only the
individual in pride of place. The occurrence of such ideas in
American political rhetoric dates from the time of Jefferson, if
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not before. Individualism had, since Jefferson's time, been
invoked in many different ways, harnessed to a wide variety of
political ends. Malin was thus utilising old styles of argument,
powerfully resonant with implication, and recasting them to serve
his own purposes. But dominant though individualistic rhetoric
has been in the history of American political thought, there has
always existed the alternative rhetorical possibility of emphasising
the prerogatives and obligations of the State, and the individual's
responsibility towards his fellows - of answering individualism
with centralism or collectivism of one variety or another.
Clements, like Malin, was invoking already existing forms of
argument and utilising them for his own purposes. The rhetorical
strategy, chosen by the technocrats in general and Clements in
particular, cannot therefore be fully understood unless this
background of an enduring pattern of ordering and re-ordering the
same or similar polemical resources is borne in mind.
Sigma school - a technical context of classification
To the Sigmatists the vegetation unit was not an organism.
The association was regarded as a real but abstract category of
which the individual stands were representative and into which
they were to be grouped by the classifier.
It is not so much that Braun-Blanquet disagreed with Clements's
organismic theories but rather that such discussions were irrelevant
to his purposes and meaningless within his social and political
context. Braun-Blanquet worked within quite a different tradition
of social thought from that which impinged upon Clements. In as
centrally organised a country as France, the principle of State
intervention in the area of land-use legislation, did not have
poo
to be argued for.
French ideology of statecraft had never enshrined rugged
individualism in the American manner. Debate over the true nature
of the French state had flowed in other more collectively-oriented
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directions. Both the conservation and the technocratic
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movements came late to France. The phytosociologists did not
have the opportunity to aspire toward becoming environmental
technocrats in the manner of the American ecologists. Thus
Braun-Blanquet, interested though he was, to an extent, in presenting
phytosociology as applicable, was clearly not in a position equivalent
to the American technocrats with their professional mission to
slay the dragons of frontier individualism and robber-baron
laissez-faire.
In contrast to the position in Nebraska, in Montpelier the
nature of the plant community was purely a technical matter.
Discussion as to its character occurred only between accredited
members of the specialty. There was no French equivalent of James
Malin. The nature of the plant association did not function as
a polemic resource in a wider realm of social suasion. Thus, it
is understandable that the Sigmatists' conceptualisation of the
nature of their basic unit was similar to that found in taxonomy
- the model from which the form of phytosociological classification
and many other elements of their practice were derived.
Incommensurability
Having traced the divergence and separate development of the
Clementsian and the Zurich-Montpelier systems, we may note that
they existed as quite independent representations of nature. Each
was a harmoniously interrelated network of observation, theory,
classification and application. Each system embodied its own form
of scientific practice. There was no possibility of independent
arbitration by Man or Nature as to the validity of the two forms
of ecological knowledge. The Clementsian and the Zurich-Montpelier
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systems were, in a word, incommensurable.
Incommensurability was not the product of ignorance or lack of
understanding. The Sigmatists followed American work closely,
admired some of it and understood the purpose of the American
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procedures. But they regarded American data as irrelevant to their
own phytosociological purposes. The differences of opinion over
the characterisation of the fundamental unit serve to illustrate this.
To the Sigmatists, floristic characterisation of vegetation units
was a key point of classificatory procedure. The making of
association tables and lists of characteristic species composition
were essential steps toward deciding if any given vegetation unit
was valid. The Americans did not use these procedures. (It would
have been very difficult for them to do because their units were
so large). How, then, could the Sigmatists decide if the American
units were valid or not? Braun-Blanquet outlined the problem:-
"It [the American association] is ... very poorly
circumscribed, a fact which may perhaps explain why
no American botanist has given a detailed tabular
analysis of a single association. This unit is
large and difficult to grasp ... Any unit corresponding
to our association is lacking. The "consociations"
... of Clements and Weaver are based entirely upon
the dominance of certain species; they are thus
quite incapable of replacing our association in any
system of classification ... In an excellent paper,
which may be considered a model of the Clements-
Weaver school, Steiger ... has given a careful
quantitative floristic and ecological study of a
portion of the prairies. These valuable ecological
data cannot, however, serve to individualize the
sociological unit. This seems to furnish the best
proof that the most exact ecological data remain
sterile for sociological evaluations when assembled
according to the system of Clements and Weaver.
To Clements, on the other hand, the very smallness of the
European units rendered them irrelevant to his purposes. Furthermore,
the European units were not characterised developmentally. The European
association was not necessarily a climax unit. But since, to
Clements, vegetation was dynamic and progressive, nothing else but
a climax unit could furnish a reliable basis for classification.
Successional vegetation was transient and did not display a full
expression of the habitat in the way that climax vegetation did.
Also, the modified vegetation of Europe could not be taken as a
reliable guide to natural conditions. American vegetation was
more natural and therefore a better basis for the construction of
classification systems:-
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"The major difficulty in the analysis of vegetation is
its great complexity, but it discloses a definite pattern
when analyzed from the developmental point of view.
The study of a local area of vegetation should always
be supplemented so far as is feasible by examining that
of adjacent regions ... Moreover, all ecological
investigators have not given the same rank to
equivalent units of vegetation. This has resulted often
from the limited area studied, i.e., its relations
to adjacent major units were not determined, or
sometimes from the fact that the studies were made in
transitional areas. Moreover, in countries long
occupied by civilised man, the natural vegetation is
represented by the merest fragments."288
The Sigmatists acknowledged the importance of investigating plant
succession, but did not accord its study the primacy Clements did.
Moreover, they considered their own vegetation an adequate basis for
ecological classification:-
"[Clements1s] dynamics are often hypothetical, and
the static social units are indispensable as a
foundation for any study of vegetation ... It must not
be forgotten ... that the areas today occupied by
climax stages have become greatly reduced ... The
developmental stages, on the contrary, still occupy
immense areas. It seems therefore unfortunate to
burden terminology with the introduction of special
terms to distinguish stages which appear to be climax
and stages which are developmental."2®"
Thus each side rejected what the other regarded as the essential
principle on which ecological classification should be built. The
Sigmatists did not acknowledge the primacy of development, nor
the necessity of basing ecological precepts upon the study of
large expanses of undisturbed vegetation. Clements did not
acknowledge the primacy of floristics, nor the suitability of European
vegetation as a basis for ecological theorising. Neither side
could meaningfully engage with the other as far as the practical
elucidation of ecological fundamentals was concerned. Furthermore,
both sides would have rejected the idea that random sampling of
vegetation could arbitrate and display what the natural units
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really were. Random sampling would not be reliable since it
would necessarily include disturbed, heterogeneous or transitional




In the previous chapter we saw how the idea of the plant
community, the idea that there were natural kinds of vegetation,
arose with Alexander von Humboldt and his immediate followers. We
saw the development of a Humboldtian tradition of plant geography
which employed such a unit. In the present chapter we have seen
that both Clements and Braun-Blanquet had a large intellectual
debt to that tradition. Their early work was done in relation to
it. Yet they were quite different from Humboldt in cognitive
interests and in conceptualisation of the form of the natural unit.
In these respects they are also quite different from each other.
It would be hard therefore to claim that the history of the plant
association from Humboldt to Clements was the history of a unit-
idea, since it seems difficult to claim that Clements's concept¬
ualisation of the plant association was, in any way, fundamentally
or essentially the same as Humboldt's. One of the purposes of
this chapter is to display the inherent flexibility, the malleability,
of the notion that vegetation occurs in natural units.
It is certain, however protean the research tradition was, that
there was a real historical connection between the activities of
Humboldt on the one hand, and Clements and Braun-Blanquet on
the other. But what I have tried to present in these first two
chapters is not the history of a unit-idea, nor a unitary tradition
of practice, but an account of how, as men find themselves in new
contexts which bring new challenges and new demands, the ideas
they have inherited from their predecessors function as resources
to be changed, refurbished and re-made to serve new purposes.
This is not to say that ideas are epiphenomenal. To Clements
and Braun-Blanquet the Humboldtian idea of a natural unit of
vegetation was an important resource. And they employed their own
conceptualisation of the natural unit to do important tasks. As
we shall see in the following chapter, those of their successors
who sought to redirect the discipline of ecology and reform its
practice, felt obliged to engage Clements at the level of ideas -
to challenge his conception of what the underlying nature of the
plant community was.
I have also sought to display how the Clementsian and the
Sigmatist conceptions of the plant community were not, either of
them, wholly determined by Nature itself. I have sought rather to
indicate how ideas of the plant community are conventional in
that they are constructed within social contexts and structured
by social purposes both internal and external to communities of
trained scientists. I have also sought to show how scientific
views of nature may intermesh with networks of usage beyond the
purely technical. To put it plainly, ideas of nature are part of
culture. There are important differences between American and
French culture, even scientific culture. Therefore different forms
of knowledge about nature are produced in the different countries.
Maintaining this is not, however, to detract from the status
of the Braun-Blanquet and Clementsian systems as carefully observed
and technically successful representations of Nature. It is clearly
within the ingenuity of Man to produce theories which fulfil
many purposes at once.
CHAPTER THREE
HENRY ALLAN GLEASON
AND THE INDIVIDUALISTIC HYPOTHESIS
Introduction
Clements never quite achieved the recognition which he so
obviously sought and which he thought his due. He was certainly
1
the major theorist of early twentieth-century American ecology.
He published several times more text, many more books, than his
nearest rival. Much of what he wrote exerted considerable influence
on how American ecologists described vegetation. It cannot be denied
that he was acknowledged by his contemporaries to be an important
figure within the field of ecology. Yet, strangely, he seemed also
2
always marginal to it.
Clements had a strong coterie of followers, in the West and
Middle West. He often collaborated with John Weaver, Professor of
Botany at the University of Nebraska. Weaver had been a graduate
student under Clements in Minnesota,and throughout his working life
he shared Clements's concern with the management of the plains and
prairie grasslands. Clements also appears to have received much
support from among the practical men of the State and Federal
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advisory agencies. Yet at no time could it be said that the
majority of American academic ecologists were unreservedly or whole¬
heartedly Clementsian. Clements, it might be said, seemed like a
hero who pitched his tent apart.
There were a variety of reasons for this. Clements's writings,
while admirably comprehensive, were prolix and too often seemed
grandiosely speculative or inflexibly deductive. His fellow
ecologists, despite having adopted much of his terminology, cavilled
at what they chose to regard as his over-elaborate neologisms and
4
unduly rigid and a priori definitions. Personally Clements often
5seemed intellectually arrogant, aloof and unclubbable. He was,
all in all, not a charismatic leader. It is significant that he
never held a senior position in the Ecological Society of America
although he was a charter member when the society was founded in
191A.^ His health was never altogether robust and in later years,
7
he seldom attended botanical meetings. He rarely replied to, or
even acknowledged, criticisms of his work - concentrating instead
0
on developing and articulating his own system. Joining the
Carnegie Institution in 1917, although he continued for many years
afterwards to teach summer schools for the University of Nebraska,
Clements cut himself off from the vital life-line of graduate
students.
Thus, in the nineteen-twenties and -thirties, pedagogical pre¬
eminence within the newly emerged discipline of American ecology
fell to H.C. Cowles at Chicago, W.S. Cooper at Minnesota, and G.E.
Nichols at Yale. Their institutions were the principal centres at
which the next generation of ecologists were trained, and,
correspondingly, the importance of their intellectual leadership
9
was considerable.
As I have stressed in the previous chapter, the need to
communicate directly with a lay audience exercised a considerable
influence on Clements's work. In the Land-Grant Colleges, in which
context Clements formulated his research programme, scientific
research, of whatever sort, had to appear readily applicable. But
at universities such as Chicago and Yale, for example, the need to
appeal to a lay constituency was less acute. There was more
institutional support for pure research than was ever possible at
1 0
Nebraska or Minnesota. While ecologists, wherever in America
they were based, were unlikely to neglect altogether the claim that
ecology was an applicable subject, outwith the Land-Grant Colleges
more traditional notions of the scope and content of botany held
sway. This variety of institutional settings meant that not all
ecologists were surrounded by quite the same constraints as
Clements was, and thus they had the possibility of fostering
alternative points of view.
But, despite considerable disagreements on other matters,
American ecologists concurred with Clements almost to a man - Cowles,
Cooper and Nichols included - that vegetation existed in real
natural units which had an individuality of their own. The one man
in the whole of America who openly and explicitly dissented from
Clements's view on this point, between 1917 and 1945, was Henry
Allan Gleason, the champion of an alternative 'individualistic
concept' of the plant association. In 1917 and again in 1926,
Gleason argued that the association was "not an organism, scarcely
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even a vegetational unit, but merely a coincidence." Gleason
acknowledged that one could identify, in the field, areas of
vegetation which exhibited uniform floristic composition over
appreciable areas. In this concrete sense definite associations
existed. But the phenomena of the plant community depended
entirely, Gleason argued, upon the behaviour of individual plants.
Thus, associations did not represent basic units of which all
vegetation was comprised. In any sense other than that of a
concrete stand of plants, the association concept was a classifier's
category, sustained by the activity of classification rather than by
the reality of vegetation:-
"Different mills produce different qualities of flour
from the same wheat. The association concept is the
product of our mental mills."
Gleason did not remain an ecologist throughout his entire career.
While comparatively young, he progressively abandoned ecological
work to devote most of his research energies to what had always been
the other string to his bow - taxonomy. Working within the splendid
facilities of the New York Botanical Garden, he established himself
13
as one of America's leading systematic botanists. He was
continuously productive and innovative within taxonomy for more than
sixty years. But he was, in the twilight of his career, called back
into ecological debate - to be acclaimed as the lost founding father
of plant ecology, the clear-sighted pioneer whose counsel the
discipline had neglected for forty years, to its serious detriment.
His early publications were re-examined. His individualistic
hypothesis was revived. He was made the patron and the figure-head
of the discipline's post-war transformation.
Gleason is thus a figure of considerable interest in the history
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of ecology. Yet no full account of his life and work exists.
The first purpose of this chapter is to remedy this neglect of
Gleason by providing a comprehensive account of his career in
ecology. My treatment of Gleason will be chronological. I shall
follow the development of his career from its beginnings -
examining his ecological researches and publications one by one.
Within this framework I shall trace the development of Gleason's
views as to the nature of the plant association and elucidate the
reasons behind his radical dissent from generally received opinion
on the question of natural kinds of vegetation. I shall describe
how Gleason's career was shaped by a variety of social, personal,
scientific and extra-scientific factors. I shall also examine why
the Gleasonian individualistic concept of the plant community was
so comprehensively rejected by his American contemporaries when
it first appeared. The eventual general acceptance of the
individualistic hypothesis is considered only very briefly in the
present chapter, but is more fully described in Chapter Four.
As well as providing essential background to the debate over
the nature of the plant community, Gleason's career in ecology is
of more general interest. The period of his maximal involvement in
ecology was also the period during which ecology became institution-
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alised as an academic discipline in the United States. I shall
argue that Gleason was more centrally involved in early American
ecological activity than recent commentators have given him credit
for. I hope that elucidation of Gleason's work within ecology will
shed light not only upon the individualistic hypothesis, but upon
the research practices and intellectual concerns of ecology as a
whole in these formative years. In particular, it will highlight
how cognitive innovation in the new discipline was structured around
the prior professional commitments and skills of its recruits from
other disciplines.
Unfortunately I have been able to pay little attention to
Gleason's work in taxonomy, save where his taxonomic and floristic
concerns have implications for his ecology.. It is important,
however, to bear in mind that this is Hamlet without the Prince of
Denmark. Considered over the course of his whole career Gleason was,
1
quantitatively speaking, much more of a taxonomist than an ecologist.
The present essay, concentrating as it does on his career in ecology,
is far from being a balanced account of his scientific career as a
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whole. While efforts are made throughout to acknowledge and allow
for this larger undescribed aspect of Gleason's professional
activities, the reader must often balance these matters for himself.
Early botanical training
Henry Allan Gleason was born on the 2nd January 1882, on a farm
near Dalton City, Illinois. In 1892 the family moved into the town
of Decatur, Illinois. Gleason reacted against the strange urban
environment by taking an interest in the outdoors:-
"As a small boy, brought up on a farm with no other
boys near by, I had never learned how to get along
easily and smoothly with youngsters of my own age.
After my parents moved into a good-sized town when I
was nearly eleven years old, I was involved in a
continuous warfare with other boys. Living at the
edge of the city, with woods and a river just a shorty
distance away, I turned to the woods for recreation."
At the High School in Decatur, Gleason acquired his first formal
instruction in botany and natural history. However, important though
the school tasks of collecting and naming flowers undoubtedly were
in stimulating Gleason's early botanising, he was largely self-directed.
And, equipped with Gray's Manual and a home-made plant press (both
presents from his father who greatly encouraged his interest in
natural history) he was a precocious naturalist. In his autobiography,
he recorded his surprise, on re-reading his boyhood notebooks, at
the accuracy of his identification of species and the care with which
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he had made his notes. This capacity for careful attention to
detail was to provide the foundation for Gleason's rapid acquirement
of important botanical skills.
By the time of his graduation from high school, Gleason had
determined to become a professional botanist and he had already laid
the foundations of his future competence:-
"Three years of collecting had taught me how to make
specimens and identify them, had given me a fair-sized
collection of my own, probably two or three hundred
sheets, and had still further increased my love for
wild things and for the fields and woods where they
lived. I was now fully decided to be a botanist, not
because of any instruction I had received or for any
promises made to me for the future, but simply because
I liked plants."20
In the autumn of 1897, at the age of fifteen, Gleason entered
the University of Illinois. In his first year, he registered for
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an elementary course in entomology. This course was remarkable,
indeed probably unique for its time, in that it was taught by two
men who were later to achieve recognition as pioneers of ecology in
America. Stephen A. Forbes gave the lectures. Charles C. Adams
was the assistant in charge of the laboratory classes. Both of
these men were to be early presidents of the Ecological Society of
22
America, Forbes in 1921 and Adams in 1923. Adams, who had only
recently graduated, left Illinois in 1898 to do graduate work at
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Harvard. Detailed discussion of his association with Gleason will
be left until later.
Forbes, on the other hand, was already by this time a well-
2A
known biologist. As well as his post at the university, he held
the directorship of the State Laboratory for Natural History through
which he supervised the state-funded programme of research into
economic entomology and limnology. Forbes was one of a quartet of
eminent biology professors, all located in the Middle West, who
were present at the birth of ecology in America. The other members
of this foursome were S.M. Coulter, teacher of H.C. Cowles at the
University of Chicago, E.A. Birge at Wisconsin and C.E. Bessey at
Nebraska. These men, although not themselves trained as ecologists,
all became interested in the new science, cultivated it, and were
influential in the careers of many of those members of the next
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generation of biologists who were to establish ecology in America.
Forbes was himself very active in ecological research. Indeed at
the turn of the century, he was probably the leading student of
26
animal ecology in America.
One of Forbes's principal research interests was the inter¬
relations between organisms, particularly between predator and prey
species. He held that natural selection worked not entirely in the
individualistic Darwinian mode but also upon groups, thus producing
stable balanced assemblages of species. Entire complexes of species
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were said to have a 'community of interest'. As early as 1880,
Forbes had developed a concept of the 'biotic community' - which
was later acknowledged by Clements to be very similar to his own,
lacking only the distinctively Clementsian emphasis on developmental
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change. Forbes's study of ecological inter-relations between
species was also innovative in that it was often quantitative. He
devised a 'coefficient of association' to aid in statistical analysis
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of the mutual occurrence of species. Although famous principally
for his work as a zoologist, Forbes was also an accomplished field
botanist and had made valuable contributions to the knowledge of
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the Illinois flora. Thus, on becoming a student at Illinois,
Gleason had entered one of the very few institutions in the United
States in which, prior to the end of the nineteenth century,
ecological ideas were being taken seriously and ecological practice
was being nurtured. And he had made personal contact with one of
the leading practitioners of a style of field research newly
introduced to America - research based upon the identification of
communities of organisms.
One of Forbes's assistants in the State Laboratory was the
entomologist, Charles A. Hart. Hart was an avid field worker and
collector, and he and Gleason were soon close friends:-
"My first real botanical trip came in the summer of
1900, when C.A. Hart invited me to go with him on a
collecting trip to Grand Tower in Southern Illinois.
I knew of the wonderful flora growing there ... Hart
knew the surface geology of the state and told me
about the various stages of glaciation and the moraines,
and I believe I got from him at this time mv first
inkling of such phytogeographical matters."-^1
This was the beginning of a long and fruitful collaboration
between the two men. Gleason came to admire Hart greatly and learned
a great deal from him. He was to describe on more than one occasion
the important role which Hart's knowledge of the areas they studied
played in the development of his own ecological ideas. Hart was
an entomologist. Gleason's botanical knowledge was already much
superior, but Hart:-
"
... knew the history, geography, geology, physio¬
graphy, climate and fauna of the state of Illinois with
most surprizing thoroughness. A field trip with him
was an education in itself.
The nature of Gleason's indebtedness to Hart provides us with
an insight into the character of Gleason's first forays into ecology.
Indeed it tells us much about the nature of early ecology as a
whole. In America, as in Britain, ecology initially sprang from, and
was an extension of, the interests and the skills of good field
workers from the disciplines of taxonomic botany or zoology. The
best taxonomists had always been interested in the "history,
geography, geology, physiography, climate and fauna" of the areas
in which they searched for specimens. They were natural historians
as well as systematists. Much early ecology amounted to an attempt
to shift these and other related interests towards the centre-stage
of biological inquiry - to formalise into a science an area of
knowledge which had previously been informal and auxiliary to
taxonomic botany.
The continental model of ecological plant geography seemed to
offer a vehicle with which to achieve this. If, as I argued in the
previous chapter, ecology was represented by its early practitioners
as physiology extended from the laboratory into the natural
environment of plants, it was also, in Britain and America, natural
history newly re-made in a scientific guise. It promised to provide
a new, respectably scientific, context within which botanists, fond
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of field work, could exercise their traditional skills. As we
have seen, Gleason had many of the skills of the natural historian
before he arrived at Illinois. Hart developed these skills further,
thus equipping Gleason for the new field science of ecology.
It was not long before the ecological orientation of his
academic environment began to have its effect on Gleason. Although
he majored in botany rather than zoology, he attended several
further classes under Forbes and endeavoured to incorporate an
ecological perspective into his own work. He began to study plant
communities: -
"For my [B.S.] thesis I took as a subject the flora
of the prairies and worked away earnestly on it
through my senior year. I tried to compile a list of
all the prairie plants of Illinois and to discuss their
distributions and associations as best I could. In
the latter I did very poorly in comparison with present
day standards, for ecology was not developed as it is
now. I had a very meager idea of associations and no
idea at all of succession.
Learning from Forbes and Hart prepared Gleason for other influences:-
"Late in my senior year, Cowles' studies on the
physiographic ecology of Chicago were published in the
Bot. I had paid no attention to his earlier studies on
sand dune vegetation, but for some reason this article
attracted me. I at once attempted to apply his ideas
to conditions in the woods north of Urbana and to my
great delight found they apparently held. So his work
and my application of it was presented before the
Natural History Society, and this was my first venture
into ecology."
Gleason was not alone in his adoption of the Cowlesian model.
Cowles's early papers on physiographic ecology, published in 1901,
were a major influence upon American ecology in the first decades
of the twentieth century. The study of successional changes and
correlations between topography and vegetation-types had already
been introduced into the American ecological repertoire by Conway
McMillan in his classic study of the vegetation around the Lake of
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the Woods. But Cowles produced a new conceptual framework which
was to win for successional and topographic studies the pride of
place within American ecology which they were to occupy until after
the Second World War.
American ecologists were, at the turn of the century, borrowing
heavily from the new German textbooks - in particular Schimper's
Pflanzengeographie auf physiologische Grundlage and Warming's
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Lehrbuch der okologischen Pflanzengeographie. Warming's book
contained a systematic classification of the plant formations of
the globe. Cowles, inspired by this example, set out to classify
the vegetation of the countryside surrounding Chicago in the
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Warming manner. The rationale behind the Warming system was
that the water content of the soil was the most important habitat
factor - determining which groups of plants grew where, within any
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given climatic area. Cowles, however, came to believe that,
important though water content was, a wider range of habitat factors
should be considered. He solved the problem with a brilliant
theoretical innovation. He made Warming's principal factor - water
content - subordinate to another more fundamental environmental
variable - topography. Cowles argued that soil water content was
itself a dependent variable, dependent upon the slope and elevation
of the terrain:-
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"The soil conditions are chiefly determined by the
surface geology and the topography. The original
character of the soil whether rock, sand, clay or marl
depends upon the geological relations. From the
vegetational standpoint the topographic relations are
commonly much more important, since they condition the
presence or absence of drainage and hence cause
striking variations in air content and humus.
Thus the explanation for the distribution of vegetation lay
within the geomorphological process of base-levelling:-
"Having related the vegetation largely to topography,
we must recognize that topography changes, not in a
haphazard manner, but according to well-defined laws.
The processes of erosion ultimately cause the wearing
down of the hills and the filling up of the hollows.
These two processes, denudation and deposition,
working in harmony produce planation; the inequalities
are brought down to a base level ... As a consequence
of all these changes, the slopes and soils must change;
so too the plant societies, which are replaced in turn
by others that are adapted to the new conditions.
There must be, then, an order of succession of plant
societies, just as there is an order of succession of
topographic forms in the changing landscape ... Here
then is a classification both genetic and dynamic, a
classification which has a place for all possible
ecological factors.
As the continental land-mass was gradually approaching the
condition of a peneplain, the vegetation was becoming more mesophytic
- approaching the most mesophytic plant society possible under the
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regional climate. Thus an understanding of erosion cycles and the
processes of topographical change could give the ecologist insight
into changes going on within vegetation and would enable him to
interpret and classify vegetation upon a developmental basis.
Cowles had cleverly meshed together the European systems of
vegetational classification by habitat factor with the theory of
base-levelling being employed by American geographers and geologists
such as William M. Davis and Rollin D. Salisbury. Salisbury had
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taught Cowles geology at Chicago. Cowles, in fact, had begun
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graduate studies in geology before transferring to botany. As
Tansley put it:-
"Cowles's training in geology and his keen, abiding
interest in the causation of the physical features of
landscapes and their relation to vegetation had a
decisive effect on his pioneer work and on the whole of
his subsequent teaching and activity."^6
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Cowles called his new approach 'physiographic ecology'. His
confidence in its value was well-placed. Physiographic ecology was
relatively easy to apply, requiring only an elementary knowledge of
geology and geomorphology, such as most botanists already possessed
and such as Gleason had lately acquired from Hart. It seemed to
remove much of the apparent arbitrariness of the European habitat
classifications - in which the shape of the classification seemed
to depend upon whichever factor individual ecologists assumed was
primary. And it conveyed a powerful sense both of ubiquitous
vegetational change and of an underlying predictable regularity
within that change. It seemed to uncover the laws of vegetational
development. And, perhaps most excitingly of all, it promised a
privileged insight into the history of vegetation, for:-
"In many cases, if not in most, there is a horizontal
order of succession at the present time that resembles
the vertical [i.e. the temporal] succession of which
we now have only the topmost member."
Thus by, for example, walking back from a sandy shore one could see
laid out horizontally the development stages of the deciduous forest
which was now established upon the stabilised and humus-covered
mature sand-dunes, furthest from the water's edge.
Cowles's physiographic exemplar was rapidly applied and
articulated into new areas by his students such as H.N. Whitford and
E.N. Transeau and, rather later but perhaps most famously, by W.S.
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Cooper on Isle Royale and at Glacier Bay, Alaska. Clements built
upon Cowles's 1901 work when he came, three years later, to devise
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his own 'dynamic' and developmental theory of vegetation.
The system was taken up by many other workers who, like Clements
and Gleason, had no direct pedagogical links with Cowles. Areas in
which topographical change was most rapid became especially favoured
sites for field study:-
"Throughout the country, young ecologists, of
whom I [Gleason] was one, descended on the dunes, the
shores, the marshes and the bogs and presently returned
to the laboratories to write voluminous accounts of their
observations." ^
Successional diagrams, illustrating how plant communities superseded
one another in the overall trend toward the mesophytic climax, became
virtually an indispensable feature of published accounts of vegetation.
Gleason made use of Cowles's work again in the research he
undertook for his Master's degree. But before we go on to consider
Gleason's early ecological research in more detail, we must note
that, in those undergraduate years, Gleason was also being trained
in other branches of botany. In particular, we must remember that
he was acquiring considerable experience in floristic botany which,
coupled with his naturally careful, thorough and patient methods of
work, was to make him a most accomplished taxonomist at a relatively
early age.
In his sophomore year at Illinois Gleason was offered part-time
employment in the university herbarium, sorting, mounting and
labelling a large backlog of specimens. He seems to have been the
only undergraduate assistant of George P. Clinton, who was in
charge of the herbarium. Gleason wrote of Clinton that he "had
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more influence on me botanically than any other man". Clinton
taught Gleason herbarium practice and technique. He also expanded
Gleason's botanical horizons from his earlier concentration (typical
for an amateur) on those plants with conspicuous flowers to almost
the entire macroscopic plant kingdom. Gleason continued to work
organising the Illinois herbarium throughout his undergraduate
career and for three years after his graduation. He was later to
write "It is difficult to imagine any better training for my future
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work than those ... years of mounting plants." Such experience
complemented the skills he had already gained during several years
of private collecting.
Gleason's taxonomic experience was further widened by a spell
(during the summer vacation of 1901) spent working with the famous
botanist William Trelease, Director of the Missouri Botanical
Garden in St. Louis. Gleason was evidently a satisfactory employee
since Trelease offered him a permanent position, but the attractions
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of continuing at college were too great.
The fact that Gleason developed taxonomic skills as well as
ecological ones is important to our understanding of his career
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development in two ways. Firstly it means that he had a choice of
possible careers within botany. He could either become an ecologist
or a taxonomist. And, having specialised in one, he could, by
sustaining an active interest in the other, retain the ability to
change the principal direction of his career, should the need or
opportunity arise. Gleason was to move from being primarily an
ecologist to become primarily a taxonomist - in 1918 when he
accepted the offer of a post at the New York Botanical Garden. And
he contemplated the reverse shift on at least one occasion - in
£T £
1929, when he sought to return to university life.
Secondly, his abilities in taxonomy were to play an important
role within his ecological practice. The ease with which he could
find and recognise species in the field allowed him to undertake
floristic analysis in many locations relatively readily. This,
coupled with his respect for and commitment to the methods of
orthodox taxonomy, was to have important consequences for his
conception of vegetation. Gleason's perspective on vegetation was
always to be floristic - giving a greater importance to floristic
data than did, for instance, the members of the Chicago school who,
following Coulter and Cowles, always somewhat deprecated herbarium
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taxonomy in favour of more avant-garde plant sciences. As I shall
argue more fully later, recognition of the importance which Gleason
accorded floristics is one of the keys to understanding his espousal
of the 'individualistic concept'.
Graduate research
Immediately after his graduation, Gleason was appointed to an
assistantship in the Botany Department. He remained in Illinois for
three more years - teaching, running the department's small
herbarium and working for his Master's degree under Professor Thomas
cr Q
Burrill, the head of the department. Burrill was one of the major
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powers in American botany at the turn of the century. Although
in his seventies and approaching the end of his career he was, like
Bessey, a zealous advocate of the New Botany. Trained as a
taxonomist and active in taxonomic research throughout his career,
he had also become famous as a plant pathologist. [In America, the
best advocates of the New Botany were often distinguished practitioners
of the Old.] He was one of the first to provide experimental
evidence that bacteria cause disease in plants, and he was perhaps
the first American teacher of botany to instruct undergraduates in
the use of the compound microscope (a distinction also claimed for
Bessey). Appropriately, the work Gleason did under Burrill's
supervision was within the field branch of the New Botany - ecology.
For his thesis Gleason studied the vegetation of the Ozark
Hills in Southern Illinois. The finished thesis bears the strong
impression of Cowles's influence. Chapters on geology and topo¬
graphy precede the description of the vegetation itself. A Cowlesian
description of the plant societies of the Ozarks takes up the
major chapter of the thesis. Gleason identified processes of change
going on within the vegetation and related these to topographic
trends:-
"The plant associations in the Ozark region fall
naturally into three great groups, the upland societies,
the cliff societies, and the flood-plain and swamp
societies ... By normal processes of erosion and base-
leveling the character of the plant growth on any one
area is constantly changing, on[e] society giving way
to another better suited to the changing ecological
conditions. Thus, as a ravine is eroded back into
the uplands, the land formerly occupied by a typical
upland forest is replaced by a cliff flora, which in
turn giyes way to the associations of flood-plain or
swamp."
But there are other chapters, other elements in Gleason's account
of the Ozark vegetation, which indicate the diversity of his interests.
Chapter Six consists of a list of all the species known to occur in
Southern Illinois. It is a standard taxonomist's regional flora.
And Chapter Seven, entitled "Phytogeography", is concerned
primarily with the geography, present and historical, of the
region's floras rather than its plant associations. Gleason,
utilising the newly-published papers of C.C. Adams on the historical
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floristic phytogeography of the South-eastern United States,
outlined how the Texan and other southern floristic assemblages had
migrated into Illinois along the natural highway of the Ozark Uplift.
Gleason criticised several ecologists, including Cowles and Schimper,
for neglecting the relevance of floristic history to the understanding
of the region's vegetation:-
"In Schimper's already classic work the cause of the
forest and prairie of the central and eastern United
States is given as the amount and distribution of the
rain-fall. Mo account is taken of the fact that the
flora of the prairie is distinctively south-western in
its origin, that of the forest southeastern. Yet the
character of the plant associations in the two formations
is probably due as much to their origin as to the
present conditions of rainfall and if the two regions
were reversed, the arid portion drawing its vegetation
from a southeastern origin, and the humid portion
deriving its species from the southwest, the results
would be strikingly different from the present
actuality.
Gleason's thesis as a whole provides much evidence for the view I
have advanced above that his perspective on vegetation was always,
in an important sense, floristic. He drew upon his floristic
knowledge to enhance his ecology and vice-versa. To this extent,
Gleason was never altogether a typical young Cowlesian.
Gleason got his Master's degree in 1904, after which he took
up a fellowship under Professor William A. Kellerman at Ohio State
University. Gleason's work in Ohio seems to have been almost
entirely taxonomic. He revised Kellerman's short book The Spring
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Flora of Ohio. But in the summer of 1905, he became involved in
an enterprise which was to be of major importance in his development
as an ecologist.
C.C. Adams was back from Harvard with his doctorate and a reputation
already established due to his phytogeographical papers. He was
now a full member of the Illinois faculty. He was also to be the
leader of the University of Michigan's expedition to Isle Royale
in Lake Superior, which was planned for the summer of 1905.
Gleason wrote to his friend and former teacher applying for the
position of plant ecologist to the expedition. That post was
already filled but Adams offered Gleason the position of animal
ecologist instead. Gleason, it was intended, should devote his
energies to the ecology of the invertebrate fauna, in particular the
6 A
molluscs and insects, of Isle Royale. As a professionally-trained
botanist Gleason was not conspicuously well-qualified for such work
- but he had studied invertebrate zoology under Forbes (and Adams)
at Illinois and he had made quite extensive collections of insects
while an undergraduate. Indeed he had been such a good student of
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zoology that Professor Kofoid had, in 1901, offered him a job with
the Illinois State Laboratory, to do research into plankton zoology
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but "my interest in botany was so great that I could not accept it".
Gleason was a naturalist of broad interests and accomplishments.
Thus Gleason became part of an expedition which was to be of historic
importance, both for its scientific results and for the fact that it
heralded the University of Michigan's long-term involvement in large-
scale summer field work.
In his autobiography, Gleason recalled that, throughout the
summer of 1905 on Isle Royale, in the interval between periods of
field work, he and Adams spent much time discussing ecological
matters:-
"[Ecology] was a new subject in those days and Adams
and I were pioneers. Clements' book on Research
Methods in Ecology had just been published and we had
a copy and that was the basis of much of our argument.
Adams and I were the only ones who knew anything about
ecology and we were usually on the same side and
against Clements.
Unfortunately, in his description of these conversations, Gleason
gave no clue as to what were the precise grounds for his disagreement
with Clements at this stage. However, he summed up the value of his
summer on Isle Royale as follows
"I had gained experience with a new flora and with new
types of vegetation. I had added greatly to my
knowledge of ecology both through discussion and
observation. This fact can be best appreciated by
reading the first page of my published report."
This report (completed, with Gleason's customary expedition, by
the end of 1905 but not published until 1909) does indeed show
Gleason's growing knowledge of ecology and the extent to which he
was now capable of doing original research.® His 1901 B.S. thesis
had, as he admitted, shown little understanding of the idea of the
plant association and none at all of succession. His M.S. thesis,
although bearing evidence of great aptitude for field-work, had
been quite derivative, leaning heavily on Cowles's papers on
physiographic ecology and Adams's on phytogeography. But in the
meantime, successional ideas had become fixed in the minds of all
American ecologists by the work of Cowles on 'physiographic ecology'
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and by their subsequent development and theoretical embellishment
by Clements. Gleason had matured into an independent investigator
and thinker.
In his interpretation of his Isle Royale invertebrate material,
Gleason broadly followed the example of Cowles's work on the
vegetation of the sand-dunes of southern Lake Michigan. Gleason
was later to claim, justly as far as I am aware, that his 1909 paper
was the first to introduce into animal ecology the idea of success-
ional change which had "already been tested pretty thoroughly by
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the plant ecologists". Gleason, on moving from botany to zoology
(albeit briefly) applied his botanical skills and techniques to
zoological material.
However, while Gleason can indeed be seen as articulating the
Cowlesian exemplar into a new field, he is far from being an
unreflective or uncritical follower of Cowles's or Clements's
original usages. Clements had followed Cowles by proposing that the
present-day climax formations had, at least over part of their area,
developed from pioneer associes through a series of stages corresponding
closely to those associes which now stand spatially intermediate
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between pioneer and climax vegetation. Gleason pointedly dissented
from these authors' opinions on several matters - most importantly
from the assumption that the horizontal zonation of vegetation, such
as might occur around the shores of a lake or an island, necessarily
represented the chronological sequence of vegetational development
which had brought into being the mesophytic vegetation type now
found at the end of the horizontal series:-
"Or briefly, as some ecologists have expressed it,
the lateral distribution in space recapitulates the
vertical distribution in time. Such an assumption is
evidently closely akin to the recapitulation theory of
the evolutionists, and ... just as that so-called
biogenetic law has been accredited with more than its
true value, so has the ecological dictum possibly much
less importance than has been usually supposed. The
weakness lies in too little consideration of the time
element."71
To Gleason the theory of vegetational recapitulation could only
be upheld if dubious assumptions were made as to the uniformity of
climate and constancy of species composition throughout the entire
duration of the development of the climax vegetation - that is, if
the factors of climatic change and floral migration were ignored.
But climatic change and floral migration were key explanatory elements
in theories of historical phytogeography. Gleason wished to exploit
the potential of Cowles's physiographic paradigm, but he also wished
to do historical phytogeography in the manner introduced to America
by Adams. There were obstacles in the way of a smooth combination
of the two - no historical phytogeographer could afford to neglect
the effects of climatic change. Gleason was thus led to criticise
a line of reasoning that had caught the imagination of the plant
ecologists of his day and launched a thousand field notebooks -
the idea that the study of present-day succession gave the ecologist
a privileged insight into both the future and the past of any
given piece of vegetation. Gleason acknowledged the fascination of
interpreting vegetational history, but he cautioned that present-day
successions could not be reliably extrapolated very far in either
direction. To allow for climatic change, the insights of floristic
phytogeography were required. This criticism of successional theory
introduced a theme to which Gleason was to return many times in
later ecological work. As he expressed it, more than thirty years
later:-
"The former [distribution in space] may be a
portrayal of the latter [distribution in time] but
not necessarily so, and the further back in time the
origin of the "climax" lies, the less is the possibility
that modern zonation is a picture of ancient development.
In simple words, can you, by visiting the pioneers of
Wyoming see how the Puritans lived in New England?
Or by visiting Boston can you see the future of
Wyoming?"^2
However, no undue importance should be given to these differences
of opinion from Cowlesian ecology expressed by Gleason in 1909. They
adumbrate future dissensions and illustrate the breadth of Gleason's
early research commitments. But after the first flush of enthusiasm
for physiographic ecology, few ecologists would not have acknowledged
the importance of climatic change and plant migration to a full
understanding of vegetational change. In 1911, Cowles stressed the
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importance of precisely those factors. There was, as far as I am
aware, no lasting dispute between Cowles and Adams, nor any lasting
tension between their respective programmes of vegetation research.
Indeed, in 1900, they had collaborated on a study of the relation
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between base-levelling and specific differentiation. Cowles was
later to endorse Gleason's further development of Adams's phyto-
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geographic exemplar. Gleason's criticisms were presumably directed
principally against Clements - although this was not made explicit.
However, the criticisms expressed in the 1909 report were
distinctively Gleasonian. They sprang from his having commitments
to more than one programme of research. As I have said, they
adumbrate future dissensions. But they should not be allowed to
obscure the many features which his work had in common with Cowles's
at this time. As we shall shortly see from our discussion of
Gleason's sand-dune papers, it is clear that in the 1900s and 1910s,
both men were working on similar problems in similar ways. More
united them than divided them. They were participating in the
creation of a common tradition.
On the Faculty of the University of Illinois
Shortly after his return from Isle Royale, Gleason left for New
York to register for the degree of Ph.D. at Columbia University. His
doctoral research was mostly done in the herbarium of the New York
Botanical Garden and was entirely taxonomic. One of his supervisors
was Nathaniel Lord Britton, the Director of the Garden, who set Gleason
7 f)
to work on the Vernonieae of North America. But Gleason's
ecological interest was not entirely in abeyance. During his time
in New York, he put together his Isle Royale paper and wrote up the
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first of his studies of the inland sand-dunes of Illinois. He was
only a year in New York before he returned, with his doctorate, to
join the faculty of the University of Illinois as an Instructor in
Botany. In his 1944 autobiography, Gleason described his intentions
upon leaving Columbia:-
"Theoretically I had finished my education. Practically
I had not completed it. I intended to specialize in
ecology and I wanted to see and study all the principal
types of vegetation of the world before I settled down
permanently.
Gleason was now only twenty-four and he was to go some way toward
fulfilling both of these ambitions in the next few years. At Illinois
he taught courses in morphology and taxonomy as well as ecology, but
he was recognised as the ecology specialist on the staff:-
"Ecology was to be my specialty at Illinois. It was
a new subject everywhere and I was in on the ground
floor. "^9
He ran a "beginning class" in ecology, with four field trips, for up
80
to eighty students. He also put on an advanced seminar course in
ecology for a few especially interested students. His summers were
spent in ecological research or teaching ecology at summer school.
Of course, it must be remembered that, at this time, the University
of Illinois was not well suited for taxonomic research having only
a small herbarium and library. Ecological research had the advantage
of needing less in the way of institutional facilities, and was thus
more readily undertaken in the Mid-West, especially after the
expansion of the inter-urban railway-system allowed easier access
to a wide variety of field sites. But Gleason continued to con¬
centrate on ecological research after he moved to the somewhat better-
equipped University of Michigan in 1910.
The extent of Gleason*s concentration on ecological research
during the decade which followed his leaving New York can be gauged
by the fact that between 1907 and 1918, he published fourteen papers
which may be unequivocally classified as belonging to ecology or
ecological plant geography, and only four on topics within floristics
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and taxonomy. During this period in his career, he was, one might
say, primarily an ecologist, with an important auxiliary interest
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in floristic botany.
The first of these ecological papers to be published was
entitled "The Botanical Survey of the Illinois River Valley Sand
Region". It formed part of a series of three papers on the Sand
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Region published in the Bulletin of the Illinois State Laboratory.
It was preceded by an article by Hart' on the area's geology and
topography and followed by another article by Hart on the fauna.
All three papers were the product of Hart and Gleason's joint study
trips to the area - Gleason's field-work having been done in 1903
and 1904. The Sand Region of Illinois provided a most appropriate
and appealing study subject for, as Gleason wrote:-
"The ecological study of sand-dune vegetation has
in recent years attracted the attention of numerous
American botanists, and many noteworthy contributions
to it have been made. Dune vegetation is especially
well adapted to ecological investigation, since the
changes in the physical factors of the environment are
usually considerable, the component associations are
sharply distinguished, physiographic processes go on
with comparatively great rapidity and the plant
inhabitants show characteristic features in habit and
structure. The vegetation of the dunes bordering
Lake Michigan has been studied in detail by Cowles,
while Rydberg, and Pound and Clements have described
the sand-hills of Nebraska."®^
Gleason's chosen study area was geographically intermediate
between those of his famous predecessors. It was within the same
floristic and climatic region. Gleason could thus readily address
himself to unravelling the same vegetational processes as Cowles and
Clements had studied. And the study area was so situated that it
permitted not only the study of sand-dune vegetation but also, like
those of Cowles and Clements, the interactions between the prairie
vegetation and the forest. Furthermore, Gleason was able to shed
some light on the phytogeographic origin of the prairie flora. By
and large, the 1907 paper was a perfectly orthodox and thoroughly
competent Cowlesian interpretation of successional changes in the
dune vegetation due to biotic factors and the movement of the dunes
by the wind. Being the first paper of his to be published, it is
evidence of his successful recruitment to the new and growing
specialty of plant ecology.
However, Gleason's first sand dune paper did exhibit at least
one novel feature. Species composition was quantified. The species
occurring in each study quadrat were grouped into classes, according
to the number of individuals, "a signifying 1 to 5; b, 5-10; c,
10-25; d, 25-50; e, 50-100; f, 100-200; g, over 200; and o,
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none". The numbers were "estimated for the most part although
care was taken to make actual counts at intervals to avoid as far
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as possible any serious errors of observation". Gleason made use
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of other methods of describing species abundance in his later work.
Clearly this technique was a most rudimentary form of quantific¬
ation. Yet its development by Gleason in 1907 is of considerable
historical significance. Very little quantitative work, comparable
in sophistication with even this simple numerical classification, had
been done by North American plant ecologists prior to this date.
Mention might be made of earlier work done by Clements in collaboration
with Roscoe Pound in the context of their invention of the meter
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quadrat technique. But the counting of species and individuals
within quadrats was about the limit of Clements's development of
quantitative techniques. For all his continual advocacy of physio¬
logy, quantification and more modern methods generally, Clements's
work on plant communities was to remain primarily descriptive - as
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was the work of most of his contemporaries. Gleason's 1907 paper,
however, marked the beginning of his development of an increasingly
sophisticated quantitative approach to vegetation - which was to
make Gleason one of the pioneers of vegetational statistics.
As just noted, there was little interest in quantification
among plant ecologists in the first decades of the twentieth century.
But there was some other quantitative ecological work being done at
Illinois at this time. Kofoid was applying quantitative techniques
to the study of the composition and distribution of the freshwater
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plankton of the Illinois river. Kofoid's work was pioneering both
in the context of ecology in North America and as far as the world-
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wide study of plankton was concerned. The first-ever quantitative
study of plankton was only ten years old and the techniques involved
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had occasioned much controversy. They were still novel. Gleason
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followed Kofoid's work closely. Furthermore, also at Illinois,
S.A. Forbes and his students were engaged in quantitative studies
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of the distribution of fish, insects and birds. Gleason must
certainly have been aware of Forbes's quantitative work - some of
which was published in the same volume of the Bulletin of the
Illinois State Laboratory as the Gleason-Hart papers on the biology
of the sand areas. Thus, not only was the University of Illinois
one of the few institutions in which ecological research and
research into communities of organisms were being undertaken, it
was also the location of some of the earliest quantitative ecology
done in America. Doubtless, the examples offered by Kofoid and
Forbes encouraged Gleason to apply his own numerical skills to the
study of plant communities.
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Differences and similarities with Clements
Between 1908 and 1913, Gleason published a series of papers on
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the vegetational problems of the Illinois area of the Middle West.
The most important paper of these Illinois years was the truly massive
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"The Vegetation of the Inland Sand Deposits of Illinois". This
paper, published in 1910, was one hundred and fifty-two pages long,
not counting the photographs. It was the product of one of the
most intensive field studies done by any American ecologist in the
first two decades of the twentieth century (Gleason was supported in
his field-work by a grant from the Botanical Society of America and
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a personal donation of $100 from S.A. Forbes). Cowles's early
studies on the shores of Lake Michigan or Cooper's famous studies
following Cowles were not as large or as comprehensive in scope and
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vegetational detail as this 1910 paper of Gleason's. And, although
much the largest of Gleason's early papers, this was, as we have
seen, by no means the only publication of his years in Illinois. At
this time he must therefore have been one of the most prolific
ecologists in America after Clements. Given the evident tendency
for there to be a somewhat direct relationship between quantity of
publications and achieved status in academic life, it is not hard to
see these Illinois papers of Gleason's as announcing his challenge
for a prominent role in the ecological profession. They certainly
established that he was not subordinate to either Cowles or Clements
in capacity for field research or ability to interpret vegetation.
Proof of this is afforded by the fact that when in 1912, Norman
Taylor named eight Americans "engaged in ecological work", Gleason
was included together with Transeau, Shreve, Clements, Harper,
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Spalding, Harshberger and Cowles.
Gleason's 1910 paper was not principally concerned with theoretical
matters. But in it he expressed dissent from Clements on two
important points. The first of these again illustrates Gleason's
essentially floristic perspective on vegetation. Most ecologists
routinely investigated the species composition of their chosen study
areas. But it is the relative importance ascribed to this information
by Gleason to which I wish to draw attention. The study of species
presence and the relative numbers of individuals of each species was
the primary means whereby Gleason sought to investigate and understand
vegetation.
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As we have seen in earlier chapters, this was not the only
possible approach. Ecologists had used a variety of criteria to
classify vegetation. They had considered habitat factors such as
soil type or soil water content, or non-floristic vegetation features
such as physiognomy or the spatial organisation of the plant cover.1^
Most relevant to our present discussion are the criteria used by
Clements. The principal units of Clements's classification of vegetation,
the formations, were identified by physiognomy - although in theory
they were characterisable according to unified development. As we
have seen in the previous chapter, Clements maintained that, by
definition, all the dominants of a single climax formation must be
of the same physiognomic type, since each distinctive physiognomic
type represented a unified response by the vegetation to the regional
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climate. Thus coniferous and deciduous trees could not both be
climax dominants in the same formation. Where they occur together
one or the other must be pre- or post-climax, that is part of a
successional stage or a relict of a previous climax.1^
Below the level of the major climatic units,the formations in
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Clements's hierarchical classification scheme, were the associations.
They were held to be units determined by habitat differences within
the overall regional climate. Each association was said to belong
to a definite habitat - river bank, sand bar, or mountain scree, for
example. In practice, however, Clements used a combination of
floristic and habitat criteria to determine the associations. This
is reflected in his use of a nomenclature which made reference to
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both habitat and floristic features.
In contrast to Clements, Gleason held that the non-floristic
characteristics of a study area should be regarded as being secondary
in importance, at least from the ecologist's point of view. Vegetation
was constituted by the individual plants and it was as an object
made up in this way that it ought to be studied:-
"
... the differentiation of both minor and major
ecological groups depends principally upon the plants
themselves, the associations being distinguished by
the specific composition, the formation by the general
appearance, and the [floristic] province by the
distribution of the vegetation. This is an extension
of the idea already expressed, that the most important
feature of the association is not the habitat but the
plant.1,1®
Discussing the classification contained in Clements's 1905 book
Research Methods in Ecology, Gleason argued that "a classification of
habitat rather than vegetation ... may lead to the uniting of
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radically different types of vegetation". By "radically different
types of vegetation" Gleason meant stands with significant differences
in species composition. Contrariwise, Gleason also held that
Clements arbitrarily separated associations which were in reality
closely related because of similarities in species composition
"The classification of associations by Clements is
largely of this nature [i.e. a habitat classification]
and in some cases leads to a wide separation of closely
related associations or even to the placing of a
particular area in two different groups. Thus a hydro-
phytic sand bar (cheradium) may be converted into a
new xerophytic "formation" (syntidium) merely by the
fall of the water in the river."1<^
Clements's argument that the classification of vegetation must
ultimately rest upon climate and habitat factors was based on his
axiom that the form of both the individual plant and the plant
community were direct and proportional responses to the stimulus
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provided by the environment. Again, Gleason argued differently
"The plant itself is in many cases the controlling
agent in the environment; the differentiation of
definite associations is mainly due to the interrelation
of the component plants; and the physical environment
is as often the result as the cause of vegetation ...
The establishment of a plant in the place which it
occupies is conditioned quite as much by the influence
of other plants as by that of the physical environment."
The second point at which "The Vegetation of the Inland Sand
Deposits of Illinois" departed from the theoretical framework being
promulgated by Clements, was the question of the direction of
succession. In the paper Gleason described "the first example of a
reversed succession ... Clements said such a thing was impossible in
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nature". To Clements, as we have seen, the formation was an
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organism. Therefore all successional change must be developmental
and progressive. Retrogressive change was as impossible for plant
communities as it would be for an individual organism. Adults cannot
spontaneously revert to being children. Therefore the reaction of
the plants upon the environment must always usher in a higher, more
mesophytic form of vegetation than the one which initiated the
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reaction. Only destruction of the vegetation by such factors as
erosion, fire or overgrazing could produce changes in the vegetation
which went against the developmental trend. Any vegetational change
produced by the plants themselves must be in the direction of the
climatic climax vegetation type. Thus Clements excluded, virtually
by definition, all possibility that succession could be anything
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other than progressive.
Gleason, however, interpreted the formation of ponds in the
blow-out hollows of large sand-dunes as illustrations of true retro¬
gressive succession. The process he discerned was as follows. The
sand in the bottom of the hollow was stabilised by the moss Polytrichum
which formed a dense carpet and produced a peaty layer of humus over
the sand. This eventually became so thick that it gave a water-tight
bottom to the hollow and prevented the run-off of standing water.
A pond thus developed and was colonized by a typical association of
pond plants. Now clearly this process was only temporary, but
nevertheless it seemed to Gleason to be an instance in which vegetation
reaction initially produced a more mesophytic vegetation from a
xerophytic starting point and then reversed the trend toward meso-
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phytism by producing a pond, that is a hydrophytic plant community.
However it was not until 1917, seven years later, that Gleason
explicitly made this example of reversed succession out to be a
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contradiction of Clements's developmental principle. The discovery
of this temporary reversal of the trend toward the mesophytic did
not prevent Gleason from agreeing with the view of Cowles (endorsed
by Clements) that all the "vegetation of a region is tending toward
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an ultimate common destiny". Indeed, despite the above differences
there was still, in 1910, much in common between the approaches of
Clements and Gleason.
The common features between Clements' s and Gleason's work in the
1900s and 1910s are evidence of Clements's enormous influence upon
early American ecology. Such was the comprehensiveness and intellectual
scope displayed in Clements's work that it had, in many respects, no
rival. In the words of W.S. Cooper:-
"
... Clements was the first to organize the field
of dynamic ecology as a unified science covering the ,
entire history of the plant population of the earth."
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Clements had investigated new research areas, developed new techniques,
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and proposed an organised format for ecology's embryonic methodology.
Contentious as much of Clements's theorising was, no-one else provided
as detailed a general programme for the young discipline to grow into.
His work could not be ignored and it was regularly drawn upon - even
by those who disagreed with him vehemently and fundamentally.
There is certainly much in Gleason's 1910 paper - in his method¬
ology, as exampled by his use of quadrats in transect across areas
of transition; in his classification, as exampled by his use of an
hierarchical system of syntaxa; in his nomenclature, as exampled by
his use of terms such as 'consocies' and 'associes' - which displays
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his direct or indirect borrowings from Clements. Clements and
Gleason were later to differ on even more fundamental matters than
those described above. Certain terminological Clementsianisms,which
he used in 1910, were later to fall out of Gleason's usage. But
mirroring the situation I have described for Cowles and Gleason,
Clements and Gleason differed, at this time, within a shared tradition
whose development and maturation they were both contributing to.
In 1910, Gleason moved to the University of Michigan. But this
account of his work at Urbana would not be complete without mention
of the fact that at the University of Illinois, Gleason was involved
in the training of two young plant ecologists who were later to
become prominent members of the profession. One of these men was
Frank C. Gates, who eventually became Professor of Botany at Kansas
State University and who was President of the Ecological Society in
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1952. Gates began his graduate work at Illinois under Gleason's
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supervision. He also assisted with Gleason's field work in the
Sand Region. When Gleason went to the University of Michigan, Gates
followed him and completed his doctorate there. The other young
ecologist was Arthur G. Vestal who, while an undergraduate at Illinois,
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likewise helped Gleason with his field work. Vestal went on to
take a doctorate under Cowles at Chicago, eventually returning to
Illinois as Professor of Plant Ecology. He was Secretary/Treasurer of
122
the Ecological Society in 1934.
1
Physiological plant ecology
Some of the work Gleason did in collaboration with Gates is
interesting in that it sheds further light on Gleason's perspective
on vegetation. In 1914, Gates and Gleason published the results of
a study of the rates of evaporation from different types of
123
vegetation. Evaporation was measured using the porous-cup
atmometer. This is the only occasion I have come across on which
Gleason used an instrument to make direct measurements of the
physical environment.
The porous-cup atmometer had been developed by Barton Livingston
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of Johns Hopkins University. Its use was in great vogue in the
1910s and 1920s. Atmometers had been employed in the field by
Transeau, Fuller, Shreve, and several others, as well as by Livingston
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himself. Accurate measurement of evaporation formed only part of
a much larger research effort involving the comprehensive measurement
of the physical habitat in an attempt to correlate environmental
factors with the distribution of plants. Such a correlation was the
principal aim of what was known as physiological ecology:-
"The study of vegetation ... has brought its leading
problems to the point at which they demand for their
solution a precise knowledge of the functional activities
of the plant and an equally precise knowledge of the
environment."
Physiological ecology constituted a major programme of research
within the American plant ecology of the early decades of the twentieth
century. It ran parallel with physiographic ecology and was of
similar importance. As Cowles noted, in 1911 : —
"Plant ecology has a two-fold aspect: the one
considers the individual organism and its component
parts as related to environment; this, since it
overlaps morphology and physiology may be called
morphological and physiological ecology, or the ecology
of plant structure and behavior. The other aspect
considers plants en masse as related to soil and
climate; this, since it overlaps physiography, may
be called physiographic ecology, or the ecology of
vegetation."'2/
Physiological ecology was, as its name implies, more directly
associated with plant physiology proper than physiographic ecology
was. Livingston, for instance, had studied plant physiology under
F.C. Newcombe at Michigan and had been laboratory assistant to both
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Newcombe and C.R. Barnes, who taught plant physiology at Chicago.
Livingston eventually became Director of the Johns Hopkins University
Laboratory of Plant Physiology as well as holder of the Chair of
Forest Ecology also at Johns Hopkins. To take another example,
Daniel T. McDougal, the first Director of the Department of Plant
Research at the Carnegie Desert Laboratory, had studied plant
physiology at Purdue and been employed as a physiologist at the
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New York Botanical Garden. In the hands of men such as these,
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ecology was indeed physiology extended into the field
"We have approached our problems in plant geography
with the mental conception that they are merely problems
in physiology, with all of the environmental conditions
fluctuating and uncontrolled, but nevertheless
measurable, and with all the activities of the plant
in normal performance and also measurable, not by
auxograph and balance, but by such features as
distributional extent, habitat occurrence, communal
behavior, relative abundance, size, seasonal behavior,
etc."1^
Investigations with the atmometer had led several ecologists to
argue that changes in the rate of evaporation from plant communities
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ought to be considered as an important cause of plant succession.
Gleason and Gates argued from their atmometer data that change in
the vegetation came before changes in evaporation rates and not as
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a consequence of these changes. The moral that Gleason and Gates
took from these atmometer experiments was entirely a negative one.
They stressed the limitations of measuring instruments and the need
for a prior understanding of vegetational dynamics on the part of
the investigator if the use of instruments was not to mislead. In
other words, Gleason's disagreement with Fuller and Transeau over
the use of the atmometer took the same form as his disagreement with
Clements over classification. In both instances, Gleason emphasised
the primary importance of the study of the plants themselves over
the study of the physical parameters. Gleason was no environmetrician.
He resisted the allure of instrumentation and physiology. He adhered
to the more conventional techniques of field botany - attempting to
understand vegetation through the identification and observation of
plants directly.
On the faculty of the University of Michigan
Gleason's teaching duties at Michigan were much the same as at
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Illinois - teaching ecology and taxonomy. And in 1911 he had the
additional task of teaching classes in ecology and general botany at
the University's newly-established Biological Station on Douglas Lake
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in Northern Michigan. In 1913, Gleason was made Director of the
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Station. It was there that much of his later field work was done.
It was, for example, in the environs of the Station that Gleason
undertook the quadrat studies which supplied the data for his research
into the statistical distribution of species within vegetation. This
work was begun during the summer of 1912, when Arthur Vestal acted
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as Gleason's research assistant and "counted quadrats all summer".
Gleason continued to do field work at the Biological Station for
several years after he had left the University of Michigan.
In 1913 Gleason took a year-long leave of absence from Michigan
in order to fulfil one of his ambitions - to see more of the principal
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types of the world's vegetation. With a research student, Bert
Quick, as companion, Gleason went on a voyage around the world. The
Asiatic tropics provided the especial interest of the trip. Gleason
and Quick visited several sites in Ceylon, Borneo, Java and the
Phillipines making floristic and vegetational observations. In the
Phillipines, they stayed with Frank Gates who was then working for
the College of Agriculture in Manila, and they benefited from his
local knowledge of the vegetation types. On his return, Gleason
published a series of short anecdotal and impressionistic descriptions
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of the types of vegetation and flora he had seen. It is clear
from these accounts that the tropical rain-forest made a lasting
impression upon him:-
"The marvelous richness and luxuriance of such a
forest must be seen to be appreciated, and baffles
adequate description. One scarcely enters the forest
before he is impressed by the relatively great
importance of the arborescent flora. The visitor finds
himself giving all his attention to the trees, and
neglecting almost completely the herbaceous plants
along the side of the path. The number of species
which comprise the forest is very large. More than four
hundred have been reported for Mt. Makiling. Also they
are widely scattered, so that a single small area
contains a very large number. In a small arboretum of
about seven acres, over two hundred species were found
growing naturally. As a result, a group of trees of
the same species is seldom found. The nearest
neighboring individuals may be and usually are separated
by a considerable distance, and the number of species
is so large and confusing ...
His experience of tropical vegetation was, later in his career,
to furnish him with evidence to support his revised conception of
the nature of the plant community. On his return to Michigan,
Gleason continued his research into the ecology and phytogeography
of the region's woods and grasslands - investigating such matters as
the role of fire in the maintenance of the prairie and the inter-
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actions between coniferous and deciduous woodland. The vegetational
history of the Middle West occupied him for many years, leading up
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to his publication in 1923 of a major paper on the subject.
In 1916, Gleason attended the first summer field-trip meeting
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of the newly-formed Ecological Society of America. This was held
in San Diego, California. There he met Fred. E. Clements, apparently
for the first time. The extent to which they disagreed was soon
apparent:-
"On our return trip [from a two-day trip into the
mountains] I had the good fortune to ride in the same
car with Clements, the noted ecologist ... Almost at
once Clements and I got into an argument. It lasted
until lunch, and after lunch until our car drew up in
front of the ... hotel, where I was staying. As a
parting shot when I left, Clements shook his long
finger in front of my nose and said 'Now Gleason. My
book on succession will be out next month, and it will
be a test of your meristematic condition whether or not
you can accept my ideas.'
The individualistic concept
But the publication of Clements's book Plant Succession did not
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silence Gleason. As might have been predicted it had quite the
opposite effect. Gleason was moved to write a critical riposte in
which he expressed disagreement with Clements more explicitly than
ever before:-
"Ecological literature has recently been enriched by
the publication of an exceedingly important book ... on
the structure and development of vegetation ... For all
its contents the working ecologist is grateful, although
it is probable that some of the more radical ideas of
the author may be accepted reluctantly, and that others
may be rejected altogether."1^3
Gleason took especial exception to four features of Clements's
treatment of vegetation - his view that the unit of vegetation was
an organism, his expansion of the scope of the vegetational unit
to include not only the climax vegetation but all the successional
stages leading up to the climax, his "introduction of several new
terms into an already burdened terminology", and his exclusion by
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definition of possible exceptions to his deductive system.
But as well as countering Clements on these specific points,
Gleason set out an alternative set of propositions as to the nature
of vegetation. It is worth noting that these embodied a theoretical
position different not only from Clements, but also from that earlier
adopted by Gleason himself. For instance, in 1910, Gleason, in his
account of the sand-dune vegetation of Illinois, had explicitly
accepted the generally-held opinion that plant associations were
natural units of vegetation:-
"It is true that the distinctness of the associations
is lost and their character greatly modified by the
effects of civilisation but experience in natural
conditions justifies the statement that associations
are definite organized units and that all vegetation is
composed of them, either mature and fully differentiated
or in process of organization. It is as difficult to
formulate a satisfactory definition of an association
as of a species, and as unnecessary. For the present it
may be considered that it is a homogeneous area of
vegetation in which the interrelations of the component
individual plants permit them to endure the physical
environment."1^
This differentiation of the vegetation into definite associations was
brought about by the plants themselves "through their modification
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and control of the physical features of the environment."
Also, Gleason had earlier been prepared to think of the plant
association as analogous to the taxonomic species:-
"The areal distribution of an association may be
compared to the distribution of a species. Both are
irregular in outline, although co-extensive with certain
combinations of environmental factors. Both consist of
scattered members independent of each other, but
related by a common genesis and common demand upon the
environment. Both show minor local and broad geographical
varieties. The former are illustrated in the association
by the consocies; the latter, in the species by the
subspecies ... " ^
But by 1917, Gleason was no longer happy with this analogy
"While the similarity of vegetation in two detached
areas may be striking, it is only an expression of
similar environmental conditions and similar surrounding
plant populations. If they are for convenience
described under the same name, this treatment is in no
wise comparable to the inclusion of several plant
individuals in one species."1^
Gleason's dissatisfaction with the taxonomic analogy followed
from the fact that he was no longer prepared to accept that vegetation
universally existed in natural units. Gleason did not deny that
there were units of vegetation which might be recognised in the field,
nor did he deny that it was useful to classify vegetation into units,
but:-
"
... the great mass of ecological facts revealed
by observation and experiment may be classified in
different ways. "^2
No one classification of vegetation was uniquely natural.
Gleason noted that many of the techniques used in the study of
vegetation depended on the assumption of vegetational uniformity for
their utility since "a small area can be chosen for intensive study
which exhibits faithfully the average structure of the whole
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association". He acknowledged, as he had done in 1910, that the
dominant species of any given association exercised a certain
influence over the environmental conditions experienced by the
subordinate species. Therefore subordinate species tended to be
somewhat similar throughout the area of a given set of dominants.
But visually striking as this apparent uniformity within an association
might be, and useful as its assumption was heuristically, it was not
absolute. The environmental control of the dominants was not by
itself enough to enforce uniform species composition over wide areas
of an association. The physical environment varied continuously and,
Gleason argued, "no two species have identical environmental
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demands". Therefore, despite the fact that a particular set of
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subordinate species was often to be found occurring underneath a
given dominant species or a given dominant vegetative form, plants
did not occur in precisely repeating groups. Individuals of the
same species were capable of growing in different habitats, and had
different associated species in different localities:-
"With one environmental factor near the optimum,
others may apparently be near the minimum: thus the
tamarack, which in southern Michigan is confined to peat
bogs, in Isle Royale occurs even in crevices in vertical
rock cliffs."^5
When one allowed for further obstacles in the way of the
establishment of uniform species composition - such as the vicissitudes
of migration and invasion - it was clear that there were too many
variables involved in determining which plant species grew where for
vegetation to remain constant over a large area or to repeat itself
exactly in two localities. Plant species had individual requirements
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and properties and distributed themselves accordingly. Migration
served Gleason as a good example of this dependence. Each species
moved at its own rate - depending on such matters as the mobility of
its seeds or spores, species-specific response to physical factors,
accidents of dispersal, variation in seed production, and the
proximity of parent plants. Clearly the composition of any given
piece of vegetation was dependent on whether all the species capable
of living in that locality had succeeded in migrating to it. Thus
associational composition was dependent on the individualistic
behaviour of the plant species.
Gleason argued that when one examined vegetation in the field,
one indeed found that no two areas had identical composition as
measured by component species and the relative numbers of individuals
of each species. He had studied the beech-maple forest around
Douglas Lake and found constant variation between sites and "much
greater differences are found when these are compared with the
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beech-maple forest of Southern Michigan, 500 km away." Variation
was continuous even within a vegetation type as apparently definite
and homogeneous as beech-maple, but "still the beech-maple forest
158has always been interpreted as a single association of wide extent."
Gleason still considered it legitimate to call vegetational
features such as the beech-maple forest 'associations'. The desig¬
nation was useful and common practice among ecologists:-
"In the same limited region, that is with the same
surrounding population, areas of similar environment,
whether continuous or detached, are therefore occupied
by similar assemblages of species. Such an assemblage
is called a plant association."1-^
There were indeed often naturally occurring sharp discontinuities
between one sort of vegetation, one association, and the next. But
such discontinuities were not sufficiently numerous or sufficiently
consistent to allow the construction of a comprehensive classification
of vegetation into natural units:-
"The physical factors of the environment generally vary
gradually in space ... Such gradual and progressive
variation of environment would normally lead to equally
gradual and progressive changes in vegetation ...
Under these conditions Gleason argued, where one association finished
and another began was a matter of judgement:-
"Whether any two areas, either contiguous or separated,
represent the same plant association, detached examples
of the same one, consocies, or different associations,
and how much variation of structure may be allowed within
an association without affecting its identity, are both
purely academic questions ... " 6
Gleason had come to believe that all the collective phenomena of
vegetation depended on the individualistic behaviour of the component
plants. Therefore the recognition of vegetational units could not
always be based upon the existence of natural divisions within the
vegetation itself
"
... since the association represents
coincidence of certain plant individuals ... ■■
This individualistic perspective led Gleason to make a strong
criticism of the homology Clements had made between the plant
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community and the individual organism. Gleason pointed out that
the later stages of a plant community's development did not spring
endogenously from within its immature stages. Rather they were the
result of the invasion of new member species from outside the
community. As we have already seen, to Gleason migration was an
individualistic phenomenon - each species moved at its own rate.




Furthermore, vegetational change need not in Gleason's opinion
be developmental. It could be retrogressive, trending away from the
mesophytic - a pond could become established upon a sand-dune as
Gleason had described in 1910. Vegetational change toward mesophytism
could be entirely absent:-
"Theoretically, all associations of a region tend to
culminate in the establishment of a climax. Many
associations, however, occupy their ground so tenaciously
that there is little or no observable evidence that
they are ever replaced by the association ordinarily
considered to be the climax of that region."1®
Gleason was thus no longer a believer in the monoclimax hypothesis.
Succession was individualistic, like all the other processes within
vegetation, not propelled by necessary inherent vegetational or
climatic principles.
For all the above reasons, in Gleason's view the origin of a
new plant community, its successional development and its eventual
disappearance were not at all comparable to the stages in the life-
history of an individual plant:-
"
... in sharp contrast with the view of Clements that
the unit of vegetation is an organism which exhibits a
series of functions distinct from those of the individual
and within which the individual plants play a part as
subsidiary to the whole as that of a single tracheid
within a tree."1®
On the contrary, "the phenomena of vegetation depend completely upon
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the phenomena of the individual".
With the publication of "The structure and development of the
plant association" in 1917, Gleason moved from being a more or less
typical young physiographic ecologist to take up a distinctive
position of theoretical heterodoxy. His 'individualistic concept'
or 'individualistic hypothesis', as it was to become known, was to
remain controversial, guaranteeing him a degree of notoriety among
1SY
ecologists, for fifty years.
The mainstream of ecological opinion
Had Gleason confined his criticisms to Clements's organicism, it
is unlikely that he would have been perceived as unconscionably
heterodox by the majority of his ecological peers. This is a
crucially important point. Several authors have described the polar
dichotomy between Clements's and Gleason's views on the nature of
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the plant association. Certainly the views of these two ecologists
were radically different. But it has been too often assumed that
these two points of view represent the entire extent of the debate.
Certain commentators, notably Tobey and Worster, have.portrayed this
controversy as being fought between a Clementsian majority, on the
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one hand, and a lonely Gleason, on the other.
The possibility of a broad middle ground between the two extremes
has seldom been remarked upon. But such a body of opinion did exist.
Clements's work had certainly been influential. But many American
ecologists, perhaps a majority, did not accept "the pure milk of the
Clementsian word", any more than they accepted the individualistic
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hypothesis. I have been unable to find the Clementsian organismic
analogy within the independent work of J.E. Weaver whom Ronald
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Tobey names as Clements's chief apostle and collaborator. Nor can
it be found in the work of Bergman and Stallard who were students of
Clements at Minnesota, whose research was done under Clements's
direction, and whose field practice and interpretation of data were
172
clearly and explicitly based upon the exemplar of Plant Succession.
If the organismic concept cannot be found in these authors, it seems
unlikely that it was widely used within the specialty. The early
volumes of Ecology, the journal of the American Ecological Society,
first published in 1920, contain very few examples of its employment
by plant ecologists. Overall the evidence seems to support Duff's
contention that, in this respect, Clements "was out on a theoretical
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limb".
The fact that the organismic analogy was seldom used in technical
contexts supports the argument I developed in the previous chapter
that its principal function was an ideological one - fashioned by
Clements's need to exercise suasion within a lay constituency. An
important secondary purpose seems to have been in pedagogy. There
is, for example, an important exposition of the organismic analogy
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in W.B. McDougall's 1931 textbook. It is also referred to
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frequently throughout Clements and Weaver's 1929 textbook. (It is
1If}
strangely absent from Clements's earlier 1907 textbook.) However
as far as the technical context of ecological research and theory-
making is concerned, the organismic analogy was not generally
employed.
An awareness of the existence of a large body of opinion which
disagreed with both Clements and Gleason is essential to a proper
understanding of this period in the history of American plant ecology.
Any other interpretation oversimplifies the complexity of the debate
and, indeed, greatly exaggerates Clements's intellectual dominance.
He was important, but not that important. It also ignores the
attitude of major plant ecologists, such as W.S. Cooper and G.E.
Nichols, who were to be crucial foci of research and, especially in
Cooper's case, graduate teaching throughout the twenties and thirties.
To get an impression of opinion somewhere near the centre of the
spectrum between Clements and Gleason, let us look at several articles,
produced by American ecologists in the second and third decades of
the twentieth century - beginning with "The interpretation and
application of certain terms and concepts in the ecological classi¬
fication of plant communities" - published by George Nichols in the
same year as Gleason's first presentation of his individualistic
177 173
concept. Nichols's reading of Cowles was reflected in his work.
He was clearly doing Cowlesian ecology:-
"During the past seven years much of the writer's
study has been alon the line of local physiographic
plant ecology ... "
Nichols proposed a formal system of classification of vegetation -
specially designed so as to be compatible with the practice of
physiographic ecology:-
"The groundwork for such a classification is afforded
by the principle of succession, the fundamental bearing
of which on the relationship and evolution of plant
communities has been indisputably established by the
work of Cowles, Whitford, Clements, Moss and others ...
The scheme of classification itself is by no means
wholly new or original. It is the outgrowth, and
perhaps not a very radical modification of the
classification originally devised by Cowles."
Nichols's proposed classificatory scheme was quite complex and
its details need not concern us here. However in describing the
rationale behind his system, Nichols necessarily expressed his opinion
on several points of the theory of vegetation.
Nichols's system differed from Clements's in several ways. One
of the most important was that he did not acknowledge the physio¬
gnomic formation to be the fundamental unit of vegetation. To
Nichols, the fundamental unit was the association. At least in
theory, uniformity of habitat defined the association. It was:-
"
... any group or community of plants, taken in its
entirety, which occupies a common habitat ... an
essentially uniform environment."1^
Unlike Gleason, but like Cowles, Nichols made use of the taxo-
nomic analogy:-
"If the association is regarded as an ecological
species and the edaphic formation constitutes an
ecological genus ...
This reflected his conviction that the association was a natural
unit of vegetation.
Floristic criteria occupied a secondary place, behind habitat
criteria, in Nichols's classificatory system. Variation in species
composition was acknowledged by the proposed sub-divisions of the
fundamental unit - which Nichols termed 'consociations' (where the
variation concerned the dominant species), or 'societies' (where the
variation concerned species of secondary importance).
The association, as conceived of by Nichols, was not a complex
developmental unit in the Clementsian sense of including all the
successional stages leading up to the climatic climax. Nichols
defined the association as consisting of a single "stage in a given
successional series", not the entire series considered as a single
183
entity. Vegetational development was however accommodated within
the classificatory scheme in that associations held to be succession-
ally related to one another were grouped together into an 'association-
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complex'.
But Nichols's association-complexes were not quite identical to
the Clementsian formations. For Nichols, while accepting that there
was an overall trend toward increased mesophytism within any given
area of vegetation, did not believe that all the successional series
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in that area were necessarily destined to achieve a single common
vegetation type. That is to say, like Gleason, he did not accept the
monoclimax hypothesis, which was one of the most important elements
of the Clementsian theory:-
"Now it is commonly stated or implied in ecological
literature that in every region, as the logical
consummation of progressive successional changes, the
vegetation of all soils and all types of topography is
destined eventually to acquire the same degree of
mesophytism that characterizes the regional climax
association-type; that, while in unfavourable situations
the influence of certain habitat factors may diminish
the rapidity of the succession, it does not alter the
final outcome; that ultimately ... the regional climax
is destined to be attained in all areas ... This is
the working hypothesis which the writer followed in his
earlier field-studies; but observations continued over
a number of years have made it seem increasingly
evident that such an assumption is untenable from the ^g
standpoint of contemporaneous dynamic plant geography."
Nichols argued that habitat factors, such as wind on an exposed
sea coast, might place a permanent limit on the degree of mesophytism
that vegetation within that habitat could attain. Mature vegetation-
types in which succession had been altered in this way constituted
186
"edaphic climax associations". They and their successional
stages could be naturally grouped together into "edaphic formations".
Nichols was, thus, an adherent of the polyclimax theory - the view
that it was possible to have more than one permanent type of
vegetation occurring within an area of uniform climate.
The polyclimax view was shared by many American and European
ecologists. Schimper, for instance, had been the first to propose a
1R7
special nomenclature for edaphic climax vegetation-types. Tansley,
when reviewing Clements's Plant Succession, had expressed agreement
with Schimper and pointed to the absence of any recognition of the
existence of non-climatic permanent vegetation-types as one of the
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major defects of Clements's book. But American opinion was divided
on this matter. Cowles, for instance, had proposed a monoclimax
18Q
hypothesis before Clements. And in 1911 he had forthrightly
re-expressed the theoretical basis for such a view:-
"At the close of the vegetative cycle there is no
such universal feature as the base level of the
physiographer, since the final vegetative aspect varies
with the climate, and hence is called a climatic
formation. In the eastern United States, the final
stage is a mesophytic deciduous forest; farther to the
north and in the Pacific states, it is a coniferous
forest; in the great belt from Texas to Saskatchewan,
the final stage is a prairie; and in the arid southwest,
it is a desert. In every case, the ultimate or
climatic plant formation is the most mesophytic which
the climate is able to support in the region taken as
a whole. "190
Cowles's student, W.S. Cooper, in his comprehensive application
of the Cowlesian system to the forests of Isle Royale, had argued,
on the basis of field data, that all the successions he observed in
the Lake Forest were leading toward a common goal, a single climax-
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type - the balsam-birch-white spruce forest. It is not surprising
that Cooper discerned a single climax on Isle Royale, for he had
gone to Lake Superior with the specific intention of identifying
the climatic climax of the Lake Forest:-
"Eastern North America North of Florida and Mexico
is divided into two great phytogeographic regions, the
eastern deciduous forest and the northeastern conifer
forest. In each of these a number of lines of succession
may be traced, all of these of a region leading to a
certain forest type as the final or climax stage ...
The purpose of the present work was to determine the
climax forest of Isle Royale, its composition and
character, and to trace the various lines of succession
leading to it."192
But Cooper's willingness to accept, with reservations, the
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monoclimax hypothesis did not make him a Clementsian. Neither
Cowles nor Cooper nor Nichols ever employed Clements's organismic
conception of the plant community. Cooper repeatedly expressed his
dissent from it:-
"
... we note the thesis, declared to be fundamental,
that the unit or climax community is an organic entity,
with structure and functions corresponding to those of
an individual organism. This assumption colors the
whole of Clements' treatment, and in the opinion of the
writer, detracts seriously from the usefulness of his
contribution.
and again:-
"Many ecologists have accepted Clements's thesis that
'the developmental study of vegetation necessarily
rests upon the assumption that the unit or climax
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formation is an organic entity. As an organism the
formation arises, grows, matures, and dies'. Thus set
up as a foundation stone - as the corner stone, indeed,
of the whole edifice - it demands consideration.
Although by no means the first to voice opposition, I
cannot refrain from expressing vigorous dissent from
the categorical statement quoted above."195
He concluded, after a detailed discussion:-
"The assumption that the vegetation-unit is an
organism, used as a foundation stone of the edifice of ^
dynamic ecology, is fallacious and should be abandoned."
Cooper also expressed dissent with Clements over the a priori
requirement that all the dominants of any given climax need necessarily
be of a single life-form. Indeed he commended Gleason on his
vigorous protest against. Clements's "unwarrantable framing of rigid,
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subjective concepts".
Thus we can conclude, from this brief review of opinion in the
profession, that there was far from universal acceptance among
American ecologists of the Clementsian doctrine, in its entirety.
In particular there was much disagreement over the question as to
whether the plant formation could be regarded as equivalent to a
biological organism. Thus, if Gleason had confined his criticism of
Clements to the question of organicism, or to Clements's "introduction
of several new terms into an already burdened terminology", or his
enlargement of "the scope of the vegetational unit [so] that it
includes ... not only a climax but also all the vegetational series
leading to the climax", or his rigid petitio principii definitions,
it is probable that Gleason would not have irrevocably offended
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moderate opinion within the specialty. If the above had been the
limits of Gleason's critique, it is unlikely he would have seemed
any more radical than the eminently respectable W.S. Cooper - with
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whose view of vegetation Gleason expressed much sympathy.
What really differentiated Gleason from his contemporary
ecologists was not his aversion to the plant association being
regarded as an organism, but his criticism of the much more widely
held view that the association was a definite entity of some other,
less highly integrated, variety. Cooper expressed what I take to be
the majority view:-
"It seems to me that plant communities exist, that
they are definable and comparable and therefore
constitute a legitimate field of study. Naturally
they are not nearly so sharply defined as individual
organisms.
Against Gleason's contention that "the phenomena of vegetation depend
completely upon the phenomena of the individual", Cooper argued that:-^
"Assemblages of plants or of animals are subject to
special laws, so that their mass action is not equivalent
to the sum of the action of the component individuals. "2<-)2
On this matter Cooper regarded Clements's and Gleason's views as
equally dissentient:-
"His [Gleason's] paper was a useful corrective to the
tendencies toward the opposite extreme. I think the
truth lies somewhere in between."^03
That is to say, plant communities were integrated entities in their
own right. They had distinctive properties. Their study required
autonomous forms of explanation. But they did not possess such a
high level of integration as to be equivalent to the individual
biological organism.
Nichols's view of the level of integration within the plant
community was also different from Clements's. He was however prepared
to employ a broad analogy between plant communities and individual
organisms:-
"
... a plant association may be regarded in its
entirety as an organic entity, and as such it occupies
a position in the field of ecological plant sociology
which is homologous in a general way to that occupied
by an individual plant or specimen in such fields of
botany as plant morphology or plant taxonomy. As
integral parts of the larger community, plant societies
bear a relation to the association which is somewhat
analogous to that borne by the various organs of an
individual plant to the plant as a whole.
But Nichols located the level at which the processes of organic
integration were effective quite differently from Clements. What
Clements regarded as an organic entity, Nichols terms an aggregate.
For example, the pitch pine 'entity', according to Clements, included
within it all the pitch pine communities in existence and also all
successional stages developing or potentially developing into pitch
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pine communities. In Nichols's view, however, the organic entity
was a concrete piece of vegetation, a single plant community - or
individual stand or a close group of stands of pitch pine trees.
This was the level at which integrative community processes were
discernable:-
"To me the aggregate view of the association seems
altogether too intangible to be of practical value; at
any rate I am extremely reluctant to regard the
association in this sense as being in the nature of an
POR
organism.
Nichols's view is therefore not identical to Cooper's, but, like
Cooper, he stands somewhere between Clements and Gleason on the
question of the organic (or otherwise) nature of the plant community.
So, too, did George Fuller, another student of Cowles, who in a
review of American opinion on the nature of the plant community,
published in 1918, was the first to polarize the views of Clements
and Gleason as representing the ends of the spectrum of American
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opinion. Fuller agreed with Clements that the plant community
was "an entity comparable to some extent at least to an organism"
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but he saw this only as a useful analogy. He had reservations
about the full-blown homology postulated by Clements.
We have now considered all the major articles, written by
American ecologists in the late 1910s and early 1920s, that discuss
the nature of the plant association. With the exception of Gleason's,
they all represent the opinion that the plant community was more
than the sum of its constituent individuals. The phenomena of
vegetation were not simply the phenomena of individual plants.
Integrative processes operated at the level of the vegetation itself,
at least in certain circumstances
"Viewed as a concrete piece of vegetation, any
association may be regarded as an entity, or even as
an organic entity; but the only associations which
may at all reasonably be likened to organisms are those
in which there is active commensalism; whose constituent
plants, in varying degree, exhibit the phenomena of
competition, priority, dependence and mutuality. These
relationships are most highly developed in climax
communities."
Thus the plant community was generally regarded as a real natural
unit. But it was a unit not quite as integrated, not quite as
closely similar to a biological organism as Clements claimed. Its
development was not strictly comparable to the life-cycle of an
individual plant or animal. As Nichols put it:-
"Most ecologists ... would concede ... that the
likening of the association to an organism must
necessarily be taken, very largely, as a figure of
speech.
The tripartite division of ecological opinion which I have
outlined here - Clements, the mainstream, Gleason - has not been
previously recognised by historians. However it was recognised by
contemporary observers. As Gleason categorised it:-
"Out of the thousands of pages of literature which
have been used in expounding various views on the matter,
three well marked theories may be chosen ...
1. The association is an organism, or a quasi-organism,
... made up of individual plants and animals held
together by a close bond of interdependence ... with
properties different from, but analogous to, the vital
principles of an individual, including phenomena
similar to birth, life, and death, as well as constant
structural features comparable to the structures of the
individual [the view of Clements]
2. The association is not an organism, but is a series
of separate similar units, variable in size but repeated
in numerous examples. As such, it is comparable to a
species. Under this view, the association is ...
capable of typification by one or more of those pieces
which most nearly approach the average or ideal
condition, [the view of what I have termed the
Mainstream]
3. The vegetation unit is a temporary and fluctuating
phenomenon, dependent, in its origin, its structure,
and its disappearance, on the selective action of the
environment and on the nature of the surrounding
vegetation, [the view of Gleason]"^1®
Gleason, Clements, Cowles, Cooper, Nichols and Fuller were all
practitioners of what they called 'dynamic' ecology - employing
large-scale vegetational units, and being particularly concerned
with vegetational change between and within these units. They
worked with a common tradition. But within that tradition,
Clements's and Gleason's views on the nature of the plant association
were regarded by most observers as being equally extreme, albeit in
opposite directions.
At the New York Botanical Garden - quantitative investigations
Professionally and personally, Gleason's years at Michigan were
successful ones. He was being groomed to become head of department
upon the retiral of the incumbent, F.C. Newcombe. He had married
and built a house to his own specifications. But the pay was
comparatively poor and salary increments were not so large or as
regular as Gleason thought his due. He was also frustrated by
having to teach a course in elementary botany to pharmacy students.
Meanwhile he had been keeping up his contacts with the New York
Botanical Garden. In 1912, Britton received new collections of
Vernonia from Cuba and he invited Gleason to come to New York to
study them. Gleason was again invited to New York in 1918. Before
he returned to Ann Arbor, Britton offered him a permanent post at
the Garden. The position was that of First Assistant - second in
rank in the Garden and equivalent to Assistant Director:-
"I was in a quandary. I knew that New York would be
a dreadful place to live, especially in comparison with
our Ann Arbor home. I knew that we would find it
difficult to get acquainted with any people outside the
Garden staff. I knew I would have shorter vacations
and more rigidity in my working hours. But I also
knew, on the other side of the ledger, that I would
have a considerably larger salary and a far better
chance for research. I knew that I was getting tired
of teaching the same old subjects over and over."211
Gleason accepted Britton's offer and in February 1919, at the age of
37, moved to New York.
Inevitably, in such an institutional setting, the principal
direction of Gleason's research effort shifted, from ecological
toward taxonomic investigations
"Britton wanted me to take up this vast problem [the
Flora of northern South America] for my life work, and
decided that a trip down there would be the best way
to arouse my interest. Since I spoke no Spanish, the
only place to send me was British Guiana."21?
Thus began Gleason's investigation of tropical flora which was to
occupy him for eighteen years until he eventually forsook it to




But he did not abandon ecology altogether, despite his work in
taxonomy and heavy administrative duties. In 1923, he returned to
the Michigan Biological Station to teach a summer course and to do
ecological research. George Nichols was also at the Station during
214
that year. He and Gleason were close friends and Nichols had
acknowledged how Gleason's "stimulating and suggestive advice" had
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helped him in preparation of one of his papers. They were to
21 &
remain on good terms until Nichols died in 1939. But now something
was different:-
"Nichols and I were the best of friends, but he
simply would not discuss ecology with me. I knew why;
it was because his ideas and mine were so radically
different. "217
Gleason was again at the Station in 1931, continuing the
quantitative studies begun in 1912. He returned also in 1933 and
1935. Membership of the staff of the New York Botanical Garden did
not mean that Gleason immediately ceased to produce ecological
articles. His important technical and quantitative paper "Some
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applications of the quadrat method" was published in 1920.
In the following pages, I shall consider Gleason's quantitative
work in some detail. I do this because such study sheds important
light on the precise nature of his conception of vegetation. We
must understand the exact character of his individualistic hypothesis
if we are to understand how it was modified by the ecologists who
revived it after the Second World War. Such modification will be
discussed in the following chapter. Secondly, the reception the
quantitative aspect of Gleason's work received says much about the
general attitude of ecologists toward quantitative investigations
in the nineteen-twenties and -thirties. As we shall see in the next
chapter, the revival of the individualistic hypothesis coincided
with the rise of interest in quantitative methods. That the
individualistic hypothesis was quantitatively testable was one of
its important attractions. Thirdly, close scrutiny of Gleason's
vegetational statistics shows that even mathematical expressions of
the nature of vegetation are structured by prior interests. Gleason's
vegetational statistics express his commitment to the floristic
level of investigation. They are amenable to the same explanation
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as the other expressions of that commitment. The apparent objectivity
of quantitative techniques does not mean that mathematical forms of
knowledge about vegetation are uniquely determined by input from
the natural world.
Gleason had employed the quadrat technique regularly since 1903.
In his study of the development of two plant associations in northern
Michigan, he had used data from quadrats fixed out over three seasons
between 1915 and 1917. Like Clements, he believed that the quadrat
method facilitated an objective understanding of vegetation structure
and changes
"
... in all cases of verbal description, the result
unconsciously and unavoidably embodies the author's
idea of the conditions, rather than the actual and
impersonal facts, in that conspicuous species may be
emphasized although possibly relatively unimportant,
while important but comparatively inconspicuous species
may be neglected. While the quadrat method is by no
means a panacea for all these difficulties, its proper
combination with verbal description and photography
does much to aid the observer in securing a thorough
knowledge of the association and in more satisfactorily
expressing its structure in terms intelligible to his
readers. "219
But Gleason's view of the nature of the plant association had
certain consequences for the application of the quadrat method.
Outlining these was the first purpose of the 1920 paper
"The use of a chosen quadrat in representing the
structure depends absolutely on the theory of the
homogeneity' of the association ... If the association
were absolutely homogeneous ... any quadrat could be
chosen to represent the vegetation."220
But since no association was perfectly or essentially homogeneous,
the location of quadrats became a crucial matter. The investigator
could not simply place them where he happened to regard the vegetation
as typical since the data thus produced would not necessarily
constitute an objective representation of the association as a whole
"
... the quadrat method itself, as ordinarily used,
offers no aid in the selection of this typical area, so
the actual choice invariably represents the observer's
idea rather than the impersonal facts."221
Gleason therefore argued that large numbers of quadrats had to
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be set out in order to describe adequately a single association.
He recommended the use of one hundred since this number made
computation easier. Also he advocated that these plots be "chosen
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at random to avoid the personal element". Gleason did not, however,
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mean 'random' in the modern strict sense. He simply placed the
first plot 'anywhere' and located the others in some pre-determined
relation to the first. For example, they might be in a straight
line or around the corners of a square. Statistically inadequate as
this may seem by present standards, it was quite different in
principle to the then accepted practice whereby the investigator
placed the plots where he had, by inspection, decided the vegetation
was most typical. The resulting data were then used to describe
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the structure of the association.
The second purpose of the 1920 paper was to display Gleason's
ideas as to how the structure of vegetation could be statistically
expressed. The primary advantage Gleason saw in the quadrat method
was that it yielded neat quantitative data. The quadrat "does
constitute the only practicable means for the quantitative study of
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the association". Quadrats, therefore, were the basis of
Gleason's statistical study of vegetation.
The principal quantitative measure of vegetation which Gleason
extracted from the quadrat data was the frequency index [F.I.]. The
use of this measure had been pioneered by the Montpelier botanist
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P. Jaccard in 1901. The frequency index is the ratio of the
number of quadrats in which a particular species occurs to the
total number of quadrats used. [Clearly the value of the frequency
index of each species is dependent on the area of the quadrats used.
In forest, Gleason generally used one metre quadrats]. Thus, a
quantitative description of a given piece of vegetation might take
the form of a list of species ranked according to their frequency
indices. Any species with an F.I. of 0.60 or more was deemed to
be important.
The frequency indices could be used to construct 'major
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quadrats'. These were larger than the original quadrats - their
size being so determined that any one contained all the major species
of the association as well as a number of other less important ones.
More precisely, the size of the major quadrat was arrived at by
determining at which size all the important species (original F.I.
greater than or equal to 0.60) would have their F.I.s increased to
0.99 or more. Once determined, a major quadrat could be cautiously
regarded as 'a fair sample' of the association in its entirety, and
could be used as the basis for further intensive study or for
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teaching purposes.
Using probability considerations, Gleason derived an equation
for F.I. If n plants are distributed at random over q quadrats,
the probability o
Which is to say:-
f any one quadrat being occupied is 1 - (1 - ~)n<
F.I. = 1 - (1 - -)n (1 )
q
This became known as Gleason's Formula.
If the F.I. for any species had been calculated from the field
data, Gleason's Formula allowed n - the expected total number of
individual plants of that species within the quadrats -to be derived.
n - los -1 ~Qq'1'- , where q = 100 (2)log .99
The actual number of plants was nearly always greater than the
value of n calculated in this way, due to the fact that few plants
are randomly distributed.
Gleason's Formula could also be used to determine the required
size of the major quadrat. If F.I. is given the value 0.99 (the
desired F.I. for all important species in a major quadrat) and the
total number of plants of a species with original F.I. 0.60
(calculated using equation 2 above) is taken as the value of n, then
Gleason's Formula could be solved for q. This gave the number of
larger quadrats into which the original 100 quadrats must be
redivided so that all the species with original F.I. 0.60 or more
would show F.I.s of 0.99 or more. Thus, if q was 20, the original
100 quadrats were redivided into 20 larger quadrats. Thus the
major quadrat would be five times as large as the original. Despite




... experience has shown that it [the method of
calculating the size of the major quadrats] gives
surprizingly good results. On the average four major
quadrats out of five, the location of which is chosen
at random, present all the important species for which
they were computed.
Gleason concluded the paper by indicating how the frequency
indices could be used to improve Jaccard's community coefficient (C.C.)
which was designed to express numerically the degree of similarity
between two areas of vegetation. Jaccard had simply divided the
number of species to both areas by the total number of species
observed in the two areas. Every species was thus of equal significance.
The technique failed to allow for the greater importance with plant
communities of a few very abundant species. However, Gleason weighted
each species with its frequency index. Thus his community coefficient
was the sum of the frequency indices of species common to both areas,
divided by the sum of the frequency indices of all the species
found over the two areas. This produced C.C. values which coincided
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more closely to visual impressions of similarity.
Gleason's 1920 paper was very much a pioneer effort. His
statistical ecology was distinctive and innovative. These qualities
were further exhibited in two other quantitative papers Gleason
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produced in the 1920s. These were both on the relation between
area and the number of species. Obviously larger areas of vegetation
generally contain more species than the smaller areas. In 1921, the
Swedish botanist Arrhenius had attempted to express mathematically
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the relation between the size of the area and the number of species.
He suggested the formula
Area 1 no. of species in Area 1
Area 2 no. of species in Area 2
where area 1 and area 2 are portions of the same association, and n
is a constant for each association. In 1923, Gleason published
calculations which showed that Arrhenius's equation gave erroneous
predictions under several circumstances, and especially when applied
to areas of a square kilometre or more - in which cases the solutions
gave either absurdly high or absurdly low predictions, depending on
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the value of the exponent, n.
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Gleason pointed out that, if an association was perfectly
uniform, then a single quadrat of suitable size would be sufficient
to encompass its entire complement of species and larger areas
would produce no increase in the number of species found. However,
in fact, not all species were uniformly distributed. Many were
localised and absent from certain parts of the association. Thus
counting more quadrats did in fact increase the number of species
found. But only up to a point - associations were overall quite
uniform in composition. Indeed it was on the basis of such uniformity
that pieces of vegetation were identified as associations. Thus
as more quadrats were counted, the rate of increase in the number of
species found should show a steady decline. Arrhenius had erred,
according to Gleason, in using too small a size of quadrat - only
a single square decimetre. Even counting a total of three hundred
such quadrats would not be sufficient to show the eventual reduction
in the rate of increase of species.
As an alternative to Arrhenius's exponential formula, Gleason
proposed a logarithmic relationship between species and area.
However he was, in 1922, unable to say precisely what this relation¬
ship might be. He stated he was handicapped in his study of the
matter by the fact that a large amount of quantitative data
collected for statistical research had been lost. Presumably this
had occurred in the fire which, in 1913, destroyed the south wing
of University Hall in Ann Arbor in which the Botany Department of
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the University of Michigan was then situated. (Some of these
lost data were presumably those collected by Vestal in 1912 - for
Gleason never published the results of those early quantitative
investigations.) However, in 1923, Gleason undertook further
quantitative fieldwork, again at the Biological Station on Douglas
235
Lake, with the help of several undergraduate assistants. The
results of this investigation were published in 1925.
Gleason was now able to propose the formula
log 3 - log A _ b - a (3)
log C - log A c - a
where areas a and B are non-overlapping portions of area C, such
that B is greater than A, and the number of species of these areas
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are a, b, and c respectively. Thus if the number of species in
the two study areas A and B be determined by direct observation [a
was generally a single quadrat, B a hundred quadrats], then the
number of species to be found in any larger area C, may be calculated.
Gleason held the equation to be valid:-
"
... as long as its use is restricted to an area of
general environmental and floristic similarity, in which
plants are distributed according to the laws of probability
and chance, that is, to a single plant association."237
Whether plants are best thought of as being distributed according to
the "laws of probability and chance" was, in itself, a controversial
matter. However Gleason had great faith in the predictive power,
to within very precise limits, of his species area formula:-
"But the equation worked. It was never off more than
4 per cent; often less than 1 per cent. It would predict
the number of dicotyledons, or the number of foreign
species, or even the number of grasses or composites,
just as accurately as the total of all species. It was
exciting but wearisome work. The count of a hundred
quadrats could easily be made in the course of an hour.
Then came the bench-table work to determine the size
of the area [C in equation 3 above]. Next came the
laborious work of discovering every species on the
tract. The whole area was divided off into strips
about six feet wide and each strip was searched with
every possible care. In a ten-acre tract, the search
and the shifting of the strings separating the strips
required about thirty miles of walking and might easily
require three days work. As one starts this long
task, the number of species grow rapidly as far as
thirty or forty, then more slowly, and finally with
discouraging slowness. Finally the last species is
found, a little plant of Polygala paucifolia nestling
in the shade of a half-rotten log, but one does not
know it is the last. Sixty-four species have been
discovered. Then one gets his table of logarithms
and from his first results computes the number of
species to be expected, 64.46, an error of less than
one per cent, and is glad that he found that last
little Polygala.
Gleason held the fact that there was a definite mathematical
relationship between number of species and area to indicate that
plants were distributed by chance rather than each species having
its own peculiar environmental preferences. However, he developed
a further statistical test to show this more directly.
The basis of the test was as follows - if species a occurs in
50 quadrats out of 100, and species b in 50 quadrats of the same
hundred, they should occur together in 25 quadrats, provided their
distribution depends purely on chance. If it is determined by
environmental factors, Gleason argued, the species should occur
together in more than 25, if they require the same conditions, or
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in fewer than 25, if their demands are different.
Gleason chose to display the efficacy of this test in an aspen
association. Aspen forest, he wrote, "impresses the observer as
offering unusually diverse environments for one association, and
leads him to expect that here if anywhere species will be more or
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less controlled in their distribution by environmental factors."
However even in the motley aspen association, Gleason was unable
to identify any species or group of species whose distribution was
in any way incompatible with the expectation from pure chance:-
"In other words, environmental differences in the
aspen association, while easily observable, are not of
sufficient magnitude to affect the distribution of the
species, unless these differences exist within the
limits of a single square meter.
Gleason further argued that such finely grained environmental
differences were not likely to exist or be effectual. Thus he con¬
cluded: -
"All these facts warrant the general conclusion that,
within the limits of a single plant association, the
environment, while possibly presenting observable
differences, is essentially homogeneous for each species;
that the distribution of species is primarily a matter
of chance, depending on the accidents of dispersal;
and the number of individuals of a species, other
things being equal, is an index to its adaptation to
its environment."2^2
Gleason's test for species grouping, while rough-and-ready, was
the most sophisticated operation of its kind undertaken by an
American ecologist up to that time, and for some time afterwards.
It showed a readiness to use statistical methods to manipulate quadrat
data and to interpret the nature of vegetation. Such an attitude was
quite absent from the work of the majority of Gleason's contemporaries
who were, first and foremost, descriptive ecologists - Cooper or
Nichols might be mentioned as examples. Clements had introduced the
quadrat into ecological research but he continued to employ sub¬
jective estimation of communities as the basis of classification.
Quadrats were used to describe the composition of previously-
determined units, rather than as the basis of classification.
On the North American continent there had, up until then, been
few attempts to describe vegetation quantitatively, beyond crude
counting of the numbers of plants and species. The few American
ecologists who were quantitatively minded were environmetricians,
like Livingston and Shreve, concerned with measuring the physical
parameters of the plant habitat. American ecologists were not,
generally speaking, emulating the work being done on the continent
of Europe to develop statistical techniques for the characterisation
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of vegetation. (Such techniques were becoming an important part
of the methodology of both the Uppsala and Zurich-Montpelier schools)
One of the very few exceptions to this general pattern was S.A.
Forbes. Forbes had published a very early attempt at a quantitative
measure of species association as early as 1907, in the issue of the
Bulletin of the Illinois State Laboratory which contained Gleason's
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first ecological publication. Thus Forbes must have been engaged
on this statistical work at the same time as Gleason was making
his first quantitative assessments of species abundance. In the
twenties, Forbes*s work on measuring the "associational relations
of species" attracted some fresh interest and he again published in
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this field. But his method was designed chiefly for animal
populations and was technically quite different from Gleason's.
Gleason's statistical ecology was, as I have said, distinctive and
innovative.
Rare mathematical skills
Gleason had no formal training in mathematics beyond his
freshman year at Illinois, during which he was taught algebra and
trigonometry. But he was always greatly fascinated by numbers and
calculations. While an undergraduate he had become interested in
astronomy:-
"I had a book of spherical trigonometry which I had
never studied in school, and from it learned to do all
sorts of calculations such as the time of sunrise and
sunset. For several consecutive weeks I charted the
position of Mars against the fixed stars and from these
crude observations worked out the length of its year.
I missed the true figure by only a quarter of a day,
but that was just bad luck ... I had become acquainted
with Joel Stebbins, professor of astronomy, and used
to talk to him about my problems. One of them impressed
me as very simple, but I could not solve it. I saw a
star rising in the east and another setting in the west
and at that particular moment both were apparently the
same distance above the horizon. I knew what both
stars were and I could easily get their sidereal
positions from the Nautical Almanac. I thought that
such observations would be a good way to determine the
correct time, but I could not solve the equation.
This interest in figures persisted throughout his life:-
"Dr. Gleason had a strong mathematical bent, which
showed in many ways ... He belonged for many years to a
men's bridge club, which met on Sunday afternoons ...
They would play bridge for a couple of hours, take a
break for refreshments, and then play again for a couple
of hours. Dr. Gleason was not formally a teetotaler,
but he was abstemious, and he took nothing alcoholic
on these occasions. He and one other man ... were the
only ones in the party that did not indulge. Dr.
Gleason kept a cumulative record of the scores over
a period of years. He told me that during the first
session he and his non-drinking friend were just
average players, but that during the second session
they were marvelously good. "*^9
The younger of Gleason's two sons, Andrew Mattei Gleason, became
an eminent mathematician and is now a professor of mathematics at
Harvard. He very kindly provided me with the following assessment
of his father's interest and abilities in mathematics:-
"Dad was not well educated in Maths. There was no
question. I don't think he had ever taken a course in
calculus for example. He had a very good sense of
mathematics though, in a very over-the-table sort of
way. So much so that he was very good at mental arith¬
metic. I'll tell you an amusing thing - when we were
very little he had some games which we played which were
dependent on various purely mathematical arithmetic
tricks. One I remember particularly was that he would
invite one of the kids ... to write a three-digit
number down and he would thereupon immediately write
another three-digit number down next to it and say 'Here
take this away and divide it and you will see that it
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is divisible by 37'. He could do this with respect to
several different divisors. I got very curious as to
how he did this and it wasn't until I was about fourteen
that I figured out how it was done. I don't know how
he found out how to do this. From the point of view
of a professional mathematician it is very simple but
he found this out himself. There is no question that
he just observed how to do this and figured out how it
worked. And he could do it for several different
integers as divisors - the same kind of trick. Well
that was one of the various things - but then he had a
number of ... little funny stories which he told ...
and illustrated with numbers ... He had worked these
problems ... up just because he liked to do this sort
of thing. He had no real mathematical education,
certainly knew nothing like as much mathematics as many
freshmen. On the other hand, he was quantitatively
oriented. There is no question about that. He was
quantitatively oriented to the point that he used to -
regularly - walking to the railroad station, he would
clock himself from the back steps to such and such a
telephone pole and see if he was ahead or behind his
usual time - that sort of thing. He was very'conscious
of very detailed, quantitative thoughts about what
was going on, about everything."250
Professor Gleason can offer no explanation for his father's interest
in quantification - save that Henry Allan's own father, Henry Milton
Gleason, was also interested in numbers and calculating. Despite
never having been at college, he taught Henry Allan to use logarithms.
Henry Allan Gleason's interest in mathematics is perhaps best
thought as being simply a matter of personality. However, given that
Gleason possessed such skills and interests, it is not surprising
that he sought to utilise them in his professional work - to count
plants and to perform statistical operations upon the data, especially
since, as we have seen, with the work of Forbes and Kofoid, quanti¬
fication had been part of the practice of ecological investigation
in the institution at which Gleason was trained.
Although Gleason was naturally an able mathematician, he was
not a technically accomplished one. He obtained the formula that
bears his name (equation 1 above) by trial and error. He was unable
to derive the equation formally
"I wanted to discover the relation between the number
of individual plants and the Frequency Index ... I
need only say that I had a hard time doing it. It
went easily enough for a few plants distributed over
just a few quadrats. I could solve such problems on a
piece of paper. For more plants or more quadrats I
borrowed a big computing machine ... which could handle
numbers up to twenty figures long. For a lot of plants
or a lot of quadrats, I was still completely baffled.
At last I stumbled by chance on a way to extrapolate my
figures for a given number of plants or quadrats to
the next higher number above. Now the computing machine
could be used again for a time, but as the numbers grew
larger I was stuck once more. Also in some unknown
way I lost my formula and several years went by before
I rediscovered it. In the meantime I had found an
algebraic formula which could be worked easily,
regardless of the number of plants or quadrats, merely
with the help of a table of logarithms. How I ever
discovered it is a mystery to me now, but I could test
it out on smaller numbers and see that it worked ...
Unfortunately I could not prove my formula and in my
printed article I merely stated it, leaving people to
think (so I hoped) that it was a very simple matter
that every schoolboy and of course every ecologist
ought to know.
Gleason's Formula is, however, not difficult to derive from first
principles. The task would not be far beyond a talented schoolboy
mathematician. Gleason's son, Andrew, solved the problem in a few
minutes, while a college freshman. Gleason's equation for the
relationship between area and number of species (equation 3 above)
was likewise arrived at entirely empirically.
Clearly, under these laborious conditions of work, Gleason's
potential in mathematical ecology was necessarily limited. The
mathematical exposition in his 1920 paper is cumbersome and difficult
to follow. The notation is confusing. I mean by these remarks no
disparagement. His contributions were certainly original and
pioneering. His quantitative work shows a fine grasp of statistical
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problems and underlying principles. But it must be seen in
perspective. Gleason was not the man to transform ecology into
a predominantly quantitative or mathematical discipline - even if
this had been his desire. And there is no evidence that it was.
Gleason was not possessed by a reforming zeal for the introduction of
quantitative techniques into ecology - such as possessed many
253
ecologists from the nineteen-fifties onwards. Gleason had, on
this point at least, no fundamental quarrel with the established
modes of work - of which he was a skilled practitioner. He considered
his quantitative work important but his advocacy of quantification
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was mild. Gleasonian statistical ecology was a complement to
observational and descriptive methods. It was not an explicit
challenge to orthodox techniques in a way that, for instance,
experimental taxonomy or biosystematics was a challenge to herbarium
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taxonomy.
In the nineteen-twenties most of Gleason's colleagues were
markedly less quantitatively minded or skilled than he was. David
Goodall's comprehensive (but probably not quite complete) bibliography
of statistical plant sociology lists only thirty-one papers published
256
in America before 1940. The vast majority of these were concerned
with the testing of techniques empirically in the field; very few
were concerned with developing new statistical tools in the manner
demonstrated by Gleason. The few who did take up the example of
his work were likewise handicapped by technical limitations:-
"Two people in California tried in vain to solve it
[Gleason's Formula] and they set up an elaborate
apparatus to scatter small counters representing
plants over a grid of squares representing quadrats.
When they got through with this empirical test, they
wrote 'Having established the truth of Gleason's
Formula ... ' and went ahead with their work on actual
plants. "^7
It was many years yet before circumstances were such as to bring
about the large-scale introduction of mathematical techniques into
ecology.
Much of the historical interpretation I offer in this chapter is
predicated upon the observation that cognitive innovation tends to
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be structured by previously acquired skills and commitments.
For example, we have seen that, when called upon to do animal ecology,
Gleason produced an important innovation by applying within a
zoological context the techniques for the analysis of succession
which he had acquired in the course of his earlier botanical work.
I also sought to understand the development of his ecological
perspective in terms of his applying within the context of his
ecological research, skills developed in the course of his training
in floristics. Likewise his mathematical skills and aptitude found
expression within his ecological work.
However it is not only at the level of the individual that
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innovation is so structured. The adoption of a new idea or technique
by a specialty as a whole, or by significant sub-groups within it,
is often dependent on the proposed innovation being perceived as
allowing the utilisation of skills already held by the specialty's
members. Thus Cowles's physiographic exemplar was widely and
readily adopted, partly at least because, in applying it, ecologists
or would-be ecologists, were able to get further mileage out of
skills they already possessed. Gleason's mathematical innovations,
however, suffered precisely the opposite fate. They were not
generally adopted because ecologists in the 1920s lacked the
necessary interest in quantification and were not sufficiently
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mathematically sophisticated.
From our present point of view, however, the interest of Gleason's
mathematical ecology lies in the fact that it expressed Gleason's
concept of the nature of vegetation. Firstly note that his statistics,
like every other aspect of his ecological investigations, were based
solely upon species as the objects of analysis. He attempted no
statistical description of the plant community in terms of physio¬
gnomic types, of growth-forms, or any other non-floristic feature.
Furthermore, Gleason maintained that the species, within any
given stand of vegetation, were distributed uniformly - that is, in
Gleason's terms, at random. All his statistical procedures were
predicated upon this assumption. He acknowledged that the environ¬
mental control of the dominant species affected the species composition
of the underlayers but not, he argued, sufficiently strongly or
precisely to produce detectable departures from random, within any
single association. In other words, plants do not occur in co-evolved
groups, each plant uniquely adapted to live with its fellow
members of the co-evolved group. There is little supra-individual
patterning within the plant community. For instance, Gleason offered
no mechanism to explain why the distribution of species obeyed his
species/area formula (equation 3 above). No such mechanism was held
to apply. Species distribution was simply a matter of probability,
not the result of biologically meaningful 'community functions', to
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use Clements's term, or 'organizing factors', to use Tansley's.
Such uniformity was only relative however. On a larger scale,
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all was variation. A single small stand might be uniform. But
no two isolated examples of the same sort of vegetation were identical.
Large associations changed gradually throughout their extent.
Gleason's investigations into the statistics of species distribution
all served to illustrate this, to Gleason, fundamental feature of
vegetation. He developed statistical tests, the purpose of which
was to highlight the spatial variation of species composition -
in other words to demonstrate objectively the tenets of the
individualistic hypothesis.
One might say that Gleason's arguments for the existence of
small-scale uniformity undermined the possibility of small, co-
adapted units, units on the scale of the Continental European
association; on the other hand, his statistical expression of large
range variation undermined the possibility of large co-adapted units,
units on the scale of the American association or formation. In
other words, all his mathematical investigations expressed and
supported his individualistic concept of the plant association.
His floristic interests and his ecological theories structured the
form in which his natural aptitude for mathematics found expression.
The vegetational history of the middle West
While at the Botanical Garden, Gleason published several papers
on plant geography - both floristic and ecological. The most
important of this series of papers was published in 1923. It was
-I
entitled "The Vegetational History of the Middle West". An
earlier version had been written while Gleason was at Michigan but
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he had experienced some trouble in getting it published.
Eventually, on the recommendations of Cowles and Transeau, it was
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accepted for the Annals of the Association of American Geographers.
The paper is interesting for in it Gleason combined the dynamic
viewpoint of physiographic ecology with the longer historical
perspective afforded by floristic phytogeography. Gleason's vegetational
history drew, thus, upon both his ecological and his floristic skills.
The combination well illustrates the amphibious nature of Gleason's
research interests.
European floristic phytogeographers had long been interested
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in elucidating the history of present-day plant distribution - by
locating the geographical point of origin of species, genera and
flora and following their subsequent migrations. In the 1900s,
as we have seen, C.C. Adams introduced this European historical
perspective into the investigation of the flora and fauna of the
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Middle West. But his example had not led to much further work -
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until it was taken up by Gleason. In the 1923 paper Gleason
applied Adams's historical model and sought further to improve
historical phytogeography by incorporating within it an ecologist's
understanding of such matters as succession, associational migration,
the environmental requirements of species, the continuity of habitats,
and the significance of relic plant communities. And returning to
matters he had first discussed in his Master's thesis, Gleason sought
to demonstrate that light could also be shed in the opposite direction
- the ecologists' understanding of vegetation could be enhanced by
a consideration of floristics and floristic history.
Previous attempts at interpreting the history of vegetation in
the United States had been based upon backward extrapolations of
present-day successions, and, in Clements's case, upon the recon-
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structions of the climates of the past. From Gleason's point of
view, the former technique could only give a partial picture of the
history of vegetation, since the displacement of one climatic climax
by another might bear little similarity to physiographic succession
- even assuming present-day successions could be reliably extra¬
polated backward in this way. (Gleason had already argued they could
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not.) Clements's study of climatic changes also seemed to be
limited in that it was based almost entirely upon the evidence
provided by the physiognomic types of fossil plants and upon a
cyclical theory of climatic change. Gleason however sought to
extrapolate the dynamic viewpoint into the history of vegetation,
not simply in terms of present-day successions, climatic changes or
fossil physiognomies, but by incorporating what was known or could
be deduced about the migration and evolution of species and
floristic elements.
Drawing upon both his ecological and his floristic skills,
Gleason was thus able to provide simultaneously a history of the
floristic elements and of the vegetation-types of the Middle West.
His combination of ecology and historical phytogeography was
remarkably fruitful. He mustered evidence from both fields with
great skill and constructed a grand and plausible vision of vegetation-
types advancing and retreating over the plains as climatic and
topographic changes occurred. His most notable success lay in the
postulation of a xerothermic - mild and dry - climate, existing in
the Middle West immediately after the Wisconsin period of glaciation.
This had been accompanied by a large eastward extension of the
prairie, Gleason argued. The existence of such a xerothermic period
was intensely controversial for some time, but was later corroborated
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by fossil palynology.
Given the paper's great originality, it is -perhaps not altogether
surprising that Gleason initially had difficulties in getting it
published. American phytogeographers had not followed Adams's
advice to introduce the historical perspective into the subject. And
American ecologists had been antipathetic toward floristic studies,
for as long as there had been ecologists in America. As Raup put it:-
"A striking corollary to the development of physio¬
logical plant geography has been its antipathy toward
floristic ideas. This has been particularly true in
America ... Floristic geography was regarded as
primitive and outmoded useful only for the mass of
facts it accumulated."269
Shreve, for instance, maintained that:-
"The physiological phase of the study of the plant
life of particular areas, Ecological Plant Geography,
is not at all concerned with the systematic relation¬
ships of plants but rather with their form, structure,
and functions, and the relation which these have to
the physical and organic environment of the
individuals."270
Arguing from a somewhat different perspective, Cowles likewise
regarded orthodox taxonomy practice as being of only secondary
importance:-
"No one realizes so well as does the ecologist the
inadequacy of laboratory experimentation in the
settlement of field problems. The ecologist feels
that the species problem is essentially a field problem
and hence incapable of final settlement either in the
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herbarium or the laboratory ... One of the noblest aims
of ecology is the destruction of many of the species of
our manuals. Where the critical study of species is
confined to the herbarium, it often happens that
ecological varieties or habitat forms are given specific
rank.
Cowles concluded
"It is to be hoped that the taxonomists and particularly
those taxonomists who have sinned in the much making of
species and those who made a so-called critical study of
plants without any adequate training in the general
principles of botany, will reform their ways. In truth
they must reform ... Taxonomy must be scientific. It
must require for its devotees a training as rigid as
that required by professional workers in morphology,
physiology or ecology ... If the taxonomists of the
future fail in these respects a hard but certain fate
awaits them. The world of morphologists, physiologists
and ecologists has borne with them patiently and long
and has deferentially abided by the specific determinations
of taxonomists ... These things will not be endured much
longer; a little more and the sinning'taxonomists will
be "cast out into the outer darkness where there shall
be wailing and gnashing of teeth"."272
As we saw in the previous chapter, Clements also had a low opinion
of the usefulness of floristic botany as then practised in North
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America.
Gleason was thus one of the very few botanists who took both
ecology and floristics seriously. This dual commitment had a
formative influence on his interpretation of vegetation. The fact,
that he had a foot in more than one botanical camp explains much of
the content of Gleason's work. It also helps elucidate the reception
of some of Gleason's work by his colleagues. As far as the publication
of his "Vegetational History of the Middle West" is concerned, one
might say that having a foot in both camps almost caused him to fall
between two stools.
The individualistic concept revisited
During the nineteen-twenties Gleason's duties at the Garden did
not prevent him undertaking further ecological field research. In
192A he investigated the composition and successional relations of
some of the few tracts of virgin deciduous forest left in the
northern part of the Lower Peninsula of Michigan. The results of
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the study, with general remarks on the structure of the maple-beech
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association, were published the following year.
And in 1925, at the instigation of Melville Cook, a plant
pathologist employed at the Insular Experiment Station in Puerto
Rico, Gleason was invited by the Puerto Rican authorities to undertake
an ecological survey of the island. Gleason spent three months there
in 1926, on paid leave from the Garden. This greatly increased his
acquaintance with exotic vegetation, The report, with Cook as
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co-author, appeared early in 1927. This visit to Puerto Rico was
however to be Gleason's last major ecological field trip.
Undoubtedly the most important piece of ecological work that
Gleason produced in the Twenties was a re-expression and amplifi¬
cation of his individualistic concept of the plant association. This
y-rCL
was published in 1926. In the introduction to this article Gleason
pointed to the continuing failure of ecological investigators, on
both sides of the Atlantic, to achieve any general agreement as to
the fundamental nature and classification of plant associations.
Such chronic disagreement "leads one", Gleason wrote, "to the
suspicion that possibly many of them are somewhat mistaken in their
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concepts or are attacking the problem from the wrong angle".
Gleason made it explicit that his quarrel was not only with Clements.
He invited all plant ecologists to abandon their "pre-conceived
ideas" as to the nature of the plant community:-
"
... we may conclude that we would better demolish
our whole system of arrangement and classification and
start anew with better hope of success ... Is it not
conceivable that, as the study of plant associations
has progressed from its originally simple condition into
its present highly organized and complex state, we have
attempted to arrange all our facts in accordance with
older ideas, and have come as a result into a tangle of
conflicting ideas and theories?"^
Gleason was thus posing a radical challenge to the basis of contemporary
practice in the study of plant communities.
Gleason acknowledged that plant associations existed and might
be recognised on the ground. The ecologist in the field frequently
came across areas of vegetation which were uniform, to the extent
that any two small subdivisions of the vegetation appeared quite
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similar. Such areas were conventionally designated 'associations':-
"
... but different ecologists may disagree on a
number of matters connected with such an apparently
simple condition. More careful examination of one of
these areas, especially when conducted by some
statistical method, will show that the uniformity is
only a matter of degree, and that two sample quadrats
with precisely the same structure can scarcely be
discovered. Consequently an area of vegetation which
one ecologist regards as a single association may by
another be considered as a mosaic or mixture of several, „q
depending on their individual differences in definition."
There was no general agreement among ecologists as to how much
variation ought to be included within a single association.
Gleason admitted that, in northern latitudes, a technique of
delimitation based on the identification of character-species -
species or sets of species limited to single associations - had had
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some success. But the success of this technique, Gleason claimed,
was dependent upon the flora of these regions being especially
impoverished. In other areas such a system would not necessarily
be efficacious. Here Gleason drew on his experience of vegetation
outwith the United States:-
"
... in many parts of the tropics, where diversity
of environment has been reduced to a minimum by the
practical completion of most physiographic processes
and ... where the flora is extraordinarily rich in
species, such a procedure is impracticable or even
impossible. Where a single hectare may contain a
hundred species of trees, not one of which can be
found in an adjacent hectare, where a hundred quadrats
may never exhibit the same herbaceous species twice,
it is obvious that the method of characteristic species
is difficult or impracticable." ^81
This account of the floristic richness of the tropical forest mirrors
quite closely his description of the Makiling forest, quoted earlier.
Gleason was thus the first, as far as I am aware, of a series of
investigators who were to argue, most vocally in the late fifties,
that the concept of the plant association would not have arisen if
tropical rather than temperate vegetation had been the first to
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be studied. Doubtless Gleason's trip to the tropics helped nurture
and sustain his confidence in his individualistic view.
Gleason argued that the floristic aspects of the vegetation did
not allow the universal identification of precise associational
boundaries. Nor could the features of the physical environment
provide the basis for a foolproof definition of the association.
Different environments supported similar communities; similar
environments, different ones. All in all, it must be concluded
that associations were not necessarily delimited by distinct natural
boundaries.
Gleason then introduced the argument that was to attract most
attention in the post-war years. He argued that associations did
not repeat themselves exactly but rather that vegetation consisted
of a continuum of variation
"A great deal has been said of the repetition of
associations on different stations over a considerable
area. This phenomenon is striking indeed, and upon
it depend our numerous attempts to classify associations
into larger groups. In a region of numerous glacial
lakes, as in parts of our northeastern states, we find
lake after lake surrounded by apparently the same
communities, each of them with essentially the same
array of species in the same numerical proportions ...
But even this idea, if carried too far afield, is
found to be far from universal. If our study of glacial
lakes is extended to a long series, stretching from
Maine past the Great Lakes and far west into
Saskatchewan, a very gradual but nevertheless apparent
geographical diversity becomes evident so that the
westernmost and easternmost members of the series ...
are so different floristically that they would scarcely
be regarded as members of the same association.
Similarly, along the floodplain of the Mississippi, the forest seems
constant in composition for mile upon mile. But as:-
"
... the observer continues his studies further
downstream, additional species very gradually appear,
and many of the original ones likewise very gradually
disappear. In any short distance these differences
are so minute as to be negligible, but they are
cumulative and result in an almost complete change
in the flora after several hundred miles. No ecologist
would refer the alluvial forests of the upper and
lower Mississippi to the same associations, yet there
is no place along their whole range where one can
logically mark the boundary between them. One
association merges gradually into the next without
any apparent transition zone.
Ecologists, who necessarily tended to limit their field research
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to relatively small study areas, seldom recognised such continuous
variation in space. But, Gleason argued, it was a universal feature
of vegetation. Simple statistical analysis would corroborate that
isolated associations did not repeat themselves exactly and
contiguous associations might grade into one another over long
distances.
Gleason then rehearsed and amplified the arguments, first
expressed in 1917, that, provided the theoretical underpinning for
his rejection of the community-unit theory. No two plants were
physiologically identical. Groups of species happened to grow
together only because their physiological requirements happen to
coincide to the extent of allowing them to utilise a particular
place at a particular time. Such joint utilisation was also
dependent upon the individualistic vicissitudes of migration.
The concern of the physiographic ecologists with the study of
development had led many to classify successional stages together
into unit-successions or series. Thus, a regular series of success¬
ional stages were held to lead through to a particular pre-determined
end point. But Gleason argued that succession, like all other
community phenomena, is dependent on the behaviour of the individual
plants, and upon pure chance. The various stages in a successional
series need not follow one another in a fixed sequence:-
"The next vegetation will depend entirely on the
nature of the immigration which takes place in the
particular period when environmental changes reaches
the critical stage. Who can predict the future for
any of the little ponds considered above? In one, as
the bottom silts up, the chance migration of willow
seeds will produce a willow thicket, in a second a
thicket of Cephalanthus may develop, while a third,
which happens to get no shrubby immigrants, may be
converted into a miniature meadow of Calamagrostis
canadensis."885
No integrative processes operate at the level of the community:-
"The plant individual shows no physiological
response to geographical location or to surrounding
vegetation per se ... "286
Every species of plant was best thought of as a law unto itself. The
behaviour of plant species provided no basis for the segregation of
definite communities:-
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"It is small wonder that there is conflict and
confusion in the definition and classification of
plant communities. Surely our belief in the integrity
of the association and the sanctity of the association-
concept must be severely shaken. Are we not justified
in coming to the general conclusion ... that an
association is not an organism, scarcely even a
vegetational unit, but merely a co-incidence?"287
Why the individualistic concept?
In order to appreciate fully the implication of Gleason's apostasy
over the reality of the vegetation-units, one must be aware of how
deeply the community-unit theory was embedded in the practice of
American ecology. The assumption that vegetation has a unit structure
is, for example, quite explicit in Clements's work:-
"The developmental study of vegetation necessarily
rests upon the assumption that the unit of climax
formation is an organic entity."288
To take a further example, in the major textbook Clements wrote with
Weaver we find the following:-
"Vegetation, like all organisms, not only undergoes
development but also possesses structure. The vegetation
of a continent, such as North America, is not uniform
throughout. Depending upon climate, it is differentiated
into large natural units such as forest, chaparral,
grassland, tundra, etc. The composition or structure
of each type differs from the others. Each of these
larger units of vegetation is called a plant formation."
Even Cooper, who frequently emphasised the changeability and
variability of vegetation and who differed markedly from Clements
as to the level of integration with which the community-units
should be credited, likewise saw the unit of vegetation as the
essential basis of ecological study:-
"It seems to me that plant communities exist, that
they are definable and comparable and therefore
constitute a legitimate field of study. Naturally they
are not so sharply defined as individual organisms and
I cannot follow Clements and his disciples in considering
them as strictly comparable. Doubtless tropical
communities are even less distinct than those of
temperate regions but I feel strongly that they exist."
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The identification of natural units of vegetation was a central
component of the practice of most American ecologists. As Stanley-
Cain put it:-
"For them [plant ecologists and geographers] it is the
sine qua non of their science."^
As well as providing ecologists with practical tasks to do in
the field and at their desks, the community-unit theory constituted
an autonomous reality - of vegetation per se - for the would-be
autonomous discipline of ecology to investigate. Study of the
vegetation at the level of the community-unit had been a distinctive
feature of ecological botany since its beginnings within Humboldtian
science. The community-unit theory defined a unique and peculiar
field for ecological study - thus helping to distinguish ecology from
other branches of botany, and to re-inforcing its claim to be a
discipline in its own right.
Why then did Gleason, although a dedicated ecological investigator,
choose to view the plant association in an altogether different
manner? I would argue that part of the explanation lies in his twin
commitment to floristic botany. Gleason, as we have seen, straddled
the important professional divide between ecology and taxonomy. The
doing of ecological research was not his entire professional life
as a botanist. Therefore the establishment of a uniquely ecological
form of inquiry to emphasise the distinctive nature of the ecological
specialty was not such an important matter to him as it was to
botanists committed solely to ecology. To Gleason, therefore, it
was not so essential emphatically to separate the two research
activities. Therefore it is understandable that he should have had a
lesser commitment to the community-unit theory - and therefore been
prepared to countenance alternatives to it.
The appeal of possible alternatives was, no doubt, increased
by the fact that the majority of Gleason's fellow ecologists generally
disparaged the floristic aspects of botany in the course of their
employment of the community-unit theory. American ecologists
generally sought to associate themselves with the New Botany, as
exemplified by physiology and morphology. Floristics was to them
part of the old Botany - from which they wished to distinguish
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themselves. Thus Clements and Cowles laboured to reform taxonomy in
the light of ecological principles and to establish the superior
knowledge claims of ecology. The employment of a classification
system based on a unit unique to ecology - the supra-individual
community-unit - aided these claims. The autonomous ecological form
of inquiry investigated an autonomous reality consisting of vegetation
per se rather than simply individual plants and their species - the
subjects of floristic study. As made explicit by Clements and Nichols
floristic criteria were to be of secondary importance, at least in
theory, in the determination of natural units of vegetation.
Distinctively ecological, that is habitat, criteria were to be
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employed to identify the distinctively ecological unit.
Gleason, however, was an extremely skilled taxonomic botanist.
He had had considerable experience in floristic botany before he
began his ecological research. Given these investments of skill and
training, it is not surprising that throughout his career he placed-a
much higher value on floristic study than did the majority of his
fellow ecologists. Gleason, with considerable and continuing pro¬
fessional investment in both floristics and ecology, did not seek
to separate the two or denigrate the importance of the former.
On the contrary, he emphasised the importance of floristic background
for ecologists:-
"I appeared on its [the Michigan Biological Station]
staff in 1911 ... Again my previous experience was
greatly to my advantage. I had learned the northern
plants during my summer in Isle Royale ... and for the
first time in its three years the station had a
botanist who knew the flora in advance. It must have
been a great strain on Burns who taught there in 1909,
and on Pool, of 1910, to teach ecology without knowing
the species and the students must have discovered the
circumstances very promptly."293
And he also argued for the utility of ecology for floristics as evidenced
both by his "Vegetational History of the Middle West" and by his
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study of the evolution and distribution of the Vernonia.
Given Gleason's commitment to floristics it is not surprising
that he, contra Clements and Nichols, emphasised species composition
as the most fundamental feature of plant communities. All the non-
floristic characteristics such as physiognomy were secondary, as
far as Gleason was concerned. They were the product of the species
composition - not independent features of the vegetation. Therefore
uniformity of physiognomy could never be accepted by Gleason as
proof of the underlying unity of any two pieces of vegetation if
their species compositions were disparate. He also rejected the
physiognomic synusiae theory of the Estonian botanist Lippma which
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had briefly had some following in the United States. Likewise
the study of the characteristics of the physical environment could
not by itself be a primary means toward an understanding of
vegetation. We have seen that Gleason expressed this point of view
in his criticism both of Clements's classification of vegetation
by habitat and of Fuller's evaporation theory of the cause of plant
succession.
A floristic approach entailed giving primacy to the study of
the individual plants and their species. This was the essence of
the individualistic concept. All the phenomena of vegetation were
dependent on the individual plant. The autonomous unit of vegetation
on which most ecological practice was based, did not exist. Plants,
not plant communities, were the legitimate level of inquiry. Thus,
Gleason's commitment to a floristic form of botanical practice must
be taken as part of the explanation for his development of the
individualistic concept of the plant association.
Gleason had special skills which enabled him to undertake
ecological investigation at the level of the individual plant species
readily and successfully. Not only was he well trained in the
identification and classification of plants, he was also extremely
good at the difficult task of finding rare species in the field.
Gleason's elder son, Henry Allan Jnr., trained as a professional
botanist and he took a keen interest in his father's work. Professor
Gleason was kind enough to provide me with the following assessment
of his father's field skills:-
"He was a meticulously careful observer. He saw things
that experienced field workers passed. In 1933 he and I
spent a summer collecting around the University of
Michigan Biological Station. At that time that was,
without question, the area that was floristically best
known in all of North America. Gates was teaching
ecology there, from Michigan, and had taught systematic
botany there for years and years - a very careful field
worker and he had just combed that place and it had got
to the point where they were finding two or three new
species a year and that was it. Well we found a couple
of dozen ... The one that I think upset them more than
anything else was - Nuphar advena the common yellow
water lily, it grows all over there, they came across
it all the time ... We just got to looking inside it
and we found - right on Douglas Lake - the lake that
they went on all the time - we found Nuphar rubrodiscum.
At a distance the things look exactly alike but when
you look inside the big disc at the top of the stigma is
red instead of yellow. And so it went ... We looked
at plants more closely than people had looked at them
... that was one of his peculiarities ... that kind of
observation."296
Thus Gleason's advocacy of a floristic, individualistic approach
to vegetation correlated with his possession of all the various
skills of a first-rate floristic field botanist - whose practice was
necessarily based upon the individual plant and its species.
However, by arguing that Gleason held a fundamentally floristic
view of vegetation, I do not mean to disparage his understanding of
the dynamic processes of vegetation. Gleason's published work
clearly illustrates that his approach to vegetation was as dynamic
and comprehensive as either Clements's or Cowles's. To Gleason, the
floristic study of plant communities was not an end in itself
"I used to tell my students flatly that the plants
they got acquainted with in taxonomy might never be seen
again, unless they lived or taught school in this same
north country; that the plant associations to which I
introduced them in ecology were also northern. I wanted
them to learn how to recognize an association, how to
write a clear and reasonable description of it, how to
discover its successional relation to neighboring
associations, and so on. If they developed that skill,
then they could do ecological work anywhere."297
But, to Gleason, dynamic properties of vegetation, such as
successional change, were the product of the action of individual
plants - not attributes of the plant community as a collective entity.
Thus general principles governing the behaviour of vegetation as a
whole could only be discerned by investigation at the level of the
individual plants. Studies of migration, of spatial and temporal
variations in species composition, and other individualistic features
were not, as I have said, ends in themselves - but they were the
primary means whereby Gleason sought to investigate and understand
vegetation.
Gleason's commitment to floristic botany structured his ecological
practice - in such a way that his floristic competences could be
maximally utilised within his ecological investigations. And the
individualistic concept of the plant association provided a theoretical
legitimation of the practical connection Gleason wished to make
between floristics and ecology. The individualistic concept created
a formal cognitive framework for ecology, within which floristic
skills were necessarily to be allowed full expression. It sanctioned
the primary role which Gleason granted floristics in the making of
valid ecological knowledge. It entailed that no other form of
expertise, whether physiological, geomorphological or physical, could
take precedence over the expertise possessed by the floristic botanist.
The floristic character of Gleason's individualistic concept of
the plant, association exemplifies a pattern of cognitive construction,
well known to sociologists of science. Pre-existing competences and
practices are brought to bear on new problems - thus structuring
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cognitive innovation around prior investments of skill and training.
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As Gleason put it:- "My first research was in taxonomy." This
early training in taxonomy structured his approach to ecological
processes and phenomena. Such a perspective was maintained by his
continued involvement in floristic research.
Gleason's distinction from other 'individualistic' ecologists
That Gleason's perspective on vegetation was at least partly the
product of his background in floristic botany helps us also to
understand how and why he differed from some other contemporary
botanists - in particular those who recently have also been identified
as having had individualistic views. For instance, Mcintosh and
Billings have drawn attention to apparently Gleason-like individual¬
istic statements made by the physiological ecologists, Livingston
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and Shreve. Certainly these ecologists stressed, as Gleason did,
that vegetation ought to be approached in terms of its individual
component plants:-
"
... we have tried to bear constantly in mind the
conception that vegetational characters are simply the
expressions of the activities of individual plants."^1
They did not admit the possibility of 'special laws' of 'mass action
Furthermore, Livingston and Shreve argued that no two plant
species were quite identical in their habitat requirement, and hence
no two plant species had identical patterns of distribution. As
Shreve had written in 1914:-
"It is impossible to study the distribution of
vegetation in a region where pronounced differences may
be found within short distances without being impressed
with the independence which each species exhibits in
its allocation ... It is nowhere possible to pick out
a group of plants which may be thought of as associates
without being able to find other localities in which
the association has been dissolved ... The physical
requirements of plants are so varied and so elastic
that the composition of a series of communities
occupying similar habitats in widely separated places
shows the constant overlapping of the ranges of
individual species which is due to the physiological
inequivalence of these species."3®
However, as well as these striking similarities there are also
important differences to be detected between Shreve and Livingston
on the one hand, and Gleason on the other. For instance, Shreve
and Livingston had little sympathy with the aims of floristic botany
"The study of vegetation as such has been, on the
whole, greatly obscured by the fact that it has never
been completely divorced from the study of the flora.
Too much emphasis cannot be laid, at the present time,
on the radical distinctness of the work of physiological
plant geography, on the one hand, which attempts to
relate the occurrence and distribution of species as
physiological entities, to the factors of environment,
and the work of floristic plant geography, or phyto-
geography, on the other hand - which attempts to reveal
the geological history, the movements, and vicissitudes
of species as phylogenetic entities. The floristic
flavor which plant geography and ecology have always
possessed may be largely accounted for by the fact that
all plant-geographical interest has sprung historically
out of floristics, and by the fact that we are in the
position of not being able to mention a plant of
particular identity without using its technical Latin
name, which is solely an abbreviated expression for
denoting the place we believe it to occupy in the
phylogenetic scheme ... Nevertheless, in order to come
squarely to face with the problems of physiological
plant geography, we shall have to lay aside much that
floristics has taught us, and shall have to ignore
phylogeny, except in so far as it shows us that plants
of close kinship often have the same or similar
anatomical and physiological characteristics."704
Livingston and Shreve were thus dismissive of research practices
which were, as we have seen, extremely important to Gleason. They
did not share the interests which shaped the "Vegetational History
of the Middle West". The difference in attitudes to floristic
botany correlates with the fact that neither Shreve nor Livingston
had any particular training or experience in taxonomic or floristic
botany. Livingston did gather together a small private herbarium
while at high school but, as he put it:-
"I never received any instruction in systematic or
taxonomic botany anywhere except in the half-year course
in high school.
However, as an undergraduate at Illinois, Livingston had had an
extensive training in physiology. This was before he developed a
professional research interest in ecology:-
"
... I asked Prof. F.C. Newcombe to let me take his
lectures in plant physiology, omitting the laboratory
work, but he said that would be only a half-year course
and it would do me no harm to know a bit about
physiological experimentation; furthermore, he would
predict that after I had completed that laboratory
course I would find physiology more interesting than
any other field of botany. How he reached that
prediction I can't tell, but I became his laboratory
assistant the next year, and have stuck to physiology
ever since. Newcombe was not interested in ecology,
which was then just getting started under the leadership
of Warming and Schimper. Their books were not available
to me till I went to the University of Chicago in the
summer of 1897. I was a confirmed enthusiast for
physiology by then."707
Livingston therefore came into ecology with an established
interest in physiology rather than in floristic botany. It is not
surprising therefore that his approach to ecological problems was a
physiological one:-
"Our attitude towards plants has been that of the
physiologist ... "708
This entailed an individualistic viewpoint in the sense that the
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distribution of plants was correlated with each plant's distinctive
physiological capabilities, as demonstrated by experiment in the
laboratory, or inferred by observation in the field. The distribution
of vegetation was, to Livingston and Shreve, the product of the
distribution patterns of the individual plants. The fundamental
rationale behind this physiological approach lies in the premise that
the majority of plants have their distribution controlled directly
by the physical environment:-
"The great bulk of the trees, shrubs, grasses,
root-perennials, and other plants which make up the
dominant natural vegetation of the world may safely be
held to have had their present distributional limits
imposed by physical factors which are either now
operative or were operative in very recent time."309
The identification of which physical factor controlled the distribution
of which species was the principal research goal to which Livingston
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and Shreve's activities were directed.
Such concern with the physical environment led Livingston and
Shreve to place rather less emphasis than some of their contemporaries
upon vegetational dynamics. There is, for instance, no discussion of
succession whatsoever in Shreve's book-length study of the vegetation
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of the Santa Catilina mountains of southeastern Arizona. Plant
succession was not a very interesting topic since it shed little
light on the mechanisms of environmental control:-
"As soon as we begin to study the relation of physical
conditions to successional stages, the relation of these
stages to each other sinks to a position of minor
importance, and our work emerges upon the broad field
of causational plant geography."312
Shreve, in his study of the montane rain forest of Jamaica, similarly
argued that processes of succession were important only as they were
reducible to the effect of the physical environment:-
"Any successional phenomena which might be discoverable
in the montane rain-forests, whether due to such physio¬
graphic change as the merging of a maturing ravine into
its mother slope or to such climatic change as would
cause a relict alpine meadow to be invaded by forest,
would in any case resolve themselves into a matter of
the gradual change of vegetation in dependence upon a
gradual change of physical environment. The relation
of the old vegetation to its environmental conditions,
and the relation of the succeeding vegetation to its
environmental complex are both matters that would far
outweigh in importance the floristic and ecological
features of the succession itself."
In the atmometer work discussed earlier we saw another attempt to
interpret succession not in vegetational but in physical terms.
But Gleason was unlikely to accept this subordination of
vegetational dynamics to physiology. Much of his field practice
consisted of attempting to explain vegetational change in 'floristic
and ecological' terms. And his individualistic concept did not
diminish the importance of processes such as succession. In 1927,
he published a major theoretical paper on the 'succession concept' -
in which he elaborated how successional change could be understood
in the light of the individualistic concept and indicated the
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advantages to be gained from this re-interpretation.
Gleason sought to understand vegetational dynamics in individual
istic terms. But the centrality of vegetational change within the
research programme of dynamic ecology would not be thereby altered.
The study of succession as a vegetational process was still an
important element of practice. Gleason's individualistic concept of
the plant association therefore functioned, broadly speaking, within
the general context of physiographic ecology. Livingston's and
Shreve's physiological individualism was, on the other hand, outwith
that context. It belonged to physiological ecology - the other great
division of early American plant ecology. In this research programme
vegetational processes were not themselves explanatory categories,
nor were they the primary objects of field research. 'Floristic and
ecological features' were to be reduced to the more fundamental (from
this point of view) explanatory level of physical and physiological
variables.
Given these differences between physiographic and physiological
plant ecology, together with the more specific, but just as
significant, divergence in attitude between Gleason on the one hand,
and Livingston and Shreve on the other, as to the importance of
floristic botany, it is not altogether surprising that Gleason,
Shreve and Livingston never made common cause. Nor is it surprising
that the apparent similarities between their 'individualistic'
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theories were not recognised by their contemporaries.
The Ithaca Conference, 1926
The fact that Gleason's practice lay nearer physiographic than
physiological ecology did not however entail the general acceptance
of his work by the physiographic ecologists. His ideas certainly
belonged to physiographic ecology, but they were controversial within
that context.
The publication of Gleason's second (1926) paper on his individual¬
istic concept caused an immediate reaction among ecologists. An entire
half-day session of the Ecology Section of the International Congress
of Plant Sciences was set aside in order to discuss it. The Congress
met in August 1926. Nichols, who was then Chairman of the Ecology
Section, took the opportunity to present a paper detailing his
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objections to the arguments put forward by Gleason. He allowed
Gleason to read his paper before it was delivered and Gleason was
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able to prepare a reply.
Interestingly the first polemical tactic adopted by Nichols in
his criticism of Gleason was not the presentation of substantive
counter-arguments. Rather he chose to point to the general consensus
among ecologists that, contra Gleason, definite units of vegetation
did exist - and to emphasise the centrality of such a conception of
the plant association within the normal practice of the specialty:-
"But those ecologists are few and far between who
would not recognise the plant association concept as
something which is at least susceptible to more or
less definite characterisation. ... By some ecologists,
the term association is applied to the concrete pieces
of vegetation which we study in the field and which
correspond to the individual plants of the taxonomist.
By others, these individual pieces of vegetation are
regarded merely as examples of an association, in much
the same way that different individual plants of the
same kind may be regarded as examples of a particular
species. By many, the term association is applied in
both (or in all three) of these senses." 31°
It was as if Nichols was reminding his audience of the vested
interest they had in the theoretical status quo - the collective
commitment to the reality of community-units:-
222
"These, then, are the concepts of the plant association
which Dr. Gleason holds up to criticism - the concepts
by which we recognise vegetation as being built up of a
series of vegetation-units comparable, in a way, with
species ... These are the concepts which he would
supplant with his own so-called 'individualistic concept'
of the plant association."^"1^
Furthermore, Nichols pointed out that the theoretical position
which he had himself espoused in earlier papers "meets with favour
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among the majority of American ecologists and not a few European".
Thus, he presented his credentials to speak on behalf of the
discipline. He showed he was well-qualified for the task of reminding
his audience how Gleason's view threatened their professional
interests.
The tactic adopted here by Nichols occurs quite commonly in
scientific debates. A protagonist addressing the faithful, of which
he wishes to be considered an accredited member, publicly delimits
and defines the communalities of the group. He reminds his
audience what their normal practice is, in other words where their
professional vested interests lie. It might be said that he erects
a symbolic totem or standard around which the tribe may rally. Such
preaching to the converted strengthens the zeal and cohesion of the
group and renders it easier to identify and exclude non-members.
Anyone who will not rally to the standard is an outsider - not a
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proper member of the group - and thus may be discredited.
That Nichols should adopt this mode of defence against Gleason
is good evidence for my earlier point that the idea of the community-
unit was central to the contemporary practice of American ecology.
And thus Gleason's individualistic theorising, denying the reality
of the community-unit, constituted a challenge to that practice.
Nichols conceded the point Gleason had made in the 1926 paper
that there was much disagreement between ecologists as to how the
vegetation-unit should be conceived. This, he admitted, was regrettable.
But he stressed that there was a consensus that such units did in
fact exist, however they were to be conceived. And ecology was not
alone in being riven by disputes. Similar disagreements existed in
the field that Gleason had now made his primary profession:-
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"
... there are wide differences of opinion among
ecologists when it comes to the precise definition of
the term plant association; but so also are there
differences of opinion among taxonomists when it comes
to the precise definition of the term species."^
Nichols returned to this comparison between the practice of
ecology and that of taxonomy again and again in the course of his
talk. He repeatedly made an analogy between the plant association
and the species - maintaining that the reality of the plant association
was as fundamental to the activities of ecologists as the reality
of species was to the activities of taxonomists - notwithstanding
the disputes in both disciplines as to the exact definition of each
concept:-
"Is not the situation here identical with that faced
by taxonomists, one of whom would differentiate into
several species what another would treat as a single
one? Is the absence of general agreement in the matter
of allowable variation any more reason for discarding
our concept of the association as a vegetation unit
than it is for discarding that of the species as a
floristic unit?"323
Thus, as far as being riven by "constant disagreement" was
concerned, the taxonomic pot was as black as the ecological kettle.
The fact that there were many taxonomists in the audience, most of
whom sided with Gleason as being one of their own men, no doubt added
piquancy to these remarks - especially in the context of a conference
which had already been riven by disputes between taxonomists and
ecologists over the species question, a matter we have already seen
was the cause of enmity between the members of the two specialties.
It is worth briefly digressing from the description of Nichols's
paper to outline the nature of this other Ithaca dispute, for it
aptly illustrates the professional divisions between ecology and
taxonomy which were current in the twenties and which Nichols sought
now to exploit.
In 1923, Harvey Hall and F.E. Clements, colleagues in the employ
of the Carnegie Institution at Pike's Peak, published The Phylogenetic
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Method in Taxonomy. The book contained much criticism of orthodox
taxonomic procedures and urged the adoption of experimental methods.
Clements returned to criticisms he had made in 1905:-
"The thought of subjecting forms presumed to be
species to conclusive test by experiment has apparently
not even occurred to descriptive botanists as yet.
Notwithstanding there can be no serious doubt that the
existing practice of resplitting hairs must come to an
end sooner or later. The remedy will come from without
through the application of experimental methods in the
hands of the ecologist and the cataloguing of slight
and unrelated differences will yield to an ordered
taxonomy. "-^5
Clements and Hall had revised the North American species of
Artemsia, Chrysothamnus and Atriplex along 'phylogenetic' lines. At
the Ithaca conference, Hall presented a paper outlining some of their
methods. A half-day session was given over to a discussion of Hall
and Clements's work.
One of the taxonomists whose work was most directly contradicted
in The Phylogenetic Method was Per Rydberg, a colleague of Gleason at
the New York Botanical Garden. Rydberg took the opportunity of the
Ithaca conference to reply. His annoyance at having his work inter¬
fered with by an ecologist was evident:-
"That the "endless" splitting of genera and species
should meet objection especially among non-taxonomists
was natural. These objections have been voiced in this
country, at least in print, strongest by some of the
leading ecologists. The objections might have been
warranted, but they should not have been presented in
an over-bearing and sarcastic way. How can ecologists
teach taxonomists the way to do their work? One of the
former [Clements] undertook such a thing and for the
purpose roped in one of our best taxonomists [Hall] to
help him and the result was the publication of the
"Phylogenetic Method" ... If this paper was intended as
a review of the publication, I would give a good deal of
praise to the main part of it. The credit is due
chiefly to Dr. Hall. It is the purpose and the principle
laid down in the preface that I object to, and the
inconsistency in carrying out the plan. The preface
was written principally by Dr. Clements."-^
Rydberg did not confine his criticism solely to Clements and
laid about ecologists as a whole for their unhelpful and inconsistent
attitude to the creation of species by taxonomists. However, Hall,
confident and a fine platform speaker, was held to have carried the
day for experimental ecology, cytology and genetics against orthodox
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taxonomy. For the taxonomists, however, this was only a set-back
opo
in a long campaign.
To return to Nichols's criticism of Gleason - the first
substantive argument he produced was on the matter of the floristic
diversity of the tropical forest. But it too hinged on the question
of credibility. Nichols reported that he had corresponded with two
of the very few other American ecologists with experience of the
tropics, H.N. Whitford and N.L. Shantz. Both these men were
adherents of the community-unit theory - Whitford had been a student
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of Cowles and Shantz of Weaver. Nichols had elicited their opinion
as to Gleason's claim that, in the rain forest, definite associations
could not be discerned. Both Whitford and Shantz maintained that
Gleason had grossly over-estimated the variety of species composition
which existed in the tropical forest. Furthermore character-species
could indeed be found there; associations determined:-
"To the average botanist, entering the tropical
forest" concludes Dr. Whitford, "all seems confusion",
and yet "with a knowledge of the species and
quantitative studies of the composition, tropical
forests can be classified by associations and can be
designated by the generic and sometimes the specific
names of the predominating trees."330
In other words, Gleason's acquaintance with the tropical forest had
been too slight to permit him to make generalisations about its
character. He could not be'regarded as an accredited tropical
ecologist. Nichols took care to point out that, by contrast, Whitford'
credentials in this respect were impeccable:-
"
... probably no American ecologist is more familiar,^
from actual experience, with the forests of the tropics."
Nichols then addressed Gleason's arguments that it was not always
possible to define the geographical boundaries of an association and
that associations gradually blended into one another over long
distances. These were however, to Nichols, relatively unimportant
observations, with little bearing on the reality of the association:-
"Reverting to our analogy between the association
concept and that of the species, is not a piece of
vegetation which comprises a mixture of the characteristics
of two associations quite comparable to a plant which
exhibits a mixture of the characteristics of two species?
If we refuse to recognize the plant association as a
vegetation unit on this account, are we not almost equally
justified in refusing to recognize the species as a
floristic unit because of the existence of hybrids?"
Having dismissed several other of Gleason's arguments, Nichols turned
to the question of the general prevalence of variation within the
plant cover. Gleason held that continuous variation was universal
and that this made the traditional association concept untenable.
This was, to Gleason, a point of central importance. And the gradual
change in character exhibited by the forests of the Mississippi
flood-plain was a crucial example. However, to Nichols, the
Mississippian continuum was merely a 'discrepancy':-
"The existence of this condition no more invalidates
the concept of the association as an entity or unit
than does the corresponding discrepancy in taxonomic
botany [individuals intermediate between species] ^33
invalidate the generally accepted concept of the species."
Continuous variation was, to Nichols, the exception rather than the
rule. Its existence thus did not challenge the reality of the
vegetation unit.
We may discern, in these exchanges between Nichols and Gleason,
a pattern frequently exhibited by scientific disputes. Different
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commitments produce different worlds. In this present case, if
one is convinced of the reality of the plant association as a
natural unit, then one organises and weights vegetational phenomena
in a particular manner; if one does not accept the reality of the
association, then one, by contrast, arranges phenomena according to
another quite different protocol. Thus what are to Gleason crucial
examples may be dismissed by Nichols as relatively unimportant
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anomalies. Throughout the exchange, Gleason and Nichols consistently
failed to agree as to which pieces of evidence were to be regarded
as important. Even a phenomenon as large as the Mississippian valley
forest - all two thousand miles of it - could be relegated by one
side to the status of a 'discrepancy'. This is a measure of the
distance between Gleason's and Nichols's respective commitments as
to what the methodology of the discipline of ecology ought to be -
Gleason seeking an ecology based on floristic practice and the
individualistic concept, Nichols seeking a more autonomous form of
practice, based on the community-unit theory.
Nichols ended by describing various methods of ecological
classification, by re-emphasising the importance of classification
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within ecological practice and by re-iterating that the "importance
of the association-type as an ecological unit of classification is
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generally recognized."
Gleason responded to Nichols's critique by stressing his own
claim to be regarded as an ecologist. The debate was partly about
credibility. Gleason emphasised the points at which his view and
Nichols's coincided. In response to Nichols's attempts to bar him
from the ecological community, he made out a case for his being
included as a fully accredited member of the profession
"To the uninitiated, it might seem that Dr. Nichols
and I are fundamentally opposed. Such is by no means
the case. Both of us agree absolutely on the existence
of those well-known units of vegetation, the plant
associations; both of us agree on the importance of a
clear understanding of their nature, of the fundamental
causes which bring them into being; both of us are
sincerely interested in advancing and clarifying
ecological knowledge, a science to which both of us ^37
have given much of our time and ability for many years."
Gleason took explicit exception to only one feature of Nichols's
discussion of his views - the prominence Nichols had given to the
taxonomic analogy. Gleason argued that:-
"An association is not a species of vegetation. Nay
more, the differences between them are so fundamental
that even the word analogous can not be used with entire
correctness. I readily admit that there are similarities
between the two concepts as they exist in the human
mind, particularly when we select the concept of the
association as held by Dr. Nichols, but that is as far
as the similarity extends. Under any concept, a species
is a group of individuals the members of which are
theoretically related by genesis, and capable of
classification genetically when our knowledge is
sufficient. But an association has no powers of
reproduction. It is merely continued Dy the reproduction
of individual component plants. "338
Gleason cleverly defused Nichols's appeal to the practice of
taxonomy in defence of the practice of ecology by admitting that the
former was indeed in a far from desirable condition
"
... every botanist knows the present chaotic state
of opinion on the species question, and no ecological
principles, especially none so sound as Dr. Nichols',
should be supported on so weak a crutch."339
[As it happened, Gleason also had strong and somewhat unorthodox
views on the question of the species concept - views which were to
attract strong criticism from his fellow taxonomists.
The bulk of Gleason's reply to Nichols was given over to a
reiteration, in somewhat different terms, of the argument of his
recently published paper. He admitted that in many cases, distinctive
types of vegetation could be discerned. In this sense, associations
existed. But they were produced only under quite specific circumstances
"Now it is well known that it frequently happens that
a uniform environment does have a considerable extent
and is repeated in other areas. Wherever this happens,
a definite plant association develops and is repeated
in neighboring habitats. If this condition was universal,
neither my paper nor Dr. Nichols' criticism would have
been written. But there are other places it does not
occur. There the environment changes so gradually from
one place to another that the association-concept in
Dr. Nichols' sense is no longer applicable."^
Gleason concluded by giving perhaps the most concise statement
of his own opinion as to the nature of vegetation:-
"Vegetation then, varying as it does in both time and
space, partly through areal variation of chronological
change or seasonal or periodic fluctuation in the
environment, partly through changes in the flora which
by its migration provides the component plants, is a
wonderfully unstable thing ...
In his autobiography, Gleason recorded his impressions of the
Ithaca meeting and its repercussions
"That morning the room for the Ecology Section was
packed full. Every ecologist was there and practically
all the taxonomists as well, because they knew it was
one of their own number who was to be flung to the
lions. So George made his speech and I made my rebuttal
and every ecologist there knew that I was dead wrong.
On the way out of the building an hour or so later,
Briquet, the taxonomist from Switzerland, walked over
to me and said "You are exactly right and all the
taxonomists know it."
Taxonomists are not ecologists, however, and for the
next several years I and my theories were anathema to
all the ecologists."343
We have now seen many examples of how Gleason straddled an
important professional divide. His perspective on ecological matters
was a floristic one - at a time when ecologists wished to be
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independent of taxonomy. It is, therefore, not surprising that his
individualistic concept was regarded more favourably by taxonomists
than by ecologists - particularly since Gleason was in the mid nineteen-
twenties increasingly devoting the major part of his research effort
to taxonomy - and was correspondingly becoming less active in ecology.
Departure from ecology
There is no doubt that Gleason exaggerated the extent to which
he was personally an "anathema to all the ecologists". In later
years, he often recollected that ecologists came to regard him as
344
"a good man gone wrong". This cannot be taken altogether at
face value. On the one hand, it is clear that there was a considerable
controversy surrounding Gleason's ideas in the late nineteen-twenties
- not all of which is fully represented in print. Ivan Johnston, a
taxonomist at the Gray Herbarium in Harvard, wrote to Gleason in
1929:-
"I have just realised how full of iniquity you are.
When your writings can offend a good New England
conscience and remove a subscriber from the roll of
Ecology, it seems to me that it is time for reformation."
George Nichols encouraged certain of his graduate students to read
Gleason's papers, but when one such student [Frank Egler] ventured to
find some worth in Gleason's work, Nichols responded:-
"You wouldn't want other people to think of you as we
think of Gleason, would you? "-^6
On the other hand, there is much evidence that Gleason was not
so much expelled from the ecological community as gradually came to
abandon active involvement in ecology as a consequence of his
increasing commitment to taxonomic work and the demands imposed
upon a senior member of staff of an institution predominantly devoted
to taxonomy. He was, for instance, able to continue publishing
ecological papers, despite the controversy he had engendered. Ecology
carried his long and detailed discussion of the succession concept
in 1927 - this paper emphasised the variability of vegetation in
time as well as in space and clarified and amplified the consequences
of the individualistic concept for the theory of succession. A
fourth quantitative paper appeared in 1929, and an article on the
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theory of synusiae and the environmental control exercised by one
318
plant upon another was published as late as 1936. He does not
seem to have had much difficulty getting his ecological material
published. One might expect that he would have experienced such
difficulty if he had come to be regarded as being beyond the
ecological pale altogether. But it is clear that he remained well
respected. In 1929, he was invited by Tansley, the dean of British
ecology, to present a paper on the classification of vegetation at
the International Botanical Congress to be held in Cambridge the
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following year. Furthermore, he reviewed Fuller and Conard's
English translation of Braun-Blanquet's Plant Sociology for Ecology
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in 1933. And in 1930, when the journal Ecological Monographs was
founded, Gleason was on the editorial board.
Also he did receive some support, in private if not, as far as
I am aware, in print, from a number of European ecologists. Gleason
met and talked with many eminent European workers during the
International Phytogeographical Excursion to Czecho-Slovakia in 1928.
He discovered that the Finnish ecologist Alwar Palmgren was basically
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of the same mind as himself on the nature of the plant association.
He also received some support from the Montpelier phytosociologist
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Pavillard and the Swede Hugo Oswald. However, their support
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stopped some distance from compete agreement. Gleason also
received messages of approval from the eccentric French botanist
Felix Lenoble."^
That his views attracted more support from Europeans than
Americans is not surprising given that, as I outlined in the previous
chapter, there was much more of a symbiotic relationship between
taxonomy and ecology in Europe than there was on the other side of
the Atlantic. However it must be stressed that although he did
receive a certain amount of support from European botanists, his
views were, even in Europe, taken seriously only by a minority
"I well remember walking through a little patch of
steppe with him [Palmgren], a little field of waving
Stippa pennata, and finding that he fully accepted the
ideas which I had presented in my "Individualistic
Concept", and his remark about them "Jetzt ist die Zeit
zu s&hen". Unfortunately it was not the time to sow;
not one person in that party of forty except Palmgren
believed, and not one of them would discuss the matter
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with me. They were too polite to disagree with a
colleague from so far away, and they were genial, and
friendly conversationalists on all other matters, but
on the philosophy of the association, - No!"^5
The floristic perspective of the European phytosociologists had led
to vegetation-units conceived of in floristic terms, not to the
abandonment of the vegetation-unit concept, as in Gleason's case.
Gleason was evidently disappointed that his duties at the New
York Botanical Garden allowed so little time for ecological research.
He was also dissatisfied with the salary he was receiving. He sought
to improve matters by appealing, in 1928, to Marshall Howe, then
Acting Director of the Garden:-
"It is ten years ago today that I first reported
for duty at the New York Botanical Garden. Since that
time many improvements have been made at the Garden
and I can also detect numerous indications of my own
progress. I believe I am safe in saying that my ability
to do research work of high quality is second to none
in the institution, and that the results of such work
as evidenced by printed publication compare favourably
with any other's, either in amount or quality. It is
certain that my work in taxonomy is accepted with
confidence by other systematists both in this country
and abroad, who believe that my methods of work lead
to reliable results. It is also certain that my work
in ecology has attracted more'favourable comment and
more serious attention from European workers than that
of any other American for more than a decade. With
the one exception of my work in Puerto Rico in 1926,
all of my ecological research has had to be done during
vacation time and at my own expense. Until six months
ago, all of my work was done without the help of an
assistant.
Because of these existing conditions, I place before
you the three requests below ...
1. That my salary be placed on a par with that of
other men of equal ability ...
2. That it be made part of my regular duties to
devote as much as three months of each year to ecological
research, provided first, that this time include both
the accumulation of data in the field or laboratory
and the preparation of the data for publication, and
provided second, that unused parts of such time be
allowed to cumulate into succeeding years so that work
in the tropics or at other distant points may profitably
be undertaken.
3. That two hundred and fifty dollars be annually
'appropriated in support of such ecological work to be
used for travelling expenses, materials ... "356
I have been unable to find Howe's reply in the archives of
the New York Botanical Garden. However, it is reasonable to assume
that it must have been unfavourable since later that year Gleason
wrote Charles Hottes, at the University of Illinois, inquiring as
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to the possibilities of a return to university life. In April
1929, Hottes recommended Gleason to the Dean for a full professor-
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ship in plant ecology. But the salary offered was not an
improvement on what Gleason was already receiving at the Garden.
Gleason, ever canny on money matters, did not go back to Illinois
but he continued his quest for a university job:-
"By 1929 I had been working several years without an
increase in salary and I thought that my increased
ability deserved a higher pay. Just then I received
hints that I might be welcome as head of the department
of botany at the University of Cincinnatti. All
negotiations by correspondence went smoothly and in the
spring I went out to look the place over. The staff
seemed favourably disposed toward me, the dean was
willing, and when we parted it was understood that I
would be recommended to the Board of Trustees for
appointment.
Back at the Garden, while waiting for the official
notification, I appeared before our Board of Scientific
Directors to report on that famous collection of plants
from Mount Duida. I closed by saying that I would
probably not be at the Garden next year and that 1
hoped that the Board would make proper provision for
continuing the work. Half an hour later I was called
back to the meeting and was asked if a generous raise
in salary would keep me at the Garden."359
Gleason was thus secured for the Garden and for taxonomy. The
cutbacks in public and institutional spending occasioned by the Wall
Street Crash and the Depression were shortly to make professional
mobility very problematic indeed. Gleason remained in New York
until the end of his career. But he never got the special concessions
he had sought for his ecological work. In the context of the New
York Botanical Garden with its strong institutional commitment to
taxonomy and the splendid facilities for taxonomic work it offered,
it is not surprising that Gleason's active involvement in ecological
work fell into abeyance. This is made further understandable by
the fact that, bearing at times a heavy burden of administrative
duties - he was Acting Director from May 1936 until February 1938 -
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Gleason often had little time even for taxonomy.
In 1937 Gleason wrote
"I have done nothing in plant ecology for a long
period of time and for the past two or three years ^
have accomplished very little in systematic botany."
This was a matter of regret
"My chief disappointment during the past twenty
years has been the necessity of giving up almost completely
my original interest in ecology ... At New York I am
employed primarily because of my work in taxonomy, to
which I am apparently better adapted than to ecology,
if I can judge from my reputations in the two fields,
although I still consider that my most valuable
contribution to plant science is in my various papers
on ecology."362
Conference at Cold Spring Harbor, 1938
Although Gleason had regretfully and somewhat wistfully abandoned
ecology, ecologists had not altogether abandoned him. The Garden was
a major centre for botanical research. It attracted a steady stream
of visitors from all over America. Botanists would come to use its
facilities and consult its staff. Gleason thus continued to meet
and talk with botanists interested in ecology and in the nature of
the plant association.
The most important of the contacts Gleason nurtured in this way ■
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was the energetic and eclectic young ecologist, Stanley Adair Cain.
Cain had been a student of Fuller and Cowles, but he could never have
been described as a typical product of the mainstream of American
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ecology. He was always concerned with examining the theoretical
principles of ecological practice and felt that the discipline should
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establish itself upon a more universal, less sectarian basis. With
this in view, he went to Pikes Peak to talk to Clements and he
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experimented with the methods of the Sigma School. Cain regularly
passed through New York on his way from the University of Tennessee
to Cold Spring Harbor Biological Laboratory, where he taught a
summer school in plant ecology. In 1936, and again in 1937, he took
the opportunity to talk to Gleason about the individualistic hypothesis.
In 1937, Cain, often an academic impresario, persuaded the Cold
Spring Harbor Biological Laboratory to allow him to organise a
conference. It was to be held in 1938, under the title "Plant and
Animal Communities". Cain wrote to Gleason, telling him of the
plans:-
"You will notice that we have suggested that you
present a paper on your opinions concerning the
association. You may not care to re-enter this field,
but we think that you would have a distinct contribution
to make to the program as it is now constituted. We
would appreciate your frank reaction to the whole program
and especially to the section on association concepts.
We are not thinking of the "association" alone but of ^gg
the "association" as the heart of community problems."
Gleason replied immediately:-
"I am not only greatly interested in your proposed
symposium for next summer but I am also highly compli¬
mented to see my name among the suggested speakers."^
Cain was thus the principal architect of Gleason's return to the
ecological stage. He was to present an exposition of Clements's
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system to the conference. But he had, by 1938, become more
sympathetic to Gleason's views:-
"I may say that I am closer to your "individualistic
concept" - perhaps by the close of the Conference I'll
be convinced."^
Gleason's 1938 conference paper was a concise and carefully argued
synthesis of his 1 926 paper on the individualistic concept and his
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1927 paper on succession. He argued that the environment was
continuously variable in space and time. Vegetation likewise
exhibited continuous variation. Individual pieces of vegetation
might be highly uniform due to the exercise of environmental control
by the dominant plant. Environmental control might also lead to the
narrow well defined boundaries between adjacent associations. However
this uniformity was not absolute. Over long distances or long time
spans radical changes in community composition gradually appeared.
Likewise there was no exact repetition of the same vegetation from
one location to another. There was only approximate repetition:-
"It must be remembered that we admit the essential
uniformity of vegetation within a single community, and
the frequent striking uniformity between adjacent
communities. But the fact that these small cumulative
differences do exist is basically important in the
consideration of the general concept of the plant-
association. They indicate that each community, and
for that matter each fraction of one, is the product
of its own independent causative factors, that each
community in what we now choose to call an association-
type is independent of every other one, except as a
possible source of immigrating species. With no
genetic connection, with no dynamic connection, with
only superficial or accidental similarity, how can we
logically class such a series of communities into a
definite association-type? Truly the plant community
is an individualistic phenomena."^
Clements was not at the Cold Spring Harbor Conference, having
declined an invitation to present a paper entitled "The Monoclimax:
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the association as a complex organism". But in the discussion
period following Gleason's paper, the cudgels were taken up on behalf
of organicism by Alfred Emerson, a member of the Chicago animal
ecology group, who had, as we saw at the end of the previous chapter,
used the 'organismic-community concept of modern ecology' as a
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'scientific basis for ethics'.
Emerson had also presented a paper to the conference. Entitled
"Social Coordination and the Superorganism", it displayed his con¬
tinuing commitment to organismic modes of thought and his willingness
to extend his discussion from the nature of plant and animal
communities to the nature of human society
"Wheeler states that human society does not possess
an ontogenetic cycle except through colonization, which
he compares to the swarming of the honey bee. I would
be inclined to view "budding" as well as sexual repro¬
duction of the superorganism, as indications of an
ontogenetic cycle, although one is less sharp than the
other. Both involve degrees of physiological isolation,
reorganisation and development. Social insect colonies
show a greater degree of isolation than human communities.
Because of the integration between communities, human
society is as extensive as the species, while insect
society extends little beyond the colony. Great cycles
in human society are postulated by Spengler who speaks
of the rise and fall of civilisation types ... A great
many fluctuations in human community populations have
been shown to be correlated with exploitation of new
resources and also with greater efficiency in social
integration."^76
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In response to Gleason's denial of the reality of supra-
individual units of vegetation, Emerson argued that the biological
integration of units was as real as the individual units themselves.
While an individual organism could legitimately be regarded as a
population of cells, it was, nevertheless, also a real integrated
unit in its own right. The concept of the human race still had
meaning despite the fact that human beings varied and each individual
was unique. Holistic units combined to produce larger wholes. Thus
despite the dependence of vegetation upon the phenomena of the




In the previous chapter I pointed out that the debate which
surrounded Clements's organicism extended into the realms of political
and social policy. I showed how Clements and the Chicago animal
ecology group derived a collectivist social programme from their
assumptions of the organismic nature of plant and animal communities.
Gleason's individualistic concept likewise carried social implications
- if only to the extent that its existence in the scientific
literature posed a potential threat to the scientific basis from
which Clements and his Chicago group derived their holistic ideology.
It is understandable, therefore, that Emerson was moved to confront
Gleason's individualism.
Any threat posed by Gleason could not be unduly serious for as
long as the individualistic concept was espoused only by a very small
minority of scientists. However, its potential social implications
were displayed through its adoption by one of the arch-opponents of
the ecological technocrats, James C. Malin - whose vigorous opposition
to the Clementsians I described in the previous chapter.
Malin contrasted Gleason's "down-to-earth realism" which "excluded
completely any idea of vegetation as an organism, even in the sense
of analogy" with the formalism of Clements and Frederick Jackson
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Turner. Gleason's individualistic view with its conception of
continuous variability in nature was, in the hands of Malin, a
powerful antidote to the determinism of the closed-system theorists:-
"
... if Turner had known and accepted for historical
purposes Gleason's point of view in ecology of indeter¬
minate process, he would have been obliged to abandon
the Listian theory of stages."3^
To Malin the existence of the individualistic concept showed
that it was possible to achieve a non-Clementsian, non-organismic
understanding of the ecology of the Great Plains. The individualistic
concept implied the possibility of alternatives to the policies of
social and agricultural management proposed by' the ecological
technocrats of the New Deal. By invoking Gleason, these alternatives
could be given the full backing of scientific ecology - an ecology
which unlike "the outmoded and wholly erroneous" structure of
Clementsianism did not deny the "capacity of man to unfold the
potentialities of the mind in discovery of new properties of the
4-UI. 380earth".
Thus Malin employed Gleason's argument as to the nature of
vegetation in a social context - drawing support from the individual¬
istic concept of the plant association for his advocacy of an
individualistic social order on the plains. Malin utilised Gleason's
individualistic concept to draw social conclusions diametrically
opposite to those which Clements and the Chicago animal ecology group
drew from the organismic analogy.
There is no evidence to suggest that Gleason was involved in
this political debate one way or the other. He, as far as I am aware,
drew no explicit social implication from his individualistic concept
of the plant association. Gleason did, however, once indicate that
there was a strong similarity between his views on vegetation and
his views on the development of human society:-
"
... vegetational history exhibits a striking
parallelism to human history. Thus Europe has witnessed
during the last two millenniums the extinction or
absorption of the early Iberians, the persistence of
the Basques, the arrival and retreat of the Moors and
Turks, and an enormous evolution in culture. Further¬
more, the underlying causes of vegetational and human
history are similar, even though the human species ^
exhibits an exceedingly complex relation to its environment."
It is perhaps worth noting that, for a variety of reasons, it is
not altogether surprising to find a man like Gleason on the
individualistic side of an individualist/collectivist political
dichotomy. Gleason sprang from farming stock. He cherished his
connections with farmers and farming - connections he retained
throughout his life. His father's farm remained in the family's
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ownership and Gleason supervised its management by a tenant. At
the time of the Wall Street Crash, when the finances of the New York
Botanical Garden were very precarious indeed, Gleason bought another
farm in Maryland to which he intended to retreat - to make his
living as a farmer should his employment at the Garden be terminated
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or become no longer financially worthwhile. Like many of his
background and class, he admired the life of the homesteader and
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smallholder:-
"I believe modern economists call such a place a
subsistence farm, and usually allude to it in rather
disparaging terms. Nevertheless, it gives the farmer
a degree of independence far beyond that of any city
dweller or even of any farmer who lives by producing
and selling cash crops only. It is the sort of
independence celebrated by poets in verse and envied
by many a wage-earner in town. It is the continuation
into the present day of the life of our ancestors two
or three hundred years ago ...
Such a life style produced "that good old American attitude of
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courage and nerve".
Thus Gleason was a believer in agrarianism of the Jefferson
mould - the sturdy, self-sufficient independent yeoman farmer was
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the bulwark of the American way of life. He coupled this
agrarianism with staunch Republicanism - with all that that entailed
for the role which the apparatus of federal government should play
in the life of the nation.
On a personal level, he believed in the all-importance of
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individual conscientiousness and financial rectitude. These
beliefs led him to be, within limits, egalitarian. He was proud to
number people from all walks of life and levels of society among
his friends. He was saddened by the existence of hierarchical social
distinctions. He wrote thus of some neighbours of his at Cos Cob
in Connecticut:-
"He was in charge of the stock room at the big electric
plant down the road. She was an excellent cook and a
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remarkably fine backyard gardener. Both of them
impressed us as people worth knowing not for their
wealth or station but just for themselves. So we had
them up at our house for a meal, and they reciprocated
in due time by inviting us down there. Nevertheless
we could never become well acquainted with them. Their
whole attitude seemed to be that they themselves were
just ordinary folk while we were of the upper class.
Thea [Mrs. H.A. Gleason] would like to have known her
as a superior housewife and homemaker; I would like to
have known him as a sober, hard-working useful citizen,
but neither of us could bridge that gap between us.
There are many such stories in his autobiography. When Gleason
was working at the Kew Herbarium in London he marvelled at the
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British meek acceptance of traditional class distinctions. He
adhered to the view that a man's place in society ought to depend
upon his own individual virtues and efforts. Furthermore he was not
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beyond using the term 'new-dealer' in its pejorative sense. He
392
disliked communism and left-wing agitation.
For all these reasons, therefore, it is not surprising to find
Gleason's name invoked by those on the individualistic side of the
collectivist/individualist dichotomy of American social thought.
Whether or not Gleason would have sanctioned Malin's political
employment of his doctrines, his life style was such that he does not
seem out of place in the camp of those who opposed the scientific
ideologues of the collectivism and centralism of the New Deal.
Reassessment and recognition
The Cold Spring Harbor conference on plant and animal communities
393
attracted wide attention. Gleason's appearance at it certainly
revived some interest in his work among ecologists. He received
several letters seeking clarification of his views on the association
and related concepts. And in 1940, Frank E. Eggleton, Chairman of
the Nomenclature Committee of the Ecological Society of America,
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invited Gleason to become a member of the Committee. Gleason
replied:-
"The fact that I have been out of touch with ecology
for so many years will make me of doubtful value on a
committee. There is no use having a member put forward
ideas which were out of date ten years ago or fail
to understand ideas which are now generally accepted.
Your invitation is the fourth of a similar nature
which I have received this year ... Under the circumstances
I know that I ought to decline to serve on your committee
and yet I hate to lose one last chance to be an ecologist.
Before saying no finally would it be possible for me to
find out what will be expected of me as a member of the
committee."395
Gleason's desire not to finally relinquish his involvement with
ecology eventually won the day. He joined Eggleton's committee
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and remained on it until December 1947. This work for the committee
gave him opportunities to exert his influence against the persistence
of Clementsianism. For example, in 1947, Gleason reacted strongly
against a glossary of ecological terms composed by Richard Carpenter:-
"As I look through the various notes which I made on
the enclosed list of terms, I realize that I must have
been in a particularly bad temper. However the temper
was inspired by the remarkably Clementsian flavor of the
definitions. Clements is a great man and he has done a
lot for ecology but he has erred in attempting to
crystallize a lot of colloid facts - and it can't be
done. He apparently has thought that it could be done
by setting up a series of definitions which reminds
one of a woman in our vicinity who believes that she
can sink the Japanese navy by concentrating her thought."
As well as his committee work Gleason continued to have opportu¬
nities to discuss his ideas on the association with visitors to the
New York Botanical Garden. In the forties he had long conversations
with Frank Egler, who was doing extensive bibliographic research in
the Garden's library, just as he had had with Stanley Cain in the
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thirties. Gleason came to regard both Cain and Egler as converts.
However it was not until the late forties that the individualistic
hypothesis received public support in America. In 1947, Cain and
Egler both argued that ecologists should conduct a general reassess¬
ment of Gleason's theory. ^ And in the late forties, two field
studies got under way, in Wisconsin and in Tennessee, by John T.
Curtis and Robert H. Whittaker respectively, which were to provide
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new quantitative evidence for the individualistic hypothesis.
Curtis and Whittaker were major advocates for the individualistic
concept throughout the fifties. However the individualistic concept
was still intensely controversial and the community-unit theory of
the plant association retained many adherents. It is perhaps
significant that in 1956 when Gleason was presented with the Certificate
of Merit of the Botanical Society of America, the citation made no
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mention whatsoever of his work outside taxonomy. However, by the
mid-fifties the tide was certainly running strongly for Gleason.
Curtis wrote to Gleason in 1955:-
"[American phytosociology's] current status seems to
be a state of flux with a great majority of the
investigators rapidly coming around to the Gleason
individualistic hypothesis or a reasonable facsimile
thereof. The last major holdout appears to be in the
group of range managers in the Plains States who are
still imbued with Clementsian doctrine. It is noteworthy,
however, that no important papers on vegetation have
appeared in the last two or three years which actually
used the Clements system. The old ideas seem to die
harder in those who talk about ecology rather than those
who are actually practising it.
As you have probably gathered, we consider ourselves
your disciples. With each passing year, we are more and
more impressed with the insight you showed and with the
clear manner in which you expressed the interrelations
existing in vegetation. It becomes more and more
difficult to understand the apparent indifference or
actual opposition to your ideas. There must have been
a kind of mass hypnotic state among the ecologists.
As is perhaps understandable, given his role as a major protagonist
in the renewed debate surrounding Gleason's theories, Curtis over¬
emphasised the extent to which the opposition had been vanquished and
the individualistic concept generally adopted. He also erred in
identifying his opponents only within the remnants of Clementsianism.
Ecologists who had no great love for Clements - principally students
of W.S. Cooper - were yet to return to the barricades on behalf of
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their own version of the community-unit theory. However, Curtis's
remarks show that the process of reassessing the significance of
Gleason within the history of the discipline was well underway. Gleason
was to be represented as the lost founding father of the discipline -
the real precursor of modern ecology.
In 1959 Gleason was honoured by the Eminent Ecologist Award of
the Ecological Society of America. The encomium was spoken by Stanley
Cain, who was also chairman of the Nominating Committee:-
"Dr. Gleason was never one to fit into pigeon holes
the facts which fell under his acute sight, and I have
no interest in trying to classify him other than as an
"individualistic ecologist" who has bothered a lot of
other ecologists with his "individualistic association"
concept. He has always been a man of ideas. But these
are the ideas arising from what he has observed in
nature not ones he has tried to fit nature to. He has
neither been impressed nor foiled by the philosophic
creations of other ecologists, for he has always tested
their ideas concerning the association, succession, the
climax, environmental controls, and biogeography
against what he knew in nature.
Such acclaim gave Gleason great pleasure. He felt vindicated
by this revival of his individualistic concept:-
"
... I wrote to Curtis of the University of Wisconsin,
and asked him how generally ecologists now accepted my
theory. Curtis replied that everyone did, with the
possible exception of a few die-hards ... Well, it was
a long wait, but it gives me great satisfaction in my
old age to know that I have made some real contribution
to plant ecology."^
Gleason was entitled to feel vindicated. The association-unit
theory, as it had been employed by Nichols and Cooper, was indeed in
retreat - at least in America. But the reason for the fresh adoption
of the individualistic hypothesis did not lie entirely in its inherent
virtues, considerable as these were. Changes in the social context
within which ecology was practised also played a part. Furthermore
the individualistic hypothesis adopted by Curtis and Whittaker was
subtly different from Gleason's own version. But these developments
are another story and merit a full and detailed treatment of their
own. They will be studied in the following chapter.
Conclusions
We have now followed the full extent of Gleason's career. We
have seen how an early attraction towards the outdoors led to an
interest in natural history as a hobby and the study of botany at
university. Success in that study led him to aspire to become a
professional botanist. The aptitude displayed as an undergraduate,
the skills developed in private study, led to him being chosen to
receive intensive training in taxonomic botany. But being a student
at one of the few American institutions at which ecological research
was being done, at a time when influential exemplars in plant ecology
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were being produced, Gleason began to practise the nascent specialty
of ecology. Initially Gleason followed closely the model of Cowles,
but gradually developed an approach more distinctively his own. I
have argued that this approach was characterised by a commitment
to conceiving of the plant association and other ecological phenomena
in floristic terms. This is explicable in terms of Gleason's early
floristic training. Most ecologists wished to retain the association
as a distinctive object of ecological study, defining an autonomous
reality. Thus they rejected the individualistic concept. Other
ecologists thought also in individualistic terms but approached
ecological research from a background in physiology, not taxonomy,
so had little common ground with Gleason.
Gleason was one of the most prolific ecologists of the 1900s
and 1910s. But he always kept up his interest in floristic botany.
Financial consideration and the promise of fewer teaching commitments
led him to accept the offer of a job at the New York Botanical Garden.
In that institutional setting it was inevitable that his ecological
work should take second place to his taxonomy. But he abandoned
ecology only gradually, with regret and not without making calculations
as to the advisability of returning to ecology and university life.
However, personal contacts with young botanists facilitated by his
institutional position, enabled him to keep his ecological ideas in
currency and eased the way to a revival of the individualistic
concept when conditions became favourable.
Thus, we have seen that Gleason's professional activities were
determined by skills and commitments gained both within and without
his professional training. We have seen the great importance of the
fact that he early acquired skills in floristic botany. But equally
important in shaping his career and the content of his work were his
love of the outdoors and his aptitude for mathematics. One might
also mention his commitments to a society based on hard work and
individual virtue. Furthermore, I have demonstrated how the
reception of Gleason's individualistic hypothesis is explicable in
the light of the interests and skills of his fellow ecologists.
The character of Gleason's early ecological work tells us much
about the nature of ecological practice in the discipline's formative
years. A comparison of the view-points of Shreve and Livingston,
Gleason and Cowles, affords much further evidence to support the
view that prior training and skills are important in structuring
research activity. The competences already possessed by those entering
the field of ecology systematically organised each new recruit's
approach to the phenomena of vegetation. This was particularly
obvious in the early decades of the century - before ecology was
fully institutionalised and therefore before recruits to ecology had
generally received an undergraduate and graduate training in ecology
itself. The constructive orientation of prior competences is
evident in early American ecology even despite the wish of many
ecologists to make the discipline's subject-matter as distinctive
as possible in order to enhance the autonomy of the specialty.
Thus Livingston had special training in physiology and, having
entered ecology, remained a physiological ecologist. Cowles was
originally a student of geology and, on becoming a botanist, founded
the physiographic school of ecology whose theory was based on the
principles of geomorphology. Gleason's equivalent early competence
was in floristic botany and he continued to articulate a floristic
perspective on ecological matters, even after he had adopted much of
the Cowlesian physiographic paradigm.
We have also seen how Gleason made career decisions in the light
of where he considered his personal interests lay, on matters of
financial rewards, life-style and the like. I have tried to give a
composite picture of how all these skills, commitments, interests
and contexts, combined to produce, as it were as a resultant, the
shape of Henry Allan Gleason's scientific career and the development
of his ideas as to the nature of the plant community.
CHAPTER FOUR
THE INDIVIDUALISTIC HYPOTHESIS REVIVED
Introduction
By the nineteen-twenties, with the work of the Zurich-Montpelier
and Uppsala schools in Europe and that of Cowles and Clements in the
United States, the community-unit theory had taken on its mature
modern form. As we have seen, up until the nineteen-forties, this
view of the nature of vegetation was almost universally accepted -
although many ecologists quarrelled with Clements over the very high
levels of integration within each unit which Clements claimed to
discern. Only one ecologist in America (Gleason), and no more than
half-a-dozen elsewhere, had publicly disagreed with the assumption
1
that there were natural kinds of vegetation. So fully accepted was
this theory, so much was it an unquestioned and implicit framework
for practice, that it did not even have a definite name until 1956.
It was only then that R.H. Whittaker, an American ecologist and one
of the first men to revive the individualistic hypothesis, dubbed it
2
the 'association-' or 'community-unit' theory.
In the late forties and early fifties, this unanimity amongst
American ecologists as to the fundamental nature of the units of
vegetation began to break down. Explicit expressions of dissent on
this matter first appeared in print in 1947 - when a single edition
of the leading American journal Ecological Monographs contained three
articles, all from prominent figures in the American botanical
community, which expressed disagreement with the community-unit theory
3
and support for the individualistic hypothesis. Gleason's individual
istic hypothesis, it must be remembered, had been available as a
potential resource within the discipline since 1917 and had been re¬
stated by Gleason in 1926, and again in 1939. But it had received
scarcely any public support at all, until these three articles
appeared together in 1947.
In the nineteen-fifties, Gleason's individualistic hypothesis
was to attract much attention. Major field studies were based upon it
Much debate was again occasioned by it. By the raid-sixties, the
individualistic hypothesis had become, more or less, generally
adopted - in preference to the community-unit theory as employed by
4
Clements, Nichols and Cooper. In this chapter I shall examine why
Gleason's theory was re-assessed in the late forties and early fifties.
It is not my intention here to go into any great detail as to the
nature of the technical arguments or empirical evidence put forward
by the new champions of the individualistic hypothesis. Nor will I
be concerned with documenting the wider adoption of the individual¬
istic hypothesis. Such matters will be mentioned only briefly. My
principal concern will be the social and institutional background to
this transformation - for I believe that it was the actors' perception
of adverse social circumstances which led to the production of new
technical arguments and new empirical data and to the re-interpretation
of theory.
Clements's work had, of course, been criticised in print many
times before 1947, not only by those who found his views on system-
5
atics and speciation unacceptable, but also by his fellow ecologists.
Clements had what is a strange position in the history of biology in
being the acknowledged leader of a field to which he was always
marginal. He was always marginal in the sense that the Clementsian
doctrine was never generally accepted in its entirety. He was the
most creative and productive ecologist of his generation, but much
of his theorising was always regarded by his colleagues as being
fanciful and overblown. Perhaps an American ecologist asked in the
nineteen-thirties to name the greatest American ecologist would
have responded in the manner of the Parisian critic who, when asked
to name the greatest living French novelist, was forced to reply,
"Victor Hugo. Helas!"^
As we have seen in the previous chapter, several aspects of
Clements's work had been subjected to criticism by Cooper and by
Nichols, to name only two. But these criticisms had not extended,
save in the work of Gleason, to expressions of doubt as to the
existence of community-units.
New criticisms
In 1934, R.F. Griggs described the difficulties he had in applying
the community-unit theory to the vegetation of the Arctic:-
"In the temperate zone vegetation is rather clearly
segregated into more or less well-marked associations,
like beech forests, oak forests, pine woods, swamps
and bogs ... when one goes to the arctic he naturally
expects to find similar plant associations, but instead
he meets a bewildering mixture of plants of all sorts
jumbled together in seeming defiance of the principles
of plant association learned in low latitudes.
Griggs's conclusions were not however the same as those at which
Gleason had arrived, when confronted with similar problems in the
tropical forest. Griggs argued not for the general inappropriateness
of the community-unit concept but rather that its present inapplica¬
bility to boreal vegetation was evidence that recovery from the
effects of general glaciation in the Ice-Ages was not yet complete.
Q
Arctic vegetation was still in a "process of active readjustment".
However, in 194V, Hugh Raup, an ecologist and plant geographer
at Harvard, used Griggs's work to emphasise the hypothetical nature
of the notions of equilibrium, climax and succession as then
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conventionally employed. He argued, in effect, that the theory of
large-scale occurrence of climax vegetation-types determined uniquely
by overall climatic conditions was perhaps false. This implied that
much previous work on the determination of successional changes had
been predicated upon a false premise.
In 1942, Raup returned to the argument to voice a more general
criticism of Clementsian methodology:-
"Ecological geographers, starting with the assumption
of a causal relation between plant and environment,
have built the entire structure of their science upon
efforts to prove its significance and to interpret the
distribution of plants on the basis of it. The initial
reasoning, therefore, has not been by simple induction
from a body of empirically and naively determined facts,
but from a system of working hypotheses based upon
assumptions of mutual cause and effect ... In his
earlier work on Research Methods in Plant Ecology (1905)
Clements states clearly that his premises were in
environmental determinism. In the latest textbook of
Weaver and Clements (1929, 1938), however, the causal
relation is obviously no longer an assumption but an
established fact, and no apology for it is given."''®
Raup argued that the Clementsian system was not only erroneous
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in detail but was fundamentally misguided. It was overly deductive
and hypothetical. Raup, however, criticised not only the Clementsians
but the prevailing ecological orthodoxy quite generally. Like
James Malin, he argued that disturbance was quite universal even
within virgin vegetation. He argued that long-term stability was
never achieved and that a high degree of supra-individual
integration did not exist within the plant cover. He emphasised
the importance of accidental and catastrophic events such as
11
hurricanes. Like Gleason, Raup brought to his ecology considerable
experience in floristic botany - he had been an assistant in the
1 2
Arnold Arboretum. And, like Gleason, he emphasised the importance
of floristic plant geography and the study of the individual plant
species rather than assemblages per se. He broadly supported
Gleason's critique of the organismic metaphor and the community-unit
1 3
theory. However, in the early forties, Raup did not explicitly
deny the existence of natural kinds of vegetation.
Thus, in the early nineteen-forties, the following situation
obtained. Most ecologists, like Cooper and Nichols, distanced
themselves from the totality of the Clementsian system. But they
routinely worked with the notion that vegetation existed in natural
units. On the other hand, Gleason, explicitly, and Raup, implicitly,
denied the reality of definite units of vegetation. Both these
critics took issue not only with Clements but also with mainstream
opinion at many crucial points. Gleason, however, was no longer a
practising ecologist. Raup was on his own.
In 1947 a new note was struck. In that year, Herbert Mason,
Stanley Cain and Frank Egler all cast doubt upon the objective
reality of the plant associations described by American ecologists
and explicitly criticised the community-unit hypothesis. These
publications taken together constitute an event of great significance
in the history of plant ecology.
I shall look at each of these papers in turn and consider in
detail the criticisms that each author raised against the community-
unit theory. A pattern of common emphases will emerge. It will
be seen that not only did Mason, Cain and Egler agree on the
deficiencies of the community-unit theory, they shared a pessimistic
appraisal of the condition of the discipline of ecology as a whole.
I shall argue that it was no coincidence that these two forms of
dissatisfaction occurred together. By criticising the community-
unit theory, Mason, Cain and Egler were advocating a change in the
overall strategy of the discipline.
A background of problems
But first, in an effort to illuminate the background to Mason's,
Cain's and Egler's criticisms, I will consider the situation of
ecology as a scientific discipline in the years leading up to 1947.
It is here that the key to an understanding of their advocacy of new
directions for the discipline lies.
American ecology in the nineteen-forties was in a lowly position.
It lacked prestige and prominence within the scientific community and
it was suffering thereby. It had been under pressure for some time
as to its legitimacy as a scientific discipline. Veterans of the
thirties and forties recalled that the specialty's pretensions to
1 4
scientific status were the subject of much sceptical comment. A
fine illustration of the pressures the field disciplines found
themselves under is provided by Henry Allan Gleason's experiences as
15
Director of the University of Michigan's Biological Station.
Gleason was appointed Director of the Station at a time when its
very existence was being cast in doubt by the criticisms of influential
persons within the university. His predecessor as Director had been
the founder of the Station, Jacob Reighard, the Professor of Zoology.
Gleason saw tactical disadvantages in the regime of the summer school
as instigated by Reighard
"Jacob Reighard ... was a great outdoor man. He
liked fishing and hunting; he liked his cottage in the
woods of the Upper Peninsula. As a result of his own
likes, he thought that all students of nature, both
botany and zoology, should also be completely at home
in the woods, should like the wilderness and be on
familiar terms with all the plants and animals. In
other words, a botanist or a zoologist should be a sort
of Boy Scout on a more elevated plane."''6
Reighard had required that all students enrolled in the summer
school undertake a weekend camping trip, which involved no scientific
250
work but during which the students learned to pitch their own tents
and cook their own meals. Gleason saw that this sort of activity
was regarded as frivolous by members of the faculty not involved with
the Station. More importantly, it lessened the esteem in which the
Biological Station was held by its paymasters
"The requirement was printed in the annual announcement
of the Station and had been at least one of the causes
why the University Administration regarded the Station
as a camping party."17
Gleason worked hard to increase the student enrolment of the
summer school and to convince faculty and administration of the need
for field-work within the teaching of biology and of the legitimacy
of field research. As one of his first acts as Director, he abolished
the camping trip. Eventually he had to face an inspection from
Kraus, the Dean:-
"We showed him everything that was going on, took
him on brief excursions, let him see a class or two
at work, showed him the research that we were doing.
I shall never forget his last afternoon, when he and
I sat in my tent and discussed Station affairs. I had
convinced him that we were really doing scientific
work and not merely camping out, that the students
were learning ... that there actually was opportunity
for research. The Dean told me all his misgivings
and told me of the opposition to the Station held by
some of the professors ... but in the end he promised
his full support for 191 A. The Biological Station was
saved ... if I had not convinced Kraus of the quality
of our work, and Kraus really had to be convinced, the
Station would have been closed forever at the end of
the 1913 session."1®
Under Gleason's directorship, the Station gained its first permanent
building, the Haughton Laboratory. With student enrolment up and
an increased financial appropriation, its continued existence was
assured.
The trouble Gleason experienced over the funding of the Station
well illustrates, on a small scale, the institutional stresses which
the new specialty of ecology was suffering. For ecology, although
conceived in the enthusiasm for the New Botany, always stood a
little uneasily with the other subjects nurtured by that enthusiasm.
It was a field subject, devoid of much of the paraphernalia of
laboratory science. It was more often observational than experimental.
Other scientists did not always appreciate how ecology was different
from high school natural history, or worse, weekend backwoodsmanship
- pastimes rather than scientific professions. Therefore ecology
was exposed to accusations of lack of scientific rigour and intellectual
seriousness. In 1944, J.D. Covington complained to the Ecological
Society of America:-
"Ecology is commonly omitted in the introductory
course in biology or zoology, due to either of two
mistaken concepts; ecology is either grammar-school
natural history and hence unworthy of the college
freshman level or it is too advanced and difficult.
Neither view is correct."! 9
Eugene Odum encountered similar problems:-
"When I first came to the University of Georgia as a
young instructor in 1940, my suggestion that a course
in ecology be included in a core curriculum for majors
received an exceedingly cold reception. My colleagues
of those days confused ecology with natural history and
voiced the opinion that no new ideas or principles were
likely to be revealed in an ecology course that had not
already been covered in courses in taxonomy, evolution,
physiology and other subjects considered more basic."20
Ecologists, wishing to escape from the unpleasant consequences of
being so perceived, were faced with the task of persuading their
scientific peers and paymasters that they were doing real science.
Such problems had long dogged the discipline. We have already
seen, in Chapter Two, how Clements sought to increase ecology's
prestige by adopting the methodology and vocabulary of the indubitably
scientific discipline of physiology. The problems of dubious status,
which called forth this strategy of Clements, may be regarded as a
continuing part of the collective experience of members of the
specialty. As we shall see, the subject's low status was a source
of embarrassment and, more importantly, frequently a cause of
financial stricture. I will argue that the need to resolve these
difficulties exercised a formative influence upon the character of
the specialty as a whole.
Ecology in the late forties was not even as relatively prosperous
as it had been in the late thirties when ecologists and applied
ecologists had benefited from the increased interest in land manage-
21ment and conservation associated with the New Deal. After the
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Second World War, and particularly with the new Republican admin-
22
istration, this was no longer the growth area it had been. Job
opportunities were few even for the better students; advancement
opportunities for established ecologists just as scarce. Few
studentships or fellowships were available. Here again, the comparison
with other disciplines was painful
"Although large sums of money are being made available
through scholarships and research fellowships for
capable young students interested in doing research in
numerous scientific fields, only very limited amounts
of money are available for students interested in the
botanical field and especially ecological research."23
The discipline was still under adverse scrutiny. In 1948, D.B.
Lawrence, the editor of Ecology complained of:-
"
... the people who critically evaluate ecological
research and constantly question the right of ecology
to be considered a science.
Symptomatic of these troubles, the membership of the Ecological
Society of America had not grown since 1920 - after an initial period
25
of expansion immediately following its foundation in 1914.
Ecology was suffering, for instance, through not being seen to
be associated with fields of the brightest theoretical promise. The
University of Chicago's leading ecologist, H.C. Cowles, a very
26
distinguished scientist, retired in 1934. Although he was replaced,
plant ecology lost something of the status it had previously enjoyed
in that institution. The University of Chicago was a major recipient
of money from the Rockefeller Foundation which in 1933 redirected
its funds from nuclear physics into biology - specifically into the
27
areas of biochemistry and genetics. This was the era when
28
physicists first began to become molecular biologists. Ecology
lost out - it did not benefit from this new influx of funding or
personnel into biology.
A similar change of direction was made by the Carnegie Institution,
which had been a generous source of funds for ecological research,
29
virtually from the very beginnings of the subject in America. In
the 1900s and 1910s, Shreve, Cowles, McDougal, Cannon, Livingston,
and Spalding all received financial support from the Carnegie. The
Desert Laboratory was founded with Carnegie funds in 1903, and
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remained an important venue for research in ecology and ecological
physiology for forty years. Clements joined the Carnegie in 1917,
working first principally at the Desert Laboratory. In 1917 the
Carnegie also took over the Alpine Laboratory at Pikes Peak, Colorado,
which had been established by Clements and his fellow members of the
Botanical Seminar of the University of Nebraska. A third laboratory,
the Coastal, was founded at Mission Canyon near Santa Barbara, in
1925. Clements had, by this time, become head of a specially created
section for ecological research within the Carnegie Institution. To
the Carnegie, therefore, is due a considerable part of the credit
for the successful institutionalisation of ecology in America in
the early twentieth century.
By the late twenties, the Carnegie had lost the first flush of
its enthusiasm for ecology. In 1927 the Ecology section lost its
independence and became part of the Division of Plant Biology.
Clements lost several research assistants in the re-shuffle. He
lost considerable status in the process. Neither he nor ecology ever
recovered their former position within the Institution - although he
continued to be supported by Carnegie funds until his retirement in
1941. The Carnegie Institution, like the Rockefeller Foundation, was
intent on redirecting its funding toward other, more promising, areas
of scientific research. This was particularly threatening for
Clements. He evidently felt that his work was misunderstood and his
30
personal worth unappreciated by the executives of the Carnegie.
One of the problems was that Clements, like many other early
31
ecologists, was a Neo-Lamarckian. He held that the form of the
plant was the product of the direct action of the environment.
Natural selection could not operate upon adaptive forms since they
were completely at harmony (epharmonic) with the environment which
had produced them. Mature plants were seldom 'unfit' in the Darwinian
sense. Clements sought therefore to alter plant form, and indeed
transmute species,by transplant experiment. By the late twenties he
believed that he had succeeded in converting "several Linnean species
32
into each other".
The Carnegie had also begun to fund the work of Clausen and his
33associates at Stanford. These researchers were convinced that the
environment selected particular genetic strains rather than directly
influencing changes in the form of the plants. Clausen argued, in
direct contradiction to Clements, that environmental modification
of the phenotype was of relatively minor importance and not heritable.
This was the view which became part of the prevailing orthodoxy in
evolutionary biology. In the face of the Stanford results, Clements's
continued, assertion of his Neo-Lamarckian claims served only to
discredit him - respectable as such claims might have been twenty or
thirty years earlier.
By the time of his death in 1945, Clements, the major theoretician
of the pre-war years, was no longer a figure it was useful for young
ecologists to identify with closely if they wished to be regarded as
within the mainstream of biological research. Stanley Cain, for
instance, in the preface to his 1944 book The Foundations of Plant
Geography acknowledged the benefits he had received from his conversa¬
tions with Clements, but was careful to distance himself from Clements's
view on speciation:-
"To F.E. Clements, I wish to express appreciation for
his hospitality at the Alpine Laboratory and for many
hours of his inspiring conversation. Anyone familiar
with his Neo-Lamarckian concepts will realise the extent
to which I disagree, yet I wish it known that I consider
him a great ecologist of profound learning."34
35
This was the era of the New Darwinian synthesis. By making
the most modern genetics and quantitative population studies com¬
patible with, and apparently reinforced by, the achievements of
traditional descriptive disciplines such as palaeontology, morphology
and embryology, the Neo-Darwinians had constructed a theory of
impressive scope and power, which had more or less silenced (if only
briefly) the debate over the mechanism of evolutionary change. The
New Synthesis had become the most prestigious theory in the biology
of the day. It seemed to draw support from the whole of biology and
to have implications for every sub-discipline. The New Synthesis
seemed to emphasise the unity and enhance the scientific status of
the science of biology. As Provine has written, "By 1940, any
evolutionist not a neo-Darwinian was clearly out of step with the
36
times". Adherence to the New Darwinian Synthesis was held to be
part of a biologist's scientific credentials and a mark of his serious
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commitment to his subject. But Clements was out of step. Continued
support for Clementsian views amongst ecologists was not liable to
impress geneticists or even taxonomists, and was. not likely to aid
their acceptance as full members of the community of biological
scientists.
The distance between ecology and the New Synthesis meant that
unflattering comparisons could be made between the state of ecology
and other more apparently progressive botanical specialties -
specialties with which, in some cases, ecology had long sustained a
rivalry. Raup was pleased to point this out:-
"The main point to be made here is that floristic
geography has been enormously enriched by genetic views
in the study of populations, and by the contributions
of genetics and cytology to the problems of taxonomy.
These views are remarkably free from environmental
determinism, and the reasoning is rigorously inductive,
without pretense of a direct attack upon the ultimate
complex causal relationships. Physiological plant
geography, on the other hand, has been rather resistant
to the inroads of genetical ideas, perhaps owing to its
inherent preoccupation with the external environment of
plants. One of its basic ideas has always been a causal
sequence in which the habitat comes first, but the field
of floristics now comes forward, aided and abetted by
students of genetics, with the idea that the plant
itself, by its inherited existence, contains causal
elements which cannot be readily subordinated to the
T7
external environment." '
If, in every other field, Clements's views were regarded as
antediluvian, it is not to be expected that a peripheral and insecure
specialty eager for recognition, such as plant ecology in the forties,
would long sustain any allegiance to him. Given the general
situation, it is not surprising that the younger American ecologists
should seek new directions for the discipline to carry it out of a
state of low prestige and low funding.
Some other circumstances eased the way for change within the
discipline. Clements had died leaving behind few active students.
He had spent the last thirty years of his life working not in a
university, but at the Carnegie Institution. There had been other
important changes in the discipline's personnel. The retiral of
Henry Cowles has already been mentioned. George Nichols, another
major figure among pre-war ecologists, had died in 1942, while still
38
active in research and teaching. Nichols had been Eaton Professor
of Botany at Yale and although he had interests in other fields of
botany (in particular mycology), he may fairly be regarded, with
Cowles, as one of very few American ecologists to have achieved an
elevated position in an academic institution before the Second
World War. American ecology between the wars was dominated by four
men - Cowles, Clements, Nichols and W.S. Cooper of the University of
Minnesota. After 1946, only Cooper remained. The demise of Nichols
is particularly important in the present context - that of the
revival of the individualistic hypothesis - since he had been, in
the twenties and thirties, one of the most determined opponents of
the Gleasonian view of vegetation. Theoretical changes were correlated
with and facilitated by these changes in personnel.
A move away from old forms of theory may be understood as part
of a general strategy aimed at rendering the discipline of ecology
more similar to those parts of biology which at the time were centres
of greater scientific prestige and recipients of more generous
funding, such as physiology, genetics and those disciplines of general
biology, embryology for example, which were associated with the new
evolutionary synthesis. We shall see this change being advocated by
Mason, Cain and Egler.
Here as at many points in the history of American ecology, the
importance of Clementsianism should not be over-estimated. Relatively
few of these authors' critical remarks were addressed directly toward
Clementsian tenets per se. Mason, Cain and Egler criticised the state
of ecological orthodoxy as a whole. However, such criticisms of
Clementsian doctrine that they did make were significant. Clements
had been, despite everything, a giant amongst ecologists. And, perhaps
because of his relative isolation within the discipline and certainly
because of the extreme character of his methodological prescriptions,
Clements's style of ecology stood as a potent symbol of the ecology
that was now old-fashioned. Clements's ecology, represented as
subjective, descriptive, deductive and speculative, provided a
most vivid and convenient image of what the new ecology could not
afford to be.
Herbert Mason's criticisms
Mason's article was a revised version of a paper given to a
conference on plant geography organised jointly by the Ecological
Society of America and the Association of American Geographers. The
conference took place in Boston in 1946. The date is significant
because of the hiatus occasioned to much ecological activity by the
Second World War. Considerable numbers of the younger members of
the profession had been dispersed from their home bases by becoming
involved, one way or another, in the war effort. Others had their
entry into academic careers or graduate training delayed by the war.
So as civilian activity gradually returned to normal in 1946 and 1947,
there were re-adjustments to be made. Furthermore, the institutional
circumstances of American science were somewhat altered by the Second
World War. As a result of the role science had played in the war
effort, public funding for science was more readily available than it
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had been before. But much to the distress of the Ecological Society
of America, the public paymasters were not looking in ecology's
40
direction. Compounding its lack of prestige among its scientific
peers, ecology lacked an obvious role in the national effort - this
being important at a time when, and in a country in which, the
41
ideology of a national science was taken seriously. It was time
for a change.
Mason was not a professional ecologist. The fact that Ecological
Monographs was publishing the proceedings of a conference organised
only partly by the Ecological Society explains the presence of a
paper by Mason in an ecological journal. His main interests lay in
study of the evolution and distribution of flora. He had trained as
a taxonomist. He was Director of the Herbarium of the Department of
Botany at the University of California, Berkeley - a department
notorious at the time, and for some time afterward, for its lack of
42
support for ecological research. Mason was well-known as an out¬
spoken critic of what he saw as the scientific pretensions and short¬
comings of ecology - opinions which were also voiced by several of
43his colleagues and students.
Mason would never have called himself an ecologist - but the
subject-matter of his research was interrelated with that of vegetation
science and his work did have ecological implications. He pointed
these out forcibly in his 1 9A6 paper which was a forceful advocation
of the general applicability of the new Darwinian synthesis to both
floristics and vegetation science. Mason argued that floras and plant
communities were best thought of as assemblages of inter-breeding
populations - a perspective explicitly derived from population
genetics. There were, therefore, no integrative processes working
above the level of the population
"The organic functions of the population, then, are
solely the functions of population genetics and result
from reproductive and genetic activity within the
population ... Furthermore, there are no organic
functions that operate between genetically unrelated
populations ... A community made up of such populations
has neither organic nor functional unity but is an
aggregation of independently operating populations of
interbreeding individuals. Each such population
functions strictly on its own behalf without consideration
of any unrelated associated population.
Therefore Mason concluded:-
"
... that floristic evolution is activated by the
interplay between environmental conditions and genetic
and physiological phenomena that induce migration,
bring about extinction, and select those genetic races
within the species population that are preadapted to
the new conditions. The production and selection of
the genetic races must be construed as steps in the
evolutionary process known as natural selection.
'Natural Selection' was a key term - as were 'genetic' and
'physiological'. The last two recurred in nearly every paragraph of
the paper. Throughout its entire length, Mason demanded that both
floristics and ecology "lean heavily upon the logic of ... physiological
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interpretations". The principal implication of Mason's argument
was that ecology must become similar in explanatory structure to the
most prestigious areas of contemporary biology. It must become
Darwinian. It must base itself on the models of genetics and physio¬
logy. Genetics was attractive to Mason as an important component of
the Darwinian synthesis and an increasingly successful discipline.
Physiology was, as we have seen in the previous chapters, the
perennial exemplar of a 'hard' experimental biological science.
It was essential, according to Mason, if ecology was to be made
harmonious with these prestigious disciplines, that the community-
unit theory be abandoned
"
... such dynamics [i.e. the physiology of the
individual and the genetics of the population] leave
little room for concepts of vegetation in time or
space that regard the community as a functioning unit
made up of wholly interdependent individuals. The
interdependencies within the community are strictly
within the sphere of parasitism and symbiosis and as
such are the special problems of special cases.
The community-unit theory, as articulated by Clements and others,
necessitated the assumption that integrative processes worked at the
level of the community. Otherwise the organismic analogy, or arguments
about the whole being greater than the sum of its parts, had no
meaning. Mason argued that such an assumption was incompatible with
the Neo-Darwinian emphasis upon explanation in terms of individual
organisms. Individuals, possessing differing competitive abilities,
differed in the number of offspring they produced - thus altering
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the gene ratios of succeeding generations. All large-scale biotic
change was taken to be the product of these differences between
individuals and the resulting alterations of population gene ratios:-
"Floristic history, because of the lack of reality
of precise associations through time and because of the
lack of functional unity of the plant community, becomes
the history of an aggregation of independently operating
dynamic systems, each of which is meeting its problems
in its own way."^9
Conveniently for Mason, the abandonment of the community-unit
theory which he advocated did not necessarily entail the leaving of
a complete vacuum in ecological theory - there already existed a
rival theory which could be called upon to take its place:-
"We may agree with Gleason [1926] as to the coincidental
nature of the plant community A. The plant community,
then, possesses only coincidental unity based upon
simultaneous environmental tolerances for the overall
environmental factors."^
The Gleasonian concept of the plant community had the great
virtue, for Mason, that he could present it as being consistent with
the individual and population emphases of Neo-Darwinian inquiry.
As Mason expressed it, the individualistic concept could be regarded
as harmonious with a physiological and genecological interpretation
of the phenomena of vegetation. Gleason's emphasis on explanation
at the level of individual plants seemed to allow the possibility of
rapprochement between vegetation science and the Neo-Darwinian
research programme.
It is important to note that compatibility with Neo-Darwinism
should not be regarded as an inherent or essential feature of the
individualistic hypothesis. There is certainly no evidence that
Gleason so conceived it. Nowhere in his expositions of the individual¬
istic hypothesis did Gleason connect it with Darwinian theory. Gleason
did not employ the term 'Natural Selection' nor any other of Mason's
key words in expositions of his views on the plant association.
Certain other botanists have chosen to regard Gleason's work in quite
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the opposite light - as anti-Darwinian in implication. Gleason's
insistence that species were distributed at random and by chance
seemed to deny the possibility of the structuring of the plant
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community by micro-environmental selection and competitive advantage.
The premises of Gleason's statistical approach could be regarded as
involving a denial of the fundamental Darwinian tenet that each species
grew where it was best adapted to grow. Mason therefore had inter¬
pretative, or at the very least selective, work to do before he
could present the Gleasonian individualistic concept as compatible
with Neo-Darwinism. This was not obviously or necessarily the case.
Gleason's work could have been interpreted in several different
ways - a Darwinian Gleason merely being one of them. It was the
high standing of the Darwinian approach in biological science generally
which led to Mason expressing Gleason's ideas in Darwinian terms.
In the forties, biological theories were being judged by yardsticks
different from those which had applied when the individualistic
hypothesis was first proposed. Mason's version of the individualistic
hypothesis was altered in response to these new circumstances.
Stanley Cain's criticisms
In the previous chapter we saw that, in the late nineteen-thirties,
Cain had much personal contact with Gleason and learned of the
individualistic hypothesis directly from its originator. Eventually
Cain had declared himself to be convinced. It is not surprising
therefore to find Cain, now Professor of Botany at the University of
Tennessee, among those who were the first to call publicly for a
re-assessment of Gleason's case.
Stanley Cain's 1947 paper, also given at the 1946 conference in
Boston, was not quite so combative as Mason's. Cain did not so much
attack the alleged unscientific basis of contemporary ecology, as
worry over it. In describing the methods used to determine vegetation
types, Cain wrote:-
" ...the exercise is an intellectual one of a different
order from everyday physics, chemistry and mathematics.
I will not say that this type of ecology is an art -
but it is something less than an exact science.
And again, later in the paper, referring to contemporary European
ecological practice, he maintained:-
"New investigations of the phytosociologists produce
results with the appearance of a high degree of accuracy,
with statistical data on coverage, frequency, density,
constancy, and fidelity, with impressive tabular
comparison of stands of an association. And yet it
seems to me having tried these methods myself, and
without impugning the honesty of the investigators,
that there is more artifice than science in the selection
of stands for representation of the association."5^
However, to Cain, it was not necessarily a bad thing that the
intuitive skills of the trained ecologist should have a role to play
in understanding the phenomena of plant communities:-
"Unless one arbitrarily limits his attention to a
single factor or a restricted group of factors ... he is
confronted with the necessity of a more or less sub¬
jective delimitation of natural areas ... the number of
operative factors is so great and the mutual effects
and interrelations so complex, that the investigator
must decide somewhat on the basis of how he feels about
the matter just where the boundary of a particular area
is to be recognised. This is in the nature of things
and not to be decried but it ... gives the cloak of
authority only to the scientist with wide experience,
broad knowledge and that imponderable which may be
called good biological sense."55
The determination of natural areas must engage the expertise of
experienced field workers, if it was to be done satisfactorily. But
while this was inevitable, the inherent susceptibility of such
procedures to criticism on the basis of lack of objectivity was a
matter of concern to Cain. And ecologists should have been, yet
had not been, modest as to the ontological status of conclusions
arrived at in this not entirely scientific manner. In Cain's
opinion, the fact that subjective criteria were employed in the
determination of associations on the ground brought into question
the objective reality of the plant association in the abstract:-
"I cannot see that the association, as usually
understood in either the large or the small [i.e. in
either the American or the European] sense, has
objective reality."56
Note that the general form of argument used here by Cain was
very similar in form to that we have already seen employed by Mason.
The attempt at persuading ecologists to accept change took the form
of an appeal to contemporary cultural criteria of what it was to be
truly objective, truly scientific. The character of the discipline
of ecology was contrasted with that of more secure, indubitably
scientific disciplines (in Mason's case genetics and physiology, in
Cain's physics, chemistry and mathematics). Ecology was found
wanting. The implication was clear. Ecology must reform itself,
become closer in methodology to those disciplines whose scientific
status was not in doubt, if it was to enhance its own position
within science as a whole.
In a mode of criticism often employed against theoretical
orthodoxy, Cain called for more attention to be given to empirical
data-gathering and naturalistic convention-free inquiry:-
"There is a surprising paucity of information as to
the exact areas of species and particularly on the
composition structure and total areas of plant
communities. I refer not to the hypothetical and
admittedly approximate areas of "association types"
according to the concepts of Clements for example but
to actual concrete specific communities on the
ground. One way of explaining what I mean is by
reference to the differences between a cover-type map
(as used in the sense of foresters to show actual
vegetation) and an associational map, as often
presented by ecologists purporting to show climaxes.
The former objective type of map is needed by plant
ecology. The latter may or may not result when
abundant objective data are available."57
Like Mason, Cain called for a reassessment of the Gleasonian
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individualistic hypothesis:-
"To the vast majority of ... ecologists ... bringing
into question the objective reality of the plant
association must seem heretical, today as it did to
Nichols (1929) when he criticized Gleason's essay of
twenty years ago on the individualistic association.
For them it is the sine qua non of their science. The
association is compared to the species. Just as a
species is made up of the individuals of a kind, so
is the association made up of association individuals
... However, believing that associations and species
are not phenomena with the same objective reality, I
wish to add my voice to the few, among them Gleason
... who have objected."58
Overall, Cain's condemnation of the state of the discipline of
ecology was not as complete as Mason's. For instance, Cain main¬
tained that it was important to retain, in their proper place, the
traditional skills of the field ecologist:-
"I wish to say plainly that no amount of physical
data can ever suffice without the opinion of an
experimental field naturalist in solving the problem
of natural areas."59
The difference between the stringency of the two men's critiques
is explicable in terms of the difference between their degree of
attachment to ecology as it was then practised. Cain was much more
a full member of the ecologists' community than Mason was. He was
Treasurer of the Ecological Society from 1938 to 1940, becoming
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Vice-President in 1953 and President in 1958. Mason had the
outsider's freedom to make sweeping suggestions for reform. He
had little investment in the practice of ecology as it then was.
Cain, on the other hand, was an insider. He had a considerable
professional commitment to ecology and it is thus understandable
that he produced a less sweeping condemnation of contemporary
practice.
Why, one might ask, did Cain advocate reform at all? Cain was,
it should be noted, a very unusual sort of ecologist to find in
America at this time. He had taken his doctorate under Cowles but
had on several occasions taken time to discuss theoretical matters
with Clements in Colorado and, as we have seen, with Gleason at the
New York Botanical Garden. Such eclecticism was rare. Not only
this, he also stood out from among his more parochial fellows by
264
taking seriously the work of the European phytosociologists. He read
the French and German literature and had tried out the European
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methods. Cain also had research interests in floristic plant
geography. And he was one of the earliest American ecologists to
take an interest in the application of mathematics to the subject.
He wrote the first American textbook to deal with quantitative
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techniques in vegetation science. He thus had a range of experience
and competence wider than that of many of his colleagues. Cain was
flexible enough to accommodate certain changes in the practice of
ecology and he was well placed to benefit from such changes.
Cain's extraordinary position was reflected in his personal
standing among his peers. Despite his undoubted ability and energy,
he was often regarded with a certain amount of misgiving by his
fellow ecologists. His cosmopolitan eclecticism drew suspicions
of dilettantism. As George Fuller put it:-
"Cain is a good man but rather inclined to be carried
away by every new doctrine."^3
Nichols discouraged his students from reading and discussing Cain's
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work. Cain was certainly an insider, when compared to Mason, but
he was less of an insider than most.
Frank Egler's criticisms
The third of the critical trio of papers which appeared in the
1947 volume of Ecological Monographs was somewhat different from the
ones already considered. Frank Egler's paper was not given at the
Boston conference, nor was it, at least primarily, a theoretical
review, as Cain's and Mason's were. That it appeared in the same
volume as the other two was a coincidence. There was no direct
consultation or collaboration between the authors. Egler had not
been at the Boston conference. In 1947, he imagined himself to be
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virtually a lone protagonist for the Gleasonian point of view.
Cain and Egler were both professional ecologists in the nineteen-
forties. They were both aware of the discipline's problems.
Furthermore their careers were linked in a more particular manner.
They both had had sustained contact with Gleason. I have already
noted, in the previous chapter, the importance of the New York
Botanical Garden as a focus for botanical activity in America.
Gleason might have retired from active ecology, but in the Botanical
Garden he was far from isolated. In the late thirties and early
forties, Egler was frequently at the Garden, researching in its
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library. He lunched at the staff table and happened to get a
place next to Gleason's. Gleason, Egler recalls, was keen to
discuss ecological matters. This was the beginning of a close
association between the two men which was to last for several years.
Eventually Egler, like Cain, was convinced of the validity of the
individualistic hypothesis. Gleason came to regard Egler as a
disciple.
Frank Egler's 1947 paper was a description of research he had
undertaken on a previously unstudied area of vegetation - on the
island of Oahu in the Hawaiian Archipelago. Egler was as
critical of the status quo in ecology as Mason or Cain had been, but
in a somewhat different manner. He claimed to be able to support
his criticism with new empirical evidence - the sort of new
evidence that Cain had stressed the importance of, but did not
supply. However, Egler's treatment of his vegetation data was
not very novel. As far as his ecological practice was concerned,
Egler offered the traditional descriptive observational style. He
went out and looked carefully at the vegetation, described what he
saw and arranged the plant communities according to what he surmised
to be the important controlling factors and the processes of
vegetational change.
Despite its appearing in a research paper, the principal thrust
of Egler's attack was still at the level of theory. Egler expressed
support for Raup and argued that circumstances were such that
cognitive change would be timely:-
"Science marches on, and American ecology appears to
be on the threshold of fundamental changes in its
conceptual structure. Old ideas have served their
time. New facts demand new concepts, unless indeed
we cling as the mediaevalists cling to Aristotle.
Considerable dissatisfaction is being voiced with the
ideas of the early twentieth century."^8
Like Cain and Mason, Egler dissented from the community-unit
theory as then conventionally employed:-
"Personally, the writer believes the association-
concept - valuable as it was at one stage in the
history of vegetation science - to have caused serious
confusions, and to have stymied the development of
this entire field of knowledge. Because of certain
connotations, the term association is not used in
this paper.
Egler refrained from employing not just one of the older key words,
but three - not just 'association' but 'succession' and 'climax' as
well. By refusing to employ their vocabulary Egler was, in effect,
rejecting much of the legacy of the founders of American ecology.
As we have seen in the last two chapters, the identification of
succession and climax was the principal motif of pre-Second World
War American ecology.
Egler asserted that questions of the direction of successional
change have more often been settled "by faith than by empirical
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knowledge". On the matter of the climax, he was agnostic:-
"When the term and the concept were first presented,
they served a very practical purpose. They represented
to our then simple understanding of vegetation change,
and in our simple northern vegetation, the one single
and only end stage. The next two decades witnessed
all sorts of limitations, encompassed by such learned
verbosity as climatic, edaphic, physiographic, mono-,
poly-, sub-, pro-, pre-, post-, dis-, and other
climaxes ... At the present, the term covers a
multitude of varying concepts for different scientists
... Until one or another of these concepts emerges
with sufficient clarity to demand a term - climax or
otherwise - I consider it best to refrain from the
use of the word."
Like Cain and Mason, Egler endorsed the individualistic
hypothesis:-
"
... the writer adopts wholeheartedly and without
exception the "individualistic concept" of the plant
community as developed by Gleason. In the light of
the writer's knowledge of botanical literature, he
considers these all-but-forgotten papers as being of
top significance in the entire development of American
vegetational thought."72
In short, Egler argued that it was time for a change and the
individualistic hypothesis was an idea whose time had come.
Continuance of the Cooperian tradition
Ecology, in the late forties, was thus in a situation of
suffering adverse scrutiny and damaging criticism from scientists
both internal and external to the field. There are of course two
standard strategies which one routinely finds used by actors in
situations where the social order is under strain. I refer to the
duality, familiar to us in politics, of reform versus revolution,
the one continually attempting to thwart the other. If Egler, Mason
and Cain may be taken as advocates of revolution - advocating
radical alteration of the theory and practice of the discipline,
seeking to discard rather than to renew the traditional systems,
then on the side of orthodoxy and reform in this admittedly simplistic
dichotomy, one might place Rexford Daubenmire of Washington State
and Henry J. Oosting of Duke University, North Carolina. Both men
had been students of Cooper at Minnesota; in fact they were doing
their doctorates there when Egler was in Minnesota doing his Masters
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- in 1934.
In the late forties, both Daubenmire and Oosting published
textbooks in which they preserved the basic framework of their
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professor's work. These texts were structured around the
traditional descriptive approach to plant communities. They embodied
the assumption of distinct vegetation types - to be recognised in
the field by observation based on long experience and training.
Unidirectional successions were assumed to change one form of
vegetation into another, a process which culminated in the climax
type. Climax vegetation was held to be determined uniquely by the
climate. Neither Daubenmire nor Oosting explicitly rejected the
mono-climax hypothesis - the hypothesis that all the vegetation
within a single climatic area is successionally related to the
highest or most mesic form of vegetation capable of growing under
the given climate - despite the fact that their mentor Cooper, among
many others, had been quite sharply critical of this aspect of
Clements's theorising. Within this very traditional framework,
there were, however, important concessions to more modern method¬
ologies. Daubenmire and Oosting both emphasised the need for greater
use of quantitative experimental and statistical techniques. Overall,
these textbooks embodied a traditionalist, conservative, only mildly
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innovative stance. They represented an attempt at continuity
between pre- and post-Second World War ecology - as did the
re-publication in 1 9A9 of a revised edition of McDougall's textbook.
In his new preface, McDougall wrote:-
"Although many excellent papers and some books on
ecological subjects have been published during recent
years, most of them have not changed our fundamental
thinking to any great extent.
These three textbooks were not liked by Egler. In 1951 he
reviewed all three together and was moved to write some of the most
vehement criticism ever produced by a writer who was never one to
pull his punches:-
"The comments on these books are not to be considered
primarily a review of their factual contents and a
spotlighting of the good and bad in omission and
commission. To the contrary, the comments are in the
nature of a critical analysis of certain methodologic
and epistemologic foundations of American ecology.
The immaturity and artlessness of some of these
foundations deserve serious scrutiny in these times
that have seen the rise of Nazi physics and Soviet
genetics. As Americans, we bugle our claim that
totalitarian straight-jacketing of the scientific
intellect destroys science. It follows as a corollary
that freedom of the scientific intellect is a precious
privilege and those who possess it have a deep obliga¬
tion to exercise it for the advancement of science.
It comes as a curious anomaly therefore to find
evidence of a self-imposed imprisonment on the part of
some scientific workers, with apparent contentment on
their part ... There are many men whose ideas and
habits of thinking are so firmly ingrained that
neither the clearest logic nor the subtlest persuasion
will lead them to reconsider their viewpoints."^
Egler invoked the Clementsian system as an example of what must
be avoided:-
"
... we have Clements, the uncompromising idealist,
the speculative philosopher, driven by some demon to
set up a meticulously orderly system of nature, as
neatly organized and arranged as the components of
Dante's Inferno ... The climax is identified with
climate and physiognomy, thus supplying two of the
most characteristic features of the Clementsian
speculative philosophy. We are then subjected to an
orderly breakdown of the climax carrying us through
a sequence of -ations, -es and -ules of associ-,
consoci-, faci-, loci-, soci-, lami-, and sat-'s, in
all their devious combinations."'''®
Egler admitted that Daubenmire and Oosting's texts were fair
and competent, if restricted, re-expressions of "what has been to
them the changeless philosophic structures they learned as students".
But Egler reiterated the arguments he had made in 1947 - new
circumstances demanded change and a departure from old ways of
ecological thought:-
"Sciences ... go through long periods of patient
plodding accumulation of data. These are tacked onto
the basic framework of the science, until sometimes it
groans with the burden of carrying such a multitude
of minutiae. Then suddenly there is revolution, an
upheaval ... a new structure appears based on entirely
new concepts ... Some American ecologists however
have felt they have attained "reality" and all that is
now necessary for themselves and their students (who
have inherited the sense of finality) is to go on
adding details to the old conceptual structure. Thus
American ecology has been stuffing itself with such
"facts" for half a century, and in the neatly
appropriate year of 1950, it is showing some cracks in
its- chitin." 80
These sweeping and fundamental condemnations and criticisms struck
home. Egler recollects that whereas Oosting eventually forgave him,
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Daubenmire never spoke to him again.
A noteworthy feature of Egler's 1951 polemic against the
contemporary state of American ecology is that he adopted a form of
argument similar to that found in Cain's or Mason's 1947 paper. He
made a damaging contrast between ecology and more prestigious
disciplines. His advocacy of radical change was likewise predicated
upon the appeal to culturally-given criteria of what it was to be
scientific. Egler, however, adopted a different paragon subject.'
Rather than reflect upon ecology's deficiencies as compared with
particular scientific disciplines, such as genetics or chemistry,
Egler chose to contrast it with the one ideal scientific discipline,
that ultimately prestigious one - the one invented by philosophers of
science. Not surprisingly, ecology is again found wanting:-
"There exists also a remarkable naiveness toward our
European cultural herita'ge in the realms of scientific
methodology, applied logic, and the philosophic
foundations of the exact sciences ... This innocence of
the principle of scientific methodology is more
insidious than appears at first glance ... until such
adults ... are willing to settle down and really think
along unaccustomed channels, they may continue to thwart
the development of American Plant Ecology. To speak
more concretely, the traditional ecologic theories were
not proposed and tentatively accepted, and verification
was not attempted by methods of logical analysis."^2
I think it is fair to say that generally disputes within ecology
at this time were not as acrimonious as the above passage from
Egler would suggest. But Egler's 1951 review and his 1947 paper,
taken together with Cain's and Mason's articles, are evidence that
there were real divisions and strains within American ecology in the
late nineteen forties and early fifties. Accepting the existence
of such divisions, one might ask why Daubenmire and Oosting were
on the side of tradition and only relatively mild innovation.
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Daubenmire and Oosting were typical middle status academics.
Both had had perfectly standard apprenticeships - both had been
students of the most mainstream of all the major teachers in the
field - W.S. Cooper. Cooper had not been damagingly close to
Clements, nor damagingly out of step with ecological orthodoxy
more generally. He was, as far as I have been able to discern,
universally respected. Attempting to work within his legacy must
have seemed a tenable strategy. Neither Daubenmire nor Oosting had
well-developed competences in any other fields, nor did they have
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experience of ecological practice outside the United States.
They were thus thoroughly socialised toward orthodox professional
ecological practice. They were not equipped to reform the discipline
by importing techniques from other disciplines or research programmes.
Both had had a long period of initial career uncertainty between
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leaving graduate school and gaining permanent employment. But in
the nineteen forties both were beginning to reap the standard
rewards of normal academic careers. Oosting had just been made a
full professor and had been appointed to the editorial board of the
journal Ecological Monographs. Daubenmire had become established
at Washington State University and was beginning to be appointed
to various committees of the Ecological Society. There must have
been little incentive for them to rock the boat.
Furthermore, they were both very good practitioners of the
old style of investigation. Daubenmire's papers are especially
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noteworthy in this respect. They constitute perhaps the finest
American development of descriptive ecology based on the community-
271
unit theory. The whole exercise was firmly based on classificatory
techniques. Types of vegetation were identified and delimited by
observation and experience and characterised in detail by quanti¬
tative species lists taken from specially selected plots. The
occurrence of vegetation types was correlated, often quantitatively,
with environmental and biotic factors. Successional relations were
determined by extrapolation. All combined to give a vivid and
comprehensive understanding of the vegetation under study. It is
not surprising that scientists capable of producing such studies
should have an interest in preserving and maintaining the cognitive
status quo - which gave meaning to this mode of investigation.
Egler, on the other hand, did not have a permanent job and did
not conspicuously appear to want one. His radically independent
turn of mind was conveniently connected to a degree of financial
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independence. He and his wife owned a thousand-acre estate in
Northern Connecticut to which he often threatened to retreat. He
had professional involvements in applied ecology, range management,
and consultancy work, all of which lessened his career investment in
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pure plant ecology. Egler was well-placed, as a comparatively
marginal, comparatively independent figure, to criticise and to
point to new directions for the discipline.
Egler cannot be said to have been successful in his task of
reform. His suggestions had little direct effect on ecologists'
practice. When the discipline did change, he was not in the van of
these developments, nor was he held to be their inspiration. To
some extent, Egler's carefully cultivated independence worked
against him. He was regarded as being eccentric, unorthodox and
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not a little troublesome. His papers were most unconventional in
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style and he refused to allow editors to alter them. His writings
clearly show his critical distance from the rest of the profession.
He was not sufficiently a member of the team to become its new
leader. Also, and perhaps more importantly, despite the unconventional
manner in which he presented his results, his research methods were
still virtually those of the old-fashioned solitary field naturalist.
His practice was based on observation and description of vegetation
and' on skill at species identification. His interpretations of
vegetational processes were couched in terms of his personal experience
of vegetation. He was not a great quantifier, using statistics only
seldom and other forms of mathematics not at all. In this respect
his practice was less innovative than Daubenmire1s and Oosting's. He
employed little in the way of investigative technology or elaborate
experimental methods. He was well read in the philosophy of science,
but however strongly he might be able to defend his subjective
methodology as truly scientific in philosophical terms, his actual
practice did not look much like that of a successful modern biologist.
He once described himself (not explicitly but the implication was
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clear enough) as a Prince of Serendip. In the dawn of the new age
of Big Science and Organization Men, the Prince of Serendip was
not likely to be much of a Pied Piper.
Similar arguments might be made as to why Cain or, a. forteriori,
why Raup (two other enfants terribles, although perhaps less terrible
than Egler) did not lead the transformation of plant ecology. In
hindsight, it seems that what was required was not theoretical or
logical argument or generalised methodological prescriptions, but
new forms of practical procedure. When the theoretical reform
came it was mediated by new investigatory techniques - techniques
which were so designed as to resemble those employed by more
prestigious biological disciplines. The new exemplar changed
theory and practice together and changed both in strategically
relevant ways - ways determined by culturally given criteria as to
what it was to be scientific.
New empirical work: R.H. Whittaker
Unbeknown to Cain or Egler, a study which did involve new
methods of field investigation was already underway. Robert H.
Whittaker, a graduate student at the University of Illinois, under¬
took, in the summer of 19^7, an intensive study of the vegetation
of the Great Smoky Mountains in Tennessee. Whittaker was aware, on
beginning the project, that there existed a diversity of opinion as
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to the nature of the fundamental units of vegetation. Whittaker's
principal supervisor was Charles Kendeigh, a zoologist who worked
93with a notion of the community-unit similar to Clements's.
Whittaker had also been taught at Illinois by Victor Shelford whose
collaborative connection with Clements I have detailed in Chapter
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Two. Whittaker had however read widely and was aware that the
European phytosociologists employed units of a different kind.
Furthermore, his second supervisor was Arthur Vestal, Gleason's
former research assistant. Vestal had remained what one might
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term a crypto-Gleasonian. He introduced Whittaker to Gleason's
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work and to the individualistic hypothesis.
Whittaker went to the Great Smokies determined to devise an
objective test that would discriminate between the various theories
of species grouping in plant communities. The technique he devised
was random sampling - placing his sample plots within the vegetation
not with a view to illustrating vegetation types, but to sample the
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vegetation as a whole. Whittaker did not set out primarily to
classify the vegetation of his study area:-
"
... methods free from the subjective difficulties
of conventional ecological procedure were sought in
order to analyse the vegetation without reference
to preconceived "associations"."97
This was a radical departure from the accepted norms of field
procedure. Random sampling of vegetation had never been done before
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in America. One factor which facilitated Whittaker's adoption of
new techniques was that he had not been thoroughly trained in the
practices of traditional plant ecology
"It [random sampling] appealed to me, first because
it was more objective ... Also I didn't know what the
natural types were, therefore how could I, why should
I, try to sample in terms of them?"99
Whittaker was a graduate student of zoology. The thesis
project was originally intended to be a study of the foliage insect
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communities of the Great Smokies. Whittaker recalled that it
was almost inadvertently that the preliminary survey of the vegetation
grew so large that it eventually constituted the final thesis by
itself.101
Using the technique of random sampling, Whittaker came to the
conclusion that none of the various theories as to the nature of the
community-unit were correct:-
"In the course of the vegetation analysis the author
felt himself compelled by his data to accept fully the
individualistic hypothesis of Gleason, and to seek new
ways of constructing an understanding of communities
from an individualistic beginning."1®
Whittaker recalled that he came to this conclusion before he was
aware of the fresh support given to Gleason by Cain and Mason:-
"Independent and simultaneous - you can say what
you like about the time being ripe for this." ®
In his description of the vegetation of the Great Smokies,
Whittaker described a pattern of continuously changing species
composition, along environment gradients - in this case, the obvious
ones of elevation and exposure. There were no definite vegetation
classes. Species distributed themselves individualistically, each
with its own maxima at a different point along the gradient.
Substratal species, shrubs and herbs, distributed themselves
independently of the dominants.
Whittaker coined the term 'gradient analysis' to describe his
new approach to vegetation:-
"Gradient analysis seems one of the most fruitful
and realistic means by which vegetation can be studied.
By it the investigator can free his study from the
difficulties of pre-conceived associations and work
in terms of one aspect of ecological reality - the
actual distributions of community members in the
environment and their relative status in different
communities."1®
As a graduate student, Whittaker had very little background in
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statistics or mathematics. Nevertheless one of the attractions
gradient analysis had for him was its inherent quantifiability and
its statistical nature:-
"These groups ... show distribution of trees by
their percentages of the stand and of the canopy against
the primary gradients of elevation and site moisture-
balance. The isa-rhythms [sic] of percentages drawn
outline the binomial solids, the distribution-forms
described as peaks and ridges, and show their relation
to one another, to the gradients and their interaction,
and to the major communities. The most impressive
features of this series of charts are, first, the
apparent universality of binomial solids or some
modification of them as the basic distribution pattern,
and second, the general distributional independence
of different species."11-^
Gradient analysis would banish subjectivism from ecology:-
"Daubenmire was saying that because you can see what
looks to the human interpreter like a discontinuity,
there has to be a discontinuity there and your method
is wrong if you can't show that. What I think I see
is correct. Of course it's not so - we see what in many
cases appear to be well-defined zones on mountains
from a distance but when we study them in detail they
intergrade with one another. The findings of quanti¬
tative analysis are necessarily stron r than the
visual impressions of discontinuity."
Furthermore gradient analysis promised the development of a truly
qauntitative ecology:-
"The techniques we have been using have become
increasingly mathematical, as we have been seeking more
objective, more efficient, more accurate ways of
dealing with vegetation. I think that would be the
major change in this area of research."^®
Further evidence that the change Whittaker was advocating for
the discipline was one which would bring its character nearer that
of more prestigious botanical disciplines is afforded by noting whence
Whittaker first received support for his new ideas. Whittaker was
well aware of the radical nature of his dissent from conventional
plant ecology:-
"I felt very alone - in a position for which Gleason
had been castigated."1^
He was grateful, therefore, for the support he received from Wendell
'Red' Camp:-
"Red Camp found out about my work, was very interested
in, and was an enthusiastic supporter. The individualistic
hypothesis fitted in with the way he liked to see
things. So, yes, I had extensive contact and support
with him."111-'
111
Camp's support for Whittaker began very early - in 19^7 Camp
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was not a plant ecologist. He called himself a biosystematist.
He was among the first to develop a genetic understanding of the
segregation of ecotypes. The biosystematists employed the new
Mendelian genetics to interpret floristic distribution and species
113
variation in the field. This was a rapidly developing research
programme at this time. Camp and his fellows were doing what we
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have seen Mason advocating in 1947 - interpreting population phenomena
in genetic and physiological terms.
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Camp had worked in the Great Smokies. He thus understood the
floristic and vegetational background to Whittaker's work. Further¬
more, he was, at this time, a member of staff of the New York
Botanical Garden. He knew Gleason well and he had had many discussions
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with Gleason on taxonomic and ecological matters. Camp saw the
possibility of using the individualistic hypothesis to achieve an
understanding of communities in terms of population genetics. This
was very similar to what Whittaker intended:-
"I think, myself, that the future of field plant
ecology lies along the lines of population analysis
which I am developing and which others of my generation
will work out."116
Whittaker had thus created an ecological theory which harmonised
with the prestigious Neo-Darwinian synthesis, and which Camp was,
for several reasons, well placed to understand.
However, a new form of investigatory practice, fresh data, and
good relations with fashionable disciplines were necessary but not
sufficient conditions for the successful reform of plant ecology
and the general introduction of the individualistic hypothesis.
Whittaker was at the wrong end of power relations within the
discipline.
Whittaker was young. He had done his radical new work while a
graduate student. He was to have difficulties finding a satisfactory
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job and getting his Smoky Mountain work published. The Ph.D.
thesis was examined and accepted in 1948 but the material was not
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published until 1956. After several false starts, Whittaker
submitted a manuscript to Ecological Monographs:-
"I had substantial trouble with the editor, who was
H.J. Oosting. I would, in retrospect, concede that
Oosting was doing his best to deal fairly with me and
that the troubles, as an author, were primarily
myself. But anyway it was a long negotiation to get
that through some adverse reviews ... I was getting
some adverse reviews because what I said was unpalatable
to conservative ecologists."119
The main sticking point was, ostensibly, the new sampling
technique:-
"I was told by Daubenmire, for example, that it was
not scientifically valid to sample the way I had done
because one would get a lot of stands that were inter¬
mediate or disturbed and were inappropriate to the
recognition of the types one was trying to seek and
demonstrate."^20
A sampling technique which was not designed with the asummption of
community-units would not inspire the confidence of a community-
unit theorist and therefore would not count as an objective test.
Whereas Whittaker appealed to criteria of objectivity pertaining
outwith plant ecology, traditional ecologists appealed to criteria
internal to the discipline. The two were quite different.
A certain amount of ill-feeling was aroused:-
"These men, remember, had devoted themselves to a
lifetime of research on vegetation, using a certain
set of assumptions and for me to come along and ^
challenge their assumptions did not please them."
J.T. Curtis enters ecology
In the late forties and early fifties, Whittaker was not poised
to lead a reform of ecological theory and practice. However, again
quite independently, another investigation of the basis of the
community-unit theory had begun. The principal mover of this, John
T. Curtis, was more successful in attracting favourable attention
and acceptance. The work of Curtis and his associates established
the individualistic hypothesis upon a new quantitative base and gained
for it a central position in American ecological theory.
John Thomas Curtis was born in Waukeska, Wisconsin in 1913, and
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attended Carroll College in Waukeska. He displayed an interest
in natural history from his high school days, becoming a protege of
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the Milwaukee Museum's Botanical Curator, Albert Fuller. He
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published three short papers while still an undergraduate at Carroll.
One of these was a contribution to floristic botany, recording his
discovery of a new hybrid of the native Wisconsin lady-slipper orchid,
Cyripedium. The other two were on ornithological observations.
Judging by these early papers, it is safe to assume that Curtis had
already gained considerable competence in natural history before
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starting his graduate training.
Curtis graduated A.B. from Carroll in 1934 and went on to the
University of Wisconsin, Madison, where in 1935, he gained the degree
of A.M. Curtis's graduate research was directed by the most eminent
botanist active in the University of Wisconsin at that time, Benjamin
Duggar. Duggar was a plant physiologist and phytopathologist of
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international renown. Curtis worked for his master's degree and
his doctorate under Duggar on the general problem of orchid seed
germination. The study was directed along three main lines:-
environmental influences on germination, seedling nutrition, and
mycorrhizal relations. Investigation of the last formed the most
detailed part of the thesis. Several aspects of orchid mycorrhiza
were studied including the distribution of the fungi and the degree
of specificity between fungal species and the species of host orchid.
While a graduate student, Curtis also worked with Dr. Alexander
Hollaender, a colleague of Duggar's, on the effect of ultra-violet
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radiation on micro-organisms. It should be noted that Curtis's
physiological investigations, while lacking nothing in technical
sophistication by the standards of the nineteen thirties, were not
narrowly conceived laboratory studies. On the contrary, his research
involved a certain amount of field work and aspects of it were, at
/
least potentially, relevant to ecological questions. This broad
conception of physiological inquiry is in contrast to the narrow
scope of much physiological work being done at the time, but it
should not be thought of as in any way peculiar to Curtis. It was
typical of the style of botanical investigation promoted and
sponsored by Benjamin Duggar, who sought to make physiological
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research relevant to the life of the plant as a whole. In this
regard, Duggar was interested both in agronomy and applied biology,
on the one hand, and in environmental physiology on the other.
Duggar's concern with environmental science is further evidenced
by the fact that in 1938, he, together with Norman Fassett, set up
the first plant ecology course ever to be taught at Wisconsin. This
was the year after Curtis gained his doctorate and he now held the
post of instructor in the Botany department. He was Duggar's
assistant and Duggar encouraged him to help with the teaching of
the plant ecology course.
While still a student of Duggar's, Curtis was also involved in
another line of work in which the ecological and the physiological
were intimately combined. He spent his 1935 summer vacation as
botanist in charge of photosynthesis work at the Trout Lake
Limnological Laboratory of the Wisconsin Geological and Natural
History Survey. The University of Wisconsin, at this time, was the
home of a very important programme of limnological studies, which
constituted the most advanced research into the fresh-water habitat
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then being undertaken in North America. These studies had begun
with the work of E.A. Birge, and had been continued under the
general direction of his collaborator, Chancey Juday, who in 1931
became Professor of Zoology in Madison.
In the 1930s, Juday began to turn his attention away from
descriptive limnology and towards measurement of the rate of energy
fixation and the subsequent transfer of energy between the trophic
levels of a lake. During the summer of 1935, Curtis worked with
Juday upon experiments designed to determine whether algae in their
natural habitat had photosynthetic productivity similar to those of
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cultured algae in the laboratory. This work, published in 1937,
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was one of the first bioassays of productivity in the field.
In 1940, Curtis was granted a semester's leave of absence to go
to the University of Pennsylvania and set up there a physiology
course of the type that Duggar taught at Madison. The Botany
Department in Madison was eager to have him back, and by the end
of 1940 he had returned, this time as an Assistant Professor.
Experimental physiology still formed the major part of his research
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effort, but he was steadily developing his interest in ecology.
In 1941 he took over Duggar's half of the teaching of the plant
ecology course, and in the same year he founded a course entitled
"Problems and methods of plant conservation". This was the first
course in conservation in the Botany Department at Wisconsin, a
university which was already involved in conservation studies with
the work of Aldo Leopold who held a chair in Wildlife Management and
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was a close friend of Curtis.
In 1942, Curtis joined the Ecological Society of America. He
had not yet published his first paper on a purely ecological subject,
but he was more actively engaged in ecological research than he had
been before. He had extended his work on the native orchids to
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include study of the plant assemblages within which the orchids
grew, so as to be able to relate studies of their physiology and
autecology to their synecological context - again to make the
physiological inquiry more ecologically relevant. Also, among
several other projects in physiological ecology, his experience
with mycorrhiza was being employed in an investigation of the
problems involved in the artificial regeneration of pine forest.
These involvements in ecological research may be considered as
more or less natural extensions of his earlier work in physiology.
They were all applications of his physiological expertise within
an ecological context.
In the early nineteen forties Curtis made a distinct shift
in the emphasis of his research - away from the physiology, pure or
environmentally applied, which characterised his early research,
towards mainstream community ecology. We can see this from the
fact that, in 1941, Curtis applied to the Guggenheim Foundation for
a fellowship to allow him to investigate, full-time for a year, the
phytosociology of the Lake Forest. This project represented a new
departure for Curtis, since the proposed investigation would not
involve the application of physiological expertise to an ecological
problem. It was rather a research topic entirely within vegetation
science. Curtis intended spending his Guggenheim year with W.S.
Cooper in Minnesota.
Curtis thus entered the ranks of plant ecology already with an
established reputation in the more prestigious field of physiology.
And yet, it is important to note, Curtis also possessed an interest
in natural history, well-developed and of long standing, a talent for
work in the field and experience of ecological problems. He was
this well-equipped to adapt quickly to his new intellectual
environment.
Curtis came into ecology with a mission to cleanse the stables,
"to go far toward establishing ecology as a science instead of an
134
art". He desired an ecology that was "scientific, with rigorous
135
requirements based on quantitative data". As a physiologist he
was well aware of what were the culturally given criteria of science.
These were the standards to which ecology must adhere.
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Curtis's entrance into ecology was delayed. He was not long
into his Guggenheim Fellowship at Minneapolis when his plans were
affected by the involvement of the United States in the Second
World War. With the capture of the Malaysian plantations by the
Japanese, the Allies were in danger of suffering a serious shortage
of rubber. Alternative sources were urgently sought. In Haiti,
the United States Emergency Rubber Project was set up to investigate
the rubber production potential of species of Cryprostegia. Curtis
was made its Research Director.
Curtis remained in the Caribbean until 1945, and it was not
until late that year that he returned to Wisconsin. This enforced
migration produced important intellectual consequences. In Haiti,
Curtis gained experience of exotic vegetation. He undertook a
136
study of the palo verde woodland. Also he came into contact with
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experts in tropical botany, notably Lester R. Holdridge. Curtis
found the ideas of plant communities which he had gained in temperate
America difficult to apply to tropical vegetation.
On his return to Madison, he wrote to Cooper to say that he no
longer intended to continue with his Guggenheim project. He no
longer saw it as a feasible or worthwhile piece of research:-
"I find myself with markedly different views
concerning the general field of plant ecology than I
had when I was last in Minneapolis. First hand study
of the immensely complex group of tropical plant
associations has more or less undermined my faith in
the possibilities of arriving at any clear-cut
conclusion regarding the relationship of our own
seemingly simple plant societies. The disillusionment,
in fact, has been so great that I now entertain serious
doubts concerning the validity of the entire plant-
association concept. In other words, the idea that
any considerable numbers of plant species possess
environmental requirements sufficiently alike to
permit them to form sociological units, having
definable and meaningful composition, structure and
development seems to me highly debatable. At least,
I am convinced that no meaningful definition can be
forthcoming until we have far greater knowledge
concerning the requirements and the behavior of the
individual species than we now possess. ,,138
Curtis conceived a grand plan to put matters right. By the end of
1946, he had embarked upon several long-term studies, or rather a
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single long-term project with several aspects. Curtis, skilled at
raising research grants, persuaded the Wisconsin Alumni Research
Foundation to fund a ten-year project aimed at describing and
investigating the vegetation of Wisconsin. This support provided
not only research money for Curtis and other faculty members working
with him, but also financed a steady stream of graduate students.
Curtis also attracted research funding in smaller_ quantities from
several other sources. Quite quickly a considerable team of workers
gathered around Curtis in Madison.
In the ten-year period from 1946, ten Ph.D.s and nine M.S.
degrees were awarded to graduate students associated with the
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project. All worked on topics picked for them by Curtis. Each
played a role in the overall plan. Grant Cottam, a graduate student
until 1948, joined the faculty in 1949 and continued to work
closely with Curtis. Several other members of the Botany department,
including Norman Fassett and Henry C. Greene, were also involved in
aspects of the research.
Curtis was a skilful and inspiring project director:-
"He was very much the leader and you wound up after
you got an education under Curtis being a disciple ...
The graduates were a closely-knit group. They liked
Curtis. We all met together once a week for lunch -
and it was friendly half-social, half-business ...
He was an excellent teacher and he spent hours and
hours with the graduate students - each of them had a
one hour appointment every week. He kept their nose
to the grindstone."'1^
New techniques
One of Curtis's great concerns was methodology. Methodological
innovation was necessary to establish "ecology as a science instead
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of an art". A considerable advance was made in 1947, when Curtis
and Cottam successfully applied the surveyor's method of 'random
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pairs' to the sampling of forest vegetation. This technique
allowed quantitative data on woodland to be generated much more
quickly than ever before:-
"
... we had methods where one man could go out and
sample, say, four stands in a day and in the course of
a summer collect data on a hundred or so stands.
Because of this we had a lot more data to work with.
Up to that time most of the papers had been written
over a single stand or two or three stands. But Curtis
immediately put his students to work gathering data on
lots of stands.
The quantitative techniques developed by the European phyto-
sociologists were studied, modified and applied to the grassland
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vegetation of the state. Curtis and his students pioneered the
use of punched cards and computing machines for the storage and
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manipulation of vegetational data. Field experiments on the
effect of fire and perturbation upon study plots were undertaken
in the University's Arboretum.
In 1947, upon submitting the results of an early series of
these experiments to Ecology, Curtis experienced some difficulty
in getting the material published:-
"
... to judge from the reviewers' comments they
objected not on the basis of how the material was
presented but rather on what was said ... This is not
the first indication I have had that our Wisconsin
idea of learning about the dynamics of plant formations
through their experimental manipulation ... is a little
ahead of its time ... We are not discouraged but will
proceed according to plan ... In future we will restrict
our papers for "Ecology" to those dealing with
traditional descriptive ecology since we do carry on
such work as a necessary adjunct to the experimental
establishment program."1^
I
The paper was eventually published by the American Midland Naturalist.
Curtis did not have such troubles often. He was an experienced
author, having already published many articles in the physiology
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journals, and he knew how to please the editors of periodicals.
After 1950, the Wisconsin school had little difficulty getting their
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papers published. The iconoclastic Whittaker, by contrast, was
still having chronic problems getting some of his material published
150
as late as 1960.
By 1951, Curtis was on the editorial board of Ecology and able
to exercise his influence not only to get innovative material into
the journal, but to keep old-fashioned work out and to impose his
standards upon the discipline-. Indeed, he did not confine the
exercise of such influence to Ecology. In 1959 he wrote to Oosting,
the editor of Ecological Monographs:-
"I cannot resist the urge to write you and complain
bitterly about the publication of Martin's paper on
Algonquin park in the new monographs. This is the
worst piece of ecological tripe I have read in years.
How did it ever get by your editorial board? It is
filled with unsupported assertions, contains only
limited data from single stands chosen with a precon¬
ceived view in mind ... To me it does not seem right to
open the pages of our journals to the exposition of
hare-brained ideas that are totally unsupported by
the evidence. We all have a responsibility to see that
ecology remains scientific, with rigorous requirements
based on quantitative data. This paper fulfills none
of the requirements."^
New theory - the continuum
One of the first of the graduate students Curtis put to work
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on the random pairs sampling method was Robert P. Mcintosh.
Mcintosh recollected that the ease with which data could now be
collected rendered possible a new approach to vegetation sampling:-
"A good part of the whole approach was that you got
lots of data ... The distinction I am sure was quite
clear in our minds that against the older approach
whereby you classified subjectively and then went in
and sampled your pre-classified groups as representatives,
put these together as descriptive of what you had
already classified - this kind of approach [random
pairs] allowed you to put things together come what
may rather than simply describe what you have previously
classified.
Using the quadrat method a sample of woodland might take a
week or more to complete. Therefore each sample had to be carefully
placed so as to be optimally useful. When more than one could be
done in a day, the investment in each was less. Sample plots could
be placed more speculatively, with less of a fixed idea in the
investigator's mind as to what each was intended to display.
It was clear to the Wisconsin group that their early attempts
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at classification had been arbitrary and, hence, unsatisfactory.
They had few guidelines on which to work. Curtis had newly become
an ecologist - when Mcintosh arrived in Wisconsin in 1946, he was
still teaching physiology. His ecology was largely self-taught -
he had no developed system of classification to introduce his
students to. Indeed, he was sceptical of all the existing systems.
The examples of classification in the ecological literature were
not precise or detailed enough to function as working models:-
"
... in the literature, of course, there were
fairly explicit descriptions of oak-woods, maple woods,
actually several kinds of oak-woods and as I went
around and qualitatively tried to figure how these
things fitted in - then it was just very difficult -
because none of these papers spelled out the criteria
- they generally don't - they are more or less like
and so on."''55
So, like Whittaker in the Great Smokies, Curtis's students
worked without a detailed image of what the constituent associations
in their study vegetation might be. Unlike Whittaker, they did not
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deliberately set out to sample at random. But they were able
to sample more freely and speculatively than ever before. This had
a similarly disorganising effect on the data produced. They had,
as Mcintosh recognised, a distinctively different approach - an
approach which, by its very nature, produced large amounts of data
- data which would not fit into any existing scheme of vegetational
157
classification.
Curtis and Mcintosh were, thus, faced with a problem. How were
they to organise into a publishable form the large amounts of data
158
that the new sampling technique had generated? In 1 948 and
1949, Mcintosh worked on the problem:-
"
... one of the first approaches we took was the
mechanical strip method. It's just a big board with
a little strip across the bottom and we cut long
narrow white plastic strips and then marked quantities
and then basically just lined them up and shuffled
them back and fore - trying in effect optimally by
eye-balling to see how the species distributed. Since
it was the old tradition that black oak was the one
end and sugar maple was the other, so we generally
started out like that. I was doing all the mechanics
of this because John had lots of other things to do.
But we put the black oak at one end and the sugar
maple at the other and saw how the others fell. And
then juggled them to optimum - to see whether you could
make the smoothest curve. You got pretty thoroughly
into the series of patterned curves. Then with all
the tree species you got the continuum-type sequence."
In other words, the best way to organise the stands appeared
to be into a sequence of continuous variation, each dominant
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gradually peaking in frequency, and then dropping out along a
continuum between stands dominated by sugar maple, Acer saccharum
and stands dominated by black oak, Quercus velutina. There were no
distinct 'associations'. Each species had its optimum occurrence
at a different point on the scale.
This idea of an 'upland forest continuum' without definite
classes within it was first presented by Mcintosh and Curtis at the
meeting of the Ecological Society in Columbus, Ohio in September
160
1950. The paper attracted little comment. The most remarkable
event of the conference for Curtis was his discovery that Whittaker
was working along similar lines.
Later in the same year, Curtis and Cottam went to another
meeting in Cleveland to present related material
"I remember that Curtis was very apprehensive when
we went to Cleveland ... He expected to be attacked.
He expected we would both be attacked, we both gave
papers. But we weren't."1^
The Mcintosh and Curtis manuscript on the upland forest continuum
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was readily accepted by Ecology and appeared in the summer of 1951.
Meanwhile in Madison, Curtis's students were being set the task of
applying the idea of the continuum to other types of vegetation. A
total of nine papers were presented by Curtis and his students to
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the 1951 Minneapolis meeting of the Ecological Society. Four
of these described new continua. Again there was little controversy.
Curtis was not altogether pleased by the calm reaction to the Wisconsin
work:-
"In fact we were badly disappointed at the recent
Minneapolis meeting at finding very few who either
agreed or disagreed. We were beginning to think that
our work was making no impression of any kind."''®
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Curtis was a forceful public speaker and formidable in argument.
All his papers, and those of his students, were very carefully
prepared and presented. He was not an opponent to engage with lightly.
Furthermore, his approach was more quantitative than was then
standard, and doubtless this inhibited comment from mathematically-
unsophisticated audiences. However, one of the most important
factors in easing the acceptance of the Wisconsin work seems to have
been a widespread confusion as to what the continuum actually referred to.
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As described above, the upland forest continuum consisted of a
series with black oak at one end and sugar maple at the other. This
was 'traditional', as Mcintosh put it, because the black oak was
regarded as being a xeric, pioneer species and the sugar maple as
being a more mesic, climax species. Thus the two ends of the
Wisconsin continuum coincided with the two ends of a perfectly
conventional successional series. Furthermore, much of the
vocabulary with which Curtis and Mcintosh described the upland
forest continuum was borrowed from the language of successional
theory
"The sequence of the species in this pattern is
such that pioneer species are at one end and climax
species at the other ... The results of this study
... indicate that Acer saccharum is the tree species
best equipped to persist in the terminal forests of
the area. All other species are less efficient in
this respect and their relative degree of 'climaxness'
may be evaluated by the spatial relations of their
optimum development curves ... " '
The position of species along the continuum was referred to by
'climax adaptation numbers'. In one schematic description of the
continuum, the species were connected to one another by arrows which
lay in the same direction as, under Cowlesian and Clementsian theory,
progressive successional change was held to occur.^
Thus, despite the explicit support voiced by Curtis and Mcintosh
for the Gleasonian hypothesis and despite the lack of any explicit
mention of dynamic relations between the stands, the 1951 description
of the continuum lent itself to the interpretation that what was
being characterised was not a continuous series within climax forest,
but a sere between pioneer and climax vegetation. That seres were
at least occasionally continuous was an accepted part of orthodox
ecological theory. Thus it was easy for the traditional ecologist
to interpret Curtis's work as a very elegant quantitative des¬
cription of a continuous sere. This seems to have been the basis
on which the paper was accepted by D.B. Lawrence for publication
in Ecology:-
"I would suggest that you reconsider the use of the
term "ecological adaptation number" [later changed to
climax adaptation number] which seems to me ambiguous
and could mean almost anything. Why not call that idea
the "sere number" or "succession number"?''®
Whittaker, on the other hand, by continually emphasising the
mature, undisturbed climax nature of the vegetation he studied in
the Smokies, denied the traditional ecologists the opportunity of
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accepting his work as a description of a continuous succession.
Whittaker confronted orthodox theory earlier and more directly than
Curtis did.
Lawrence was not foolishly or gratuitously misunderstanding
Curtis. I would argue that the Wisconsin group itself took some
time to decide on the status of the continuum. In 1949, Curtis
seems to have thought of it principally as a description of
succession:-
"We have erected a succession index for the purpose
of classifying upland hardwood on a scale varying from
pioneer species on one end to climax species on the
other. ""^I
Even as late as 1956, Curtis still regarded the upland forest
continuum as, at least partly, a description of a dynamic process
of succession:-
"You are right in your assumption that most of the
types in the continuum are not permanent but will be
followed by others higher on the scale in the absence
of disturbance. The terminal forests (climax, if you
will) on the other hand tend to change much more
slowly, always in the direction of sugar maple.
The idea of the continuum as a description of continuous
variation between mature climax stands emerged only gradually. Like
the development of the idea of the community-unit described in the
first chapter, the discovery of its antithesis, the continuum, was
a process, not a unit-event. It emerged only gradually from
Mcintosh and Curtis's deliberations over their board and their
plastic strips. And, for a long period, the distinction between
the continuum and conventional descriptions of succession was
blurred. The early expressions of the continuum idea contained
successional connotations. These connotations allowed adherents
of the community-unit theory to interpret Curtis's results as
compatible with their own views on vegetation. It seems that this
defused much potential controversy, allowing the Wisconsin work
an easier passage than it might otherwise have experienced.
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In 1955, in the published version of the prairie continuum
paper, Curtis explicitly stated that a continuum existed between
mature climax vegetation stands. Having described a continuous
variation between dry, mesic and wet prairies, he maintained
"There is no evidence whatever that the wet prairies
are capable of becoming mesic prairies through any
reaction their members may have on the habitat, nor can
the dry prairies so change their environment as to
become mesic."'' '3
In other words, the continuum was no longer associated with
successional change. It had come to be regarded as a distinctively
different phenomenon.
Articulation of the continuum exemplar
In 1952, Curtis gave a paper on the continuum idea at a
symposium in St. Louis, organised by Stanley Cain. The prominence
which Curtis had already achieved as an opponent of the community-
unit theory is clear from Cain's invitation
"It is obvious that such a matter [vegetation
classification] can't be handled in any adequate manner
without the continuum being represented. And the
continuum can only be adequately represented by
John T. Curtis. "*7^
Whittaker was not invited to speak at the symposium. Whittaker's
'gradient analysis' and Curtis's 'continuum' were virtually
175
identical concepts. But Wisconsin had become identified as
the sole source of the new approach. Cain described Curtis as "the
176
father and leading exponent of the concept of the continuum".
In the 1952 symposium, Curtis was able to refer to studies,
undertaken upon a large variety of vegetation types, which supported
the continuum theory. Continua had been found not only in the
southern hardwood and the prairie, but also in the northern coniferous
forest, the herbaceous understory of both coniferous and hardwood
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forest, among epiphytic lichen and soil fungi. There was even a
178
study of the continuously varying distribution of nesting birds.
Curtis's students were articulating the continuum exemplar in all
directions.
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Another noteworthy feature of Curtis's presentation in St.
Louis was that he made a parallel between the continuum model and
explanatory devices recently developed in biosystematics:-
"This variation commonly shows a continuous
progression of changing combinations of both dominant
and subordinate series, resulting in a vegetational
continuum, rather than a series of separate, discrete
and identifiable segments. The situation is comparable
to the case in taxonomy when the breeding barriers
between the two species break down. The resulting
continuous variates may be studied but not
classified. "179
This was not simply a rhetorical connection. The leading bio-
systematists Wendell Camp, whom we have seen also took an interest
in Whittaker's work, and Edgar Anderson were frequent visitors to
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Madison. They followed Curtis's work with great interest, as he
did theirs. The two developments, both employing new methods in
traditional fields, were parallel responses to the changed intellectual
climate produced by the transformation of the life sciences by the
development of genetics and the new Darwinian synthesis.
Acceptance of the individualistic hypothesis
Curtis proclaimed himself to be a disciple of Gleason:-
"Throughout my phytosociological research I have
constantly been stimulated by the ideas of H.A. Gleason,
whom I consider to be the most outstanding plant
ecologist of all time. He was so far ahead of his time
that we have not yet caught up to him."181
He presented the Wisconsin work as a vindication of Gleason's early
dissent from the community-unit theory. The continuum was the
direct lineal descendant of the individualistic hypothesis. However,
like Mason, Curtis felt it necessary to re-interpret and modify
the individualistic hypothesis in the light of a new intellectual
environment. In contemporary theories of plant behaviour, each
species was precisely adapted to its own micro-environment or
niche. Thus the role given to pure chance as an explanation for
species distribution was diminished in Curtis's version of the
individualistic hypothesis, as it had been in Mason's:-
"I believe that the continuum concept to be only a
slight modification of the individualistic concept,
291
in that it holds that species assemblages are formed
by chance factors but that the innate adaptational
behaviors of the available flora will imprint a
pattern upon the results. All mixtures of species
are not possible, only some of them.""1®
The individualistic hypothesis thus did not survive as a single
unit-idea. It was altered as it was revived. The individualistic
hypothesis showed the same essentially protean character as the
community-unit theory it displaced. It was actively adapted and
re-shaped by its utilisers in light of new problems and new
circumstances.
By 1952, the Wisconsin work was beginning to attract widespread
attention:-
"Our last paper on the northern continuum apparently
was the straw that broke the camel's back. I am
getting requests for all four papers at the rate of^
two or three a week from all corners of the world."
It was discovered that similar work was being done in Australia
and that the tropical ecologists were also beginning to doubt the
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validity of the association concept. Follow-up studies had
begun elsewhere in America. Stanley Cain wrote to Curtis:-
"This very pregnant idea [the continuum] is, as you
know better than anyone else, stimulating lots of
work. I expect a deluge of papers concerning it in
the next few years. See what you've done."''®
The exemplars offered by the continuum work were rapidly being
adopted outside Wisconsin. There were still controversies to come,
but Curtis was probably justified in his summing-up of the position
of the competing theories in 1955:-
"Its current status seems to be a state of flux,
with the great majority of investigators rapidly
coming around to the Gleason individualistic hypothesis
or a reasonable facsimile thereof. The last major
holdout appears to be in the group of range managers
in the Plains States who are still imbued with
Clementsian doctrine."^®
The authority of the Wisconsin school was enhanced by the
increased mathematical sophistication of their approach to vegetation.
From the mid-fifties, they began to employ techniques whereby
stands were ordered not simply along a single continuum, but along
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several continua simultaneously. This technique, known as Multiple
Ordination, was first devised in 1954 by Roger Bray, another of
187
Curtis's students. A further important landmark was the publica¬
tion in 1959 of Curtis's large and impressive book The Vegetation of
188
Wisconsin. This encapsulated the results of the ten-year project
begun in 1947. Based on many man-years of research by Curtis and
his students, The Vegetation of Wisconsin was a regional study
without rival in the United States.
Some indication of the success of the Wisconsin school is
provided by the fact that three of Curtis's papers were among the
101 most highly cited botanical articles during the period from
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1961 to 1972. One of these highly cited papers was the original
continuum paper by Curtis and Mcintosh, and another was the original
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multiple ordination paper by Bray and Curtis. None of Whittaker's
papers appear on this list. So in 1959 Curtis was able to conclude:-
"
... there is no longer any vocal opposition to the
idea of a continuum by any responsible ecologist. It
is an accepted approach and as such does not need to
be continually tested or reproved."1^
In fact, Curtis was being somewhat over-sanguine. Daubenmire, for
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instance, still had some vocal opposition to make. But by the
nineteen-seventies, it was true that no reputable ecologist in the
English-speaking world worked routinely with the idea that vegetation
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occurred in distinct and definite associations. Classification
of vegetation was, of course, still a major research activity, but
the units of classification were generally regarded not as natural
kinds, but as instrumentally-useful categories.
Conclusions
In the introduction to the thesis, I pointed to the fact that
science is an exclusive and hierarchical institution. I argued that
the disciplinary history of ecology must take into account its
position within the larger institution of science. The behaviour of
ecologists has been shaped by the discipline's chronic problem of
comparatively low status within the scientific community. We saw,
in Chapter Two, how Clements sought to mimic, the vocabulary and
rhetoric of physiology in order to guide ecology toward scientific
respectability. The present chapter presents many more examples of
ecologists responding to an awareness that their practice was being
found wanting in the light of the culturally accepted criteria of
scientific knowledge.
We have seen how, in the new intellectual environment created
by the success of the New Darwinian Synthesis, these problems were
accentuated. American ecology's traditional practice seemed old-
fashioned and unglamorous. Ecological research was unattractive to
grant-giving bodies. The specialty's personnel was not increasing
in number. Furthermore, ecology seemed unable to play a part in the
harnessing of science to the national effort. This situation led
certain ecologists to call for reform within the discipline to bring
its practice into line with that of higher-status biological
disciplines such as physiology and genetics.
Although the need for reform was widely accepted, the extent of
the reforms advocated varied greatly. Daubenmire and Oosting
advocated only mild innovations concentrated on introducing more
quantification and experiment within the cognitive framework which
they had inherited from their teacher, W.S. Cooper." They retained
the community-unit as the primary object of inquiry. Mason, Cain
and Egler, however, called for much more radical reforms and, in
particular, the re-assessment of Gleason's individualistic hypothesis.
I have argued that part of the attraction of the individualistic
hypothesis was that it could readily be presented as being harmonious
with the individual and population emphases of the New Darwinian
Synthesis.
I also conjectured that the extent of reform which each actor
advocated varied according to degrees of commitment to contemporary
ecological practice. Daubenmire and Oosting, mainstream middle-
status academics with relatively narrow ranges of expertise, advocated
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only mild reform. Mason, Cain and Egler, with a wide range of
skills and interests, were less attached to the old forms of
practice and made sweeping condemnations of it. Even among these
three, differences may be seen. Mason and Egler, one with his base
in a different but related field, the other prepared to move out of
ecology altogether, expressed their criticisms more strongly and
were more radical in their proposals than was Cain.
What were required for successful reform were not polemics or
prescriptions, but new exemplars - new models of ecological practice
which were similar in form, at least apparently, to those of the
higher status biological disciplines. This was what Whittaker and
Curtis attempted to provide. I noted that it was still possible to
do progressive work in the old ecological style and that neither
Curtis's work nor Whittaker's provided a logical refutation of the
older theories. In principle, the new work could have been accommo¬
dated within the older cognitive framework. But the social problems
of the discipline were such that cognitive change was strategically
advantageous.
In the reception afforded the work of Whittaker and Curtis,
the hierarchical distribution of authority in science exercised its
effects. Whittaker was first to invent new methods of investigation
and to supply new data from which he argued not for the community-
unit theory, but the individualistic hypothesis. However, it was
the work of Curtis and his associates which was taken up by other
ecologists and which led to the general revival of the individualistic
hypothesis, or something very like it.
Whittaker was young, inexperienced and iconoclastic. He worked
on his own. He had difficulty getting his work published. Experienced
ecologists were able to cast aspersions on the scientific validity
of his methods. Curtis, however, entered ecology trailing glory from
his success as a physiologist. He saw the importance of devising new
research techniques. He was well aware of what counted as scientific
rigour and he was able to ensure that his work and the work of his
students reached the appropriate standards. Avenues for publication
were open to him. Curtis was, in many ways, a formidable opponent.
His challenge to the ecological orthodoxy could not be contained as
readily as Whittaker's.
A key feature of Curtis's success was his establishment of a
productive team of investigators - the Wisconsin school as it came
195to be known. The new techniques devised in Wisconsin were
articulated rapidly in several directions at once. The total amount
of new data, new methods and new practical models very quickly
became impressive. The Wisconsin school were able to present a
sustainable programme of research. New continua were discerned in
a variety of vegetations. In all these ways, the status of the
continuum as a fact in the world was greatly enhanced. Thus it was
the Wisconsin work, and not Whittaker's, which provided the primary
model for the next generation of studies using the individualistic
196
hypothesis.
However, this was not simply a story of the acceptance of an
idea produced by Gleason forty years previously. The individualistic
hypothesis was changed as it was adopted afresh. It was made
harmonious with the theoretical framework which now dominated
biological inquiry. The process of change and modification in
response to new contexts which we traced throughout the history of
the community-unit theory continued through its eclipse.
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CONCLUSIONS
This chapter is in three parts. The first consists of the
concluding remarks proper. The second section indicates, in
more detail than has been possible in preceding chapters, how my
interpretation of ecology's history differs from that contained
in Ronald Tobey's recently published account of the Nebraska school.
The third section returns briefly to the narrative to show that
debates over the nature of vegetation did not die out in the
nineteen-sixties.
Versatile and social historiography
The narrative has come a long way from Alexander von Humboldt,
Naturphilosophie and the start of what Foucault terms the modern age.
We have followed the history of vegetation science from its
beginnings. We have traced its growth into a specialism in its
own right. We have seen the rise of distinctive regional and
national schools. In particular, we have followed the development
of the idea that vegetation occurs in natural units - from its
birth to its demise within one major national tradition of
ecological inquiry.
The narrative has had sub-plots and divergences. However, I
hope I have conveyed a sense of underlying unity. The thesis is
intended to tell a single story - for the history of vegetation
science is unified to the extent that new developments have
continually been structured by past practice. I have described a
continuous tradition of research, spanning more than a hundred and
sixty years. Direct pupil to mentor links may be traced all the
way from Robert Whittaker to Humboldtian plant geography. Similar
connections may be found for the latest representatives of the
European schools.
As well as displaying continuity, the development of vegetation
science has been characterised by constant change and adaptation
to new cultural circumstances. Continuity of tradition and contingency
of response have been twin themes of my narrative.
It is worthwhile recollecting some of the other characteristics
of the production of ecological knowledge which this study has
highlighted. In the introduction to the thesis, I pointed to
the need for historians of ecology to be eclectic in their choice
of explanatory devices. History of ecology can neither be merely
internalist, nor disciplinary, nor merely externalist, if it is
to be faithful to its subject-matter. Ecologists display a wide
variety of interests. Their commitments are located in many
different aspects of the social structure.
At the internal level, we have seen the effect of purely
technical interests such as those which Gleason and Braun-Blanquet
displayed in applying floristic forms of analysis to the study of
plant communities. I argued that such interests arose as a result
of prior professional training. We have also seen the impact upon
the development of ecology of technical developments such as sampling
by quadrats and sampling by random pairs.
On the other hand, we have seen the importance of the larger
social location of research activity. In Chapter Two, I indicated
how botanists employed in the Land-Grant colleges needed to
communicate with a lay constituency. This requirement was
fulfilled in Clements's practice. This institutional situation
also gave Clements the possibility of aspiring toward the role of
ecological technocrat. The Sigmatists, in contrast, worked in an
institutional context which supported pure research. The character
of the ecological knowledge they produced was correspondingly
different. My explanation of the contrast between the Sigmatists
and the Clementsian ecologists was therefore largely in terms of
the external relations of the institution of science as a whole.
Chapter Two demonstrated how different external social situations
played a part in producing different technical practices.
In our study of American ecology, we met another example of
the importance of external relations. We saw the use of ecological
knowledge in the wider sphere of political discourse. Arguments
as to how society ought to be ordered were based upon what ecology
had revealed nature to be. I argued that the existence of this
usage led to particular forms of theorising being favoured by
ecologists.
The internal and external relations already described do not
exhaust the facets of ecology's social situation which must be taken
into account if we are to have an adequate historical understanding
of the construction of ecological knowledge. We must also consider
the relations between ecology and the other sciences. We must
consider the effect of factors external to ecology, but internal
to science as a whole.
Vegetation science has always been a relatively low status
discipline. Thus the accepted criteria of good scientific knowledge
have always been framed not in ecology, but within other branches
of science. Ecologists, therefore, have frequently had to modify
their practice, or at least their rhetoric, to try to minimise the
discrepancy between their cognitive standards and those of more
prestigious disciplines. In Chapter Two, we saw how Clements adopted
the vocabulary of physiology in response to such pressures. In
Chapter Four, we saw how the reform of American plant ecology
after the Second World War was mediated by the need to create a
form of ecological practice which apparently coincided with
culturally-given criteria of good scientific knowledge. Change
took place to bring the theoretical apparatus of the discipline
into line with those newly adopted by other higher status biological
disciplines. Ecology thus presented a better image for peer
scrutiny.
A somewhat different but related example of the effect upon
vegetation science of its relation to other forms of knowledge
production, is contained in Chapter One. There we saw how Alexander
von Humboldt fashioned a study of vegetation according to the modes
of aesthetic judgement and epistemological theory which prevailed
in his cultural milieu. Drawing upon similar materials, I
explained how vegetation came to be thought of as existing in
natural units. At an even more fundamental level, we saw that
a science of vegetation was only rendered possible by the widespread
transformation of underlying cognitive assumptions which occurred
at the end of the eighteenth century.
The thesis affords many other examples of the significance of
the social location of ecological investigation. In the early years
of vegetation science, Humboldt's maintenance of a network of
scholarly patronage was a crucial factor in the successful
development of vegetational plant geography. Even without an academic
position, Humboldt was able to gather and inspire a loyal body of
botanists who developed the exemplar of vegetation science contained
in his published work. We have also seen how the shape of Gleason's
career and, therefore, the degree of his involvement in ecological
research, were determined by decisions he made as to which
institutional position would offer him the best rewards in terms
of remuneration, security, status, life-style and intellectual
stimulation. We also saw the importance of the fact that Curtis
was able to establish a considerable team of investigators in a
secure institutional location with adequate financial backing.
The existence of the Wisconsin school greatly aided the articulation,
transmission, and acceptance of the new continuum exemplar.
These last three examples illustrate the crucial importance of
social locations, for it is clear that the history of ecology
would have been quite different if Humboldt and Curtis had not
been able to maintain the collective research programmes they did.
The history of ecology might well have been significantly different
if Gleason had been able to find an institutional setting in
ecology as rewarding as that he found as a taxonomist.
Any adequate history of ecology must, as I argued in the
introduction, be internal history in that it must document the
discipline's investigatory practice, its technical and cognitive
developments, and its professional structure. But the historian
of ecology must also consider that ecology, as a scientific
discipline, is a dependent part of the institution of science as
a whole, and that ecological thought has, throughout its history,
intermeshed with social interests and intellectual trends of the
widest possible provenance. I hope the above examples illustrate
the range of explanations which the history of ecology demands.
The need for such eclecticism renders any rigid distinction
between external and internal influence on science artificial and
meaningless. I have laboured throughout the thesis to display
how natural knowledge is a part of culture. Culture is diverse
but indivisible.
Saving the prairies - Ronald C. Tobey
The contents of this thesis are partly a development upon
the work of those few other historians who have written on the
history of ecology. I am greatly indebted to them all. Whenever
I have been aware of a specific debt this has been acknowledged,
and generally whenever I have noted an acute disagreement, this
too has been pointed out.
One book deserves special mention in this context - Saving
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the Prairies by Ronald C. Tobey. This is principally an account
of, as Tobey puts it, the "life cycle of the founding school of
American plant ecology". By the "founding school" Tobey means
Bessey, Clements and the Nebraskans. Tobey's book is the only
text whose coverage overlaps, to any appreciable extent, with the
subject-matter of this thesis. I have learned much from it. I
have also taken specific issue with Tobey at several points in
the preceding chapters. I have commented, in Chapter One, on
the lack of evidence for the split which Tobey makes between a
mechanist and an idealist tradition in late nineteenth-century
plant geography. I have noted, in Chapter Two, that, contra Tobey,
there was little difference, as far as the context of ideological
use was concerned, between organismic and mechanist metaphors of
the plant community. I also have argued that Tobey's treatment
of the ideological basis of Clements's organicism is seriously
incomplete. However, for the most part, the interpretation of
the history of ecology that Professor Tobey expounds is so
radically different from my own that it is difficult to engage
with him at specific points. If I had tried, my chapters on
Clements and Gleason would have been occupied with little else.
Instead I will indicate here where the principal differences lie.
Tobey attempts to trace the development of the Nebraska or
'grassland school' of plant ecology on the basis of a specially-prepared
bibliography. He made as full a list as possible of all the articles
or books which were listed or indexed in Botanical or Biological
Abstracts, between 1918 and 1955, under the subject headings 'ecology'
or 'grassland' and which dealt with the mid-western United States.
Titles for the period before 1918 were taken from standard textbooks
such as Weaver and Alberton's Grasslands of the Great Plains. When graphed,
the number of publications per year follows what Tobey has called the
'Kuhn-Crane' curve. That is to say, frequency of publication
starts slowly, rises quickly after 1916, levels off, and then falls
Tobey regards this curve as representing the life-cycle of the
Nebraska school as it passed from the pre-paradigm stage, through
normal science to a period in which it had solved its major
problems and in which anomalies began to accumulate. Eventually,
paradigm 'exhaustion' and crisis ensued.
As well as charting the progress of the Nebraska school, the
bibliography allows Tobey to draw more general conclusions about
the development of plant ecology in America. Thus from his list
of titles he concludes that the Chicago school declined earlier
than the Nebraskan:-
"Earlier they [the Nebraskans] had been a group of
scientists offering a microparadigm in competition
with an alternative microparadigm from Chicago; by
the 1930s, they were the establishment, the
competitors having withdrawn.
But the grassland bibliography, or indeed any bibliography, is
too narrow a base to support such judgement. As we have seen, in
the nineteen thirties, W.S. Cooper was training men who were to be
leaders of the next generation of plant ecologists - Oosting,
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Daubenmire, Egler and Murray Buell. Cooper, although in Minnesota
had been a student of Cowles and was as much a Chicagoan as
Clements was a Nebraskan. At roughly the same time, Stanley Cain
was in Chicago, studying under Cowles. The Chicago school was
far from defunct. As late as the fifties and sixties, botanical
presidents of the Ecological Society of America were still regularly
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students, or students of students, of Cowles. Chicagoan ecology
was evidently alive and well long after Tobey's bibliography
declares it dead.
There are two possible, perhaps complementary, explanations
for Tobey's misconceptions. One is that the Chicagoans such as
Cowles, Cooper and Fuller published less than the Nebraskans, but
what they did publish was, per unit, relatively more important.
This seems likely since Tobey's bibliography includes a large
number of the semipopular monographs of the agricultural experiment
stations and the publications of the United States Department of
Agriculture.0 These titles would contain much educational and
advisory material. The purer, less applied, emphasis of science
at the University of Chicago would lead to fewer publications of
this nature. One would expect the Chicagoan literature to be
less voluminous, containing little else but the products of
original research. However, it would be addressed solely to an
audience of researchers rather than partly a wider lay constituency.
Therefore it would be, per unit, more likely to stimulate further
ecological research. Furthermore, Tobey's concentration on published
material inevitably diminishes Cooper's and Cowles's historical
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importance as teachers.
The second possible explanation is that Tobey's key-word criteria
miss some important papers. It seems likely that his concentration
on 'grassland' as a key-word would favour the Nebraska school.
Cowles, Cooper and their students principally studied woodland
vegetation and its development. Perhaps Tobey ought to have
included 'forest' in his list of key-words. But, as is obvious
from my bibliography, even under such extended criteria, many of
Gleason's, or even Cooper's, papers would not have qualified. One
is forced to the conclusion that historical judgements are better
based on theanalysis of content and context than upon citations
and key-words.
Throughout his book, Tobey exaggerates the importance of
Clements. In Tobey's account Clements appears as a Colossus
astride American plant ecology. Tobey mentions no American critic
of Clements other than Gleason. But, in the preceding chapters I
have frequently pointed out that, despite his undoubted influence,
Clements's positions on many matters were generally regarded as
extreme. I have provided evidence that Clements was isolated from
the majority of American ecologists. Tobey misses the broad
spectrum of opinion which existed between Clements and Gleason.
One reason for Tobey's over-estimation of Clements is that he
routinely takes Clements's rhetoric as an accurate description of
his actual practice. To Tobey, therefore, Clements achieved the
quantification of ecology:-
"The invention of a quantitative method for ecology
was more than the clever application of statistics.
The invention of the quadrat, or meter-plot, embodied
a profound epistemological shift, in which the
scientists ceased to believe in the reality of one
phenomenon and began to believe in the reality of
another phenomenon. Ecology had "taken leave of its
senses", and hitched its intellect to mathematics.
It was a shift analogous to the shift in astronomy
from the Ptolemaic earth-centered observational
astronomy, or the shift from Aristotelian physics
based on the phenomenal qualities of motion to the
Galilean physics of hidden mathematical laws that
lay, as reality, behind the phenomena."8
This is a startling claim and, it seems to me, a false one.
One is tempted to reply 'What statistics? What mathematics?'
An inspection of Clements's published work shows that even after
the invention of the quadrat, his methods remained essentially
descriptive and observational. Plant Succession, which Tobey
regards as the paradigmatic book of the Nebraska school, contains
little statistical, mathematical or quantitative work, other than
the simple enumeration of species.' Tobey claims that Clements
believed that his German inspirer, Drude, had made a fundamental
methodological error in demarcating the boundaries of the North
American prairie without counting quadrats in it. But Clements
and his associates frequently made similarly non-quantitative
demarcations. Clements's characterisation of the Lake Forest was
controversial partly for this reason. There is no doubt that
Clements did advocate increased quantification and experiment.
However, I have interpreted this advocacy as a tactical manoeuvre
designed to raise the prestige of ecology by identifying it more
closely with physiology.
Even if we accepted that Clements did produce a profound
epistemological shift comparable with Galileo's, it would be
difficult to accept Tobey's characterisation of it. Tobey argues
that the shift was away from typological thinking. According to
Tobey, Darwin had "destroyed the sensory typology that had underlain
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classification in biology". Species were no longer considered
to be defined by an inherent essential principle. In nature, all
was flux.
Tobey argued that Clements, influenced by the widespread
adoption of Darwinian modes of thought, extended this destruction
to ecology. Leaving aside Clements's opposition to the Darwinians
on the species question, we may note that the entire thrust of
Clements's theorising was that vegetation-units did exist in
nature. They were not classifier's categories. There was
nothing arbitrary about them. They were natural kinds of vegetation.
I have shown that this was certainly how Clements's work was perceived
by his peers.
Furthermore, Clements defined and identified these vegetation-
units according to physiognomy. Each formation had a distinctive
physiognomy which was the expression of the prevailing climate.
Thus, contrary to Tobey's argument, Clements demarcated vegetation-
units according to a typology of plant form. This was a typology
perceivable directly by sense impression. Furthermore, it was also
an ideal typology since the formations were held to be potentially
rather than actually in existence throughout the entire area of
each climatic region. Thus it is difficult to credit Clements with
a determined departure from essentialist or typological thinking.
Tobey places great importance, in this context, on Pound and
Clements's demonstration that it was difficult to delimit the
boundary between the prairie grass association and the buffalo
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grass association. However, it is clear from Clements's later
work that he considered this difficulty existed partly because the
real biological boundaries lay elsewhere. The real unit, the
vegetation-organism, was not the individual association but the
grassland formation as a whole. Clements did not deny the existence
of real boundaries; he merely relocated them.
As part of his attempt to make Clements out to be a nominalist
Darwinian, Tobey frequently argues that Clements worked with a
notion that vegetation varied continuously. To an extent this is
true. Clements did acknowledge that no two pieces of vegetation
were identical. He pointed out that seres and ecotones often
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exhibited gradual change. But Tobey takes Clements's statements
on continuous variation out of their historical context and changes
their significance. We have seen that Clements's remarks on
vegetational variation were not regarded, by his peers and immediate
successors, as the central tenet of his description of vegetation.
To his contemporaries, Clements's work was predicated upon the
assumption that there were definite units of vegetation. The units
were the primary reality, despite the existence of much variation.
Vegetational boundaries might be blurred, transitions gradual,
but the monoclimax hypothesis and the requirement of uniform
physiognomy both entailed that each formation was a fundamentally
different kind of vegetation from the next. That was the Clementsian
tenet that Gleason chose to dispute.
As he exaggerates the importance of Clements, Tobey fails to
give Cowles his full significance. I have shown how Cowles's
clever harmonising of the German system of vegetation classification
with peneplain geology provided American ecologists with an
important new theoretical principle and a powerful organising
device. Tobey, however, writes that compared to the Nebraskan
invention of the quadrat
"Scientists at the University of Chicago did not^
have innovations of a similarly original character"
This is to underestimate the importance of physiographic ecology.
In Chapter Three, I described how widely influential Cowles's
innovations were - on Clements amongst many others.
Tobey's programmatic pronouncements in the introduction to
his book are very attractive
"Establishment of scientific ideas here appears less
as the victory of truth over error than the building
of networks of collaboration, placement of graduate
students in strategic jobs, and who cites whom."1^
But, just as he fails to extend his social and ideological analysis
to the genesis of scientific knowledge, so he does not consistently
eschew truthfulness as an explanation for an idea's popularity,
nor error as an explanation for its failure. He is continually
getting tangled up in ahistorical questions of logic and meaning.
Tobey refers to Gleason in a manner which, given his programmatic
statements, is somewhat judgemental
"In Gleason's universe ... there were only individual
organisms ... This position was philosophically
untenable, as any nineteenth century idealistic
philosopher would quickly have shown, but Gleason ...
whistled his tune, oblivious to the cemetery of
buried doctrines similar to his ... Gleason did not
recognise the ontological problem with his concept
of species." ^
Tobey's interpretation of the Clements/Gleason dispute seems
to be that Gleason held the individualistic hypothesis because he
simple-mindedly did not comprehend the rich complexity of the
Clementsian system:-
"Clements's critic, Henry Gleason, did not understand
that Clements held concepts both of continuity of
vegetation and of naturally limited organic boundaries
... He did not understand that Clements accepted the
continuum concept in analyzing the spatial arrange¬
ment of the ecotone and even the interior of the
association."1^
I hope I have indicated that it is possible to achieve a
fuller understanding of Gleason's attitude than this. Both Gleason
and Clements accepted that vegetation varied even within associations.
They differed as to the consequences to be drawn from the existence
of this variation.
Tobey and I agree that important changes occurred within the
discipline of ecology in the nineteen-fifties. However, he argues
that these were endogenous, being due to the Clementsian paradigm
becoming exhausted. This seems dubious on theoretical grounds,
since it suggests that the capacity of any paradigm is finite.
The social nature of knowledge production would seem to imply the
opposite. In principle any research programme is infinitely
extendable and infinitely flexible. Furthermore, the work that
Daubenmire, for example, produced in the fifties, shows that, in
fact, it was still possible to produce good work within the old
ecological style. In Chapter Four, I have argued, contra Tobey,
that the pre-Second World War paradigm did not fall. It was pushed.
It was abandoned as a result of strategic decisions made because
ecologists required, for institutional reasons, new forms of theory
and practice.
The above are a selection of the historical and methodological
points on which I differ from Tobey. Overall, I hope that my
thesis fulfils Tobey's programme rather better than Saving the
Prairies does.
Coda - the debate goes ever on
I would not like to leave the impression that the revival of
the individualistic hypothesis silenced debates over the character
of vegetation. This was not the case, even in America. As we have
seen, this debate was only partly a technical one. It also involved
wider social issues. One might conjecture that for as long as
scientific ideas of nature are invoked in this external social
context, controversies as to how nature is best conceived will
continue. Certainly the debate as to the nature of vegetation has
continued in both American and British ecology until the present
day. As a coda to the thesis, I will briefly describe these
sustained differences of opinion about the natural world.
In Chapter Four, I documented changes which occurred in the
theory and practice of plant ecology in the nineteen-fifties.
But larger changes also took place in the discipline of ecology
as a whole. The older descriptive study of plant communities was
rendered obsolete not only by continuum theory and gradient analysis,
but also by a new emphasis on the ecosystem as an object of study.
The ecosystem theorists considered plants, animals and the
relevant aspects of the inanimate habitat all together in a study
of functioning relationships.
The 'New Ecology', as it was called, was distinguished from
the old not only by its new object of study, but also by a con¬
centration on the monitoring of energy and nutrient flow between
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the various biotic elements of the ecosystem. Vegetation science
did not decline in importance, but ecosystem studies became the
most prestigious branch of modern ecology. The New Ecology was a
quantitative mode of research, often involving much instrumentation,
and leaning, at least in principle, upon the mathematics of systems
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theory. It lent itself to pursuance in team projects. With
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the New Ecology, ecology became 'Big Science'. It was, all in
all, a form of study eminently suited to coincide with widespread
20
contemporary criteria of what science ought to be.
The relevance of this development to our present concerns is
that many New Ecologists wrote about ecosystems in terms strikingly
similar to those in which Clements had described his units, the
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formations or biomes. The vocabulary was changed, the location of
the natural properties was different, but the meaning was the same.
The ecosystem was presented as possessing an holistic unity, as
greater than the sum of its parts. As Eugene Odum put it:-
"
... unique principles ... emerge at the supra-
individual levels of organisation."
The entire ecosystem was held to constitute a single natural
entity. Adjustment to the environment took place at the level of
the ecosystem as a whole, not solely at the level of the individual,
or the species, or the population:-
"We theorized that new sytems properties emerge in
the course of ecological development, and that it is
these properties that largely account for the species
and growth form changes that occur ... [T]here is
a holistic strategy for ecosystem development."23
Mature ecosystems were climax communities which maximised
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biological productivity. The development of ecosystems was
necessarily directional - from the simple to the complex, toward
maximal productivity. Mature ecosystems were also characterised
by homeostatic community mechanisms which maintained a steady-state:
"Where all the components of a community turn over
several times a year there would be ample opportunity
for changes to occur if there was no self regulative
mechanism.
Such pronouncements by New Ecologists such as the brothers
Howard T. and Eugene P. Odum did not, however, meet with universal
approval. Not everyone saw the attractions of holism, in its new
or its old guise. John T. Curtis, champion of the individualistic
hypothesis, for example, reacted strongly against the Odum approach:
"Only by getting many people to see the weakness of
the Odum techniques will this evangelistic school be
restrained ... He [H.T. Odum] should clarify his use
of "tropical rain forest". Now that Beard and
Richards have cleared up the matter there is no
excuse to let a mere zoologist throw us back into
chaos again. Also omit or document the assertions
about steady state, climax, etc. Also modify and
correct the sections on species diversity.
The style is annoying, rather like brother Gene.
Both behave like old-fashioned school-masters, setting
the ignorant readers straight on the basic issues by
means of dogmatic unfounded dicta."26
The Odums were indeed to prove ecological evangelists. Eugene
Odum has become one of the most vocal public proponents of scientific
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ecology. And, like Clements, in his appeal to a wider audience,
he has repeatedly drawn morals for human society from the holistic
properties of natural ecosystems. As nature is holistic and
mutualist, so should be man's relationship with his fellows and
with the natural world:-
"Do these coral reef discoveries have any significance
for urban industrial man? Perhaps they do. The
Pacific coral reef, as a kind of oasis in a desert,
can stand as an object lesson for man who must now
learn that mutualism between autrophic and hetero¬
trophic components, and producers and consumers in
the societal realm, coupled with efficient recycling
of materials and use of energy, are the keys to
maintaining prosperity in a world of limited resources."
Political policies designed along ecological lines, utilising
the expertise of ecologists, would lead to a reduction in waste
and an increase in social harmony:-
"Since the kind of sectional conflicts which for so
long hampered our national development are now
appearing on a truly frightening scale in the con¬
frontations between so-called "advanced" and "backward"
nations, even a partial success at coastal zone
management would have a favourable global impact by
demonstrating that action based on holistic values
and properties is a viable alternative to development
on the basis of competitive exclusion alone."29
Eugene Odum thus allied himself to an ecological ideology
which attracted many adherents in the nineteen-seventies. As Lowe
and Warboys put it:-
"The appeal to ecology has gone beyond the search for
tactical responses and technical solutions to parti¬
cular environmental problems, toward the claim that
ecology can contribute to a radical reordering of
human purposes ... "3°
The image of a harmonious natural order was a virtually
universal feature of this rhetoric. The desirability of an orderly
efficient human society was deduced from an orderly efficient
nature. Odum is thus quite typical in legitimating his social
prescriptions with technical arguments as to the observable
characteristics of ecosystems.
But not all ecologists agree that nature is holistic and
mutualist. Many follow Curtis and prefer to regard vegetation in
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individualistic terms. Professor John Harper, for example, has
vigorously expressed his dissent from the maximal productivity and
mutual aid school. In doing so, he employs vivid and evocative
social imagery
"A theory of natural selection that is based on the
fitness of individuals leaves little room for the
evolution of populations or species toward some
optimum, such as better use of environmental resources,
higher productivity per area of land, more stable
ecosystems or even for the view that plants in some
way become more efficient than their ancestors. Instead,
both the study of evolutionary processes and the natural
behaviour of populations suggest that the principles
of "beggar my neighbour" and "I'm all right, Jack"
dominate all and every aspect of evolution ... Natural
selection is about individuals and it would be surprizing
if that behaviour that favoured one individual against
another was also the behaviour that maximised the
performance of the population as a whole."22
We can see that the controversy between Odum and Harper has
the same pattern as that between Clements and Gleason, one stresses
the integrity o.f holistic collective entities, the other regards
the individual as the only viable level of explanation. Further
research would be required to characterise the Odum/Harper
controversy fully. My conjecture that it has a social basis is
simply a conjecture. However, the point I wish to make in this
coda is that the new data, new modes of research, new theories,
which emerged in the fifties, did not conclusively and unequivocably
elucidate the nature of vegetation. One seeks in vain for a
theoretical or empirical resolution of the Clements/Gleason debate.
It flows on, taking new expressions and no nearer conclusion than
ever. As I hope this thesis has shown, the roots of controversy
about Nature often lie too deep in the social fabric for scientific
observation, experiment or theory ever to wither them away.
NOTE ON SOURCES
As already mentioned in the Acknowledgements, in the course of
preparing this thesis I consulted the following archival collections:-
The Henry Allan Gleason Papers held in the Library of the New York
Botanical Garden, Arthur G. Tansley's correspondence held in the
care of Professor West, Department of Botany, University of Cambridge,
and the John T. Curtis Papers held in the Archive Division, University
Library, University of Wisconsin, Madison. In the following notes,
these sources will be referred to as Gleason Papers, Tansley Papers,
and Curtis Papers, respectively.
The Gleason archive consists almost entirely of correspondence.
The letters are well-organised in boxes, by year, and within each
year alphabetically by the name of the correspondent. There is no
index but individual letters are easy to find and I have not considered
it necessary to give details of box location. I have photocopies
of many of the items to which I refer. The New York Botanical
Garden also holds some unpublished Gleason material other than
correspondence - mostly typescripts of unpublished articles,
together with a short memoir. These items are bound and entered
in the Library's main catalogue. Details of these items, if
utilised, are given in my main bibliography.
The Curtis archive consists principally of twelve boxes of
correspondence, with some personal notes. Again it is well-organised
chronologically and alphabetically, and I have not specified box
location. I have photocopies of many of the items to which I refer.
The archive also contains six further boxes of material other than
correspondence - mainly unpublished lectures and reports. These are
arranged alphabetically by title.
The Tansley archive consists of three boxes of miscellaneous
material - letters, draft articles, a travel diary - found by
Sir Harry Godwin among the volumes of Tansley's library. The
material is not organised in any way, but the amount of correspondence
is quite small and particular letters ought to be easy to locate.
I have given the box location of each item I have referred to.
I have also taken much material from my recorded conversations
with botanists and members of Gleason's family. I will refer to
these conversations in the following manner, viz., Interview,
F.E. Egler. The date and place of each interview is given in the
Acknowledgements. Several of these tapes have been wholly or





1. Perhaps here I should have written "what is held to be ecological
knowledge". I do not mean to imply that ecologists actually
make decisions on these or any other political matters. For
ecologists' entanglements with decision-making, see Nelkin
(1977) and Lowe (1975).
2. Worster (1977), p.vii.
3. Recent important contributions to the history of ecology have
been: Tobey (1981), Cittadino (1981), and Kingsland (1981).
4. Mcintosh (1976) and Egerton (1977) give a good impression of
the historical importance of plant studies within ecology as a
whole. Mills (1969) illustrates the importance of the
community concept in another branch of ecology - marine benthic
ecology.
5. My usage here is the same as that of Lowe and Warboys (1980).
6. For examples of good 'internal' history of the type referred
to here, see Pickering (1981) or Dean (1979).
7. For a good description of the competitive and hierarchical
nature of modern science, see Hagstrom (1965), especially
Chaps. 2 and 4. See also Mulkay (1977).
8. Ecology's low status and its consequent problems are discussed
in Mcintosh (1980), p.219.
9. For a discussion of the recent recognition that it is not easy
to disengage internal from external questions, see Macleod
(1977).
10. The term 'actor' is used throughout in its technical sociolo¬
gical sense, see, for example, Goffman (1956). The best
articulated and most cogent account of the theory of social
interests and its use in historical explanation is to be found
in Mackenzie (1981), pp.216-225 et passim. Unlike Mackenzie,
however, I am not afraid to ascribe interests to individuals
as well as to the social structure.
11. For reasons of clarity of exposition, I will however adopt a
somewhat different vocabulary when referring to interests
situated in the internal rather than the external context, see
footnote 15 below.
12. See, for example, Chisholm (1973).
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13. What is referred to here is the existence within ecology of a
'knowledge constitutive interest' in prediction and technical
control as proposed by Habermas (1972), p.308. But, see also
Barnes (1977), Chap. 1, and Mackenzie (1981), pp.210-216.
14. Douglas (1972).
15. For a recent discussion and literature review of the moral use
of ideas of nature, see Shapin (1982).
16. For sociological perspectives on this current activity, see
Cotgrove (1975) and Lowe and Warboys (1980). The works cited
in the reference lists of both papers afford many examples of
explicit sermonising. See also Colwell (1970).
17. I have already mentioned the theory of social interests, see
footnote 7 above. Roughly speaking, I will use the term
'social interest' to refer to actors' commitments to actual or
desired features of the structure of society in the widest,
the 'external', sense. The term 'cognitive interest' seems
to have recently fallen out of favour among sociologists of
science, but I will employ it here since it seems to serve my
purpose well enough. What I mean by 'cognitive interest' is
a commitment to a particular feature of scientific or
intellectual practice, such as a commitment to a particular
methodology, a particular mode of theorising or a specific
body of technical resources. That is to say, a cognitive
interest differs, in my usage, from a social interest in that
the former term refers to a commitment to an aspect of the
internal social structure of a cognitive activity rather than
referring, as the latter term does, to a commitment situated
within the external social environment. Both social and
cognitive interests may, however,,be involved in the con¬
struction of technical knowledge. To take examples from the
following chapters, Gleason's interest in a floristic approach
to vegetation would be regarded as 'cognitive'; Clements's
interest in establishing an environmental technocracy would be
regarded as 'social'. The distinction is, of course, to a
large extent a vague and arbitrary one. But it is one that I
have found to be useful in organising the present study. For
examples of the usage of the term 'cognitive interest' in
approximately the sense it is employed here, see Mackenzie
(1978) and Pickering (1980).
18. For references to works by Foucault, see Chapter 1 below.
19- For a glimpse of the many research schools and traditions that
have been omitted from this thesis, and the complexity and
scope of twentieth-century plant ecology, see Whittaker (1962).
20. Nor are scientific controversies the heroes of the tale.
Despite the fact that the difference of opinion between Clements
and Gleason over the nature of the plant community dominates a
large part of its text, the thesis is not meant as a contribution
to the literature on scientific controversies and should not be
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read as such. The mechanics of the quarrel between Clements
and Gleason are only of secondary interest. My principal
concern lies with how, due to a complex of skills, prior
training and social interests, different practices diverged
from a common tradition. In the elucidation of this process,
the Humboldtians and the Sigmatists are as important as
Clements and Gleason, although I do not describe in detail any
controversies in which the former two were engaged.
21. The distinction being made here is the same as that made
between the 'contemplative' and the 'social' conceptions of the
nature of knowledge by Barnes (1977). The penultimate
sentence of the paragraph is virtually a paraphrase of one of
Barnes's (p.2).
22. I have discussed elsewhere the pitfalls of assuming disciplinary
continuity between one historical period and the next (Nicolson,
1982) .
23. See Bloor (1976) and Barnes (1974). Whether either of these
authors would accept my efforts as exemplifying the 'strong
programme' is another matter. Other presentations of the
relativist-constructivist approach include Collins U981 ) and
Knorr (1981) .
24. The most sophisticated statement of the view that history is
essentially a narrative form is to be found in Ricoeur (1979).
See also-W.B. Gallie (1964).
25. Note however that my argument here should not be construed as
implying that there is any fundamental difference in kind
between the historical and the sociological, or for that matter
the scientific, understanding.
26. Whittaker (1962), p.123.
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CHAPTER 1
1. For remarks along similar lines, see Mcintosh (1958] p.115,
and Ashby (1936], pp.221-2.
2. See Egler (1977] p.8 for a further elucidation of the distinction
between flora and vegetation.
3. Green (1914) pp.229-91 remains a good description of the
taxonomic interests of eighteenth-century botanists. See also
Allen (1976) pp.26-51 and Stafleu (1971a).
4. Humboldt (1807b) p.7. See also Brewer (1960) p,2.
5. Linnaeus (1751) pp.263-270.
6. See Du Rietz (1957) pp.161-68.
7. Moss (1910) p.27.
8. For an elucidation of the "Economy of Nature" concept as it is
relevant to the present discussion, see Limoges (1971) and (1972).
See also Worster (1977) pp.1-55, and, for more general background,
Glacken (1973) pp.501-50.
9. See Linnaeus's "The Swedish Pan" and "The Oeconomy of Nature",
English translations in Stillingfleet (1762).
10. Egerton (1973) pp.335-7, Worster (1977) pp.31-55.
11. I have argued this in detail elsewhere (Nicolson 1982). The
principal point to be made is that, while men in the eighteenth
century certainly studied the interrelations between Man and
Nature, and between species within Nature, these investigations
were maintained by quite a different cognitive framework from
that which pertained in the nineteenth century - namely
physico-theology.
12. Humboldt (1821-25) p.iii.
13. Nordenskiold (1928.) pp.560-61 ; Raup (1942) pp.319-25.
14. Grisebach for example published The Flora of the British West
Indian Islands (1859-64) as well as Die Vegetation der Erde nach
ihrer klimatischen Anordnung (1872).
15. See Whittaker (1962) p.4.
16. For a general assessment of the inadequacy of the classic
language of discovery, see Kuhn (1962) pp.52-65, also
Barnes (1982) pp.41-45, and Brannigan (1981).
17. Pickering (forthcoming, b).
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18. For a version of the case against the existence of an independent
observation language, see Hesse (1974). For a discussion of
empirical demonstrations of this point of view, see Shapin
(1982) pp.2-8.
19. Nicolson (1982).
20. For further elucidation of the notion "producing a world", see
Pickering (forthcoming, a).
21 . That the classification of vegetation into types is a
relativistic and instrumental exercise is argued by Whittaker
(1956) pp.40-43. For the more general argument that all
classification has this nature, see Barnes (1981) and Bloor
(1982).
22. For an exposition of the view that this is a good stance for
those who study science to adopt, see Bloor (1976).
23. This change is well characterised in Foucault (1970) - see, in
particular, chap. 5.
24. Ibid, p.132. Foucault's views on classification in the
eighteenth century have been elucidated by Pratt (1977).
25. Ibid, pp.132-38.
26. Linnaeus (1735). I have quoted from the English translation
of Engel-Lebeboer and Engel (1964) p.19.
27. Ibid.
20. Foucault (1970) pp.46-124.
29. Ibid, p.162; also Hartshorne (1939) p.44. Foucault uses the
term episteme to refer to the totality of assumption upon which
discourse is based, in any given historical period. His use
of this term has been elucidated by Sheridan (1980).
30. Kant's lectures on physical geography are contained in Kant
(1902-1966) 10, pp.151-436. His introduction has been
translated into English by May (1970) pp.255-64.
31. May (1970) p.259. See also Hartshorne (1939).
32. May (1970) p.260.
33. See Bowen (1981) pp.206-9.
34. Quoted in Hartshorne (1939) p.44. See also Hartshorne (1958).
35. Quoted in Hartshorne (1939) p.44.
36. Ibid.
37. Quoted in ibid.
317
30. Ibid.
39. Ibid, p.45. See also Huggins (1935].
40. Macpherson (19723 p.23.
41. Browne (forthcoming3 pp. 31-30. Page numbers refer to a pre-
publication typescript. I am greatly indebted to Dr. Janet
Browne for very Kindly allowing me to consult her book before
its publication. This has immensely improved my understanding
of early plant geography. I hope that the present chapter
will complement Dr. Browne's work. She describes the
development of floristic plant geography; I describe the
tradition of vegetational plant geography.
It should be noted, however, that Dr. Browne's concern, in
the latter portion of her book, is principally with developments
made by English-speaking investigators. She mentions no
continental European geographer after Alphonse de Candolle. The
insularity of British plant geography after 1040 has been
described by Nelson (19703. Nelson is however unable to
specify what precisely British. plant geography is isolated
from. I would suggest it was isolated from Hamboldtian
plant geography.
42. Browne (forthcoming3 pp. 59-64.
43. Ibid. p.36.
44. The most complete source for J.R. Forster is Hoare (19763.
45. Forster (17703 p.215.
46. Ibid, p.176.
47. Ibid. p.174. See also Browne (forthcoming] p.41.
40. Browne (forthcoming] p.43.
49. Forster (17703 p.174.
50. Ibid, p.176.
51. See Glacken (19733 p.613.
52. Browne (forthcoming3 p.44.
53. Forster (17703 p.174,
54. See Browne (forthcoming] Chap. 2.
55. For biographical details of Willdenow, see Bylebyl (19753 and
Konig (10933 pp.95-90.
56. Willdenow (17923. I have quoted from both the first (10053 and
the second (1ST13 English editions.
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57. Bylebyl (1975) p.386.
58. Willdenow (1811). The section on terminology occupies pp.13-




62. Hoare (1976) p.22.
63. Willdenow (1805) p.337.
64. Willdenow (1811) pp.415-6.
65. Willdenow (1805) pp.393-4.
66. Ibid.
67. For a good account of Willdenow as a floristic plant geographer,
see Browne (forthcoming) pp.45-9.
68. Willdenow (1805) p.378.
69. Ibid, p.402.
70. Hein (1959), see also Konig (1893) especially pp.80-81, 117-124.
71. Meyer-Abich (1969) p.20.
72. Browne (forthcoming) p.46.
73. The best account in English of Humboldt's life and work remains
Lassel's two-volume translation of Bruhns (ed.) Life of
Humboldt (1873). See also Botting (1973). The best German
biography of Humboldt is Beck (1959-61).
74. For a good characterisation of "physique generale" see Cannon
(1978) pp.73-79. For an excellent discussion of the aims of
Humboldt's universal science, in particular, its relationship
to Naturphilosophie and empiricism, see Bowen (1970).
75. Bowen (1981) pp.211-2.
76. Bruhns (1873) 1_, p.86.
77. Humboldt (1793) pp.9-10, trans. Hartshorne (1958) p.100.
78. Beck, the author of the most recent full-scale biography of
Humboldt, described the Flora Fribergenis Specimen in the
following terms:-
319
"Wie Kant,un geistgeschichtlich im Zusammerenhang mit ihn,
entwickelte Humboldt eine Gliederung der Geographie, die er
bis an seim Lebensende beibehielt. Die erscheinungen
Konnen nach drie GesichtspunKten behandelt werden: dinglich-
systematisch, historisch und chronologisch."
Beck (1973) 1_, p.60. Quoted by Tobey (1981) p,92.
79. See Coleman (1977) pp.1-8, for a description of this
transformation.
80. Albury and Oldroyd (1977).
81. Ibid, p.203 (my emphasis)
82. Ibid, p.202.
83. Humboldt (1793), trans. Hartshorne (1958), p.100.
84. For Gottingen, see Lenoir (1981). The best sources for the research
activity of Museum d'Histoire Naturelle are works on Lamarck;
see Schiller (1971) and Stafleu (1971). For the institutional
background, see Limoges (1980).
85. Humboldt (1807a).
86. Bruhns (1873) 1_» pp.83-87.
87. Forster (1777).
88. Botting (1973) p.21.
89. Bruhns (1873) 1_, pp.373-90.
90. For the importance Humboldt attached to his experience of the
tropics, see Humboldt (1849) p.215.
91. See Botting (1973) p.213.
92. Forster, G. (1791).
v
93. Meyer-Abich (1969) p.101.
94. This point is made by Meyer-Abich, op.cit.
95. Humboldt (1807a) p.VII.
96. Ibid, pp. V-VI.
97. Humboldt (1850) p.214. The Ideen zu einer Physiognomik der
Gewachse was first published in Ansichten der Nature (1808)
which was later translated into English, Humboldt (1850). All
references to the Ideen are taken from the Bohn's English
translation of the third edition of the Ansichten.
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98. Humboldt [1807a], p.42. I am aware that the exact meaning
of the first sentence of this quotation is difficult to
discern. However, I believe the meaning of the paragraph
as a whole is quite clear.
99. See Smith (1960), Chapter 1 and pp.64-65.
100. Humboldt (1807a), pp.30-31.
101. Humboldt (1850), p.217.
102. Humboldt (1807a), p.1.
103. Ibid., between the preface and the main text. The engraving
is not to be confused with the "Tableau Physique des Regions
Equinoctiales" which is a collection of physical and
phytogeographical data, bound in the same volume as a
supplement to the Essai, Humboldt (1807a), pp.37-152. The
engraving and the physical tables relate to the same region,
however, and the former may be taken to be the graphical
representation of the latter.
104. Bruhns (1873), 1_, p.179.
105. Humboldt (1795).
106. Bruhns (1873) 1_, pp.161-78.
107. Humboldt (1807b).
108. For a description of Goethe's botany, see Arber (1950), Chaps.
4 and 5.
109. Bruhns (1873) 1_, p.176.
110. The text of Schiller's letter to Korner 6th Aug, 1797 on the
subject of Alexander von Humboldt is quoted in Bruhns (1873)
1_, p. 1 8 8.
111. Ibid, p.172. Goethe was vehemently opposed to the vulcanist
theory of the creation of the Earth's crust, a theory
Humboldt adopted upon his return from America.
112. Humboldt (1808), see note 97 above. Humboldt's comments on
the Ansichten der Nature are quoted in Bruhns (1873) 1_, p.357.
113. Humboldt (1844) - I have used the English translation (1846-58) -
see, for example, 2_, pp. 6-7.
114. See, for example, Ibid. 1, p.37.
115. Letter to Varnhagen, April 28th 1841, Humboldt (1860) pp.67-58.
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i
116. In particular, Von Engalhart~[1976]. Lenoir [1981] provides
a guide into this literature. Von Engelhart has identified
three distinctive traditions within Naturphilosophie; the
"transcendental" which he identified with Kant and which
Lenoir associates with Blumenbach and the Gottingen school,
the "speculative" or 'Romantic" which he identifies with
Schelling, and the "metaphysical" which he identifies with
Hegel and within which Lenoir places the biological work of
□ken, Goethe and Carus.
117. Humboldt (1850], p.219.
118. Ibid, pp.229-230. Humboldt, although closely associated with
Blumenbach, must be, therefore, seen as electic even within
Naturphilosophie.
119. Bruhns (1873] 1_, p.188 - see note 110 above.
120. Mannheim (19523, pp.79-94.
121. Ibid. Chap. 2.
122. The most detailed study of Humboldt's political views is Braun
(1954a]. See also Bruhns (1873] 2, pp.242-55 and Rippy and
Braun (1947]. For the difficulties Humboldt's liberalism
caused him in Prussia, see Kellner (1963] p.218.
123. See Lenoir (1980].
124. Jordanova (1976], Chap. 3.
125. Lenoir (1980].
126. See Gillispie (1962]. .
127. Lenoir (1981].
128. See Bowen (1970] and Kellner's description of Humboldt's
lectures on physical geography, Kellner (1963], p.115.
129. Lenoir (1981].
130. Bruhns (1873] 1_, p.69.
131. Ibid. 1_, p. 83.
132. Ibid. 1_, p.72.
133. Lenoir (1981], pp.170-4.
134. Ibid, p.170.
135. For a lengthy discussion of the links between Humboldt and
Kant, see Macpherson (1972] pp.34-152, especially pp.59-63.
See also Hartshorne (1958].
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136. Lenoir (1981), p.127.
137. For example, Crosland (1967) pp.104-113, seems to do no
injustice to his subject in making Humboldt out to be a
representative member of the Society of Arcueil.
138. Humboldt (1821-25) _1_, p.V. In the translator's preface,
p.Ill,this inelegant sentence is paraphrased as:-
"... raising the mind to general ideas, without neglecting
individual facts."
139. Cannon (1978), p.75.
140. "Goethe noted with satisfaction on receiving the first
complimentary copy of the "Essai politique sur 1'ile de Cuba"
that the author (Humboldt) had not omitted "pointers to the
incommensurable" in spite of the tremendous amounts of
statistics." Meyer-Abich (1967), p.106.
141. Cannon (1978), p.77.
142. See, for example, Forster (1778), p.60.
143. Humboldt (1814-29) 2, pp.32-39.
144. For Tobias Mayer's contribution to navigation and astronomy,
see Forbes (1980), Chap. 2.
145. Humboldt (1820), r.3.
146. Crosland (1967), pp.264-5.
147. Cannon (1978), p.96, points out that it was unlikely that a
Humboldtian science of measuring physical variables could
have come into existence before the last two decades of the
eighteenth century due to the available instruments being
too crude.
148. Robinson and Wallis (1967).
149. George Harvey in the Encyclopaedia Metropolitana article on
"Meteorology" (1832) - quoted by Cannon (1978), p.95.
150. Humboldt (1807a), p.32.
151. Ibid, p.42.
152. See the "Tableau Physique" and Humboldt (1821-5) 1_, p.158.
153. Ibid.
154. Humboldt (1850), p.278. See also Stearn (1959).
155. Humboldt (1807), p.31.
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156. Ibid.
157. Humboldt (18501, p.217.
158. Ibid, pp.220-221.
159. Humboldt (1821-251 1_, p.158.
160. Humboldt (18501, p.217.
161. Lenoir (19811, p.127.
162. Ibid, pp.172-3.
163. For a description of this tradition see Whittaker (19621,
pp.4-9.
164. Grisebach (1872a) 1_, pp.9-14.
165. Ibid.
166. Humboldt (1807a), p.15.
167. Willdenow (18051, p.399.
168. Humboldt (1807a), p.17.
169. Ibid, pp.18-19.
170. For a detailed account of the development of physiognomic and
floristic technique in the classification of vegetation, see
Whittaker (1962). For an account of the utilisation of
floristic analysis by one of the most important European
schools of vegetation science, see Becking (19571.
171. For Hooker's attitudes to Humboldt, see Stearn (19591. For
Humboldt's influence on Darwin, see Theodorides (19681 and
Egerton (19701. For Humboldt's influence on the exploration
of the American West, see Goetzman (19651.
172. My account of the development of Humboldtian plant geography
has the same form as the more detailed account of the origin
of molecular biology supplied by Mullins (19721.
173. Humboldt (1807a), p.15; (1821-251 1_, p.XXIV.f.
174. He did however exercise his right as a member of the Berlin
Academy to lecture (on physical geography) at the University
of Berlin, Kellner (1963), p.115.
175. See Braun (1954b1. Braun concludes:- "Von Humboldt was
perhaps the principal patron of intellectual endeavours of
his age."
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176. There are several published volumes of Humboldt's correspondence,
see Beck (19591, pp.429-35. His letters to Varnhagen alone
fill a substantial book, Humboldt (16601.
177. Sanders (19751, p.215. See also Schouw (16231, p.III. There
is a longer biography of Schouw in Danish, Christensen (19231,
which I have not consulted.
178. Schouw (18181. The title is roughly translatable as "Some
remarks on Humboldt's work in plant geography".
179. Sanders (19751, p.215.
180. Schouw (18391.
181. Ibid. 1, p.VIII.
182. Ibid. 1_, p. IX. I have been unable to locate either the second
or the third volume.
183. Ibid, 1, p.1 (1st supplements
184. Schouw (18231, p.165 - the nomenclature was apparently first
proposed in an earlier (18221 Danish edition of this work,
see Whittaker (19621, p.9.
185. It is probably fairer to say that Schouw made no consistent
distinction between flora and vegetation. He studied both
together, see Schouw (18261. In this he differs from Meyen,
kerner and the others I have identified as Humboldtian plant
geographers. But, as Schouw himself put it:- "A Science is
not established at once; its first ideas exist, are rejected,
are touched upon cursorily, or are treated of without its
being foreseen that these ideas will, in their time, form
a self-existent branch of our knowledge." Schouw (18261,
p.161 .
186. See Browne (forthcoming 1 pp.81-82.
187. Grisebach (18381, p.160. The translation is from Clements
(19161, pp.116-117.
188. See, for instance, Clements (19161, pp.125-130.
189. kuhn (19621, pp.53-57, see also Brannigan (19811.




193. Jahn (19681, p.84.
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194. Meyeri (18461, p.3.
195. Ibid, p.8.
196. For the use of botanical arithmetic in floristic plant
geography beyond Humboldt, see Browne (forthcoming!) pp. 77-89.
197. Meyen (18461, p.8.
198. Ibid, p.98.
199. Ibid, p.1.
200. The best biographical source for Grisebach is Stearn (19651.
All biographical information is from this source unless
otherwise stated. Also useful for Grisebach is Balfour (18821.
201. Balfour (18821, p.14.
202. For Kunth and his association with Humboldt, see Stearn (19681.
203. Grisebach (1843-461,
204. Balfour (18821, p.16.
205. Grisebach (18Z2a).
206. Grisebach (1872b).
207. Grisebach (1838), p.60. See Clements (1916), pp.116-117.
208. Grisebach (18491, p.418.
209. Grisebach (1846a), p.96.
210. Grisebach (1846b), pp.132-3.
211. Ibid, p.135.
212. The relative weighting to be given to physiognomic and floristic
criteria was, as we shall see, in later chapters, a major
source of controversy in vegetation science.
213. Kerner(18631, I have used Conard's (19511 translation of Das
Pflanzenleben der Donaulander, Canard (19511 p.5. For
biographical details of Kerner, see Kronfeld (1908).
214. Conard (1951) p.V.



















Heer (18351; Thurmann (1849); Sendtner (1854); Lorenz (1858);
and Hult (1881). Thurmann provides a clear definition of the
difference between flora and vegetation:-
"A region's flora comprises an enumeration and description
of all its species without reference to their abundance
considered from a purely phytographic point of view;...
a region's vegetation is its plant life which consists of
species of the flora found in varying quantity and size
some prominent, others scattered and merging into the
background;.... To reach a thorough understanding of
vegetation the flora must first be understood, but the
flora may be studied without an exact and complete knowledge
of vegetation. Thus a region's flora and its vegetation
are two quite different things which should not be confused."
Trans.Duff (1980) p.44. However, as we have seen. Duff is
wrong in his statement, p. 26, that Thurmann was the first
formally to distinguish floristic botany from the study of
plant associations.
For biographical detail of Lecoq, see Chassagne (1928).




Ibid. 4, pp.58-84 (sociabilite), pp.85-90 (association).
□e Candolle (1855), 1_, p.I.
Ibid. 1_, p.419.f. See also 2_, pp.1175-6.
Ibid. 1_, p.419. Tobey's statement, Tobey (1977) pp.100-1,
that De Candolle denied the possibility of the study of
vegetation is erroneous. De Candolle was following another
tradition of botanical practice but he acknowledged the
existence of a vegetation science.
I am not, of course, arguing that Humboldt was not also
important to the development of floristic plant geography.
See Browne (forthcoming), Chap. 3, for an assessment of his
influence. Nor am I suggesting that De Candolle's use of
Humboldt is in any way illegitimate or a misreading.
However the novel concern with vegetation is a characteristic
aspect of Humboldt's work and there existed two traditions
of plant geography in the nineteenth century - one of which
springs from Humboldt's studies of vegetation. The other
extends through Humboldt into the Linnean era.
3£7
231. For exemplifications of the British type of interest in
floristic plant geography, see Watson (1835, 1847-59) and
the introduction to Hooker (1853-5).
232. This presumably explains the almost complete neglect of
vegetational plant geography by English-speaking historians
of science. There is, however, it should be noted, a short
description of the vegetation of the British Isles in Watson
(1835), pp. 34-60. Also Darwin's most Humboldtian work
(1839) contains several descriptions of the vegetation of
South America. It is very likely that other examples could
be found. But after 1850, the British emphasis seems to have
been almost entirely on species distribution.
233. Hinds (1843); Heer (1935). For biographical details of Heer,
see Anon. (1886).
234. Hinds (1843), pp.116-119.
235. Heer (1835), p.1 - the last sentence is from a footnote on the
same page.
236. Von Post (1842), p.97; (1844), p.113; (1851), p.110. See also
Hult (1881).
237. Whittaker (1962), p.24. A list of biographical sources for
Hult is to be found in Barnhart (1965) _2, p.217.
238. See Godwin (1977), p.8, also Oswald (1959).
239. By "self-conscious ecology" I mean the activity practised by
workers who called themselves "ecologists" and their activity
"ecology". The term is borrowed f ram Allee_et_ al_. (1949),
pp.42-43.
240. Hult (1881).
241. Ibid, p.1. I am greatly indebted to Ms. Sigridur Oladottir for
providing me with a translation of this and the other passages
quoted from Hult.
242. Ibid. p.2.
243. For the characteristics of the Uppsala school, see Whittaker
(1962), pp.23-38. The Scandinavians rejected the inclusion
of habitat factors within the definition of the association
(Flahault and Schroter, 1910) using arguments very similar
to those of Hult (Du Rietz, Fries and Tengwall, 1918).
244. Hult (1881), p.9.
245. Warming (1895a), Schimper (1898), Drude (1896); for comments
on the institutionalisation of ecology, see Duff (1980),
Chap. 2, Lowe (1976) and Cittadino (1980),
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246. Godwin [1977], p.8.
247. Rubel, one of Schroter's students,has traced a tradition of
research into the morphology of plant communities. His list
of personnel contains several names I have mentioned above,
viz. Humboldt, Grisebach "die Vater der Pflanzengesellschaften",
Schouw, Lorenz, Lecoq, Kerner, Hult, Schroter, Sernander,
and Warming, Rubel [1921), p. 19.
248. Tansley [1939), p.532,
249. Cited in Godwin (1977), p.8.
250. I have quoted from the English translation of Schimper'srbook.
Schimper (1903), p.162.
251. Ibid, p.161.
252. As we have seen, the maps given in books on plant geography
frequently well exemplify the conventions of the cognitive
framework which has produced them.
253. The best description of these changes is to be found in
Cittadino (1981), but see also Green (1909).
254. Cittadino (1981), p.88.
255. Ibid, p.89.
256. Balfour (1882), p.18.
257. Cittadino (1981), p.2.
258. Schimper (1903), p.VI.
259. Cittadino (1981), p.151.
260. Schimper (1903), p.VI.
261. For an account (somewhat partisan) of Warming's career in
ecology, see Goodland (1975). See also duller (1976) and
Tansley (1927).
262. Warming (1909), pp.2-3.
263. Tobey (1981), p.104, claims that the English translation
"introduced a Humboldtian nuance into (Warming's) Darwinian
theory". Thus Tobey argues that it cannot be said that
Warming supported the idea of definite communities in the
Humboldtian sense. But duller (1976), p.182 translated
the following passage directly from the Plantesamfund:-
"To answer the question: why each species has its own habit
and habitat, why the species congregate to form definite
communities, and why these have a characteristic physiognomy".
One can see that the passage I have quoted from the English
translation, note 262, is very faithful to the author's
original intention.
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264. Warming [1909), pp.2-6.
265. Tobey (1981), pp.102-4, Tobey provides little evidence for his
separation of plant geography into a "mechanist'1 and "idealist"
tradition. Tobey errs also in identifying Warming completely
with the New Botany. Warming's first research was in taxonomy
and floristics and he continued this line of work throughout
his life. He published a very successful text-book on
systematic and floristic botany (1895b).
266.' Nuller (1976), p.182.
267. Tobey (1981), p.103. Note that, contra Tobey, the ontological
existence of plant communities is not necessarily dependent
on cooperation between the constituent plants. Social
integration may just as easily be held to arise as a by¬
product of competition - see, for instance, Clements (1935),
pp.32-5.
268. Warming (1909), p.369 and p.370.
269. Zaunick (1959), p.138.
270. See Drude (1890a), p.IX. The Handbuch der Pflanzengeographie
was dedicated to Grisebach.
271. Drude (1890a), p.28.
272. Drude (1890b), p.35.
273. Pound and Clements (1898a), p.4. The relationship between
□rude and the Nebraskans is described by Tobey (1981),
pp.57-70 and pp.87-99.
274. For the history of the Nebraskan "school", see Tobey (1981).
275. This point is elaborated upon by Cannon (1978), pp,76-82.
276. Ben-David (1971), Chapter 7.
277. Cannon (1978), pp.73-110.
278. See, for example Stearn (1960).
279. Cannon (1975) noted this fact, p.106.
280. For example, Egerton (1976), p.340.
281. Tansley (1927), p.55; Cowles (1901), pp.73-77.
282. Worster (1977), p.198.
283. Goodland (1955), p.241.
284. Godwin (1977), p.8.
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CHAPTER 2
1. Kerner von Marilaun (1863), translated in Conard [1951],
pp.4-5 - see discussion of Kerner's relation to Humboldtian
botany in the previous chapter.
2. Nichols [1923], p.17, for example, proposed the following
definition: -
"...the association may be described as a vegetation-unit
characterised by its essentially constant physiognomy and by
its essentially constant floristic composition, at least with
regard to dominant species".
A similar definition was given by Ou Rietz [1929], p.624.
3. Tansley [1920], pp.120-1.
4. Weaver and Clements [1938], p.89.
5. Conard [1939], p.10.
6. Van der Maarel [1975], p.213.
7. Flahault and Schroter [1910], trans, in Pavillard [1935], p.211.
8. Whittaker [1956], p.30.
9. Clements [1905], p.229.
10. For a comment on what some of these terms mean in their
different contexts, see Egler [1942]. I will use the term
"phytosociologist" to refer specifically to members of the
Uppsala or Zurich-Montpelier schools.
11. For remarks on the centrality of classification to the
constitution of knowledge, see Bloor [1982]. For an elegant
empirical study of two different scientific classificatory,
practices, see Dean [1979].
12. See, for example, Tuxen [1950].
13. Compare Conard [1935], with Weaver and Clements [1938],
pp.508-16. This comparison is borrowed from Mcintosh
[1958], p.116.
14. See, for example, Just [1939], and Shimwell [1971], especially
introduction. I shall use the term "school" quite informally
throughout the chapter - meaning a more or less loosely
socially and/or geographically defined group of investigators
sharing the broad principles of a common research programme.
As an illustration of the informality with which I will use
this term, I will refer to Zurich-Montpelier phytosociology
as a "school" and I will use the same term to refer to the





17. See the detailed discussion of various schools in Whittaker
(1 975 ).
18. Whittaker (1962), pp.72-78. See also Sears (1956),
19. Whittaker (1956), p.72; Sears (1956).
20. I use the term "conventional" in the sense in which it is
employed by Barnes (1981). I will argue that the different
classification systems are socially sustained and not
uniquely determined by input from the natural world.
21. For instance, its applications to tropical vegetation have
tended to be more physiognomic than the European applications,
see Emberger et al. (1950) and Mangenot et al. (1948).
22. Allee et al. (1949), pp.42-43. See previous chapter,
footnote 239, for an explanation of this phrase.
23. My biographical information on Braun-Blanquet has been taken
from Weadcock and Dansereau (1960), Lebrun (1975) and de
Bolbs (1982). Braun-Blanquet died in 1982.
24. For the early history of the Zurich-Montpelier school, see
Whittaker (1962), pp.9-23 and Westhoff and Van der Maarel
(1973), pp.620-5.
25. As in Schroter and Kirchner (1902).
26. See, for example, Braun-Blanquet (1913), Braun-Blanquet and
Farrer (1913).
27. Flahault (1901). Determination by dominant species is at
least partly physiognomic, since the dominants are usually
of a different growth-form from the subordinates.
28. Van der Maarel (1975), pp.213-4.
29. Brockmann-Jerosch (1907), Gradmann (1909).
30. Pavillard (1920), Braun-Blanquet (1921); Braun-Blanquet and
Pavillard (1922).
31. Braun-Blanquet (1928).
32. Whittaker (1962), p.15.
33. The story of Braun-Blanquet's personal involvement with the
Station is told in Braun-Blanquet (1968),
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34. For an appreciation of the significance of the Sigmatist
approach see Van der Maarel (1975),
35. Simberloff (1980), p.15, see also Moore (1983),
36. For biographical details of F.E. Clements, see E. Clements
(1948), Ewan (1971), Sears (1973) and Tansley (1947).
37. For biographical details of Bessey, see Ewan (1970).
38. For Bessey's relation to the New Botany, see Overfield (1975).
39. For the impact of the New Botany in America, see Rodgers
(1944), especially pp.1-7, 198-202, 226-50 and 304-20, and
Farlow (1913).
40. For Bessey's teaching and the Botanical Seminar, see Tobey
(1981), pp.9-23.
41. Pound and Clements (1900).
42. Ibid, p.4, Drude (1896). Roscoe Pound was shortly to abandon
botany for a distinguished career in law. He eventually
became Dean of the Harvard Law School. Far biographical
details and an account of his early interest in botany, see
Wigdor (1974).
43. Clements (1904, 1905).
44. The use of the metre quadrat had been pioneered seven years
earlier by Pound and Clements (1898); for the background
to their invention, see Tobey (1981), pp.48-53 and 57-60.
45. Clements (1916).
46. Tobey (1977), p.15.
47. Clements (1916), pp.124-128.
48. Ibid, p.180, Weaver and Clements (1938), pp.481-2. The
reduction was achieved by regarding vegetation types formerly
held as formations as "sub-climaxes" or "disclimaxes", i.e.
stages toward climatic climaxes. Thus short-grass prairie
became a disclimax association of true prairie.
49. Weaver and Clements (1938), p. 481.
50. Becking (1957), p.428 regards the term'"concrete" to be a
technically inappropriate one for units such as those
described by Clements. However I fallow here the usage
employed by both Clements and Braun-Blanquet who contrasted
their respective positions in these terms.
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51. Becking (1957). p.427.
52. This was the key point of the "developmental" or "concrete"
view, see Clements (1916), p.125,
53. Braun-Blanquet (1932), p.366.
54. Clements (1916), p.125. For Braun-Blanquet's opposition to
Clement's organicism, see Braun-Blanquet (1932), pp.315-6.
55. See Clements (1936), p.254. In this article Clements
provided a synthesis of the views he had held for thirty
years.
56. Ibid, p.255.
57. See Egler (1951), p.682.
58. Clements (1936), p.255.
59. Weaver and Clements (1938), p.497.
60. I am here dodging the question of whether the Plains had been
altered by the Indians.
61. Weaver and Clements (1938), p.488, Gleason (1901), pp.1-13,
62. Braun-Blanquet (1932).
63. For a vivid outline of the differences between British
ecology and European phytosociology, see Poore (1955c), p.226.
64. Whittaker (1962), p.4 wrote:- "...one may well consider that
British and American ecology form together a single tradition
of no greater inherent diversity than the others."
65. See Carpenter (1939) and Whittaker (1962), pp.38-42.
66. Whittaker (1962), p.73. I must admit that the "ecology of
ecologists" explanation is employed here as something of a
straw man. I intend no strong criticism of either Sears or
Whittaker. However, discussion of it helps my exposition
since it illustrates the inadequacy of explanations of the
character of ecological classification that are based entirely
on considerations of the input the classifiers receive from
the natural world. The patent incompleteness of the
"ecology of ecologists" explanation highlights the importance
of considering the cultural context of classification.
□n the other hand, I do not wish to argue that there is no
substance whatsoever in the "ecology of ecologists"
explanation. Experience of nature may not uniquely determine
ecological classification but classifications are aeveloped
in the light of such experience. The importance of such
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input is indicated by the fact that actors frequently report
difficulties when trying to apply a system devised for one
sort of vegetation to another. We shall see, for instance,
in the following chapters that ecologists experienced
problems when trying to apply systems devised for Temperate
America to either the Tropics or the Arctic, However it
follows from the social nature of theory construction that such
problems are always, in principle, soluble. See, for example,
the solution devised by R.F. Griggs when faced by Arctic .
vegetation. This is described in Chapter four,
67. Braun-Blanquet [1932], p.VII,
68. Ibid, p.21. Braun-Blanquet did argue, however, that it was
not always the"Linnean species as such that was most sensitive
as a phytosociological indication but often its sub-species
or eco-types".
69. Braun-Blanquet (1932], p.354.
70. Ibid.p.21 - the study of life-forms did allow a preliminary
"rough characterization" of plant communities, but:- "They
cannot however be used as permanent bases in the nomenclature
and taxonomy of plant communities", ibid., pp.299-302.
71. Ibid, p.22.
72. This description of Sigmatist methodology is based on the
detailed and critical accounts of BecKing (1957), pp.426-447,
Poore (1955a,b), and Westhoff and Van der Maarel (1973).
Their accounts are fuller than any supplied by Braun-Blanquet
himself. It should also be noted that the Sigmatists did
much else besides classification. However floristic
classification was a central part of their practice.
73. See BecKing (1957), p.430.
74. Poore (1955a), p.288.
75. Ibid.
76. Braun-Blanquet (1949), p.7.
77. Braun-Blanquet (1932), pp.67-8.
78. Braun-Blanquet (1933).
79. Whittaker (1962), p.22.
80. The standard history of the New Botany is still Green (1909),
but see also Cittadino (1981), especially Chap. 1.
81. For the reform of scientific education in the German universities
and its effects, see Ben-David (1971), pp.108-133.
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82. For the general adoption of German models of higher education
in the United States, see ibid,, pp.139-162.
83. Quoted in Allen (1 976 3 , p,185,
84. Quoted in Huxley (19183, 1_, pp.403-4,
85. Ibid, 2, pp.279-80,




89. For a general account of Bonnier's work., see Davy de Virville
(1970],
90. Bonnier and Douin (1911-19353, Bonnier and Layens (18863, For
a note on Bonnier's floristic botany, see Stearn (19503.
91. See Davy de Virville (19703, pp.6-7.
92. See Hall and Clements (19233, pp.3-6.
93. Orude (19063, p.179.
94. Cittadino (19803, p.174.
95. Orude (19063, p.183.
96. This tendency of the nineteenth-century German University
system to produce more young academics (Privatdozenten) than
there were academic careers for is well documented, see
Busch (19633. Zloczower (19663 discusses the effects the
resulting competition had on research activity in physiology,
97. Cittadino (19613, p.1.
98. Huxley (19183, 1_, p.403.
99. For the importance of Engler and his school at the end of the
19th century, see Green (1 909 3 , pp.126-7, also Stapf (19313;
for the importance of Edinburgh in British teaching of taxonomy
at this time, see Bower (19383, p.58.
100. See Brockway (19793 and Bower (19383, p.26. Bower explained
the British neglect of the New Botany as being the result of
a preoccupation with Imperial duties on the part of the
leading British botanists.
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101. Such a shift of research interest might be tactical if the
competitive situation in the adopted field was easier than
in the original one. Physiology, both plant and animal, was
especially overcrowded in the decades after 1880, Ben-David
and Collins (1966] have analysed these factors in the
development of psychology which was produced by an immigration
of personnel from physiology to philosophy. Duff (1980],
pp.30-37, makes several tentative remarks as to migration
and cross-fertilisation between physiology and plant geography
as a possible origin for a distinctive discipline of ecology.
He gives little evidence for his assertion, but it seems
likely that he is substantially correct. See also note 125
below.
102. Sanders (1975], p.166.
103. An Extraordinary Professor in a German university was one who
had a sub-department within an institute or department headed
by a full professor. In other words, Schimper still had a
rung of the career ladder to ascend. Thus a shift in research
interest at this time might well have been tactical in Ben-
David and Collins's sense - see note 101 above. To establish
this would require, however, a special study of Schimper and
other similar cases.
104. Schimper (1898].
105. Cittadino (1981], p.112.
106. Retention of methodologies gained in physiology would also be
tactical if the scientific status of phytogeography was lower
than that of physiology, see Ben-David and Collins (1966],
pp.459-61. Like Schimper, Haberladt still had rungs of the
career ladder to climb. Although he was a full professor,
his chair was at the University of Innsbruck - not one of the
principal German universities and often a stepping-off point
for a move to a more prestigious institution.
107. Ecology never, in fact, quite succeeded in fully identifying
itself with the New Botany. It has always been regarded as
being on the traditional side of the botanical profession.
The persistence of such categorisations was brought home to
me when I held a fellowship at the University of Canterbury,
New Zealand. The Botany Department there fielded two soccer
teams - the Trads and the Nods. As an honorary ecologist, I
was invited to play for the Trads.
108. For a description of Schroter's teaching, see Tansley (1939],
pp.531-4; for Flahault's interest in floristic botany, see
Shene (1935], p.176. For the importance of Schroter and
Flahault as "fathers of the Zurich-Nontpelier school" of
phytosociology, see the previous chapter.
1 09. Stafleu (1971], p.267, Braun-Blanquet (1949], p,7.
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110. de Bolas (1982], p.196.
111. Braun-Blanquet (1932], p.21,
112. Moss [1910]. For biographical details of Moss, see Tansley
(1931] and Crump (1931],
113. Gradmann (1909], Although this chapter has concentrated on
the floristic systems as set out by Braun-Blanquet, it should
have been noted that he was by no means the only advocate of
such a system in the first decade of the twentieth century,
As is consistent with floristic analysis being a piece of
professional group strategy, it was a collective movement,
involving Gradmann, Pavillard and Brockmann-Jerosch, among
others associated with Schroter or Flahault,
114. Moss (1910], p.35.
115. See Becking (1957], p.467. Note that the meaning of
"synecologie" is different from the Anglo-American "synecology",
To an English speaker, synecology is the study of communities
in all its aspects- to a Frenchman, synecologie is the study
of community habitats.
116. See, for example, Braun-Blanquet (1924]. However this paper
also well evidences how the study of habitat factors was secondary
in Braun-Blanquet's eyes to the floristic identification of
associations.
117. Braun-Blanquet (1932], p.82. The German phytosociologist,
R. Tuxen, a pupil and close associate of Braun-Blanquet
(see Braun-Blanquet (1969] and Barkman (1981]) explicitly
argued that the plant was a better measure of habitat factors
than any instrument, Tuxen (1942].
118. Braun-Blanquet (1932], p.82; emphasis added.
119. Braun-Blanquet expressed his disagreement with this investigative
strategy:- "Those investigators who regard synecology as the
foundation of phytosociologic classification and indeed of the
whole structure of plant sociology, must not forget how
insecure that foundation still is", ibid, p.81.
120. Moss (1910], p.26,
121. Overfield (1975], pp.164-168.
122. Pound and Clements (1900], p.4. I have consulted the second
edition. The first edition appeared in 1898 but is very rare.
Pound (1896] reviewed Drude's book enthusiastically when it
appeared.
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123. Clements [1905), pp,1-2. Cowles made a similar identification
of the two subjects;- "It is coming to be realised that the
problems of physiology and ecology are essentially identical ,,,
in all respects .,, The method of approach has differed with
the point of view, and it is the physiologist who has given
most emphasis to the fundamental importance of experimentation.
The ecologist, on the other hand, has brought in the rich
contribution of field observation. It is only recently that
each has recognised the imperative necessity of the method
of the other, and it now seems possible to predict that the
fundamental method of the future is to be field experimentation
combined with observation." Cowles (1908), p.265,
124. Clements (1905), p.103.
125. Clements's work in physiology was never accepted as competent
by established plant physiologists, see Blackman and Tansley
(1905), pp. 233-7. The claims made by Clements as to the close
kinship between his work and that of physiologists are most
plausibly interpreted as part of a tactical programme designed
to enhance ecology's scientific prestige by "borrowing the
methods of a high-status field", Ben-David and Collins (1966),
p.460. See also note 101 above. Ben-David and Collins's work
has stimulated a considerable amount of further study, and a
considerable bibliography on intellectual migration and the
transfer of methodologies is now available. Mulkay (1972),
Chaps. 4 and 5, Mullins (1972), dulkay (1974), Whitley (1974)
and Robbins and Johnston (1976) provide examples of a variety
of approaches. The tactical advantage of being seen to
apply the methods of a higher status discipline within a lower
status one are clear from all the above studies. See also
Schon (1963) for a less overtly sociological formulation of
the same phenomenon.
126. Clements (1905), p.2.
127. Clements (1908), p.253.
i
128. The epithet "medieval" was used by Bessey to describe orthodox
taxonomy at the same conference that Clements delivered the
paper from which the previous quotation is derived, Bessey
(1908), p.252.
129. Clements (1920), p.56.
130. Clements (1908), p.259.
131. The advantage of splitting was that it allowed taxonomists to
create new species. A taxonomist's reputation depended on the
number of new species he created. For a sympathetic study of
an inveterate "splitter", see Rodgers (1944a).
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132. Clements [1920], p.56. The splitting of genera was particularly
troublesome to non-taxonomists since it forced them to discard
long familiar plant names and learn new ones,
133. Cowles (1908], Bessey (1908],
134. Clements (1920], p.56.
135. For the general background to the Land-Grant Colleges and their
social situation, see Eddy (1956] and Ross (1942]. For studies
of the constraints, upon scientific activity in these or
related institutions, see Rosenberg (1972, 1979] and Rossiter
(1979]. It must also be remembered that American opinion,
in the East as well as the West, was in the whole suspicious
of pure research, especially if public funds were involved,
Daniels (1967]. The Land-Grant Colleges, thus,intensified a
quite general social pressure encouraging directly applicable
scientific research.
136. Qverfield (1 975], pp.170-76, see also Tobey (1 976].
137. See for example, Bessey (1886, 1888, 1894, 1895], Tobey
(1976], pp.719-720 and Overfield (1975], p.173 give fuller
lists of publications by Bessey relevant to these subjects.
138. Tobey (1976], pp.720-22.
139. E. Clements (1948], p.266.
140. Clements (1905], p.14.
141. Eddy (1956], p.84.
142. E. Clements (1948], p.266.
143. Clements, "Annual Report of the Minnesota State Botanist"
(1910] (not seen) - quoted in Clements (1920], p.9.
144. See Rosenberg (1979], p.156. The pressures and aspirations
which produced McCollum's and Pearl's rejection of the role
forced upon them by the milieu of the experimental station are
well described in Rosenberg (1972].
145. Clements (1920].
146. Ibid, p.330.
147. Ibid, pp. 227-40..
148. Ibid, pp.331-4.
149. E. Clements (1948], p.226.
150. E. Clements (1960], p.230.
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151. Clements (1 935a).
152. Ibid, p.355.
153. For the general increase in interest in conservation occasioned
by the Drought and the New Deal, see Swain (1963), For the
involvement of the NebrasKans in drought-inspired conservation
schemes on the Plains, see Tobey (1981) Chap, 7.
154. See note 135 above.
155. See Tobey (1976) for the practical orientation of Bessey*s
research and pedagogy.
156. The conflict between disciplinary allegiance outside the local
context and the practical orientation essential within it is
described by Rosenberg (1972), pp.185-90 and 199-203, As
Rosenberg expressed it elsewhere (1979), p.144:- "In the
hierarchy of scientific achievement, applied science possessed
a ... problematic quality: enshrined in the formulas of
conventional rhetoric, the applied scientist was nevertheless
part of a scientific world in which abstractness generally
correlated with status. The utility so appealing to mid-
nineteenth century Americans constituted a dubious virtue in
the world of pure science."
157. Letter, Clements to Tansley, July 30th 1905. Box 1, Tansley
Papers.
158. See, for example, Clements and Shelford (1939), pp.1-5,
159. See Clements (1902a,b). The uncompromising character of many
of Clement's prescriptions for ecology may be readily
appreciated from these articles.




164. Letter, McMillan to Clements, Jan. 3 1907, Bessey Papers,
University of Nebraska Archives, quoted and discussed in
Cittadino (1980), pp.24-25.
165. McMillan (1897).
166. Drude (1905), p.188.
167. See Cittadino (1980), pp.21-25 and Gleason (1961), pp.121-22.
168. Quoted in Rosenberg (1979), p.151.
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169. Even F.E, Egler, an arch-opponent of Clementsianism was
forced to acknowledge that Clements was "a practical realist
... who impressed the soil conservationists, agronomists, and
range managers with his down-to-earth understanding of land
management.". Egler (1951), p,677.
170. A "Grayian" species is one of the sort used by Asa Gray, the
dominant figure of nineteenth-century American taxonomy, A
Grayian species was a broad category encompassing a fair
degree of morphological variation,
171. See Cowles (19081, Clements (19081 and Bessey (19081,
172. Compare Webb (19591, p.29.
173. See, for instance, Clements (1902al,
174. Letter, E.I. Rose to J.T, Curtis, Sept. 6 1948, Curtis Papers.
175. See Weadock and Dansereau (19601, p.11.
176. Paul (1972), pp.1-28.
177. Quoted in Ibid, pp.27-28.
178. Ibid, p.25.
179. Ibid, p.20. This point is relevant in the present context due
to the links between Montpelier and Zurich. The Station at
Montpelier was in Swiss ownership,* Braun-Blanquet1 s programme
had been first devised in Zurich, Braun-Blanquet (1932), p.vii.
180. See Paul (1980) and Shinn (1980),
181. Paul (1980), pp.158-66.
182. Nye (1975), p.291.
183. Paul (1980), p.161,
184. Ibid., p. 162.
185. Shinn (1980), pp.302-315.
186. This hierarchy was enshrined in the official aims of the
Nontpelier station, see Weadock and Dansereau (1960), p.3.
187. Ibid, p.13.
188. Westhoff and Van der Naarel (1973), p.622. Tuxen's interest
in application is emphasised by the fact that he became
editor of the journal Angewandte Pflanzensoziologie (Applied
Phytosociology) .
189. Braun-Blanquet (1932), p.26.
190. de Bolos (1982), p.193.
191. For example, Braun-Blanquet (1949, 1952); the quotation is
from the former, p,6,
192. Braun-Blanquet (1949), pp.7-8, 14-16.
193. Braun-Blanquet (1935); Weadock and Dansereau (1960), p.9,
194. Weadock and Oansereau, p.9.
195. See note 135 above.
196. Clements (1916), p.3.
197. Ibid, p.6.
198. Clements and Shelford (1938), pp.20-21,
199. For example, Clements, Weaver and Hanson (1929), p.314.
200. For the American vogue of Spencer, see Hofstadter (1955a),
Chap. 2.
201. Pound (1954), p.113.
202. Clements, Weaver and Hanson (1929), p.314.
203. Clements (1935), p.35.
204. Ibid.
205. Smuts (1927), p.349.
206. Clements and Shelford (1939), p.23.
207. Quoted in ibid, p.24.
208. Ibid, p.21.
209. Clements to Tansley, Sept. 30 1916, Box 2, Tansley Papers.
210. The classic text oh the history of the Great Plains is Webb
(1959), 2nd ed. I have leant upon Webb's account extensively,
More detailed and up to date is Kraenzel (1955).
211. The detailed history of this and other ranching problems on
the plains is set out in U.S. Secretary of Agriculture (1936)
212. For the ideological background to the Homestead Act, see
Hofstadter (1955b) Chap. I.
213. Kraenzel (1955), pp.137-48.
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214. See Morgan (1971), Chap. I.
215. For the history of agrictultural discontent, see Saloutis (1951)
and Burden (1965). The history of agriciltural discontent is
also the history of populism, see Hofstadter (1955).
216. The tension between the welfare demands of populist and other
references and the entrenched support for individualism and
laissez-faire is described in Fine (1956),
217. For the legal problems surrounding water use, Webb (1959),
pp.431-52.
218. For legislative attitudes to the rancher, see Webb (1959),
p.411. For the sanctity accorded the small farmer against all
other landusers, see Carstensen (1958).
219. Lamar (1974), p.510.
220. For the effect of New Deal legislation on landuse in Nebraska,
see Berberet (1970).
221. Clements and Shelford (1939), p,3,
222. For a general study of the ideological connotations of
ecologists' holistic rhetaric,see Lowe and Warboys (1980),
223. This attitude on land-use and conservation is well documented
by Hayes (1959) .
224. Akin (1977), esp. Chap. 4.
225. Quoted in ibid, p.10, Taylor by training an engineer was
the founder of the scientific study of management, see
Taylor (1911 ).
226. Akin (1977), Chap. 2.
227. Quoted in Duff (1980), p.119.
228. See Allee et_ al_. (1949), Chaps 1&2.
229. Clements and Shelford (1939).
230. For Shelford, see Miller (1977) and Kendeigh (1968).
231. Clements and Shelford (1939), p.6.
232. Clements affirmed this similarity, ibid. pp.144-6,
233. Worster (1977), pp.326-7.
234. Russett (1966), p.164.
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235. Emerson (1954), pp.74-75,
236. Since I began this study, two other historians have written
on ideological aspects of American ecology ^ Ronald Tabey
(1961) and Andrew Duff (1980), Duff's conclusions are
broadly similar to my own, However his account is very
general and his analysis refers to American ecology as a
whole rather than to Clements directly, or indeed to any
particular group. Duff distinguishes little heterogeneity
either within ecology or within the cultural backgrounds
from which it sprung and the social movements with which it
was connected. My account, as offered here, is therefore
more finely textured and more strongly contextualised than
Duff's. However, within limits, our accounts reinforce and
complement one another.
There are more important points of difference between my
treatment of Clements and that offered by Tobey. Tobey
identifies, a shift in the ecological theorising of
Clements and his associates consequent upon the problems
of the Great Drought. His analysis of Clementsian ideology
amounts to an attempt to characterise this shift as ideological
- as the altering of ecological knowledge to meet the new
social goals offered to ecology by the New Deal, Tobey
(1981), pp.202-13. I can see no evidence of such a shift.
More importantly, I would argue that Clements's ecology was
ideological throughout its entire career. I have attempted
to adduce evidence that from its very inception Clementsian
ecology was shaped by social interests. One might say that
Tobey leaves still unfinished Mannheim's unfinished agenda.
237. Tobey (1981), pp.80-2 has argued that there is a necessary
conflict between organismic and mechanist elements in
Clements's work. But his a priori logical approach is
borrowed from scholarship in the history of ideas and he
pays no regard to the context of use, which is where I would
argue the essential similarity lies.
238. Veblen (1921), pp.5-9, paraphrased and quoted in Akin (1977),
p.21. Veblen was describing the national industrial system.
Herbert Hoover, in 1921, described the same institution as
"a single industrial organism". Akin (1977), p.13.
239. Clements (1920), p.16.
240. Clements (1935), p.41 et passim.
241. See, for instance, Allen (1976), p.241.
242. Letter, Clements to A.E. Tansley, Jan. 12 1906, Box 1,
Tansley papers.
243. For an account of Henderson's political views, see Heyl (1968),
also Paranscandola (1971).
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244. For W.C. Allee, see Schmidt (1957).
245. See Peel (1971), pp.166-191 for a discussion of the
conclusions Spencer drew from his organic conception of
society.
246. A similar interventionist interpretation of Spencer was made
by the American sociologist, Lester Ward, see Hofstadter
(1955a) Chap. 4. For similarities between Ward and Clements,
see Tobey (1981), pp.84-86.
247. J.R. Commons, quoted in Hofstadter (1955a), p.34.
248. Ibid.
249. See note 215 above.
250. Hofstadter (1955b), p.64.
251. Clements shared much with other writers on society and nature
in the West and Middle West. Coleman's (1966) essay on
Frederick Jackson Turner, the most eminent historian of the
American West, comments on the Spencerianism, organicism and
environmentalism which characterised Turner's famous "Frontier
Hypothesis". Turner was also interested, like Clements, in
physiography and the natural divisions of the earth's surface.
Turner had been, like H.C. Cowles, a student of the geologist
T.C. Chamberlin. Coleman provides much evidence to support
the view that Clements constructed his arguments using
elements that were already in common political and scholarly
use in the West and Middle West.
252. Clements and Chaney (1936), p.51.
253. For the difficulties encountered in the passage of land-use
legislation, see Foss (1960) esp. Chap. 3.
254. Clements (1920), p.330.
255. Ibid, pp.330-4.
256. Taylor (1936), p.343.
257. Taylor (1935), p.304.
258. Ibid, p.303.
259. Ibid, p.296.




263. For Malin's biographical details see Brodhead (1980) and
Williams (1979). For his political and historigraphical
views see Le Due (1950), Bell (1972) and Johannsen (1972).
264. Malin (1955), p.346.
265. Malin (1953), p.219-
266 Malin (1946), p.93.
267. Malin (1952), p.37.
268. Malin (1955), pp.338-47.
269. Turner (1920).
270. Malin (1946), pp.32-46.
271. Malin (1950), p.296.
272. Malin (1952), p.30.
273. Malin (1952), p.33
274. Ibid, pp.32-33.
275. "The Plow that Broke the Plains" was a title of a film on the
dust storms of the nineteen thirties. Malin regarded the film
a deceitful libel on the homesteaders.
276. This is the title of one of Malin's books (1955).
277. Malin (1946), p.103.
278. Malin (1946), p.102.
279. For Malin's support of those who spoke of the New Deal in
these terms, see Malin (1954), pp.237-62.
280. Malin (1946), p.99.
281. Malin (1946), p.104. The "brains trust" was a body of experts
which advised Roosevelt during the New Deal.
282. Two important studies of the tension between individualism
and collectivism in American social, thought are Peterson
(1960) and Arielli (1964). Dated and somewhat partisan but
still of interest in this connection is Wiltse (1935).
283. I emphasise the word "principle" because in practice,
central direction of land use, although theoretically
legitimate, might well be determinedly opposed by individualistic
land-users in the regions. See, for example, Ardagh (1982),
pp.244-5.
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284. Far collectivism in France and its ideological justification,
see Zeldin [1973], pp.521-44. I do not, of course, mean to
imply that France is not, in its way, an intensely individualistic
country. However, the points I wish to stress are that the
centralisation of the state is acknowledged to be legitimate
and that the apparatus of central government has a monopoly
of formal authority. However, as illustrated by the example
of forestry, considered above, the state's power to act is
frequently severely limited by intense individualism at the
regional level. One might say that France is vertically
collective but horizontally individualistic, see Hoffman
(1963] and Gilpin (1968], pp.78-85. The American form of
individualism is quite different. There the strong popular
belief in individualistic virtue had led to demands for
a minimal central government and strong regional autonomy.
This theme of contrast between American and French statecraft
and culture is, of course, a very old one - see De Tocqueville
(1835].
285. For the French conservation movement, see Ardagh (1982],
pp.336-46; for the technocrats, see Zeldin (1977], pp.1040-82.
286. The classic treatment of incommensurability is Kuhn (1962]
and his "Postscript" in the second edition (1970]. Collins
and Pinch (1982] is an important recent study of, as they
call it, "contemporaneous conceptual discontinuity".
287. Braun-Blanquet (1932], p.326.
288. Weaver and Clements (1938], p.104.
289. Braun-Blanquet (1932], p.305.
290. We will see examples of the rejection of random sampling for
this reason in chapter four.
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CHAPTER 3
1. Tansley (1347), p.194.
2. Clements's isolation from his American colleagues was noted
and commented on by one of his most enthusiastic supporters,
the South African J.V. Phillips, see E.S. Clements (1960),
pp.22-6.
3. For a description of the Clementsian coterie, see Tobey (1981),
especially chap. 1. See also Sears (1969).
4. See Mcintosh (1976), p.354. Mcintosh is not correct, however,
in stating that Clements coined the term "geotome" to refer
to a common or garden shovel. The instrument referred to
was a soil auger.
5. Tansley (1947), p.196.
6. See Burgess (1977), p.7 for a complete list of the office¬
bearers of the Ecological Society of America, prior to the
Second World War.
7. E.S. Clements (1960), p.123, Tansley (1947), p.147.
8. One of Clements's very few comments on Gleason's criticisms
of his view consisted of the following:-
"In contrast to this (Clements's theory of the community
bond) stands the "individualistic" concept of the community,
which has been proposed by Gleason (1917, 1926). This
appears to involve a confusion of ideas as well as a
contradiction in terms; it has been adequately characterized
by Tansley (1920: 126) and requires no further consideration
here."
Clements, Weaver and Hanson (1929), p.315.
9. See Sprugel (1980).
10. The orientation of the University of Chicago toward pure
research, as against immediate practicality, is well
described in Storr, R.J. (1966), p.68 et passim. See also,
Murphy and Bruckner (1976). John Merle Coulter, the first
chairman of Chicago's botany department, shared this belief
that pure science ought to be the special province of" a -
university - see Rodgers (1944), pp.138-40, 236-7, 294-7.
Coulter was Cowles's PhD. supervisor, and his head of
department.
11. Gleason (1926a), p.16.
12. Gleason (1931), p.78.
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13. For an assessment of Gleason as a taxonomist, see Maguire
(13751. Gleason was president of the American Taxonomic
Society in 1938.
14. There have been several short impressions of Gleason published,
notably Cronquist (19761, Maguire (19751 and Smith (19751.
The best account of his theoretical work in ecology is
Mcintosh (19751. Mcintosh's survey is detailed but says
little about the historical development of Gleason's ideas
or why he held the views he did. Mcintosh was, as the
following chapter describes, one of the ecologists who were
responsible for reviving interest in Gleason's work in the
fifties and sixties. His attitude is therefore, that
Gleason advocated the individualistic hypothesis because it
was true, as more recent research has revealed.
For methodological reasons, I shall attempt to be neutral
over the rectitude of the individualistic hypothesis, just
as I was neutral over the existence of the plant community
in earlier chapters.
15. For the institutionalisation of ecology in America, see
Duff (19801 especially chap. 5.
16. This may be judged from the very full bibliography provided
by Maguire (19751.
17. There is no complete published account of Gleason's life. I
have been fortunate enough to be allowed access to a three-
volume unpublished autobiography which Gleason wrote in his
retirement, Gleason (1963-41. This is in the care of Henry
Allen Gleason Jnr. My biographical information is drawn
principally from this course. I have also drawn from an
earlier much shorter unpublished autobiography held in the
library of the New York Botanical Garden, Gleason (19441,
18. Gleason (19441, p.1.
19. Ibid, p-3. These early notebooks are no longer extant, as
far as I am aware, but no doubt they already bore the
impression of the patient, studious attention to detail
and concern for accuracy which were to be characteristic of
all of Gleason's later scientific work.
20. Gleason (1963-4) 1_, p.40.
21. Ibid, p.71.
22. Burgess (19711, p.7.
23. Gleason (1963-41 1_, p.72. For Adams, see Raup (19591.
24. For S.A. Forbes, see Howard (19311.
25. Mcintosh (19761, p.353.
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26. Mcintosh (19803. See also, Hutchinson (19633 and Smith (19263.
27. Forbes (18873, p.549. See also Forbes (18803.
28. Clements and Shelford (19393, p.14.
29. Forbes (19073, p.277.
30. See Vasey (18613.
31. Gleason (1963-43 1_, p.89.
32. Gleason (19643, p.8.f.
33. See Cittadino (19803, pp.173-4, Allen (19763, pp.240-3 and
Lowe (19763 for accounts of these developments.
34. Gleason (1 963-43 1_, p.78, see Gleason (19013.
35. Ibid, p.91. The papers by Cowles referred to are presumably
Cowles (19013 and Cowles (18993 respectively.
36. MacMillan (18973.
37. Adams and Fuller (19403, pp.39-40.
38. Schimper (18983, Warming (18963.
39. Cowles (19013, p.77.
40. Warming (18963, pp.358-63 - the page numbers refer to the
English translation (19093.
41. Cowles (19013, p.78.
42. Ibid, pp.78-9.
43. A peneplain is the level topography which is the theoretical
end-point of erosion acting upon a raised land-mass.
Mesophytic vegetation is vegetation adapted to conditions
which are neither extremely dry (xeric3 nor wet (hydric3.
In any given climate, extremes of dryness and wetness are
often produced by an irregular uneroded young topography.
44. The best source for Davis's geomorphology is Davis (19093.
Adams and Fuller (19403, p.39 wrote of Salisbury's
"inspiring influence" on Cowles while Cowles was an under¬
graduate. Drury and Nisbet (19713 give an account of the
structural similarities between Davis's theory of base-
levelling and early American ecological theories.
45. Adams and Fuller (19403, p.39. Further biographical details
for Cowles are to be found in Fuller (19393.
46. Tansley (19403, p.451.
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47. Cowles (1901], p.73.
48. Ibid, p.79.
49. Transeau (1903), Whitford (1901), Cooper (1913, 1923, 1928) -
these are only examples. See Sprugel (1980) for the names
of more of Cowles's students.
50. Clements (1904), pp.105-113.
51. Gleason (1936a), p.42.
52. Such diagrams occur, for example, in Gleason (1910), p,104
and Gleason (1907), p.78.
53. Gleason (1963-4) 1_, p.84.
54. Ibid, p.86.
55. Gleason (1944), p.11.
56. Fuller details of this episode in Gleason's career will be
given later in this chapter.
57. Gleason (1963-4) 1_, p.155.
58. Ibid, p.162.
59. For Burrill, see Rodgers (1968), Chap. 9.
60. Gleason (1904), p.19.
61. Adams (1902, 1905).
62. Gleason (1904), pp.97-98.
63. Kellerman, Gleason and Schnaffner (1914).





69. Gleason (1944), p.13. V.E. Shelford was also a very early
pioneer of the application of Cowles's ideas to animal
populations.
70. Clements (1905), pp.239-241. Clements coined the term
"associes" to refer to successional stages leading up to the
association.
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71. Gleason [1909c), p.57. Clements employed the recapitulation
analogy as late as 1916, Clements (1916), p.345.
72. Letter, Gleason to R.P. Wodehouse (Editor - Bull.Torr.Bot.Soc.)
August 5th 1939. Gleason Papers.
73. Cowles (1911), pp.168-170.
74. Cowles, Whitford and Adams presented a paper entitled "The
relation of base-leveling to specific differentiation" at
the meeting of the naturalists of the central states at
Chicago on December 27th, 1900. The proceedings of the
meeting are listed in the Bot.Gaz. (1909) 31, p.72. I have
not been able to trace a published version of this paper.
75. Gleason (1953), p.41.
76. Gleason (1963-4), 1_, pll67,
77. Ibid, p.170.
78. Gleason (1944), p.15.
79. Gleason (1963-4) 1_, p.180.
80. Ibid.
81. I have taken the following papers to be unequivocally
ecological:- 1907, 1909a, 1909b, 1909c, 1910, 1912, 1913b,
1914, 1917a, 1917b, 1917c, 1918a, 1918d, and Gleason and
Gates (1912). The following I have classified as floristic
or taxonomic:- 1913a, 1913c, 1918b, 1918e. The last
mentioned is a short abstract. Two papers I have classified
in neither category:- 1908, 1918c. The "Botanical sketches"
(1915a-c, 1916) - anecdotal account of his travels in the
Asiatic tropics, I have likewise not included in either
category.
82. Contra Mcintosh (1975), p.253.
83. The three papers, together with an introduction, were given
the overall title "On the biology of the sand areas of
Illinois". Hart and Gleason (1907).
84. Gleason (1907), p.149.
85. Ibid, pp.159-60.
86. Ibid.
87. Gleason (1910), pp.67-69 et seq.
88. Pound and Clements (1898a).
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89. Clements was later actively to oppose the introduction of
statistical methods into ecology, see Tobey (1981), pp.180-4.
90. See, for example, Kofoid (1903).
91. Frey (1963), p.123.
92. See Lussenhop (1974).
93. There is a good account of Kofoid's work in Gleason (1963-4)
1_, pp.115-7.
94. See, for example, Forbes (1907).
95. Gleason (1909a, 1909b, 1910, 1912, 1913b).
96. Gleason (1910).
97. Ibid. p.20.f., Gleason (1963-4) 1_, p.188.
98. Cowles (1899, 1901), Cooper (1913),
99. Taylor (1912), p.113.
100. See Whittaker (1973).
101. Clements (1916), p. 127.
102. Clements (1935), pp.254-5, 258.
103. Clements (1916), p.128.
104. For example, "Primula - Polemonium - Qxyria - phellium",
Clements (1902a), p.17, was Clements's name for the
"primrose rock cleft formation". (This would have been
called an "association" in his later terminology.) The
first three words are generic names - the last refers to
the rock habitat.
105. Gleason (1910), p.42.
106. Ibid, p.37.
107. Ibid. p.37.f.
108. Clements (1905), pp.100-1.
109. Gleason (1910), p.35. Clements acknowledged the importance
of vegetational "reaction" -that is changes produced in the
environment by the vegetation but held that the overall
climate was the primary determinant of the vegetation.
110. Gleason (1963-4) 1, p.191.
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111. Clements (1916), p.3.
112. Ibid, p.145.
113. Gleason (1910), pp.112-6.
114. Gleason (1917c), p.479.
115. Gleason (1910), p.134.
116. Cooper (1926), p.393.
117. Ibid.
118. The term "consocies" was coined by Clements to refer to
successional stages of a consociation. A consociation was
an association dominated by a single species. See Clements
(1936), pp.278-9.
119. Burgess (1977), p.7.
120. Gleason (1963-4) 1_, p.190.
121. Ibid, p.183.
122. Burgess (1977), p.7.
123. Gleason and Gates (1912).
124. Livingston (1908).
125. See Livingston (1935) for a review of atmometer work in the
United States.
126. Livingston and Shreve (1921) p.XI.
127. Coulter, Barnes and Cowles (1911) _2, p.2.
128. Livingston (1948), pp.233-4.
129. Mcintosh (1983), p.108.
130. It is instructive to note that Livingston's work was accepted
as competent by specialist plant physiologists - he became
director of the Johns Hopkins Laboratory of Plant Physiology -
whereas Clements's work was not - see Blackman and Tansley
(1905), pp.233-7. F.F. Blackman was the "doyen of Cambridge
plant physiology", Godwin (1977), p.12.
131. Livingston and Shreve (1921), p.5.
132. See Transeau (1908), Fuller (1911).
133. Gleason and Gates (1912), p.491.





130. The trip is described
139. Gleason (1915a, 1915b,
140. Gleason (1915b], p.123
141. Gleason (1917a, 1913d3
142. Gleason (1923a].
143. Gleason (1963-4] 1, p..
144. Ibid. p.259.
145. Clements (1916].
146. Gleason (1910], p.463.
147. Ibid. pp. 463-4.
140. Gleason (1910], p.36.
149. Ibid. p. 35.
150. Ibid. p. 41 .
151. Gleason (1917c], p.474
152. Ibid. p.464.















167. The use of the word "hypothesis" to describe Gleason's
individualistic concept seems to have been introduced by Cain
(1939], p.190.
168. See, for instances, Webb (1954), Ponyatovskaya (1960),
Mcintosh (1967), Duff (1975), Warster (1977) and Tobey (1981).
169. Worster (1977a), p.6, Worster (1977), pp.217-42, Tobey (1981),
pp.170-1.
170. The quotation is from Tansley's (1935) criticism of Phillips
(1934, 1935):- "He (Phillips) is occupied for the most part
in giving the pure milk of the Clementsian word, in expounding
and elaborating the organismal theory of vegetation. This
exposition ... is a useful piece of work, but it invites
attack at almost every point."
171. I have been able to examine 26 of the 29 titles listed by
Weaver in the bibliography of his major book, Weaver and
Alberton (1956).
172. See Bergman and Stallard (1916).
173. Duff (1975), p.42.
174. McDougall (1931), pp.214-18.
175. Weaver and Clements (1929), p.2 et seq.
176. Clements (1907).
177. Nichols (1917).
178. There is a good biographical account of Nichols in Steere (1977).
pp.330-2.
179. Nichols (1917), p.305.
180. Ibid.







187. Schimper (18981. p.173-6. See also, Cowles (19013, p.75,
188. Tansley (19163, p.203.
189. Cowles (19013, p.80.
190. Cowles (19113, p,161.
191. Cooper (19133, p.232.
192. Ibid, pp.1-2.
193. Cooper's reservations were that the trend toward the monoclimax
was best thought of as "a variable approaching a variable"
rather than an orderly, directed inevitable progression,
Cooper (19263, p.405. The phrase quoted was originally Cowles's
(19093, p.81.




198. A strong similarity may be noted between the criticisms of
Clements quoted here from Gleason (19173 and those to be found
in Cooper (19263.
199. Gleason (19273, p.311.
200. Letter, W.S. Cooper to J.T. Curtis, March 25th 1946, Curtis
Papers.
201. Gleason (1917c3, p.464.
202. Cooper (19263, p.394.
203. Letter, W.S. Cooper to J.T. Curtis, March 25th 1946, Curtis
Papers.
204. Nichols (19233, p.14.
205. Ibid, p.17.f.
206. Fuller (19183, p.386.
207. Ibid.
208.. Nichols (1 9263 , p.638.
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209. Ibid, p.635.
210. Gleason (1939), p.93. That the tripartite scheme used here
coincides with contemporary actors' categories is further
evidenced by the fallowing passage from Egler (1947), p.389:-
"The term association has become linked with a concept of a
plant community that possesses a high degree of integration
and organization. This concept was pushed to a ridiculous
extremity when the community was identified with a biologic-
organism. (the position of Clements) ... The bulk of the
Americans have been middle-of-the-roaders who, nevertheless,
still give the plant community such a high degree of
integration that associations have a clear-cut distinction
in time and space, and can be classified like biologic-
organisms (the position I have described as the mainstream)
... Personally, the writer believes the association-concept
... to have caused serious confusion ... In its stead the
writer adopts wholeheartedly ... The "individualistic
concept" of the plant community as developed by Gleason ...
211. Gleason (1963-4) 2, p.2.
212; Ibid, p.22.
213. Gleason began the work on the New Britton and Brown
(Gleason 1952a) in 1939.
214. Gleason (1963-4) 1_, p.340.
215. Nichols (1923), p.12.
216. Gleason (1961), pp.82-3.






223. It should be noted that the utility of random sampling was
controversial among professional statisticians at this time.
I am indebted to Mr. G. Cohen for this observation.
224. See, for example, Weaver and Clements (1938), p.11.
225. Gleason (1920), p.22.
226. Jaccard (1901).
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231. Gleason (1922, 1925a).
232. Arrhenius (1921).
233. Gleason (1922), pp.158-9.
234. Gleason (1963-4) 1_, pp.230-1 .
235. Gleason (1925a), p.66.
236. Ibid, p.68.
237. Ibid, p.70.
238. Gleason (1944), pp.45-6.




243. Ashby (1936), pp.222-3.
244. Goodall's (1962) bibliography allows a comparison to be made
between statistical activity in American and European ecology,
245. See Du Rietz (1921) and Raunkiaer (1934),
246. Forbes (1907).
247. Forbes (1925). See also, Calvert (1922).
248. Gleason (1963-4) 1_, p.120.
249. Cronquist (1976), p.56,
250. Interview, A.M. Gleason.
251. Gleason (1963-4) 1_, p.370.
252. I am grateful to Mr. G. Cohen for reading Gleason's statistical
papers and for providing me with this assessment.
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253. See, for instance, Greig-Smith [1957], p.IX.
254. See, for instance, Gleason (1936a), p.47. This article, in
which Gleason reviewed the progress of ecology from 1910 to
1935, gives a clear indication of the importance he accorded
his own work.
255. For the relation between orthodox and experimental taxonomy,
see Dean (1979).
256. Goodall (1962), pp.294-6.
257. Gleason (1963-4) 1_, p.371. See also, Woollett, Dean and
Coburn (1925).
258. For empirical studies of the structuring of cognitive innovation
around previously acquired skill, see Pickering (1900), and
Mackenzie and Barnes (1975).
259. There was little emphasis on mathematics in the professional
education of ecologists in the 1940s and 1950s, interviews,
R.H. Whittaker and P. Greig-Smith.
260. Such a form of distribution is compatible with the individualistic
hypothesis and apparently incompatible with the association-
unit theory. It is not, however, required by the individualistic
hypothesis that distribution be uniform or random. Since the
development of niche theory, other individualistic theorists
have held 'quite different views on this matter - see Mcintosh
(1975), p.257.
261. Gleason (1923b).
262. Gleason (1953), pp.40-1.
263. Ibid.
264. Adams (1902, 1905).
265. Cain (1944) p.105.f.
266. See the discussion of "Past climates and climaxes" in Clements
(1916), pp.317-43.
267. Gleason (1907), p.57.
268. Sears (1969), p.128.
269. Raup (1942), p.331.
270. Shreve, et al. (1910), quoted in Mcintosh (1983), p,11G.
271. Cowles (1908), pp.265-6.
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272. Ibid, pp.270-1.
273. Clements (1905), p.2, Clements [1908).
274. Gleason (1925b).





280. The technique of association identification by character
species is described in the previous chapter.
281. Ibid, pp.10-11.
282. See Hewetson (1955) and Richards (1952).





288. Clements (1916), p.3.
289. Weaver and Clements (1938), p.6.
290. Letter, W.S. Cooper to Curtis, March 25th 1946. Curtis
Papers.
291. Cain (1947), p.196.
292. Nichols (1923), p.13.
293. Gleason (1944), p.20.
294. Gleason (1923a).
295. Gleason (1936b). See Cain (1936),
296. Interview, H.A. Gleason Jnr.
297. Gleason (1963-4) 1, p.336.
298. See note 258 above. For a review of this literature see
Shapin (1982]. ^
299. Gleason (1944], p.28.
300. Mcintosh (1983], p.110, Billings (1980].
301. Livingston and Shreve (1921], p.XIV.
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302. Cooper (1926], p.394.
303. Shreve (1915], pp.111-2.
304. Livingston and Shreve (1921], p.5.
305. For biographical details of Shreve, see Shantz (1951],
306. Livingston (1948], p.232.
307. Ibid, pp. 233-4.
308. Livingston and Shreve (1921], p.XIV. This is an extension of
a passage quoted from above, see footnote 301.
309. Ibid, p.10.
310. Livingston and Shreve admitted, however, that there were a few
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Ponographs.
27. Leeper (1977) provides an informative profile of E.P. Odum
and his present status.
28. E.P. Odum (1977), p.1290.
29. Ibid, p.1291. The Odums have produced many such statements,
for example, see also H.T. Odum (1977).
30. Lowe and Warboys (1980), p.441.
»
31. See Mcintosh (1980), pp.239-44 for a short description of
this controversy and its personnel.
32. Harper (1977), p.777.
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